Filed 11/3/26 P. v. Harris CA4/2
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ord ered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E082950
v. (Super.Ct.No. BLF1400195)
MICHAEL DESHAWN HARRIS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
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Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Kathryn Kirschbaum and
Collette C. Cavalier, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
This appeal is before us for the second time. In our first opinion we affirmed the
order of the Riverside County Superior Court denying defendant and appellant Michael
DeShawn Harris’ request for a resentencing hearing pursuant to section 1172.75 of the
Penal Code.1 (People v. Harris (Apr. 18, 2025, E082950) [nonpub. opn.] (Harris I).)
The California Supreme Court granted defendant's petition for review and deferred
his case pending consideration and disposition of People v. Espino (2026) 20 Cal.5th 57
(Espino), which was also awaiting decision by that court in its case No. S286987.2 After
issuing its opinion Espino, the Supreme Court transferred defendant’s matter back to this
court with directions to vacate our opinion in Harris I, and to reconsider the cause in light
of Espino, supra, 20 Cal.5th 57.
In keeping with the Supreme Court’s instructions, we vacated our opinion in
Harris I and invited the parties to file supplemental briefs and they did so. Both parties
argue, and we agree, that defendant is entitled to a full resentencing hearing under section
1172.75. Accordingly, we will reverse the trial court’s order finding defendant is
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
2 The Supreme Court initially held defendant’s case pending disposition of People
v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050 (Rhodius II) but, after it issued its opinion in that case,
the court deferred defendant’s cause again pending disposition of Espino, supra, 20
Cal.5th 57.
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ineligible for resentencing relief and remand the matter with instructions that defendant
be afforded a resentencing hearing pursuant to section 1172.75, subdivision (d).
BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION
In 2014, the trial court sentenced defendant to a prison term of 15 years after he
was convicted of first degree burglary with a person present who was not an accomplice
(§§ 459, 667.5, subd. (c)(21)), infliction of corporal injury on a spouse (§ 273.5, subd.
(a)), and first degree robbery (§ 211, count 3). It also imposed but struck a one-year
sentence for a prison prior enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
The Statutory Backdrop
In 2019, the Legislature amended subdivision (b) of section 667.5 (amended
§ 667.5(b)) to eliminate prior prison term enhancements unless the prior prison term was
for specific sexually violent offenses. (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2020.) The
amendment was retroactive as to any case in which the judgment was not final on
January 1, 2020. (People v. Lopez (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 337, 341-342.)
In 2022, section 1172.75 became effective.3 (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3, eff. Jan. 1,
2022.) Subdivision (a) of that provision declares legally invalid any prison prior sentence
enhancement defined in amended section 667.5(b) that was imposed prior to January 1,
2020 (often referred to herein as a qualifying prison prior). (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) To
ensure defendants serving sentences that include a qualifying prison prior would receive
3 At the time of its enactment in January 2021, section 1172.75 was numbered
section 1171.1, but was renumbered effective June 30, 2022, with no substantive
changes to the statute (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12).
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timely relief, section 1172.75 directed the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) to identify persons serving sentences that include a qualifying
prison prior and provide those persons’ names, birthdates, and docket numbers to the
sentencing court, which would in turn determine whether the person was entitled to
section 1172.75 resentencing relief. (§ 1172.75, subds. (b) & (c).)
Following the passage of section 1172.75, a dispute arose in the courts of appeal
with respect to whether the word “imposed” in subdivision (a) was intended to limit the
provision’s resentencing relief to defendants whose qualifying prison prior was imposed
and executed, or if resentencing was also available in cases like the present one in which
the sentence was imposed but stricken. This court held “imposed” meant “imposed and
executed.” (People v. Rhodius (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 38, 45 (Rhodius I), reversed at
Rhodius II, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1068.)
Defendant’s Section 1172.75 Proceedings and Appeal
Defendant was included in a CDCR list of persons sentenced in Riverside County
considered to be eligible for section 1172.75 resentencing relief because of a prison
prior.4 At the ensuing hearing in December 2023, the sentencing court denied
4 On our own motion, we (i) take judicial notice of the declarations of Aimee Vierra
and David McKinney, filed in case No. E082642, and (ii) augment the record in this case
to include the CDCR list attached to those declarations. That list, dated June 16, 2022,
sets forth the names of persons eligible for relief under section 1172.75 in active cases for
Riverside County. Defendant’s name appears on page 18.
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defendant’s request for a full resentencing hearing “for the reasons articulated in [the
sentencing court’s case number] RIF1605083.”5 Defendant appealed.
In Harris I, we adhered to our opinion in Rhodius I, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th 38 and
found defendant was not entitled to section 1172.75 resentencing relief because the
punishment for his prison prior had been stricken, not imposed and executed. As noted
ante, defendant’s petition for review by the California Supreme Court was granted and
his cause deferred pending that court’s decision in Espino. The Supreme Court recently
issued its Espino opinion, which holds that a sentence is “imposed” for the purposes of
section 1172.75 even if the sentencing court struck the punishment for the prison prior
enhancement. (Espino, supra, 20 Cal.5th at p. 60.)
In keeping with Supreme Court’s order directing us to do so, we have reconsidered
defendant’s matter in light of Espino and find that, because his sentence includes a
qualifying prison prior that was imposed and stricken, he is entitled to a section 1172.75,
subdivision (d) resentencing hearing.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s finding that defendant ineligible for resentencing under section
1172.75 is reversed and the matter is remanded with instructions to strike defendant’s
5 The case the court referred to appears to be its decision in People v. Archuleta,
which was appealed to this court. (People v. Archuleta (Oct. 19, 2026, E082960)
[nonpub. opn.].) There, we reversed the order of the Riverside County Superior Court
(Judge John D. Malloy) denying the defendant relief on the grounds he was ineligible for
recall and resentencing under section 1172.75 because he was not serving any additional
time for his prison priors, which had been imposed and the punishment stricken. (Ibid.)
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section 667.5, subdivision (b) prison prior enhancement in its entirety and to hold a
resentencing hearing in accordance with section 1172.75, subdivision (d). We express no
opinion on whether defendant would be entitled to any additional relief at the
resentencing hearing.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________
P. J.
We concur:
McKINSTER
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________
J.
MILLER
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________
J.
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