Filed 8/24/26 P. v. Hardy CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
THE PEOPLE, C101995
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 19FE019285)
v.
SEAN TRESJON HARDY,
Defendant and Appellant.
At a house party, defendant Sean Tresjon Hardy shot and killed Chancelor Fields-
Colbert. A jury convicted Hardy of second degree murder and possession of a firearm by
a felon and found true as to the murder that Hardy personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm causing death. The trial court found true two aggravating
circumstances and sentenced Hardy to a total of 40 years to life.
On appeal, Hardy contends that (1) the trial court abused its discretion under
Evidence Code1 sections 352 and 352.2 in admitting a still image from a rap video
depicting Hardy holding a Glock firearm; and (2) defense counsel was ineffective for
failing to object or request remedial action as to testimony describing the firearm shown
in the still image as fully automatic and equipped with an extended magazine capable of
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Evidence Code.
1
holding 32 rounds. On this last point, he alternatively argues the trial court erred by
failing to sua sponte issue a limiting instruction on the admissibility of past conduct.
We affirm.
BACKGROUND
After 10:00 p.m. on July 20, 2019, Q.P. and Fields-Colbert went to a party in Fair
Oaks. At the party, a fight broke out behind a bar. Wearing a red hooded sweatshirt,
Hardy approached the bar, pulled a gun from his pocket, pointed it over the bar, and fired
two shots.
Sometime after, C.V. went outside with Fields-Colbert. They saw their friends
being jumped in the driveway and went to help them. C.V. joined the fight, but Fields-
Colbert tried to break it up. Hardy swung on Fields-Colbert. J.M. saw the fight and ran
over as Hardy pulled out a gun, so J.M. and Fields-Colbert turned and ran. Hardy then
discharged his firearm three to four times, shooting Fields-Colbert in the back. Fields-
Colbert yelled and fell next to J.M. Eventually, law enforcement and an ambulance
arrived. Fields-Colbert was transported to the hospital, where he received surgery but
succumbed to his injuries. An autopsy revealed Fields-Colbert suffered a single gunshot
wound.
Multiple witnesses identified Hardy as the shooter or otherwise similarly described
the shooter. H.C. video recorded the fight at the bar and identified Hardy as the shooter,
who she described as having “[d]ark skin” and “prominent cheekbones” and wearing a
red hoodie pulled up over his head, a black T-shirt underneath, and jeans. H.C. identified
Hardy as the shooter in a live lineup.
C.V. identified Hardy as the shooter in both shootings, describing him as a
“[d]ark” African-American male in a bright red hoodie with long sleeves and the hood
up.
2
N.O. identified Hardy as the shooter in both shootings2 and described him as an
“African-American male with a red hoodie” that had long sleeves and had the hood up.
She saw Hardy’s face and recognized him as Pook G. from rap videos she had previously
seen. At trial, she identified Hardy in exhibits 1-73 and 1-74, which were still images
from rap videos.
Q.P. described the shooter as a five-foot 10-inch dark-skinned Black man with “a
slim build” wearing gray sweatpants and a red hoodie with the hood up.
J.M. identified the same person as the shooter in both shootings, describing him as
Black and wearing a red sweater.
At the scene, a deputy collected four .40-caliber shell casings outside and two .40-
caliber shell casings inside, all of which had been fired from the same weapon. The
bullet recovered from Fields-Colbert’s body was a .40-caliber projectile that was fired
from a semiautomatic pistol. Assuming the bullet and casings were fired from the same
firearm, only a generation four or earlier Glock pistol could have fired them all.
The parties stipulated that Hardy had “previously been convicted of a felony and
[wa]s therefore prohibited from possessing a firearm. This prohibition was in place on
July 21, 2019.”
An amended information charged Hardy with first degree murder (Pen. Code,
§ 187, subd. (a); count one), and possession of a firearm as a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800,
subd. (a)(1); count two). It was further alleged as to count one that Hardy personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death (Pen. Code,
§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). Aggravating factors were alleged as to both counts
2 N.O. described a second shooter in the outside shooting as someone in a black
“wifebeater” shirt, and she told law enforcement that Hardy and the second shooter each
fired two shots.
3
The jury found Hardy not guilty of first degree murder but guilty of the lesser
included offense of second degree murder on count one and guilty of possession of a
firearm as a felon on count two. It found true as to count one that Hardy personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm causing death. In bifurcated proceedings, the trial
court found true the aggravating circumstances.
The trial court sentenced Hardy to 40 years to life as follows: 15 years to life for
the murder plus 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement. The court imposed and
stayed a consecutive upper term of three years on count two.
Hardy timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I
Admission of Still Image from Rap Video under Sections 352 and 352.2
Hardy contends the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the rap video still
image of him holding a Glock firearm.
A. Background
In motions in limine, the People moved to admit three still images from a rap
video of Hardy holding a “Glock style handgun” to prove Hardy had access to a similar
style weapon used in the homicide three months before the homicide. The People
explained that two shootings occurred on July 21, 2019, including one inside the house,
during which two shots were fired, and one a few minutes later outside on the street,
during which four shots were fired and which resulted in the homicide. Two shell
casings were found inside the house and four outside, all of which were .40-caliber, as
was the bullet that hit Fields-Colbert. The criminalist determined that 40 to 50 guns
could have fired these bullets, including a Glock but all of which were “a similar style” to
the firearm Hardy was pictured holding in the still images from the rap video.
Defense counsel objected, arguing admission of these images would confuse the
jury and be overly prejudicial to Hardy because the People’s expert would testify that
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“there’s a whole list of guns that would be consistent with being able to fire the type of
bullet that was found inside of [Fields-Colbert’s] body.” Counsel further asserted that “a
gun in a rap video is akin to rap lyrics,” and expressions of this type require a further
showing by the People to be admissible. Finally, defense counsel argued the prejudicial
value of this “character type evidence” precludes their admission under section 352.
The People added that the still images are “very different than introducing rap
lyrics.” The court agreed.
Defense counsel further argued that video of the shooting inside of the house
shows the firearm did not resemble the gun from the rap video, which had an extended
grip.
The People agreed that the gun in the video of the inside shooting did not have an
extended magazine but explained that firearm magazines are interchangeable.
The court ruled to admit one still image, stating: “I do find that the evidence that
the Defendant possessed a firearm, a handgun, which may be the same gun, may be a
similar gun, as the gun that appears to be used in the crime charged is relevant. I am
going to permit one photograph, one still photograph to be admitted into evidence based
on that relevance. I don’t find that it’s unduly prejudicial, and I don’t find it’s time-
consuming or confusing to the jury to be apprised of this evidence. [¶] I do want to be
sure that the still photograph doesn’t in any way imply any affiliation with gang conduct.
And so if there’s any question between the two of you, please confer on that.”
During trial, the People admitted one still image from the rap video as exhibit 1-
68.
B. Analysis
Section 352 “requires the trial court ‘to weigh the evidence’s probative value
against the dangers of prejudice, confusion, and undue time consumption.’ [Citation.]
The trial court excludes the evidence if these dangers substantially outweigh the
evidence’s probative value.” (People v. Mehserle (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1154.)
5
A more recent law, section 352.2, applies in criminal proceedings “where a party seeks to
admit as evidence a form of creative expression,” and requires the trial court to “consider
… that: (1) the probative value of such expression for its literal truth or as a truthful
narrative is minimal unless that expression is created near in time to the charged crime or
crimes, bears a sufficient level of similarity to the charged crime or crimes, or includes
factual detail not otherwise publicly available; and (2) undue prejudice includes, but is
not limited to, the possibility that the trier of fact will … treat the expression as evidence
of the defendant’s propensity for violence or general criminal disposition as well as the
possibility that the evidence will explicitly or implicitly inject racial bias into the
proceedings.” (§ 352.2, subd. (a).) The Legislature added section 352.2 “to address the
problem of introducing racial stereotypes and bias into criminal proceedings by allowing
rap lyrics into evidence.” (People v. Venable (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 445, 454, review
granted May 17, 2023, S279081, disapproved on another ground in People v. Aguirre
(2025) 18 Cal.5th 629, 692, fn. 34.) We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for
abuse of discretion. (People v. Robinson (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1027, 1030.)
Section 352.2, subdivision (c) “defines a ‘ “creative expression” ’ as ‘the
expression or application of creativity or imagination in the production or arrangement of
forms, sounds, words, movements, or symbols, including, but not limited to, music,
dance, performance art, visual art, poetry, literature, film, and other such objects or
media.’ ” (People v. Aguirre, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 687.) The People assert that while,
“[a]rguably, a still photograph taken from a rap music video may fall within the scope of
the statute as a piece of the larger ‘creative expression’ ” under section 352.2, subdivision
(c), such image alone “lacks almost all of the ‘creativity or imagination in the production
or arrangement of forms, sounds, words, movements or symbols’ that the larger
encompasses.” Even construed as a creative expression, we determine the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting the still image under sections 352 and 352.2.
6
As the trial court correctly observed, the still image was relevant because it
showed Hardy had access to a firearm similar to the one used in the charged offense three
months prior to the offense. (§ 352.2, subd. (a) [probative value for creative expression
for literal truth minimal unless “created near in time to the charged crime” or “bears a
sufficient level of similarity to the charged crime”].) Indeed, as the only evidence
admitted on this point, the still image was highly probative.
Hardy correctly notes the absence of evidence that the firearm used in the murder
“had either an extended magazine or a Glock switch rendering it fully-automatic.”
However, we are unpersuaded that these differences make the still image any less
relevant. At trial, the People elicited testimony that the style of the firearm in the still
image and the firearm used in the murder were both Glock-style firearms, that converting
such a firearm from semi to fully automatic was “extremely easy” and did not require
tools, and that magazines are easily changeable.
As to the undue prejudice side of the balancing test, “[t]his court has noted that
‘ “[t]he prejudice which exclusion of evidence under … section 352 is designed to avoid
is not the prejudice or damage to a defense that naturally flows from relevant, highly
probative evidence. ‘[A]ll evidence which tends to prove guilt is prejudicial or damaging
to the defendant’s case. The stronger the evidence, the more it is “prejudicial.” The
“prejudice” referred to in … section 352 applies to evidence which uniquely tends to
evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual and which has very little
effect on the issues.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Holford (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 155, 167, italics
omitted.)
Hardy asserts that the still image “severely prejudiced” him as it was “evidence of
[] Hardy’s illegal possession of a machine-pistol a few months before the killing, and the
connection of him to rap music, gang monikers and gang signs.” Hardy also claims the
image “strongly suggested that [he] had a propensity for violence and was involved in
street gangs.” We disagree.
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In addition to arguing the still image constituted propensity evidence, Hardy
argues that he “was made to seem more dangerous because of the extended magazine and
the fully-automatic Glock switch shown in” the still image. In assessing prejudice under
section 352.2, the trial court was required to consider “the possibility that the trier of fact
will, in violation of Section 1101, treat the expression as evidence of the defendant’s
propensity for violence or general criminal disposition.” (§ 352.2, subd. (a).) Indeed,
defense counsel objected below, calling the still image “character type evidence.” Thus,
the trial court considered this possibility but nonetheless found the probative value was
not substantially outweighed by the probability of undue prejudice. This finding was
within the trial court’s discretion because, as compared to the present crime, an image of
Hardy holding a firearm was not inflammatory, an undue consumption of time, or
otherwise unduly prejudicial, especially as compared to the probative value of this
evidence.
Hardy makes a number of claims that the still image “strongly suggested” gang
involvement, none of which we find compelling. Hardy claims, “[t]he connection of the
image to a rap music video, an artistic expression that many connect to gang life, was
irrelevant and of no probative value whatsoever” because the only relevance of the still
image was showing Hardy “with a gun that could have fired the rounds at the scene.” We
disagree. The still image did not reveal lyrics, gang signs, or any other such indications.
That it was mentioned that the still image came from a rap video did not constitute undue
prejudice, as other testimony established Hardy created rap videos, including N.O.’s
testimony that she recognized Hardy as the shooter because of his rap videos. Notably,
defense counsel stated that other still images from Hardy’s rap videos not depicting a
firearm were “fair game” on this point.
Hardy also argues that the introduction of another still image from the rap video
(not depicting the firearm) heightened the prejudice against him because it showed him
“making a hand gesture suggestive of a gang sign.” He additionally argues that Q.P.
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referred to Hardy as a “member” and thus “expressly conveyed to the jury that [] Hardy
was a gang member.” As the People correctly observe, none of this evidence was before
the court when it considered whether to admit or when it did rule that the still image with
the firearm could be admitted. Hardy did not subsequently raise this argument or
otherwise renew his objection to the still image at the time of Q.P.’s testimony or
admission of the second still image. (See People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 624,
fn. 32 [“had the objection been renewed at the second penalty trial the context in which
the court would have weighed the probative value of the evidence against its possibly
prejudicial impact would have been quite different”].) We agree with the People that
these specific arguments have been forfeited. Even so, we further agree with the People
that Hardy’s claim that he is making a gang sign in the second still image from the rap
video “is extremely weak.” As the People correctly observe, Q.P.’s testimony referring
to Hardy as a “member” was in reference to Hardy as a member of the fight — not a
suggestion that he was a gang member. Despite Hardy’s claim to the contrary, none of
this evidence insinuated “gang involvement” and was therefore not unduly prejudicial.
Hardy also argues that “[t]he suggestion of illegal prior firearm use, standing
alone, was highly prejudicial.” He attempts to analogize to People v. Riser (1956)
47 Cal.2d 566 and People v. Jefferson (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 494, cases in which
firearm evidence was held to be prejudicial. We find both cases inapplicable here. In
Riser, the court held that it was error to admit evidence of firearms different than the type
used in the crime, reasoning “such evidence tends to show, not that [the defendant]
committed the crime, but only that he is the sort of person who carries deadly weapons.”
(Riser, at p. 577.) The present case is distinguishable. The still image showed Hardy
with a Glock-style firearm, a weapon consistent with the type used in the shooting here
and close in time to the shooting.
In Jefferson, evidence that the defendant possessed two legally registered firearms
was admitted to demonstrate knowledge that the charged firearm was stolen. (People v.
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Jefferson, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 506.) Holding admission of this evidence
constituted an abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeal noted the relevance of this
evidence was “vanishingly slight” and was substantially outweighed by the undue
prejudice of “painting [the defendant] as a dangerous person.” (Id. at p. 507.) Again, the
present case is distinguishable. Unlike Jefferson, the still image here was highly
probative as the only evidence that Hardy possessed the same type of firearm as was used
in the murder three months before the murder. And, as discussed, the probative value
was not substantially outweighed by undue prejudice.
Accordingly, we detect no abuse of discretion. Because of this conclusion, we do
not address the parties’ harmless error arguments.
II
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Alternative Instructional Claims
Hardy claims that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by
failing to object to or seek curative measures as to Detective Ryan Oliver’s testimony
“about the fully-auto capability of the firearm, or that the extended magazine could hold
up to 32 rounds.” Alternatively, Hardy argues the trial court erred by failing to sua
sponte instruct the jury on the limited purpose of the still image of Hardy holding the
firearm. We reject both contentions.
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Hardy claims defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing
to object to or seek curative measures for Detective Oliver’s testimony, such as seeking a
pause in testimony, moving for a mistrial, or seeking a limiting instruction that the
firearm evidence could not be used as character evidence and “was only offered to prove
that the firearm in the image could have produced the shells at the scene.”
1. Background
Detective Oliver testified that exhibit 1-68 depicted a still image from a rap video,
in which Pook G. was holding a firearm, and that he had reviewed the video in order to
10
identify the firearm and whether it was a real or replica firearm. He described the firearm
in the still image as “a Glock-style firearm.” Based on finger grooves on the handgrips,
Detective Oliver determined the firearm was a Glock generation three or four. The
magazine had a metal liner, which led Detective Oliver to believe it was a real magazine
in a real Glock. The magazine was an extended magazine, which could hold between 28
and 32 rounds, compared with 15 to 17 rounds the stock magazine could hold. The type
of magazine inserted into the firearm is easily changeable. Detective Oliver noted the
firearm had a “small piece that protrudes out the back,” which indicated the firearm “had
been converted into a full-auto or a machine gun Glock.” It is “extremely easy” to
convert the firearm between semi and fully automatic and does not require using tools. A
semiautomatic firearm expels a single round when the trigger is pressed, and a fully
automatic firearm expels ammunition continuously as long as the trigger is pressed.
Defense counsel did not object to this testimony or seek any curative measures.
2. Analysis
“A criminal defendant’s federal and state constitutional rights to counsel
[citations] include the right to effective legal assistance.” (People v. Mai (2013)
57 Cal.4th 986, 1009, italics omitted.) To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must show both that counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and that the deficient
performance prejudiced defendant. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688,
691-692 (Strickland); People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-218.)
“[R]arely will an appellate record establish ineffective assistance of counsel.”
(People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 122.) “ ‘When a defendant on appeal makes
a claim that his counsel was ineffective, the appellate court must consider whether the
record contains any explanation for the challenged aspects of representation provided by
counsel. “If the record sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner
challenged, ‘unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or
11
unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation,’ [citation], the contention must
be rejected.” ’ ” (People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 845.) “ ‘Reviewing courts
defer to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions in examining a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel [citation], and there is a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” ’ ” (People v. Weaver
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 925.) “Counsel is not ineffective for failing to make frivolous or
futile motions” (Thompson, at p. 122), or for failing to object when “there was no sound
legal basis for objection” (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 616; accord, People v.
Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 127).
The record is silent as to why defense counsel did not object or seek the suggested
curative measures. As our high court has “repeatedly stressed,” if “ ‘ “the record on
appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged[,] …
unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there
simply could be no satisfactory explanation,” the claim on appeal must be rejected.’ ”
(People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266, italics added.) “[T]actical choices
presented … on a silent record … are better evaluated by way of a petition for writ of
habeas corpus, and on direct appeal we reject them.” (People v. Mayfield (1993)
5 Cal.4th 142, 188.) This is not a case where there could be no satisfactory answer.
Indeed, defense counsel could have reasonably determined that an objection, a pause in
the testimony, or a limiting instruction on the challenged testimony could have drawn
undue attention to it. (See, e.g., People v. Ramirez (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 48, 61; see
also People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 206 [finding no ineffective assistance of
counsel where counsel’s failure to object could be explained as a tactical decision not to
draw the jurors’ attention to comments by the prosecutor].)
Likewise, Hardy’s assertion that defense counsel was deficient for failing to move
for a mistrial also fails. Because of the discretion afforded a trial court in granting a
mistrial, “it would be a rare case in which the merits of a mistrial motion were so clear
12
that counsel’s failure to make the motion would amount to ineffective assistance.”
(People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 854.) “Nonetheless, defendant could
conceivably prove incompetence if his counsel’s omission was shown to be grounded in
ignorance or misapplication of the law rather than tactical considerations [citations] and if
the motion for mistrial bore strong potential for success.” (Id. at pp. 854-855.) Neither is
true here. As discussed, defense counsel could have reasonably decided not to object to
or otherwise seek curative measures for this testimony in order to avoid drawing undue
attention to it, and nothing in the record reflects that defense counsel opted not to seek a
mistrial based on ignorance or a misapplication of the law. (Ibid.) Nor was there any
likelihood the trial court would have granted a motion based on this testimony, which
constituted a brief portion of the overall evidence, and defense counsel’s failure to
request one suggests the decision was a tactical decision not to make a frivolous request.
Accordingly, we must reject Hardy’s contention that defense counsel acted deficiently.
(People v. Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 845; Haskett, at pp. 854-855.)
Even assuming defense counsel acted deficiently, Hardy’s claim nonetheless fails
because he has failed to establish any resultant prejudice. To show prejudice, it is not
enough for a defendant to show that counsel’s performance had some “ ‘conceivable
effect’ ” on the outcome. (People v. Brewer (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 199, 220.) Hardy
must demonstrate, based on the facts in the record, there is a reasonable probability that
the outcome of the proceeding would have been different but for counsel’s errors.
(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. 668 at p. 694.) “[P]rejudice must be established as ‘ “a
‘demonstrable reality,’ not simply speculation as to the effect of the errors or omissions
of counsel.” ’ ” (People v. Montoya (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1151.)
Hardy claims it is reasonably probable he would have obtained a better result but
for the alleged deficiencies in defense counsel’s performance. He incorporates his
prejudice argument from his previous claim and asserts that the challenged testimony
“made matters worse” by explaining that Hardy had possession of “a Glock machine-
13
pistol with a large capacity magazine,” which “made the jury believe that [] Hardy had a
character trait for violence.” Thus, when coupled “with the other rap music video still
images, there was a powerful suggestion that [] Hardy was a violent gang member who
had previously possessed a machine-pistol (a prior crime).”
We reject these contentions. It is not reasonably probable that Hardy would have
received a better outcome had Detective Oliver not testified about the fully automatic
capability of the firearm in the still image or the capacity of the extended magazine. This
testimony constituted a brief portion of the overall evidence admitted against Hardy.
Indeed, as the People argue, Hardy’s “guilt was overwhelmingly established by the
testimony of eyewitnesses at the scene.” This includes H.C.’s immediate identification of
Hardy in a lineup. As the jury was instructed, “[t]he testimony of only one witness can
prove any fact” (CALCRIM No. 301), and here several witnesses identified Hardy as the
shooter. On this record, Hardy cannot establish prejudice, and his claim therefore fails.
B. Sua Sponte Limiting Instruction on Evidence of Past Criminal Conduct
Arguing in the alternative, Hardy asserts the trial court was required to sua sponte
instruct the jury “on the limited admissibility of past criminal conduct” based on “the
inflammatory nature of the evidence, suggesting gang involvement and use of an illegal
fully-automatic” weapon. In support, Hardy cites People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43,
superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in People v. Champion (1995)
9 Cal.4th 879, 912-913 and footnote 9. In Collie, the court stated: “Neither precedent
nor policy favors a rule that would saddle the trial court with the duty either to interrupt
the testimony sua sponte to admonish the jury whenever a witness implicates the
defendant in another offense, or to review the entire record at trial’s end in search of such
testimony. There may be an occasional extraordinary case in which unprotested evidence
of past offenses is a dominant part of the evidence against the accused, and is both highly
prejudicial and minimally relevant to any legitimate purpose. In such a setting, the
14
evidence might be so obviously important to the case that sua sponte instruction would be
needed to protect the defendant from his counsel’s inadvertence.” (Collie, at p. 64.)
Hardy asserts that the still image of Hardy holding the converted firearm “was a
‘dominant part’ of the evidence” that “was highly prejudicial and ‘minimally relevant to
any legitimate purpose.’ ” We disagree. As discussed ante, the evidence was highly
probative to show that Hardy had access to the type of firearm used in the murder three
months before the murder. And this evidence was not a dominant part of the evidence.
Indeed, the majority of the evidence was focused on eyewitness accounts of the
shootings, and the admission of the still image comprised only a small portion of the
evidence elicited at trial. As such, we reject Hardy’s contention that the trial court was
required to sua sponte instruct the jury on the limited admissibility of evidence of past
criminal conduct.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/
EARL, P. J.
We concur:
/s/
HULL, J.
/s/
KRAUSE, J.
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