Filed 7/27/26 P. v. Henderson CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B346568
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. LA040521)
v.
SHADRICK HENDERSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Neetu S. Badhan-Smith, Judge. Reversed.
Ava R. Stralla, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Stephen D. Svetich, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
In 2005, defendant Shadrick Henderson pleaded guilty to
forcible rape (Pen. Code,2 § 261, subd. (a)(2)) and forcible lewd act
upon a child (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)). The trial court sentenced him
to an aggregate term of 48 years in prison. That term included a
doubling of Henderson’s sentence on the forcible lewd act
conviction based on his having a prior strike under the Three
Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), a five-
year enhancement for a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667,
subd. (a)(1)), 10 years for a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53,
subd. (b)), and a one-year prior prison term enhancement
(§ 667.5, former subd. (b)).
In 2022, state authorities referred Henderson to the
superior court for resentencing review based on the one-year
prior prison term enhancement portion of his sentence, and the
court appointed him counsel. (§ 1172.75, subds. (b), (c), (d)(5).)3
At a hearing on December 1, 2022, defense counsel
consented to the court (Judge Martin L. Herscovitz) striking the
now invalid one-year prior prison term enhancement with the
express understanding that defense counsel could later put the
matter back on calendar for a full resentencing.
1 See California Standards of Judicial Administration
section 8.1.
2 Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3 At the time of the referral, the relevant statute was
codified at section 1171.1. (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3.) It was later
renumbered as section 1172.75. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12.) For
ease of reference, we use the current citation throughout.
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On April 18, 2024, Henderson filed a motion for full
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75 and attached numerous
supporting exhibits. Among other things, Henderson asked the
court in resentencing him to strike his prior strike, the prior
serious felony conviction enhancement, and the firearm
enhancement. The People opposed Henderson’s requests.
At a hearing on May 9, 2025, the superior court (Judge
Neetu S. Badhan-Smith) denied the motion for resentencing,
stating Henderson was no longer eligible for resentencing
because the court had already stricken the one-year prior prison
term enhancement on December 1, 2022. In support of its ruling,
the court cited People v. Tang (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1003.
Henderson timely appealed.
Henderson contends, the Attorney General concedes, and
we concur that the superior court failed to conduct a full
resentencing as required by section 1172.75. (See § 1172.75,
subds. (c), (d).) Henderson consented to the interim striking of
the prior prison term enhancement based on the court’s
assurance it would later conduct a full resentencing. Tang did
not render that assurance meaningless. In that case, an
appellate court had stricken the prior prison term enhancement
as part of the defendant’s direct appeal. (People v. Tang, supra,
109 Cal.App.5th at p. 1006.) More than a decade later, the
defendant sought resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75 based
on that stricken enhancement, and the court held that the
defendant was not eligible for resentencing because the stricken
enhancement was no longer “imposed” for purposes of section
1172.75. (Tang, supra, at pp. 1006-1007, 1010.) Henderson’s
case did not involve two such distinct proceedings. Instead, there
was one proceeding under section 1172.75 conducted on different
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dates. Moreover, Henderson only consented to bifurcating that
one proceeding based on the court’s assurance it would later
conduct a full resentencing hearing, and it was improper for the
court to later render that promise meaningless.
DISPOSITION
The order denying resentencing is reversed and the matter
is remanded for the superior court to conduct a full resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.75.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
BENDIX, J.
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