Filed 6/18/26 P. v. Guzman CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B345079
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA035024)
v.
MICHAEL ROBERT GUZMAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Jacqueline H. Lewis, Judge. Affirmed.
Robert Derham, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_____________________________
Michael Guzman appeals the trial court’s denial of his
petition for vacatur of his murder convictions and resentencing
pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1172.6 based on the trial court’s
finding that Guzman was ineligible for relief as a matter of law.
On appeal, this court appointed counsel to represent
Guzman. After examining the record, Guzman’s attorney filed an
opening brief raising no issues and asking that we follow the
procedures set forth in People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216
(Delgadillo). We invited Guzman to submit a supplemental brief.
Guzman submitted a five-page handwritten letter brief in
response. We limit our consideration to the issues raised in the
brief. (See Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232 [where a
defendant’s attorney finds no arguable issues in an appeal from
the denial of a resentencing petition and the defendant files a
supplemental brief, “the Court of Appeal is required to evaluate
the specific arguments presented in that brief and to issue a
written opinion,” but the question of whether to conduct an
independent review of the entire record is “wholly within the
court’s discretion”].) We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
PROCEEDINGS
In 1997, the jury found Guzman guilty of three counts of
first degree murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a), counts 3, 4 & 5), and
found true lying in wait and multiple murder special
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
circumstance allegations.2 (§ 190.2, subds. (a)(3) and (a)(15).) The
jury found true the allegations that the murders were committed
for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)),
and that a principal was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd.
(a)(1)). The jury found not true the allegations that Guzman
personally used a firearm in the commission of the murders.
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1).)
The trial court sentenced Guzman to three consecutive
sentences of life without the possibility of parole, plus
determinate terms for the remaining crimes and enhancements.
On appeal, another panel of this court vacated four three-
year enhancements on counts 2, 3, 4, and 5, and ordered the trial
court to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect a minimum
parole date of 15 years pursuant to section 186.22, subd. (b)(4),
stayed pending completion of the three life without parole
sentences. The appellate panel otherwise affirmed the judgment.
In 2024, Guzman petitioned for resentencing pursuant to
section 1172.6. The trial court appointed counsel.
The People filed a response opposing the petition arguing
that the jury was not instructed on any theory of imputed malice
or on felony murder. The trial court instructed the jury on
liability for murder as a co-conspirator, but the target offense was
murder. The court gave modified instructions on malice murder
to remove all definitions other than express malice and intent to
kill, and instructed on deliberate, willful, premeditated murder
2 The jury found Guzman not guilty of murder in count 2.
It found Guzman guilty of discharge of a firearm with gross
negligence (§ 246.3, count 1), and two counts of assault with a
firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2), counts 6 & 7), with associated
allegations.
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and direct aiding and abetting. The special circumstances
instruction required the jury to find an aider and abettor or co-
conspirator acted with intent to kill before it could find true the
special circumstances. The People attached the prior appellate
opinion, the court’s instructions to the jury, the verdicts, and
counsels’ closing arguments.
Appointed counsel filed a reply arguing that Guzman was
entitled to an evidentiary hearing because he was prosecuted
prior to the passage of Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.) and the gang evidence was not bifurcated from the
prosecution of the underlying crimes. The evidence used by the
People to prove the elements of the gang enhancement allowed
the jury to impute malice to Guzman. The reply emphasized that
the jury found not true the allegations that Guzman personally
used a firearm in the commission of the murders.
The trial court held a hearing and denied the petition based
on its finding that Guzman failed to present a prima facie case
for relief. The court found that the jury was not instructed on a
theory of murder that imputed malice to him. The special
circumstances instructions required the jury to find
premeditation and deliberation. The jury could not find the
special circumstances true if it did not find that Guzman acted
with intent to kill and aided, abetted, counseled, commanded,
induced, solicited, requested or assisted any actor in the
commission of murder in the first degree.
Guzman timely appealed.
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DISCUSSION
“Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate
Bill [No.] 1437 [(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.)] ‘to amend the felony
murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with
the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).)” (People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959.) “Except as stated in subdivision (e)
of Section 189, [which describes felony murder,] in order to be
convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice
aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based
solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)
“In addition to substantively amending sections 188 and 189 of
the Penal Code, Senate Bill [No.] 1437 added section 1170.95
[(now § 1172.6)], which provides a procedure for convicted
murderers who could not be convicted under the law as amended
to retroactively seek relief.” (Lewis, at p. 959.)
In his supplemental brief, Guzman contends that this court
must reverse the trial court’s order denying his section 1172.6
petition because the jury improperly based its finding that he
intended to kill on imputed malice through “ ‘Gang Cultural
theory.’ ” Guzman argues that the prosecution had insufficient
evidence of his mental state and relied instead upon generalized
evidence of social affiliation to prove intent to kill. However,
Guzman does not support this contention with evidence in the
record in the form of instructions that would allow the jury to
impute malice to him, or in the form of closing arguments made
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by the prosecutor to the jury that the gang evidence could serve
as a proxy for finding Guzman had an intent to kill. The
admission of gang evidence under these circumstances did not
invite or permit the jury to impute malice to Guzman. (See
People v. Burgos (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1, 23 [gang evidence may be
admissible at a bifurcated trial on the underlying charge].)
Guzman next contends that, although the special
circumstance findings required the jury to find intent to kill, the
jury’s not true finding on the allegation that he personally used a
firearm in the commission of the murders demonstrates that it
found him guilty under a theory of vicarious liability that
imputed malice to him—specifically direct aiding and abetting or
murder as a result of conspiracy to murder.
Guzman misapprehends the nature of direct aiding and
abetting and liability for murder as a co-conspirator in a
conspiracy to murder. Neither theory permits a finding of guilt
solely on the basis of another’s intent. Our Supreme Court has
explained that “[b]ecause aiders and abettors may be criminally
liable for acts not their own, cases have described their liability
as ‘vicarious.’ ” (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1116–
1117.) “But . . . the aider and abettor’s guilt for the intended
crime is not entirely vicarious. Rather, that guilt is based on a
combination of the direct perpetrator’s acts and the aider and
abettor’s own acts and own mental state.” (Id. at p. 1117, italics
omitted.) Likewise, a co-conspirator to a conspiracy to murder
must intend to agree to kill and intend to aid in the killing.
(People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 441.) Neither theory of
murder liability has been abrogated by the amendments Senate
Bill No. 1437 made to sections 188 and 189. Direct aiding and
abetting of murder is still a viable theory of liability (People v.
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Glukhoy (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 576, 591), as is murder as a result
of conspiracy when the target crime is murder (People v. Medrano
(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 177, 179).
Finally, Guzman requests that this court stay his appeal
and remand to the trial court to permit him to pursue discovery
and an evidentiary hearing pursuant to the Racial Justice Act
(RJA) and recently enacted Assembly Bill No. 1071 (2025–2026
Reg. Sess.). “Section 745 provides three vehicles by which a
defendant may raise an RJA claim. The defendant may raise an
RJA claim by motion (§ 745, subd. (b); see also, e.g., id., subd. (c)
[laying out procedure for litigating a motion ‘filed in the trial
court’]); may raise an RJA claim on direct appeal from the
conviction or sentence, provided the claim is based on the trial
record (id., subd. (b)); or may raise an RJA claim in a petition for
writ of habeas corpus (ibid.; see § 1473(e)).” (People v. Wilson
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 874, 948.) Section 745, subdivision (b) also
permits a defendant on direct appeal to move to stay the appeal
and request remand to the superior court to file an RJA motion.
The statute does not permit a defendant whose conviction is final
to move for a stay and remand when appealing from a denial of a
resentencing petition, however. Accordingly, we deny Guzman’s
request for stay and remand.
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DISPOSITION
The superior court’s order denying Guzman’s Penal Code
section 1172.6 petition for resentencing is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
WE CONCUR:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
BAKER, J.
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