Filed 10/19/26 P. v. Hale CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B344076
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24LBCF00994)
v.
DEQUAN HALE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Marcelita V. Haynes, Judge. Conditionally
reversed and remanded with directions.
Karyn H. Bucur, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Eric J. Kohm, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
After defendant Dequan Hale’s motions for mental health
diversion (Pen. Code,1 § 1001.35 et seq.) and developmental
disability diversion (§ 1001.20 et seq.) were denied, he pleaded no
contest to unlawful firearm activity. Hale appeals, arguing the
trial court erred in denying his requests for diversion. We
conclude the court abused its discretion in denying each request.
We conditionally reverse and remand for the court to reconsider
Hale’s motions.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Charged Offenses
An amended felony complaint charged Hale with unlawful
firearm activity (§ 29820, subd. (b); count 1) and possession of a
controlled substance while armed with a loaded firearm (Health
& Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a); count 2). It was alleged that
when Hale committed the offenses, he was on probation,
mandatory supervision, postrelease community supervision, or
parole within the meaning of California Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(b)(4).
Police officers had reported seeing Hale riding an electric
bicycle without a helmet. He fled when officers attempted to
make contact, and they took him into custody after a pursuit. A
witness told officers Hale threw an object on a roof, and the
officers found a loaded firearm there. Hale admitted to fleeing
from officers while in possession of a firearm and to selling drugs.
1 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2
B. Motions for Developmental Disability Diversion and
Mental Health Diversion
In September 2024, at defense counsel’s request, the trial
court ordered a regional center2 to evaluate Hale for
developmental disability diversion and prepare a report pursuant
to section 1001.22. The following month, Hale filed a motion for
developmental disability diversion. He argued he was eligible for
diversion because he was receiving services from Harbor Regional
Center for borderline intellectual functioning.
In November 2024, Hale filed a supplement to his motion.
He attached an evaluation by Dr. Krystal Bowen, a letter from
Hillsman Rehabilitation Center (Hillsman), and a report by
Harbor Regional Center. On the same date, Hale filed a petition
for mental health diversion pursuant to section 1001.36
supported by the same evidence.
Dr. Bowen diagnosed Hale with opioid use disorder,
stimulant use disorder, and unspecified mood disorder. She
opined he also suffered from impulsivity. She reviewed Hale’s
records, including those from Harbor Regional Center, and noted
he had previously been diagnosed with intellectual development
disorder. Dr. Bowen concluded that Hale’s mental health
disorders were a significant factor in the commission of the
charged offenses. She said that his “history of juvenile
delinquency, impulsivity, mood instability, defiance, substance
use, and aggression” was consistent with a “mood disorder and
substance abuse disorder . . . .” She stated Hale’s “low
2 Regional centers “are responsible for determining eligibility,
assessing needs, and providing services to the developmentally
disabled.” (Ronald F. v. State Dept. of Developmental Services (2017) 8
Cal.App.5th 84, 94.)
3
intellectual functioning . . . exacerbates his inabilities to make
sensible judgments and reasonable decisions” and could intensify
his mental health problems.
Dr. Bowen opined Hale’s mental health issues would
“respond positively to [an] inpatient dual diagnosis program” to
address his mental health symptoms and substance use. She
recommended Hale participate in a 9- to 12-month inpatient
program, enroll in a reentry program and a program to reduce
gang activities, and return to high school.
Hale asserted that Hillsman could provide inpatient dual
diagnosis treatment. He submitted a letter showing acceptance
into its residential facility. Hillsman identified multiple services
Hale would receive, including individual counseling twice a week,
group counseling five days a week, work therapy, anger
management classes, drug and alcohol education, criminal and
addictive thinking group sessions, and habituation and
rehabilitative services.
Additionally, Hale submitted a report from Harbor
Regional Center with a proposed diversion treatment plan. The
regional center said Hale was its client and was eligible for
services based on a June 2024 diagnosis of borderline intellectual
functioning, “‘a disabling condition found to be closely related to
intellectual disability or to require treatment similar to that
required for individuals with an intellectual disability.’” Hale
was also diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactive disorder
and disruptive mood dysregulation disorder.
The regional center recommended a single-agency diversion
plan. The regional center would implement and monitor the
3
3 “A defendant may be diverted on single agency diversion,
administered by the regional center, or dual agency diversion,
4
plan. The plan included services by “CBEM, a vendor of [Harbor
Regional Center].” (Boldface omitted.) CBEM would meet with
Hale weekly and work with staff at Hillsman to provide
counseling and behavior intervention; services would continue at
Hale’s home. Hale would receive reentry services from another
vendor, Passport to Learning, for maladaptive behaviors, anger
management, substance abuse education, choices and
consequences, and mentorship. Lastly, the regional center would
maintain an active case for Hale and have quarterly meetings
with him to document his progress with his individual program
plan.4
C. Trial Court’s Denial of Diversion and Hale’s Plea
Agreement
The trial court heard Hale’s motions for developmental
disability and mental health diversion together. It found Hale
eligible for each. The court, however, denied the motions, stating
it was “not satisfied that the defense ha[d] presented a suitable
program to meet [Hale’s] needs.”
Following the hearing, Hale pleaded no contest to count 1.
Count 2 was dismissed due to the plea negotiations. He was
sentenced to 16 months in state prison. Hale timely appealed
and received a certificate of probable cause.
administered jointly by the probation department and regional center.”
(People v. K.D. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1, 17 (K.D.).)
4 Individual program plans are developed by regional centers for
eligible individuals and “are designed to address identified goals and
objectives through the provision of services and supports.” (In re
Social Services Payment Cases (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1257; see
Welf. & Inst. Code, § 4646.)
5
DISCUSSION
A. Mental Health Diversion
Hale argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying
mental health diversion because the court’s finding that his
proposed treatment plan would not address his mental health
needs was not supported by the record. We agree.
1. Governing Law
The Legislature enacted sections 1001.35 and 1001.36 to
create a pretrial diversion program for criminal defendants with
diagnosed mental health disorders. (Sarmiento v. Superior Court
(2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 890 (Sarmiento); Vaughn v. Superior
Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 133 (Vaughn).) “The statute
expressly promotes ‘[i]ncreased diversion of individuals with
mental disorders to mitigate the individuals’ entry and reentry
into the criminal justice system while protecting public safety.’”
(Vaughn, at p. 133; see Sarmiento, at p. 887 [“section 1001.36 was
designed to encourage trial courts to broadly authorize pretrial
mental health diversion, providing treatment for qualifying
mental disorders that result in criminal behavior”].)
Section 1001.36 requires the trial court to find the
defendant “both eligible for diversion and suitable for the
program.” (Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 891.)
Section 1001.36, subdivisions (b) and (c) set forth the criteria for
each.5
5 Section 1001.36, subdivision (b) provides that a defendant is
eligible for diversion if (1) the defendant has been diagnosed with a
recognized mental health disorder within the last five years by a
qualified mental health expert and (2) the “defendant’s mental
6
If the defendant is both eligible and suitable, the trial court
must also be satisfied “that the recommended inpatient or
outpatient program of mental health treatment will meet the
specialized mental health treatment needs of the defendant.”
(§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(1)(A)(i); Vaughn, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at
p. 134.) “This is not an additional eligibility or suitability
requirement the defendant must meet. Rather, subdivision (f)(1)
of section 1001.36 read as a whole appears to contemplate an
ongoing assessment to assure that defendants will receive
appropriate treatment for their particular conditions as part of
the diversion program.” (Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at
p. 892, fn. omitted.) “Under this provision, a court might reject
diversion if it concluded that the proposed treatment services did
not target or could not effectively address the defendant’s
particular diagnosis.” (Id. at p. 895, fn. omitted.) “For instance,
the court might be legitimately concerned if the evaluation of the
defendant suggested the need for psychiatric medication and the
recommended program did not provide psychiatric services.” (Id.
at p. 895, fn. 9.)
disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the charged
offense.”
If the defendant is eligible, the trial court must consider
whether the defendant is suitable for diversion under the criteria set
forth in section 1001.36, subdivision (c), including: “(1) in the opinion
of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s mental health
disorder would respond to treatment; (2) the defendant consents to
diversion and agrees to waive their speedy trial rights; (3) the
defendant agrees to comply with treatment requirements; and (4) the
defendant will not pose an ‘unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety’ . . . if treated in the community.” (Vaughn, supra, 105
Cal.App.5th at p. 134.)
7
Even where a defendant makes a prima facie showing that
the defendant meets all the eligibility and suitability
requirements, the trial court may still exercise its discretion to
deny diversion. (§ 1001.36, subd. (a); Sarmiento, supra, 98
Cal.App.5th at p. 892.) But “[t]his residual discretion is not
unfettered and must be exercised ‘“consistent with the principles
and purpose of the governing law.”’” (Vaughn, supra, 105
Cal.App.5th at p. 135.) “That purpose includes a strong
legislative preference for treatment of mental health disorders
because of the benefits of such treatment to both the offending
individual and the community. Where the court chooses to
exercise this residual discretion to deny diversion, its statement
of reasons should reflect consideration of the underlying purposes
of the statute and explain why diversion would not meet those
goals.” (Sarmiento, at pp. 892–893.)
A trial court’s ruling on a request for mental health
diversion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v. Whitmill
(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147.) “‘A court abuses its discretion
when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the
wrong legal standard [citations], or bases its decision on express
or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial
evidence [citation].’” (People v. Graham (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th
787, 795.) Further, “‘[a]ction that transgresses the confines of the
applicable principles of law is outside the scope of discretion’ and
constitutes an abuse of discretion.” (Lacour v. Superior Court
(2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 391, 401.)
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2. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion
The trial court found Hale made a prima facie showing that
he was eligible and suitable for mental health diversion6 but
denied diversion because it found Hale’s proposed treatment
program would not meet his mental health needs. We conclude
substantial evidence does not support the court’s finding.
Dr. Bowen diagnosed Hale with unspecified mood disorder,
opioid use disorder, stimulant use disorder, and impulsivity. She
noted Hale’s “low intellectual functioning” could intensify his
mental health symptoms and further impair his judgment. She
recommended a specific inpatient program to address Hale’s
mental health needs and recommended Hale enroll in a reentry
program. Hillsman and Harbor Regional Center confirmed they
could provide the recommended inpatient treatment and services.
Hillsman accepted Hale into its inpatient program and
identified multiple services he would receive, including individual
counseling twice a week, group counseling five days a week,
anger management classes, relapse prevention education, and
criminal and addictive thinking group sessions, among others.
Furthermore, Harbor Regional Center proposed a plan, which it
would monitor and implement, to provide additional services. A
6 The trial court expressly found Hale eligible for mental health
diversion based on Dr. Bowen’s report. Further, the People concede
the trial court implicitly found Hale did not pose an unreasonable risk
of danger to public safety as defined in section 1170.18 and was
suitable for diversion. We accept the concession. (See Sarmiento,
supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 892 [“Assuming the defendant is both
eligible and suitable, the trial court must also be satisfied ‘that the
recommended inpatient or outpatient program of mental health
treatment will meet the specialized mental health treatment needs of
the defendant’”].)
9
regional center vendor, CBEM, would meet with Hale at
Hillsman weekly to provide counseling, crisis support, and
behavior intervention. Another regional center vendor, Passport
to Learning, would evaluate him and address maladaptive
behaviors, anger management, substance abuse education,
choices and consequences, conflict resolution, and provide
mentorship. The regional center would maintain an open case for
Hale and have quarterly meetings with him to document his
progress with his individual program plan.
Hale thus presented expert opinion regarding a
recommended program that could address his mental health
needs, and the evidence demonstrated the treatment was
available through Hillsman and Harbor Regional Center. The
prosecution did not present any evidence challenging Dr. Bowen’s
opinions. There was no evidence presented to support a finding
that the proposed treatment plan did not target or could not
effectively address Hale’s diagnoses. (Sarmiento, supra, 98
Cal.App.5th at p. 895.) On this record, the court’s ruling was
without evidentiary support.
To the extent the trial court intended to rely on its residual
discretion to deny diversion, the court was required to “explain
why diversion would not meet [the statute’s] goals.” (Sarmiento,
supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 893.) The court’s summary ruling,
however, “did not ‘reflect consideration of the underlying
purposes of the statute’ nor did it ‘explain why diversion would
not meet those goals.’” (Vaughn, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at
p. 139.)
In sum, the trial court abused its discretion in denying
Hale’s motion for mental health diversion. Under the
circumstances, we will conditionally reverse the judgment and
10
remand the matter for the court to reconsider the motion,
“bearing in mind the statutory principles and purpose of the
mental health diversion statute.” (People v. Qualkinbush (2022)
79 Cal.App.5th 879, 892, 895.)
B. Developmental Disability Diversion
Hale argues that the trial court also abused its discretion in
denying his request for developmental disability diversion. We
agree with Hale.
1. Governing Law
“The developmental disability diversion program applies in
any case where misdemeanor or most felony charges are brought
against ‘any person who has been evaluated by a regional center
and who is determined to be a person with a developmental
disability by the regional center, and who therefore is eligible for
its services.’” (K.D., supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 16.) “When the
court suspects that a defendant may have a developmental
disability, ‘the [trial] court shall order the prosecutor, the
probation department, and the regional center to prepare reports
on specified aspects of the defendant’s case.’” (Ibid.) The trial
court has a “sua sponte duty” to consult with the relevant
agencies to determine whether a defendant may be diverted.
(Ibid.)
The regional center’s report must contain “three key items:
(1) a determination of whether the defendant has a
developmental disability and is eligible for regional center
services; and (2) a proposed diversion program, individually
tailored to the needs of the defendant as derived from the
defendant’s [individual program plan] (Welf. & Inst. Code,
11
§ 4646), including treatment addressed to the criminal offense
charged; and (3) a statement as to whether the proposed program
is available for the defendant through the treatment and
habilitation services of the regional centers . . . .” (K.D., supra,
110 Cal.App.5th at pp. 16–17.) “The prosecutor is required to
submit a recommendation for or against diversion. [Citation.]
And probation is required to report on specified aspects of the
defendant’s case.” (Id. at p. 17.)
“‘After consideration of [the required reports and the
prosecutor’s recommendation], the defendant’s violence and
criminal history, the relationship of the developmental disability
to the charged offense, and the current charged offense, and any
other relevant information, and the court is satisfied that the
defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in the community,
the court shall determine if the defendant shall be diverted under
either dual or single agency supervision, and referred for
habilitation or rehabilitation diversion pursuant to this chapter.’”
(K.D., supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 17.) “If the court is satisfied
that a defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk to public
safety, the court’s determination of whether to grant diversion,
and hence its consideration of the statutory criteria and
information relevant to that decision, must be based upon the
standard specified in the statute: whether the defendant is a
person ‘who would benefit by diversion.’” (Id. at p. 19.)
As with a denial of a request for mental health diversion,
we review a trial court’s denial of developmental disability
diversion for abuse of discretion. (K.D., supra, 110 Cal.App.5th
at p. 18; see id. at pp. 18–19 [“‘“abuse of discretion arises if the
12
trial court based its decision on impermissible factors [citation] or
on an incorrect legal standard”’”].)
2. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion
There is no dispute that Hale has a developmental
disability and is eligible for regional center services. The trial
court denied developmental disability diversion because it was
not satisfied that Hale presented a suitable program to meet his
needs. Under section 1001.20 et seq., however, Hale was not
required to provide a proposed plan or one that would meet his
needs. (K.D., supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 28 [trial court
erroneously denied motion for developmental disability diversion
“under the misguided view that defendant was obligated to
provide a treatment plan”].)
The developmental disability diversion statute makes it the
trial court’s duty to “‘order the prosecutor, the probation
department, and the regional center to prepare reports on
specified aspects of the defendant’s case.’” (K.D., supra, 110
Cal.App.5th at p. 16.) In its report, the regional center must
identify a proposed diversion program, individually tailored to
the needs of the defendant and including treatment addressed to
the criminal offense charged. The report must also state whether
the proposed program is available through the regional
center. (Id. at pp. 16–17, 29–30.)
If the court found the regional center report noncompliant
with the statute, this was not a sufficient reason to deny
diversion. (K.D., supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at pp. 29–30 [regional
center’s report that did not include individually tailored proposed
diversion program and did not state whether proposed program
was available did not support denying diversion].) Additionally,
13
as the People point out, it does not appear that the court obtained
the required reports from the probation department or
prosecution. (§ 1001.22, subds. (b), (c).) As the court did not have
all the statutorily required reports, the court’s ruling was not an
exercise of informed discretion.
The People argue the trial court did not abuse its discretion
because there was no evidence that Hale’s borderline intellectual
functioning had any relationship to the charged offenses.
“[U]nlike other diversion statutes, section 1001.23,
subdivision (b) does not include a stand-alone requirement that
the defendant prove that his or her developmental disability was
a significant factor in the commission of the charged crime.”
(K.D., supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 24.) Rather, the relationship
between Hale’s developmental disability and the charged offenses
is a factor the court can consider in determining whether Hale
would benefit from diversion. (Ibid.)
Furthermore, we are not persuaded that there was no
evidence of any relationship between Hale’s developmental
disability and the charged offenses. Dr. Bowen explained that
Hale’s “low intellectual functioning” could intensify his mental
health symptoms and impair his judgment and decision making.
She opined that Hale’s cognitive development influenced his
impulsivity, mood instability, defiance, and substance use.
Dr. Bowen noted Hale’s records indicated he was under the
influence of drugs at the time of the alleged offenses.
“Remand is required so that the court can exercise
informed discretion with the information required by statute,
keeping in mind the ultimate question of whether, in light of the
statutorily-prescribed considerations, defendant is ‘a person who
would benefit by diversion.’” (K.D., supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at
14
pp. 31–32, fn. omitted.) The trial court’s exercise of discretion
must be informed by the rehabilitative purpose of the statute.
(Id. at p. 19.) To the extent the court determines the report
provided by Harbor Regional Center does not comply with
section 1001.22, the court shall order the regional center to
provide a new report that complies with the statute. The court
shall also order the probation department and prosecution to
provide the required reports for consideration at the hearing.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is conditionally reversed. The matter is
remanded to the trial court with directions to hold a new hearing
on Hale’s request for mental health diversion under
section 1001.35 et seq. and developmental disability diversion
under section 1001.20 et seq. in accordance with this opinion. If
the court determines that Hale qualifies for diversion, it may
grant diversion. If the trial court does not grant diversion, or if it
grants diversion but Hale does not successfully complete it, the
court shall reinstate the judgment.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
MORI, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
TAMZARIAN, J.
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