Filed 10/21/26 P. v. Hall CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
THE PEOPLE, C102714
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 07F01305)
v.
KAVASIO KAVARIS HALL,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Kavasio Kavaris Hall was convicted of kidnapping for the purpose of
committing robbery, first degree robbery, and access card theft. The trial court
resentenced defendant under Penal Code section 1172.75,1 staying the sentence for first
degree robbery under section 654 and imposing consecutive sentences for the kidnapping
for robbery and access card theft convictions. Defendant appeals, arguing the trial court
erred in imposing consecutive sentences for these convictions because the offenses
constituted a single act committed with the same objective and intent. Defendant further
asserts that the trial court erred by reimposing a $10,000 section 1202.4 restitution fine
because more than 10 years have elapsed since originally imposed. We conclude the trial
court did not reimpose the restitution fine and order correction of the abstract of judgment
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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to strike the $10,000 section 1202.4 restitution fine. In all other respects, we disagree
with defendant and affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND2
On the evening of January 14, 2007, the victim was walking in midtown
Sacramento when codefendant Steven Davis approached her from behind, wrapped his
arms around her, placed a pointed object that the victim believed to be a gun against her
neck, grabbed her, and directed her to be quiet and comply with his demands. Davis
directed the victim to a dark spot by some tall shrubbery where he rummaged through her
pockets and purse and checked under her bra. While Davis searched the victim, a car,
which the victim believed had passed her earlier on her walk, parked next to them. Davis
handed the purse to the driver, who was later identified as defendant. Defendant went
through the victim’s purse and gave it back to Davis. Davis and defendant conferred at
the car, and Davis told the victim to get in the car. She resisted and heard what sounded
like a gun being “charged.” The victim got into the car, and Davis asked if she had a
bank account. The victim said “yes,” and Davis took her ATM card from her wallet and
said they were going to have the victim empty her account. At some point while in the
car, Davis demanded the victim’s cell phone. Defendant parked down the street from the
bank, and Davis handed the victim her ATM card. The victim withdrew all the money in
her bank account and gave it to defendant and Davis. Davis returned the victim’s purse
to her but kept her cell phone and wallet, which contained a gas station credit card and a
Tri Counties Visa ATM card, before he and defendant drove off.
At 1:00 a.m. the next morning, defendant arrived home and told his girlfriend that
he had robbed someone and handed her money and the victim’s debit card. Defendant’s
2 On June 24, 2026, we treated the People’s motion to augment the record as a request to
incorporate by reference the record on appeal in case number C058949, People v. Hall,
and granted it.
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girlfriend used the victim’s card the next day. Defendant admitted to using the gas
station credit card.
In closing argument, the prosecutor explained that there were “two completed
robberies in this case”—the initial robbery of the victim’s purse and the subsequent ATM
robbery—but only the latter was charged. As to the access card theft charged, the
prosecutor argued that the defendant admitted to using the victim’s credit card with the
knowledge that it was not his own.
On November 2, 2007, the jury found defendant guilty of kidnapping for the
purpose of committing robbery (§ 209, subd. (b)(1)—count one), first degree robbery
(§ 211—count two), and acquisition of another’s access card information for fraudulent
purposes (§ 484e, subd. (d)—count three). The trial court found true a prior strike
(§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12), a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), and
a prior prison term (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)).
On April 18, 2008, the trial court sentenced defendant to a total determinate term
of 10 years as follows: the middle term of two years, doubled to four years for the prior
strike on count three, a consecutive five years for the prior serious felony, and a
consecutive one year for the prior prison term. It imposed and stayed (§ 654) the middle
term of four years on count two. The court imposed a consecutive indeterminate term of
seven years to life, doubled to 14 years to life for the prior strike on count one. The court
imposed various fines and fees, including a $10,000 restitution fine under section 1202.4.
In 2009, a different panel of this court affirmed the judgment. (People v. Hall
(May 27, 2009, C058949) [nonpub. opn].)
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In 2024, the trial court resentenced defendant under section 1172.75.3 The court
struck the no-longer valid one-year prior prison term enhancement and imposed a nine-
year determinate term as follows: the middle term of two years, doubled to four years for
the prior strike on count three, and a consecutive five years for the prior serious felony.
The court reimposed a consecutive indeterminate term of 14 years to life on count one. It
did not orally impose any fines or fees, but the abstract of judgment reflects a $10,000
restitution fine (§ 1202.4).
Defendant timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Section 654
Defendant contends the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences for the
kidnapping for robbery (count 1) and access card theft (count 3) convictions because
those counts arose from “a single act on the same day … with the same objective and
intent of acquiring money.” Accordingly, he asserts the sentence on count three should
have been stayed under section 654. We conclude the court properly imposed multiple
punishments because substantial evidence shows defendant formed a separate intent and
objective for access card theft apart from the kidnapping for robbery.
Section 654, subdivision (a) provides that “[a]n act or omission that is punishable
in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such
provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one
provision.” Section 654’s proscription against multiple punishment applies where a
course of conduct is indivisible and punishable under multiple statutes. (People v.
3 “[A] prior-prison-term enhancement [for a non-sexually violent offense] ‘imposed’
before 2020 is now invalid, and any prisoner whose judgment includes such an
enhancement is entitled to resentencing under section 1172.75.” (People v. Rhodius
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1058; see § 1172.75, subds. (a), (c).)
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Coleman (1989) 48 Cal.3d 112, 162.) The actor’s intent and objective determine the
divisibility of a course of conduct, and if all offenses share one objective, punishment
may be imposed for any of the offenses but not more than one. (Ibid.) To permit
multiple punishments, the evidence must “ ‘support a finding the defendant formed a
separate intent and objective for each offense for which he was sentenced.’ ” (Ibid.) If
the defendant “harbored ‘multiple criminal objectives,’ which were independent of and
not merely incidental to each other, he may be punished for each statutory violation
committed in pursuit of each objective, ‘even though the violations shared common acts
or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct.’ ” (People v. Harrison
(1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335.)
We uphold the trial court’s findings if supported by substantial evidence. (See
People v. Fuentes (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 670, 680.) We review the evidence in a light
most favorable to the trial court’s determination and presume every fact the trier of fact
could have reasonably deduced from the evidence. (People v. Cleveland (2001)
87 Cal.App.4th 263, 271.)
Here, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s implicit finding that defendant
committed access card theft and the robbery with separate intents and objectives. The
court reasonably could find that defendant completed the access card theft upon
completing the initial uncharged robbery, during which he and Davis stole the victim’s
purse and the credits cards contained therein. This conclusion is supported by Davis
grabbing the victim, holding what the victim believed to be a gun against her neck,
directing her to a dark spot, searching her person, and taking her purse, which he then
gave to defendant. Reviewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment
and presuming every fact the trial court could have reasonably deduced from the
evidence (People v. Cleveland, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 271), we infer that defendants
stole the victim’s credit cards with the intent to fraudulently use them. At that time, the
crime was complete. (§ 484e, subd. (d) [“Every person who acquires or retains
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possession of access card account information with respect to an access card validly
issued to another person, without the cardholder’s or issuer’s consent, with the intent to
use it fraudulently, is guilty of grand theft”].)
After completing this crime, defendant and Davis conferred before kidnapping the
victim and taking her to the ATM to complete the charged robbery. On these facts, the
trial court reasonably could find that defendant and Davis, after discovering the victim’s
ATM card in her wallet, decided to kidnap the victim with the intent to steal her cash,
which was the basis of the charged robbery. Thus, substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s implicit finding that the access card theft and ATM robbery were committed with
separate and distinct objectives. (People v. Fuentes, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 680.)
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in imposing separate punishments.
B. Restitution Fine
Defendant contends the $10,000 section 1202.4 restitution fine must be vacated
pursuant to section 1465.9 because it is over 10 years old. The People disagree that the
trial court reimposed the restitution fine but acknowledge that if the record is interpreted
in that manner, the restitution fine should be vacated. At the October 2024 resentencing
hearing, the trial court did not orally reimpose the restitution fine, but the abstract of
judgment lists a $10,000 section 1202.4 restitution fine. A written recording of a
judgment, such as a minute order or abstract of judgment, may not modify the judgment
(People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385, 389), and where there is a
discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and a written record, the oral
pronouncement controls (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185-186).
Accordingly, we agree with the People that the restitution fine was not reimposed and
order the abstract of judgment corrected to strike the section 1202.4 restitution fine.
Given our conclusion, we need not reach defendant’s argument that the restitution fine
should be vacated under section 1465.9 because it was originally imposed in 2008, or
more than 10 years ago.
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III. DISPOSITION
We order the abstract of judgment be corrected to strike the $10,000 section
1202.4 restitution fine and direct the superior court to prepare an amended abstract of
judgment and forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
/S/
RENNER, Acting P. J.
We concur:
/S/
KRAUSE, J.
/S/
MESIWALA, J.
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