Filed 9/11/26 P. v. Hamilton CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B345828
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. BA339752)
DAVID HAMILTON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kevin P. Stennis, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard B. Lennon, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and
Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorneys General, Jason Tran
and Taylor Nguyen, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
_________________________________________
David Hamilton petitioned for resentencing under Penal
Code1 section 1172.75, and the trial court reduced his sentence by
16 years but declined to strike any of his prior strikes. We
affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. Facts2
On April 26, 2008, appellant visited the apartment of
Debra Tinsley, his former romantic partner. Tinsley’s male
friend, Asa Belton, had been staying with her for more than a
month. Appellant and Tinsley got into an argument about Belton
living there. Appellant threatened Tinsley, at which point Belton
interjected that he would not allow appellant to hurt her.
Appellant left for a few minutes, and then returned to
argue some more. He hit Tinsley, turned around and punched
Belton. Belton jumped from his seat and bear-hugged appellant
to protect himself. During the fight that ensued, appellant bit
Belton’s ear off.
2. Procedural history
In 2010, a jury convicted appellant of mayhem (§ 203) and
assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245,
subd. (a)(1)). It found true that appellant had personally inflicted
great bodily injury (§§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), and the court found
true that appellant had suffered three prior strikes (§§ 1170.12,
subds. (a)–(d), 667, subds. (b)–(i)) and three prior serious felonies
(§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and that he had served three prior prison
terms (§§ 667, subd. (a)). Appellant was sentenced to 46 years to
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 These facts are drawn from the unpublished opinion from
the direct appeal. (People v. Hamilton (Jan. 13, 2012, B227590).)
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life, comprised of 25 years to life for mayhem, plus 15 years for
the three prior serious felonies (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), three years
for the great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)),
and three years for the three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd.
(b)). The court imposed but stayed a sentence of 28 years to life
for the assault.
This court affirmed the conviction on direct appeal, but
struck two of the one-year prior prison terms and the three-year
great bodily injury enhancement, reducing appellant’s sentence
to 41 years to life. (People v. Hamilton, supra, B227590.)
In 2016, appellant petitioned for resentencing under the
Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (§ 1170.126). The trial court
denied his petition because he was ineligible, and we affirmed.
(People v. Hamilton (Apr. 28, 2017, B276323) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2023, appellant became eligible for resentencing under
sections 1172.7 and 1172.75. The trial court conducted a full
resentencing hearing and struck the remaining prior prison term
as well as the three prior serious felony enhancements, reducing
appellant’s sentence to 25 years to life. It declined to dismiss any
of appellant’s prior strikes.
DISCUSSION
1. Pertinent law
Effective January 1, 2022, the Legislature added section
1172.75 (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3), which renders “legally invalid”
any prior prison term enhancement imposed under
subdivision (b) of section 667.5 before January 1, 2020, except for
those involving a sexually violent offense. (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).)
If a judgment includes such an enhancement, “the court shall
recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.” (Id., subd.
(c).) Those who qualify are entitled to a full resentencing, at
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which the trial court “shall apply . . . any other changes in law
that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to
eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity in
sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).)
One such change in the law is found in section 1385,
subdivision (a), which permits a trial court to strike an allegation
or vacate a finding under the Three Strikes law that the
defendant has previously been convicted of a qualifying strike
offense. (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th
497, 529–530.) In deciding whether to do so, the court “must
consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of [the
defendant’s] present . . . and prior serious and/or violent felony
convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and
prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s
spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though
he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious
and/or violent felonies.” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th
148, 161.) “ ‘[T]he circumstances must be “extraordinary . . . [for]
a career criminal [to] be deemed to fall outside the spirit of the
very scheme within which he squarely falls.” ’ ” (People v.
Mendoza (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 843, 856, quoting People v.
Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378 (Carmony).)
A trial court’s denial of a Romero motion is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 376.)
2. The trial court acted within its discretion in
declining to strike appellant’s strikes
Appellant has not met his burden of showing that the trial
court’s sentencing decision was “irrational or arbitrary.” (See
Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.) In refusing to strike
appellant’s prior strikes, the trial court observed the “egregious”
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nature of the case and of some of appellant’s prior convictions,
which included two assaults by means likely to produce great
bodily injury and a manslaughter. It was reasonable for the trial
court to conclude on this basis that appellant fell within the spirit
of the Three Strikes law. To argue otherwise, appellant points to
his age (late 60’s), a stroke he suffered in recent years, and his
participation in “many rehabilitative courses” while in prison.
Although these may be favorable factors, they do not “manifestly
support the striking of a prior conviction” so as to render the trial
court’s decision “so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable
person could agree with it.” (People v. Edwards (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 523, 528, 529.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
LUI, P. J.
We concur:
CHAVEZ, J.
RICHARDSON, J.
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