Filed 9/8/26 P. v. Harris CA5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F089691
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. CR-24-014885)
v.
CHARLES HORACE HARRIS,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Carrie M.
Stephens, Judge.
Samantha Schwartz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Amanda D. Cary, Kari
Mueller, and William K. Kim, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Defendant Charles Horace Harris (defendant) was convicted by jury trial of
battery on a spouse or cohabitant. On appeal, he contends (1) the trial court erred in
allowing the prosecution to impeach him with his prior misdemeanor convictions, and
(2) the court erred in sentencing him to the upper term of four years. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On December 31, 2024, the Stanislaus County District Attorney filed an
information charging defendant with battery on a spouse or cohabitant (Pen. Code,
§ 273.5, subd. (a)).1 The information alleged that defendant had suffered a prior
conviction for battery on a spouse or cohabitant within the past seven years of the
charged offense (§ 273.5, subd. (f)). The information also alleged that defendant
personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7) and that the offense involved several
aggravating factors (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a), (b)).2
On February 19, 2025, the jury found defendant guilty of battery on a spouse or
cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a)). The jury found true the allegation that defendant had a
prior battery on a spouse or cohabitant conviction within the past seven years of the
charged offense (§ 273.5, subd. (f)), but not true the allegation that defendant personally
inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim under circumstances involving domestic
violence (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)). On March 3, 2025, the trial court found true four of the
five alleged circumstances in aggravation (rule 4.421(a)(1), (b)(1), (b)(2), & (b)(5)).
On April 11, 2025, the trial court sentenced defendant to prison for the upper term
of four years (§ 273.5, subd. (f)(2)).
On April 16, 2025, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, except as otherwise noted.
2 All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
2.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
The People’s Case
Defendant and G.J. met in approximately June 2024, at a homeless shelter. Within
a month of meeting, they began a dating and sexual relationship. At some point, they
began staying together in an alleyway encampment in Modesto. Defendant and G.J. had
a history of drinking alcohol and using methamphetamine together. Defendant had been
violent with her “[m]aybe two[ or] three times” during their relationship, but she had not
reported it to police.
On December 3, 2024, defendant and G.J. were within the living area they set up
in the alley. They were drinking and celebrating for defendant’s “birthday week.” For
unclear reasons, defendant became upset with G.J. and began to punch her face and slam
her head on the ground. Defendant then told G.J. to leave the encampment. She took her
belongings and walked to a liquor store across the street. G.J. called 911 and wanted
medical attention.
Officer Jon McQueary of the Modesto Police Department responded to the call
and found G.J. upset, distressed, dizzy, and unstable on her feet. G.J. recounted to
McQueary that defendant had punched and kicked her and noted there had been prior
incidents of domestic violence. Another officer located defendant at the encampment and
in speaking to him, noticed he had fresh blood on his hands, which she photographed.
After speaking with McQueary, G.J. was taken to a local hospital where she
received three stitches above her right eyebrow. G.J. also sustained a broken right eye
socket and broken wrist.
The Defense Case
Defendant took the stand and testified that G.J. was just his friend, they never had
sex, and he never considered her to be his girlfriend. Defendant stated that on the date of
the incident, he believed G.J. had used drugs, and defendant told her to leave because he
did not want to “be around that” and wanted to go to rehab. Defendant described his
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condition that day as dizzy and groggy, and noted that he could not stay awake.
Defendant testified that a police officer woke him up, asked him if he knew G.J., and
when he replied in the affirmative, the officer arrested him. Defendant testified he never
punched or hit G.J. on December 3, 2024.
DISCUSSION
1. Prior Misdemeanor Convictions
Defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing him to be impeached with his
prior misdemeanor convictions because neither offense involved moral turpitude. The
People do not disagree. Rather, they argue that even assuming the court erred in allowing
defendant to be impeached, the error was harmless due to overwhelming evidence of his
guilt. We agree with the People that the error was harmless.
A. Additional Background
The prosecution filed a pretrial motion in limine requesting the trial court allow
defendant to be impeached with his 2022 misdemeanor convictions for resisting arrest
(§ 148) and possession of tear gas (§ 22810), and his 2018 misdemeanor conviction for
battery against a spouse or cohabitant (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)). Defendant filed a pretrial
motion in limine to exclude all his prior convictions from 1988 through 2022, for all
material purposes. At the hearing on the motions in limine, the court allowed admission
of the 2018 conviction under Evidence Code section 1109. It further ruled the 2022
misdemeanors were “not going to be admitted [for the truth of the matter asserted],”
rather, they would be admitted “only as impeachment” evidence. The court clarified “it’s
the [underlying] conduct[,] … not the conviction” that would be admitted, finding the
underlying offenses were probative and not unduly prejudicial. The court also ruled to
exclude defendant’s convictions that occurred prior to 2018.
Defendant testified at trial and was cross-examined by the prosecution. The
prosecution asked defendant if he had been previously “convicted” of resisting arrest, and
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if he had been previously “found guilty” of possession of tear gas. Defense counsel
objected on grounds of “[i]mproper impeachment” and the objection was overruled.
B. Standard of Review
“The trial court’s determination that the evidence was proper impeachment is
reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1134.)
C. Analysis
A witness may be impeached with prior felony convictions. (Cal. Const., art. I,
§ 28, subd. (f)(4).) “A witness may [also] be impeached with any prior conduct involving
moral turpitude whether or not it resulted in a felony conviction, subject to the trial
court’s exercise of discretion under Evidence Code section 352. [Citations.] [¶] ‘[T]he
admissibility of any past misconduct for impeachment is limited at the outset by the
relevance requirement of moral turpitude. Beyond this, the latitude [Evidence Code]
section 352 allows for exclusion of impeachment evidence in individual cases is broad.’ ”
(People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 931, fn. omitted.) Thus, when the “least
adjudicated elements”—those elements which must necessarily be found true for a
conviction of the offense—of a misdemeanor offense involve moral turpitude, a witness
may be impeached with that conviction, subject to Evidence Code section 352. (People
v. Chavez (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 25, 28.)
“The California Supreme Court has divided crimes of moral turpitude into
two groups. [Citation.] The first group includes crimes in which dishonesty is an
element (i.e., fraud, perjury, etc.). The second group includes crimes that indicate a
‘ “general readiness to do evil,” ’ from which a readiness to lie can be inferred.
[Citation.] Crimes in the latter group are acts of ‘baseness, vileness or depravity in the
private and social duties which a [person] owes to his [fellow people], or to society in
general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between
[one person and another].’ ” (People v. Chavez, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at pp. 28–29.)
5.
Those crimes include “ ‘conduct involving violence, menace, or threat.’ ” (People v.
Williams (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1460, 1464).
Once it is established that the prior conviction involves moral turpitude, “ ‘the
latitude [Evidence Code] section 352 allows for exclusion of impeachment evidence in
individual cases is broad.’ [Citations.] When determining whether to admit a prior
conviction for impeachment purposes, the court should consider, among other factors,
whether it reflects on the witness’s honesty or veracity, whether it is near or remote in
time, whether it is for the same or similar conduct as the charged offense, and what effect
its admission would have on the defendant’s decision to testify.” (People v. Clark, supra,
52 Cal.4th at p. 931.)
Here, the parties do not dispute that defendant’s 2022 misdemeanor convictions
for resisting arrest (§ 148) and possession of tear gas (§ 22810) did not involve moral
turpitude. No authority was provided to indicate that resisting arrest and/or possession of
tear gas involves dishonesty or a general readiness to do evil, nor has it been determined
in reported cases. The trial court’s ruling that the conduct underlying the misdemeanor
convictions was admissible for impeachment, and its overruling of defense counsel’s
objection during trial to the admission of the evidence of convictions, was error. Neither
the 2022 misdemeanor convictions, nor the acts underlying those convictions, were
admissible because the offenses did not involve moral turpitude.
D. Harmless Error
As the parties agree, “claims of evidentiary error under California law are
reviewed for prejudice applying the ‘miscarriage of justice’ or ‘reasonably probable’
harmless error standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, that is embodied
in article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution. Under the Watson harmless error
standard, it is the burden of appellants to show that it is reasonably probable that they
would have received a more favorable result at trial had the error not occurred.” (Christ
v. Schwartz (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 440, 447.)
6.
The People argue that it is not reasonably probable that defendant would have
received a more favorable result at trial had the error not occurred, due to overwhelming
evidence of his guilt. We agree. Erroneous admission of impeachment evidence is
harmless where the evidence of the defendant’s guilt is overwhelming (People v. Marks
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 229), as was the case here. G.J. was severely beaten and
identified defendant as the person who beat her. Soon thereafter, an officer located
defendant where G.J. said he would be and noticed he had fresh blood on his hands.
Further, G.J. testified that defendant had been violent with her in the past, McQueary
testified that G.J. told him of prior abuse, and evidence was properly admitted of
defendant’s prior domestic violence conviction. Defendant has not met his burden to
show that it is reasonably probable he would have obtained a more favorable result had
his 2022 misdemeanor convictions not been admitted into evidence.
2. Upper Term Sentencing
Defendant argues the trial court failed to consider his alcohol addiction as a
circumstance in mitigation during sentencing and contends defense counsel’s failure to
object does not forfeit the issue. In the alternative, defendant contends any failure to
preserve the issue constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The People disagree, as
do we.
A. Additional Background
During trial, defendant testified that, on the day of the offense, he wanted to “go to
rehab.” However, defendant filed a sentencing brief in which he made no mention of
having addiction issues, or any mitigating factor that would trigger the lower term
presumption under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), or any other mitigating factor under
rule 4.423. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated it had considered the facts of
the case, which included that defendant had a “lengthy alcohol problem” and had “not
availed himself of treatment that [was] available to him.” In sentencing defendant, the
court stated there were “no factors in mitigation,” noted “not one that I could find and
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I’ve looked,” and also stated there was “no evidence that [defendant] has been a victim of
trauma” and “no information that [he]was experiencing some sort of trauma … or
responding to trauma ….” The court also found the “aggravat[ing] factors supporting the
upper term [had] been proven beyond a reasonable doubt,” and there were “no sufficient
mitigating factors to outweigh the aggravating factors.” During sentencing, defense
counsel did not argue that defendant had an alcohol addiction and did not object to the
court’s finding there were no circumstances in mitigation.
B. Analysis
“We review discretionary sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion.” (People
v. Knowles (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 757, 764–765.) “A court abuses its sentencing
discretion when it acts arbitrarily and capriciously, relies on improper matter in reaching
its decision, or is unaware of the scope of its discretion so that it does not exercise
informed discretion at all.” (Id. at p. 765.) “The burden is on the party challenging the
sentencing decision to show that the court has abused its discretion.” (Ibid.) And we do
not presume error from a silent record. (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 515,
527.)
First, the trial court’s obligation to apply the lower term presumption may arise
“ ‘if the record shows [the qualifying condition] contributed to commission of the
underlying offense,’ ” even when the defendant has neglected to invoke it, thus making
forfeiture inappropriate based on a defendant’s failure to request imposition of the lower
term based upon the presumption. (People v. Lopez-Tapia (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 690,
696–697.) Thus, we consider the issue on the merits.
Defendant argues that during sentencing, the trial court was required to consider
any mitigating circumstance (rule 4.409) and failed to consider his alcohol addiction and
impose the lower term as required by the section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) provision,
which factors in whether “ ‘psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but
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not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence’ was a ‘contributing factor
in the commission of the offense.’ ”
Defendant urges the court to consider his alcohol addiction as a mental health
disorder and therefore, a circumstance in mitigation and relevant factor that must be
considered during sentencing. (Rules 4.423, 4.409.) However, addiction is not
necessarily a mitigating factor and may instead be an aggravating factor, depending on
the circumstances. (People v. Martinez (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1511.) Here, the
trial court expressly stated when discussing aggravating factors, that defendant had a
“lengthy alcohol problem” and had not availed himself of treatment that was available to
him. Even if defendant’s addiction could be considered a mitigating factor, it may have
little mitigating value when the problem is longstanding. (See, e.g., People v. Regalado
(1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 531, 539–540.) Nonetheless, there is no support in the record for
a claim that the court neglected to consider the information, and the court was not
required to conclude defendant’s addiction was a mitigating factor.
Further, the lower term presumption applies only if (1) the defendant has one of
the qualifying conditions identified in the statute; and (2) that condition was a
“contributing factor in the commission of the offense.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6); see People
v. Hilburn (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 189, 205.) Here, the People contend that section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6) is inapplicable because there was no showing that defendant’s
addiction caused him to suffer psychological or physical trauma, and that such trauma
caused him to physically assault G.J.
The record reflects the trial court’s consideration of whether defendant had a
qualifying condition, because it made a finding that there was no evidence defendant had
been a victim of trauma. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A).) Defendant misstates the law when he
argues the court “should have recognized and considered the mitigating factor of
addiction” under section 1170, because the statute contains no specific provision for
addiction, only for various forms of trauma.
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Nonetheless, even if there were a causal link between defendant’s addiction and
trauma, there would still need to be an initial showing that the trauma was a
“ ‘contributing factor’ ” to the commission of the offense for the lower term presumption
to apply. (People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 991.) “[A]n initial showing
has been made when the record and/or arguments are sufficient to put a trial court on
notice that [a mitigating circumstance identified in section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)] may
have been a contributing factor in commission of the underlying offense.” (Id. at p. 994,
italics added.)
Defendant argues the record is replete with evidence of his addiction. However,
there was no evidence or argument presented “to put [the] trial court on notice that
[defendant’s addiction was related to trauma, which] may have been a contributing
factor” in defendant committing battery on G.J. (People v. Fredrickson, supra, 90
Cal.App.5th at p. 994, italics added.) Without this causal link, the court did not abuse its
discretion in not applying the lower term presumption of section 1170, subdivision (b)(6).
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
GUERRA, J.
WE CONCUR:
FRANSON, Acting P. J.
SNAUFFER, J.
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