Filed 7/23/26 P. v. Hernandez CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B352278
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA103939)
v.
CAMILO HERNANDEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Robert G. Chu, Judge. Affirmed.
Bess Stiffelman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Camilo Hernandez appeals from the trial court’s
order denying his petition under Penal Code1 section 1170,
subdivision (d) (section 1170(d)), which authorizes juvenile
offenders sentenced to life without the possibility of parole
(LWOP) to petition for the recall of their sentences and
resentencing. Although Hernandez was not expressly sentenced
to LWOP, he argues he is serving the functional equivalent of
LWOP and denying him relief under section 1170(d) violates his
right to equal protection. He does not dispute, however, that he
will have a parole hearing providing him with a meaningful
opportunity for release during his 25th year of incarceration. He
does not meet his burden of showing that the Legislature lacked
a rational basis for treating juvenile offenders serving explicit
LWOP sentences differently from juvenile offenders serving
lengthy terms. Thus, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2010, a jury convicted Hernandez of one count of murder
(§ 187, subd. (a)) and five counts of attempted murder (§ 664/187,
subd. (a)). The jury found true that the crimes were committed
for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).)
Hernandez was 15 years old when he committed the crimes. He
was sentenced to imprisonment for 100 years to life.
In 2025, Hernandez filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1170(d) and People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608
(Heard). After briefing and multiple hearings, the trial court
denied the petition. The court found that because Hernandez
would be eligible for parole under section 3051 in June 2032 at
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
38 years old, he was not sentenced to LWOP or its functional
equivalent. After the court denied Hernandez’s petition, he
appealed.
DISCUSSION
Hernandez argues that he is serving the functional
equivalent of LWOP, and that under Heard, denying him
section 1170(d) relief violated his right to equal protection. The
Attorney General agrees with Hernandez. We independently
address the merits of Hernandez’s arguments, which raise pure
questions of law we review de novo. (People v. Ashford
University, LLC (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 485, 518; see People v.
Kim (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 836, 847 [“we are not required to
accept the Attorney General’s concession”].) In doing so, we
disagree with the parties.
Section 1170(d)(1)(A) allows “a defendant who was under
18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense for
which the defendant was sentenced” to LWOP and who “has been
incarcerated for at least 15 years” to petition the sentencing court
for recall and resentencing. The statute’s plain language limits
relief to juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP. (People v. Olmos
(2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 580, 583.)
The legislative history of section 1170(d) “noted the limited
scope of underlying offenses” affected by the bill that led to
section 1170(d), “stating that ‘[o]nly a juvenile convicted of
first-degree murder with special circumstances, as specified, may
be sentenced to a term of LWOP.’” (People v. Thompson (2025)
112 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1077 (Thompson), review granted Sept. 24,
2025, S292540.) “[T]he bill was described as a ‘“modest and
3
narrowly focused piece of legislation”’” which “would only apply to
293 inmates in California.” (Id. at pp. 1076–1077.)
Hernandez is not among those juvenile offenders sentenced
to LWOP. Considering its plain language and legislative history,
section 1170(d) does not apply to him. Hernandez recognizes his
ineligibility under the express terms of the statute but argues
section 1170(d) should apply to him because he is serving the
functional equivalent of LWOP. He bases his argument largely
on Heard, and another case, People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th
349 (Contreras).
Contreras addressed whether sentences of 50 and 58 years
to life imposed on juvenile nonhomicide offenders violated the
Eighth Amendment as outlined by the United States Supreme
Court in Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48. (Contreras,
supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 356, 360.) Contreras concluded the
defendants’ sentences violated the Eight Amendment and were
functionally equivalent to LWOP, as they did not give the
defendants “‘some meaningful opportunity to obtain release
based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.’” (Id. at
pp. 367–369, 379.) Unlike Hernandez, not only were the
defendants in Contreras nonhomicide offenders, but they were
also ineligible for youth offender parole hearings under
section 3051. (Id. at p. 381.)
Section 3051 “requires the Board [of Parole Hearings] to
conduct a ‘youth offender parole hearing’ during the 15th, 20th,
or 25th year of a juvenile offender’s incarceration,” depending on
the offender’s “‘“[c]ontrolling offense.”’” (People v. Franklin (2016)
63 Cal.4th 261, 277 (Franklin).) “A juvenile offender whose
controlling offense carries a term of 25 years to life or greater is
‘eligible for release on parole by the board during his or her 25th
4
year of incarceration at a youth offender parole hearing . . . .’”
(Ibid.)
The enactment of section 3051 changed the way our high
court views lengthy sentences served by juvenile offenders
because it provided them with a meaningful opportunity for early
release. In Franklin, a juvenile homicide offender argued his
sentence of 50 years to life violated the Eighth Amendment
because it was the functional equivalent of LWOP. (Franklin,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 268.) The Supreme Court concluded the
defendant’s challenge to the constitutionality of his sentence was
rendered moot by the enactment of section 3051. (Id. at pp. 268,
279–280.) The statute “changed the manner in which the
juvenile offender’s original sentence operates by capping the
number of years that he or she may be imprisoned before
becoming eligible for release on parole.” (Id. at p. 278.) The
change was effected by operation of law with no additional
resentencing procedure required. (Id. at pp. 278–279.)
Consequently, the defendant’s sentence was “not the functional
equivalent of LWOP” as the defendant was “now serving a life
sentence that includes a meaningful opportunity for release
during his 25th year of incarceration.” (Id. at pp. 279–280.)
Heard acknowledged that “under Franklin, Heard’s
sentence as it currently operates is no longer the functional
equivalent of [LWOP].” (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 629.)
Despite this finding, the court reasoned that “[b]ecause
section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A), refers to the ‘offense for which
the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for life without the
possibility of parole’ (italics added), and Heard was sentenced to
the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence, he is
similarly situated with the juvenile offenders whose sentences
5
make them eligible to seek resentencing.” (Ibid.) Heard held the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection enabled juvenile
offenders sentenced to functionally equivalent LWOP terms to
petition for section 1170(d) relief, like juvenile offenders serving
express LWOP terms. (Id. at pp. 633–634.) Following Heard,
many defendants argued they had been sentenced to the
functional equivalent of LWOP as juveniles for purposes of
section 1170(d) resentencing.
Recently, numerous courts of appeal have rejected Heard.2
Like Franklin and Heard, these cases recognize that defendants
serving lengthy sentences are not serving de facto LWOP
sentences if they are eligible for a youth offender parole hearing.
(People v. Lara (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 484, 488 (Lara), review
granted Dec. 30, 2025, S294095; People v. Isayev (2025) 113
Cal.App.5th 1117, 1142 (Isayev), review granted Nov. 12, 2025,
S292860; People v. Ortega (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1252, 1264–
1265, review granted Sept. 17, 2025, S292070.) Unlike Heard,
however, these cases hold that section 1170(d)(1) is not triggered
by the initial imposition of a very lengthy sentence and instead
analyze “the sentence being served at the time the petition for
recall and resentencing is filed.” (Isayev, at p. 1142, italics
omitted.) They reason the Legislature did not intend to create “a
procedure for recalling and resentencing juvenile offenders
sentenced to LWOP even if that sentence was modified or vacated
on direct appeal or via postconviction collateral attack.” (Ibid.)
We agree with the reasoning in these more recent decisions.3
2 Hernandez cites no recent case agreeing with Heard.
3 Hernandez asserts we should decline to follow these recent
decisions because their reasoning “potentially” impacts the eligibility of
petitioners serving LWOP sentences. However, the cases recognize
6
Hernandez’s equal protection argument also fails because
he does not meet his burden of showing the Legislature lacked
any rational basis for treating juvenile offenders serving explicit
LWOP terms differently from juvenile offenders serving very
lengthy terms such as his. As the party raising this equal
protection claim, Hernandez bears the burden of “‘“negat[ing]
every conceivable”’” reasonable basis for such disparate
treatment. (Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th
871, 881.)
Hernandez argues solely that it was unreasonable for the
Legislature to grant relief to more culpable LWOP offenders
while excluding less culpable non-LWOP offenders. Although we
appreciate this argument, courts have repeatedly “concluded the
Legislature may rationally provide a rehabilitative benefit to a
group of offenders who committed more serious crimes, while
excluding those convicted of lesser crimes, when the less culpable
group may have other avenues for relief. ([People v.]
Chatman[ (2018)] 4 Cal.5th [277,] 294–295; [In re]
Spencer[ (2009)] 176 Cal.App.4th [1315,] 1329.)” (Thompson,
supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1080.) “‘“[T]he Legislature has
‘broad discretion’ to proceed in an incremental and uneven
manner without necessarily engaging in arbitrary and unlawful
discrimination.”’” (Id. at p. 1078.) It is not for us to second guess
that petitioners serving express LWOP sentences are eligible for relief
under the statute’s plain language. (See Lara, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th
at p. 486 [section 1170(d) “provides relief to juvenile offenders who
were ‘sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of
parole’”]; Isayev, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 1125 [“by its plain
language, section 1170, subdivision (d), applies only to juvenile
offenders sentenced to a term of LWOP”].)
7
the Legislature’s wisdom, fairness, or logic. (People v. Hardin
(2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 849–850, 852 (Hardin).)
Though it is not the court’s burden to find rational bases for
distinctions drawn by the Legislature, published and
unpublished cases provide numerous bases to support the
distinction made in section 1170(d). Some courts have suggested
juveniles explicitly sentenced to LWOP face different
consequences while incarcerated, under the law, or socially than
those not sentenced to LWOP. For example, non-LWOP
offenders “might accrue conduct credits while in prison that
would meaningfully shorten their sentences, while a [LWOP]
sentence could not be modified by credits, even if accrued.”
(Thompson, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1080.) In addition,
courts have observed that limiting section 1170(d) eligibility to
express LWOP sentences creates a workable, brightline test that
does not require judicial determination of eligibility, which
impacts the courts and fiscal budget in ways unanticipated by the
Legislature. This aligns with the Legislature’s desire to limit
relief to 293 inmates convicted of first-degree special-
circumstances murder. Hernandez does not address, let alone
negate, such rational bases. He thus does not overcome the
“‘rebuttable presumption that [section 1170(d)] is constitutional.’”
(Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 852.)
8
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
MORI, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
COGLIATI, J. **
** Judge of the Santa Cruz County Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to Article VI, section 6, of the California
Constitution.
9