Filed 9/16/26 P. v. Harris CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B347372
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. XSONA122145)
v.
RYAN HOUSTON HARRIS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Laura Laesecke and Marcelita V. Haynes,
Judges. Affirmed.
Andrea Keith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Zachary John
Crvarich, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Ryan Houston Harris appeals from the denial of his
petition for mental health diversion under Penal Code
section 1001.36.1 The trial court found Harris unsuitable for
diversion based on evidence that he would pose an unreasonable
risk of danger to public safety if treated in the community. A
jury subsequently convicted Harris of one count of injuring a
fiancée or girlfriend, in violation of section 273.5, subdivision (a).
On appeal, Harris contends the evidence was insufficient to
support the trial court’s determination that he would pose an
unreasonable risk to public safety if treated in the community.
We find no abuse of discretion and affirm the trial court order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
Early on the morning of July 4, 2023, the Los Angeles
Police Department (LAPD) responded to a domestic violence call
from Tara Jefferson.3 Jefferson told responding officers that
Harris had returned to their apartment from a trip to the store
and accused her of “setting him up to be killed.” Harris took
Jefferson by her shoulders and bit her on the back. He then
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2 We take the facts of the underlying incident from the
preliminary hearing transcript, the probation report, and the
police report. We do not consider the trial evidence that post-
dates the trial court’s January 30, 2025, order.
3 At the time of the incident, Harris and Jefferson were in a
long-term romantic relationship.
2
grabbed her by the neck and strangled her for approximately one
minute. Jefferson was unable to talk or breathe, and she lost
consciousness. When she came to, she was lying on a bed. Harris
was standing next to her, holding a shiny object, which appeared
to be a firearm, although Jefferson was not certain. Jefferson ran
out of the apartment and called 911.
When law enforcement arrived, Harris was inside the
apartment. Officers demanded that he come outside. He refused.
Harris yelled at the officers that “he had the safety on but – but
he could take it off.”4
The officers called in a SWAT team. The SWAT team
directed Harris to submit to an arrest, but he still refused to
leave the apartment. After an approximately four-hour-long
standoff, the SWAT team took Harris into custody. During that
time, law enforcement evacuated nearby homes and businesses
for safety reasons and rerouted traffic.
After Harris’s arrest, LAPD officers searched the
apartment and found under a mattress a loaded revolver
containing six rounds of live ammunition. The officers also
observed a mark on Jefferson’s back that resembled a bite mark
and redness on her neck.
In August 2023, Harris was charged with injuring a fiancée
or girlfriend (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 1), possession of a firearm
by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 2), and resisting an
executive officer (§ 69; count 3). The information further alleged
five circumstances in aggravation under California Rules of
4 A responding LAPD officer who heard Harris make this
statement testified at the preliminary hearing that his
understanding was that Harris had a firearm and could
potentially shoot at officers.
3
Court, rule 4.421(b), and that Harris had been convicted of three
serious and/or violent felonies within the meaning of the Three
Strikes Law (§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)).
In October 2024, Harris filed a petition for mental health
diversion, supported by a psychological evaluation from Dr. Ann
L. Walker, a forensic and clinical psychologist. Dr. Walker
diagnosed Harris with schizophrenia and severe stimulant,
cannabis, and alcohol use disorders. She opined that Harris’s
schizophrenia played a significant role in his commission of the
offenses.
Dr. Walker further opined that Harris’s symptoms would
respond to mental health treatment. She stated Harris had a
“good prognosis for treatment since he is motivated, and able to
learn from his mistakes.” Regarding his current treatment, she
indicated Harris “reported that he is receiving psychiatric
treatment while incarcerated at [sic] he is compliant with
treatment.”
Dr. Walker recommended a “dual diagnosis treatment
program that could provide psychiatric treatment and
psychotherapy . . . .” She suggested that Harris “receive
psychiatric treatment and meet with his psychiatrist once every
two to three months to ameliorate or eliminate the hallucinations
and delusional ideation.” She further recommended monthly
psychotherapy, weekly group substance abuse treatment, and
that he attend self-help group meetings “such as NA or AA
meetings at least once weekly.”
Regarding whether Harris presented an unreasonable risk
of danger to public safety, Dr. Walker opined: “Test results
indicated that Mr. [Harris] shows a medium risk for future
violent behavior. Mr. [Harris] presents with medium risk for
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future dangerousness to the community. Mr. [Harris]’s prior
history of convictions is the primary reason he tested in the
medium risk range. [¶] In the examiner’s opinion, Mr. [Harris]
does not present an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety
as defined by PC Section 1170.18. [¶] Residential treatment is
recommended because it is more secure.”
In opposition to Harris’s petition, the People argued his
charged offenses, together with his criminal history, which
included three prior strikes and being on parole when the current
offenses occurred, indicated he posed an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety if treated in the community. The People
also argued that the proposed treatment plan would not meet
Harris’s needs, and he would not comply with treatment.
The opposition included evidence of Harris’s criminal
history, which established he was on parole at the time of the
charged incident. Harris suffered multiple felony and
misdemeanor convictions as an adult, as well as juvenile
adjudications: narcotics possession in 2023; two first degree
robberies in 2018; assault with a deadly weapon with great bodily
injury in 2017; felon in possession of a firearm in 2015; narcotics
possession in 2014; manufacturing or possessing metal knuckles
in 2013; assault with a deadly weapon in 2012; assault with a
deadly weapon with great bodily injury in 2008; possession of a
narcotic controlled substance in 2007; and carrying a concealed
weapon in 2006.
The People also attached two reports from psychologists
appointed by courts in 2018 to determine Harris’s competency in
a different matter. When recounting Harris’s previous
psychiatric history, a report by Dr. Kory Knapke stated that as
part of Harris’s “post-release community supervision, [Harris]
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was required to attend . . . mental health treatment on multiple
occasions, but he failed to attend his treatment appointments.”
Harris also failed to take prescribed antipsychotic medication.
Harris had explained, “ ‘I don’t need medication, I don’t have a
mental illness.’ ” Dr. Knapke’s report attached a May 2018
placement evaluation report submitted to the Los Angeles
Superior Court’s mental health court, which stated that Harris
had been “largely uncooperative with treatment” while in
custody.
A report by Dr. David Rad stated that Harris “was
reluctant to discuss medications commonly used to treat his
psychiatric condition,” and he opined that Harris was “a danger
to others.” Dr. Rad also referred to a social worker’s note from a
“Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Inmate Medical
Documentation” from 2017, which stated that Harris had not
been “compliant with medications.”
In January 2025, the trial court held a hearing and denied
Harris’s petition. The court stated it had reviewed Harris’s
petition, the People’s opposition, the “case file,” the information,
the probation report, police reports, Dr. Walker’s report, the
preliminary hearing transcript, Harris’s criminal history, and the
reports from Dr. Rad and Dr. Knapke. The parties did not
submit additional evidence at the hearing.
The trial court first concluded that Harris’s history
suggested he would agree to mental health treatment but would
subsequently fail to comply with that treatment. It found
relevant that, according to Dr. Knapke, Harris did not comply
with the terms of his post-release community supervision mental
health treatment. The court observed that “historically, he has
6
not complied with any attempts at mental health treatment
outside of custody.”
After reciting some of Harris’s criminal history and noting
his failure to comply with “parole or probation,” the trial court
denied the petition, finding there was evidence Harris was at risk
of committing “a super strike called an attempted murder” if
treated in the community. When defense counsel responded that
Harris would not if provided “support” and medication, the trial
court again cited Harris’s failure to comply with mental health
treatment while on post-release community supervision. The
court also cited evidence of Harris’s failure to take prescribed
medication and of his denial of mental health issues. The court
again indicated it was denying the petition on the ground that
Harris posed “an unreasonable risk to public safety, that he is
likely to commit a super strike of attempted murder in the
future.”
In June 2025, a jury found Harris guilty of willfully
injuring a fiancée or girlfriend. (§ 273.5, subd. (a).) It acquitted
him of the remaining charges of possession of a firearm by a felon
(§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)) and resisting an executive officer (§ 69).
The trial court found true that Harris had suffered two prior
strikes and that he was on parole when he committed the instant
offenses. The court sentenced Harris to a total term of eight
years in state prison, consisting of the upper term of four years,
doubled pursuant to the Three Strikes Law.
Harris timely appealed.
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DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Denying Mental Health Diversion
A. Applicable legal principles
Section 1001.36 requires a court to consider whether a
defendant is eligible for mental health diversion and, if so,
whether the defendant is suitable.5 (§ 1001.36, subd. (a).) A
defendant is suitable for diversion if four criteria are met: “(1) In
the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s
symptoms of the mental disorder causing, contributing to, or
motivating the criminal behavior would respond to mental health
treatment”; “(2) The defendant consents to diversion and waives
the defendant’s right to a speedy trial”; “(3) The defendant agrees
to comply with treatment as a condition of diversion”; and
“(4) The defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger
to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in the
community.” (Id., subd. (c)(1)–(4).)6 Only the final factor is at
issue in this appeal.
We review “[a] trial court’s ruling on a motion for mental
health diversion . . . for an abuse of discretion, and factual
5 The parties do not dispute that Harris was eligible for
diversion.
6 The statute also requires the trial court to be “satisfied that
the recommended inpatient or outpatient program of mental
health treatment will meet the specialized mental health
treatment needs of the defendant.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(1)(A)(i).)
Further, “even where defendants make a prima facie showing
that they meet all the express statutory requirements, the court
may still exercise its discretion to deny diversion. [Citations.]
But this ‘residual’ discretion must be exercised ‘ “consistent with
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findings are reviewed for substantial evidence.” (People v.
Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147 (Whitmill).) “A court
abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious
decision by applying the wrong legal standard [citations], or
bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are
not supported by substantial evidence [citation].” (People v.
Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449 (Moine).)
B. Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s
finding that Harris posed an unreasonable risk
of danger to public safety if treated in the
community
Harris contends the trial court erred by finding he posed an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the
community. We disagree.
To find Harris suitable for diversion, the trial court was
required to find that Harris would “not pose an unreasonable risk
of danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if
treated in the community.”7 (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).) In
the principles and purpose of the governing law.” ’ [Citations.]
That purpose includes a strong legislative preference for
treatment of mental health disorders because of the benefits of
such treatment to both the offending individual and the
community.” (Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th
882, 892–893.)
7 “Section 1001.36’s reliance on the definition of
dangerousness in section 1170.18, necessarily encompasses the
list of super strike offenses found at section 667,
subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv).” (Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at
p. 450.) The super strike offenses listed in section 667,
subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv), include homicide and any serious or
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evaluating this factor, the court “may consider the opinions of the
district attorney, the defense, or a qualified mental health expert,
and may consider the defendant’s treatment plan, the defendant’s
violence and criminal history, the current charged offense, and
any other factors that the court deems appropriate.” (Ibid.)
Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding. As
to the current offense, the evidence established that Harris’s
conduct put both Jefferson and the public in danger. Harris
strangled Jefferson to the degree that she lost consciousness and
suffered a mark on her neck. There was also a reasonable
inference from Harris’s statement that “he had the safety on but
– but he could take it off,” together with the loaded firearm found
in the apartment, that Harris threatened to shoot responding
officers. During the four-hour standoff with the SWAT team, law
enforcement evacuated the nearby area and rerouted traffic for
public safety reasons.
Harris’s violent criminal history further supported the trial
court’s determination. Harris had convictions for assault with a
deadly weapon with great bodily injury, assault with a deadly
weapon, first degree robbery, and other weapons-related
convictions. Three of the prior convictions were strikes. Based
on this history, Dr. Walker found Harris posed a “medium risk” of
dangerousness to the community and recommended residential
treatment because it was “more secure.” Although she further
opined that Harris was not at risk of committing a super strike,
there was sufficient evidence to the contrary that the trial court
was entitled to credit. (Siam v. Superior Court (2026) 118
violent felony offense punishable in California by life
imprisonment or death. (See also Whitmill, supra, 86
Cal.App.5th at p. 1149.)
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Cal.App.5th 67, 83 [nothing in § 1001.36 “precludes a trial court
from rendering a dangerousness finding contrary to one
expressed by a mental health professional . . . .”].) “The trial
court could reasonably infer from [Harris]’s recent criminal
behavior and repeated failure to rehabilitate that he presents an
elevated—and escalating—risk of . . . using deadly force.” (People
v. Hall (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1266 [affirming dangerous
finding under § 1170.18 after defendant committed robbery with
a knife and had two prior serious and violent felony convictions];
People v. Jefferson (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 235, 243, 245 [no abuse
of discretion in finding defendant likely to commit a super strike
based on his prior robbery, assault, and battery convictions,
arising from a home invasion during which the victim was
rendered unconscious, in combination with prison rule
violations].)
The trial court also properly considered Harris’s history of
noncompliance with mental health treatment in determining his
risk of danger. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4) [court may consider
treatment plan and other factors court deems appropriate];
People v. Superior Court (Taylor) (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 1153,
1167, 1168 (Taylor) [citing defendant’s “history of noncompliance
with his psychiatric medication regimen” and failure to “follow
treatment recommendations” in finding insufficient evidence
defendant would not pose a risk to public safety].)
In People v. Pacheco (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 207, the court
similarly considered the defendant’s likelihood of noncompliance
with recommended treatment in affirming the denial of diversion
on the ground that the defendant posed an unreasonable risk to
public safety. A psychologist opined that if the defendant met
“certain conditions,” then he “ ‘will not pose an unreasonable risk
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of danger to public safety if treated in the community.’ ” (Id. at
p. 210.) “ ‘If he remains compliant with taking this medication
regimen, and does not use any methamphetamine, then he would
be unlikely to reoffend. . . . However, if he does not take his
antipsychotic medication as prescribed and/or returns to using
methamphetamine, then he would become unstable and psychotic
and be likely to reoffend in some bizarre manner.’ ” (Id. at
p. 211.) The Court of Appeal cited this finding in affirming the
denial of diversion. (Id. at p. 214.) The court noted defendant
had a “14-year history of chronic methamphetamine abuse,” and
found “his resolve to stop using the drug is dubious.” (Ibid.)
Here, there was also evidence of a significant likelihood
that Harris would not comply with treatment. Harris had
previously failed to comply with mandated mental health
treatment, even while under supervision. Dr. Knapke indicated
that while on “post-release community supervision, [Harris] was
required to attend mental health treatment on multiple
occasions, but he failed to attend his treatment appointments.”
Dr. Knapke also reported that Harris had been uncooperative
with treatment and did not take his medication while
incarcerated. Dr. Rad stated that Harris had not taken his
prescribed medications. The record amply supported the trial
court’s conclusion that Harris had previously failed to comply
with treatment and therefore might not comply in the future.
(Taylor, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 1169 [in determining
dangerousness, where there is a “history of noncompliance, the
trial court must take the possibility of future noncompliance into
account”].)
Harris’s reliance on People v. Williams (2021) 63
Cal.App.5th 990, is unpersuasive. In that case, the defendant
12
harassed and threatened business owners daily for two years
until his arrest. He also harassed a neighbor. (Ibid.) The Court
of Appeal reversed a trial court’s finding of dangerousness, citing
evidence that the defendant “poses a low risk to public safety in
the uncontroverted opinion of two mental health professionals,”
had been “released on bond for more than two years without
incident,” and had no prior criminal record. (Id. at p. 1003.)
Harris did not merely make threats or harass. He committed a
violent, life-threatening act and has a history of prior violent
conduct. Dr. Walker also found Harris to pose a greater risk of
dangerousness, and Harris had a history of failing to comply with
treatment that could mitigate that risk.
Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th 440, also does not support
reversal. In Moine, the defendant was charged with two separate
incidents of assault in the offices of medical care providers. (Id.
at p. 444.) In the first, the defendant and another patient got
into a fistfight over a waiting room television. (Ibid.) In the
second, the defendant verbally threatened medical office staff,
including stating that he would kill everyone if he had a gun,
after becoming upset about a referral and medication. (Id. at
pp. 444–445.)
The Court of Appeal found “nothing in the record to
indicate the prosecution presented evidence to suggest Moine was
likely to commit [a super strike] offense in the future, and the
circumstances of the pending charges did not support such an
inference. To the contrary, two psychiatrists determined that he
posed a low risk for future assault.” (Moine, supra, 62
Cal.App.5th at pp. 450–451.) Moine’s prior criminal history was
limited to misdemeanor convictions. He had no prior violent
felony convictions. (Id. at p. 450.) He had been in the community
13
on bond for two years without incident. (Id. at p. 451.) In
contrast, Harris posed a medium risk of danger, his current
offense was significantly more violent than a fistfight, and he had
several violent felony convictions. Harris committed the
underlying violent crime while on parole and had a history of
convictions for violent felonies dating back to 2008. Williams and
Moine do not support reversal here.
Harris points out that the jury acquitted him of the firearm
and resisting an officer charges. However, the question before us
is whether there was substantial evidence to support the trial
court’s ruling. And, even without the firearm and resisting arrest
evidence, there was evidence that Harris strangled Jefferson and
had prior convictions for assault with a deadly weapon with great
bodily injury. There is also evidence that the SWAT team found
it necessary to take steps to protect the public from Harris after
he appeared to threaten to shoot officers. There was substantial
evidence to support the trial court’s finding of dangerousness.
The trial court’s judgment was not irrational or arbitrary.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining Harris
would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety as
defined in section 1001.36, subdivision (c)(4), if treated in the
community.
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DISPOSITION
The trial court order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, P. J.
We concur:
HANASONO, J.
KARNOW, J.*
* Retired Judge of the San Franciso Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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