Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

P. v. Gonzalez-Guerra CA2/1

Filed 10/15/26 P. v. Gonzalez-Guerra CA2/1
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 10/15/26 P. v. Gonzalez-Guerra CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B348156

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA119158)
v.

MARIA GONZALEZ-GUERRA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Richard M. Goul, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
Mher Cholakhyan, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven D. Matthews, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________
Maria Gonzalez-Guerra appeals from an order denying her
motion to vacate her conviction or sentence pursuant to Penal
Code section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) (section 1473.7(a)(1)), on
the ground of prejudicial error damaging her ability to
meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept
the immigration consequences of her no contest plea to one count
of grand theft of an automobile.1
After the parties filed their principal appellate briefs, the
Supreme Court issued its decision in People v. Hernandez (2026)
20 Cal.5th 598 (Hernandez), which provided guidance regarding
the application of section 1473.7(a)(1) and held that the evidence
before the court entitled the defendant to relief. (Id. at pp. 615-
629.) In a separate opinion, Justice Corrigan opined remand was
appropriate to allow further presentation of evidence. (Id. at
p. 635 (conc. & dis. opn. of Corrigan, J.).) The majority
responded: “To be sure, remand to the trial court for further
development of the record will be appropriate in many appeals
from denials of section 1473.7(a)(1) motions that are pending
when we issue our decision. . . . But remand is unnecessary
where, as here, the evidence in the record establishes the
defendant’s eligibility for relief.” (Id. at p. 621, fn. 4 (maj. opn. of
Groban, J.).)
Pursuant to Government Code section 68081, we requested
that each party file and serve a supplemental letter brief
addressing (1) how Hernandez is relevant to the parties’
arguments and (2) whether we should remand the matter to the
trial court for further development of the record.
In the parties’ supplemental briefs, Gonzalez-Guerra
argues Hernandez supports reversal and remand with directions

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
to allow further development of the record or, in the alternative,
directions to grant Gonzalez-Guerra relief on the existing record.
The Attorney General argues Hernandez is distinguishable to the
extent it held the evidence in that case entitled the defendant to
relief. The Attorney General takes no position regarding whether
we should remand for further development of the record, instead
only noting that “such a remand ‘would allow the defendant an
opportunity to make a fuller presentation of evidence with the
guidance [Hernandez] ha[s] provided in mind and would permit
the trial court to make a new ruling taking that additional
evidence into account.’ ” (Quoting Hernandez, supra, 20 Cal.5th
at p. 621, fn. 4.)
With Hernandez’s guidance, we conclude that the record
does not demonstrate prejudicial error under section 1473.7(a)(1)
but that remand is appropriate to allow Gonzalez-Guerra to
further develop the record. Accordingly, we reverse the order
denying Gonzalez-Guerra’s motion and remand the matter to the
trial court with directions to allow the parties to present
additional evidence and to rehear the motion in light of that
additional evidence, Hernandez, and other applicable law at the
time of rehearing. We need not consider Gonzalez-Guerra’s
arguments that the trial court misapplied pre-Hernandez law and
abused its discretion by refusing to allow oral testimony.

BACKGROUND
A. Gonzalez-Guerra pleaded no contest to one count of
grand theft auto.
The Los Angeles County District Attorney charged
Gonzalez-Guerra with five felony counts of grand theft of an

3
automobile (§§ 484, subd. (a), 487, subd. (d)(1)). A codefendant
was charged with the same counts, among others.2
In April 2022, at a plea hearing, the prosecutor placed a
negotiated disposition on the record, stating that Gonzalez-
Guerra would plead no contest to count 2 (grand theft auto) and
be placed on probation for two years with a condition requiring
her to serve 180 days in county jail. Gonzalez-Guerra’s
codefendant would also enter no contest pleas in this case and
two separate cases.
The trial court asked the prosecutor to “take the plea for
the court.” A Spanish interpreter assisted Gonzalez-Guerra
during the hearing. In response to questions by the prosecutor,
Gonzalez-Guerra and her codefendant indicated they accepted
their plea deals and waived their trial rights.
The prosecutor advised Gonzalez-Guerra and her
codefendant: “[I]f you are not a citizen of the United States, your
plea will cause you to be deported from the United States, denied
re-entry into the United States, and denied naturalization under
the terms of federal immigration law.”3

2 Under federal immigration law, grand theft auto is a

crime of moral turpitude. (People v. Curiel (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th
1160, 1173; U.S. v. Esparza-Ponce (9th Cir. 1999) 193 F.3d 1133,
1136-1137.) “[A] noncitizen without lawful status who is
convicted of a crime of moral turpitude is ineligible for admission
to the United States as well as cancellation of removal.” (Curiel,
at p. 1174.)
3 At the time of the plea hearing, former section 1016.5,

subdivision (a), provided: “Prior to acceptance of a plea of guilty
or nolo contendere . . . , the court shall administer the following
advisement on the record to the defendant: [¶] If you are not a

4
Gonzalez-Guerra answered “Yes” to each of the following
questions by the prosecutor (after her codefendant answered
“Yes” to the same questions): “[D]o you understand those
consequences, those immigration consequences?” “Have you
spoken about those consequences with your attorney?” “Knowing
those consequences, do you wish to go forward with this plea?”4
Gonzalez-Guerra pleaded no contest to count 2. Her plea
counsel, Anthony Kidd, concurred in the plea.
The trial court accepted Gonzalez-Guerra’s plea and
dismissed the remaining counts against her. Pursuant to the
plea deal, the trial court placed Gonzalez-Guerra on probation for
two years with a condition requiring her to serve 180 days in
county jail (with 72 days of custody credit).

citizen, you are hereby advised that conviction of the offense for
which you have been charged may have the consequences of
deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or
denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United
States.” Effective in 2026, the Legislature amended section
1016.5, subdivision (a), to require trial courts to deliver the
advisement “verbatim.” (Stats. 2025, ch. 666, § 1.)
4 At the hearing on Gonzalez-Guerra’s section 1473.7(a)(1)

motion, the trial court (a different judge from the judge who
presided over the plea hearing) stated that the transcript of the
plea hearing indicated Gonzalez-Guerra “twice” stated, during
two colloquies with the prosecutor, that she understood her plea’s
immigration consequences and had discussed them with her
attorney. The transcript indicates, however, that the first
colloquy was not with Gonzalez-Guerra but with her codefendant.

5
B. The trial court denied Gonzalez-Guerra’s motion to
vacate her conviction or sentence.
In February 2025, through new counsel, Gonzalez-Guerra
moved to vacate her conviction or sentence pursuant to section
1473.7(a)(1). The motion and Gonzalez-Guerra’s supporting
declaration indicated that the federal government had initiated
removal proceedings against her.
Gonzalez-Guerra declared she was born in Mexico in 1974,
had lived in the United States since “around 1989” (when she was
around 15 years old), and desired to apply for lawful permanent
residency. Her parents died in 2000 and 2001. She had 17
siblings, most of whom lived in Texas (she did not address where
her other siblings lived). One sibling was a naturalized United
States citizen and two were lawful permanent residents.
Gonzalez-Guerra worked as a cashier and volunteered with a
church. Her adult daughter lived with her.5
Regarding her plea, Gonzalez-Guerra declared: “I was
assigned a Bar Panel Attorney, named Anthony Kidd. Because I
had recently suffered a heart attack, (while incarcerated)
Attorney Kidd advised me to plead guilty. Mr. Kidd never asked
if I was an immigrant, citizen, or anything regarding my family
situation. At the time of the plea I was married to a U.S. Citizen.

5 Citing the declaration, Gonzalez-Guerra’s appellate briefs

state that her daughter is a United States citizen. The
declaration, however, did not address her daughter’s immigration
status or whether her daughter was born in the United States
(and thus a citizen by birth). The declaration, executed in
February 2025, stated that her daughter was then 36 years old,
indicating her daughter was born in 1988 or early 1989—
potentially before Gonzalez-Guerra began living in the United
States “around 1989.”

6
My husband is now deceased.” “I was never informed of the
specific immigration consequences of the plea.” Gonzalez-
Guerra’s declaration did not address whether she understood the
prosecutor’s advisement during the plea hearing about her plea’s
immigration consequences, or whether she would not have
entered her plea had she understood its immigration
consequences.
The record contains no written opposition to the motion. At
the hearing, the People argued Gonzalez-Guerra had failed to
establish a reasonable probability that she would have rejected
the plea if she had understood its immigration consequences.
The People moved a “rap sheet” into evidence and argued it
showed Gonzalez-Guerra had “numerous theft-related
convictions.” (The record does not contain that exhibit.) The
People also argued that during the plea hearing, the prosecutor
properly advised Gonzalez-Guerra of her plea’s immigration
consequences, and she indicated she understood them and had
discussed them with her plea counsel (Kidd).
Defense counsel conceded the record of the plea hearing
showed Gonzalez-Guerra affirmatively indicated she understood
her plea’s immigration consequences. Counsel argued Gonzalez-
Guerra’s declaration nevertheless established prejudicial error
because she declared Kidd never inquired about her immigration
status or marriage to a United States citizen, which marriage
allowed her to apply for lawful permanent residency. Counsel
argued Kidd therefore failed to fulfill his duty to advise Gonzalez-
Guerra about her plea’s specific immigration consequences in her
circumstances.
Defense counsel expressed a desire to call Gonzalez-Guerra
to testify. The trial court asked: “Is there something [in her

7
proposed testimony] that would not be in the declaration?”
Counsel responded that he did not want to “paint [him]self into a
corner by going any further” if the trial court credited Gonzalez-
Guerra’s declaration that Kidd did not discuss her immigration
status or her plea’s specific immigration consequences. The trial
court asked the People if they wished to cross-examine Gonzalez-
Guerra, and they said no.
The trial court stated: “The court doesn’t feel it necessary
for her to be called and cross-examined. The court’s going to
accept her statements. However, the court must judge this,
weigh her credibility based upon her crimes of moral turpitude of
which she has been convicted in this case and was convicted in
this case itself.” The court further stated that Kidd “is a highly
skilled attorney who has been representing criminal defendants
for many years in this county and been a very vigorous
advocate.”6
The trial court found that during the plea colloquy with the
prosecutor, Gonzalez-Guerra was “told point blank that if she
pled guilty, she would be deported.” The court further found that

6 We need not consider Gonzalez-Guerra’s argument that

the trial court prejudicially erred by considering, without
evidentiary support, Kidd’s skill and vigor in representing
criminal defendants. We note that on remand, the trial court
should base any consideration of the quality of Kidd’s
representation on properly admitted evidence. (Cf. Hernandez,
supra, 20 Cal.5th at p. 615 [“evidence related to the quality of
[plea] counsel’s representation of the defendant and the nature of
their interactions . . . may be contained in the record of the plea,
including [plea] counsel’s written and oral representations to the
court; in the defendant’s case file; or in declarations or testimony
by the defendant, [plea] counsel, witnesses, or immigration law
experts”].)

8
her statement during the colloquy that she had discussed her
plea’s immigration consequences with her attorney (Kidd)
contradicted her declaration that she and Kidd had not discussed
those consequences.
The trial court denied the motion. Gonzalez-Guerra filed a
timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

A. Section 1473.7(a)(1)
1. Basic principles
“To establish eligibility to withdraw a guilty plea under
section 1473.7(a)(1), a defendant must show, by a preponderance
of the evidence, (1) ‘error damaging [the defendant’s] ability to
meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept
the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a
conviction or sentence’ and (2) that the damage resulted in
prejudice.” (Hernandez, supra, 20 Cal.5th at p. 613.) “Error may
take the form of the defendant’s lack of a meaningful
understanding of the ‘actual or potential adverse immigration
consequences’ of their plea; the defendant’s subjective
misunderstanding or ignorance that damaged their ability to
‘defend against’ these consequences; or the defendant’s failure to
‘knowingly accept’ these consequences.” (Id. at p. 621, fn. 4.) “A
defendant establishes prejudice by showing that there is a
‘reasonable probability’ that they would not have entered the plea
if they had ‘correctly understood its actual or potential
immigration consequences’ and their options for defending
against those consequences.” (Id. at p. 626.)
“Because the burden is on the defendant to establish error
and because courts must consider the totality of the

9
circumstances in determining whether the defendant has
satisfied this burden, it will generally be in a defendant’s interest
to create a robust record. (See [People v. Espinoza (2023) 14
Cal.5th 311,] 325 [‘The more robust and inclusive a record, the
greater the opportunity for effective persuasion and meaningful
judicial review’].) However, ‘no specific kind of evidence is a
prerequisite to relief.’ ” (Hernandez, supra, 20 Cal.5th at p. 618.)
In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a section 1473.7(a)(1)
motion, “we independently review the evidence in the record.”
(Hernandez, supra, 20 Cal.5th at p. 613.) “[W]e do not defer to
those findings [by the trial court] that are based on written
materials, since we are similarly situated to the trial court when
interpreting a ‘cold record.’ ” (Ibid.) “And we may ‘ “ ‘reach a
different conclusion [from the trial court] on an independent
examination of the evidence . . . even where the evidence is
conflicting’ ” ’ and the trial court’s conclusions are based in part
on its assessment of ‘ “ ‘the credibility of witnesses [it] heard and
observed.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) “Ultimately, it is for us to decide,
exercising our independent judgment, whether the evidence,
taken as a whole, establishes ‘prejudicial error’ damaging [the
defendant’s] ability to meaningfully understand the immigration
consequences of the charges to which [the defendant] pled, or [the
defendant’s] ability to defend against those consequences or to
knowingly accept them.” (Ibid.)

2. Hernandez’s guidance
As the Hernandez majority recognized, its “description of
the evidence a defendant may use to demonstrate error” provided
“guidance” to courts and litigants. (Hernandez, supra, 20 Cal.5th
at p. 621, fn. 4, citing id. at pp. 615-617.) That description
includes the following principles:

10
“A defendant may establish error by showing that they
entered a plea without a meaningful understanding of the ‘actual
or potential adverse immigration consequences’ of the resulting
conviction or sentence. (§ 1473.7(a)(1).) For example, a
defendant may show that their attorney provided incomplete or
inaccurate advice about the plea’s immigration consequences or
did not effectively communicate the immigration consequences,
so the defendant entered the plea without a meaningful
understanding of them. (§ 1473.7(a)(1).) Alternatively, a
defendant may show error in the form of subjective
misunderstanding or ignorance that damaged their ability to
‘defend against’ these consequences. (§ 1473.7(a)(1).) For
example, a defendant may show that they were unaware of
possible alternative approaches to their defense that could have
mitigated the immigration consequences or led to an
immigration-safe disposition. Such approaches may include
alternative pleas or sentences they could have attempted to
negotiate or defenses they could have raised at trial. [Citations.]
Finally, a defendant may establish error by showing that they did
not ‘knowingly accept’ the consequences of their conviction.
(§ 1473.7(a)(1).) For example, evidence that a defendant sought
to withdraw their plea when they learned of its consequences,
that they applied for an immigration benefit after entering their
plea, or that they contested their removal can support a showing
that the defendant did not knowingly accept the immigration
consequences of their conviction.” (Hernandez, supra, 20 Cal.5th
at pp. 614-615.)
“Because the error inquiry focuses on the defendant’s
subjective understanding, courts evaluating section 1473.7(a)(1)
motions must look beyond the record of the plea and consider the

11
totality of the circumstances bearing on the inquiry.”
(Hernandez, supra, 20 Cal.5th at p. 615.) “While the focus of the
error inquiry is on the defendant’s subjective understanding, a
defendant’s bare assertion that they did not understand the
immigration consequences or the options available to them to
defend against those consequences is insufficient to establish
error; the assertion must be corroborated by objective evidence.”
(Ibid.; see also id. at p. 621, fn. 4 [“the error determination turns
on the defendant’s state of mind as established by the defendant’s
testimony about their subjective understanding and corroborated
by objective evidence”].)
“Such [objective] evidence may include evidence related to
the quality of defense counsel’s representation of the defendant
and the nature of their interactions. . . . Relevant evidence
includes evidence of whether counsel inquired about the
defendant’s current immigration status and plans to apply for
immigration benefits; whether counsel fully advised the
defendant of definite and potential immigration consequences of
the conviction and sentence that would result from the plea;
whether counsel’s advice about the immigration consequences of
the plea was accurate; whether counsel informed defendant of
potential alternative pleas that would have eliminated or
mitigated the immigration consequences; whether counsel
attempted to negotiate such a plea with the prosecution; and
whether counsel discussed with the defendant the advantages
and disadvantages of going to trial, including possible defenses to
the charges.” (Hernandez, supra, 20 Cal.5th at pp. 615-616, fn.
omitted.)
“Relevant evidence also includes evidence of the trial
court’s efforts to confirm that the defendant understood the

12
immigration consequences of entering a guilty plea and had an
opportunity to discuss them with their attorney and tailor their
defense strategy accordingly. [Citation.] Such evidence may be
found in the written record, including the advisements and
findings contained in the plea form, and the transcript of the plea
proceedings, including any discussion related to immigration
consequences in the plea colloquy.” (Hernandez, supra, 20
Cal.5th at p. 616.) “Evidence that the trial court gave the
defendant the generic advisement of immigration consequences
required by section 1016.5 is relevant because it tends to show
that the defendant was made aware of the possibility that a
conviction could have serious immigration consequences and the
need to consult with an attorney about any immigration-related
concerns; however, such evidence does not alone show that the
defendant received complete and accurate advice and
meaningfully understood that advice.” (Ibid.; see also id. at p.
624 [“That a court advised a defendant, when taking their plea,
that their offense could or would have serious immigration
consequences is . . . not dispositive of the error determination”].)
“And finally, relevant evidence includes evidence of the
defendant’s subjective understanding, or lack thereof, of the
immigration consequences of the plea and their options for
avoiding or mitigating those consequences. The most direct
evidence of a defendant’s subjective understanding consists of the
defendant’s own statements to the court when entering the plea
and in declarations or testimony given in support of their section
1473.7(a)(1) motion. (See [People v. Carrillo (2024) 101
Cal.App.5th 1,] 17 [defendant ‘is the only one with direct access
to his state of mind’].) A defendant’s testimony that they did not
understand the immigration consequences or their options for

13
defending against those consequences may be corroborated by
evidence of the defendant’s priorities relevant to the plea. This
includes evidence of the defendant’s immigration status and
prospects of obtaining immigration benefits; evidence of how long
the defendant has lived in the United States, at what age they
came here, and the strength of their ties to their country of
origin; and evidence of the nature and extent of the defendant’s
ties to the United States and their family and community in this
country.” (Hernandez, supra, 20 Cal.5th at p. 617.)
Although Hernandez discussed prejudice in less depth than
error, it observed that “[e]vidence relevant to the error inquiry
will often also be relevant to the prejudice inquiry.” (Hernandez,
supra, 20 Cal.5th at p. 627.) Thus, Hernandez’s guidance
regarding error also provides guidance regarding prejudice.

B. Remand is appropriate to allow Gonzalez-Guerra to
further develop the record.
“Section 1260, by its terms, confers authority on appellate
courts to ‘remand the cause to the trial court for such further
proceedings as may be just under the circumstances.’ ” (People v.
Wilson (2024) 16 Cal.5th 874, 948, quoting § 1260; see also Code
Civ. Proc., § 906 [similar for civil appeals].) “ ‘It is familiar
appellate practice to remand causes for further proceedings
without deciding the merits, where justice demands that course
in order that some defect in the record may be supplied. Such a
remand may be made to permit further evidence to be
taken . . . .’ ” (Carter v. California Dept. of Veterans Affairs (2006)
38 Cal.4th 914, 931.)
As noted, Hernandez stated that “remand to the trial court
for further development of the record will be appropriate in many
appeals from denials of section 1473.7(a)(1) motions that are

14
pending when we issue our decision.” (Hernandez, supra, 20
Cal.5th at p. 621, fn. 4.) For the reasons explained below, we
conclude this is one of those appeals.
The parties and the trial court did not have the benefit of
Hernandez in the proceedings below. The trial court’s ruling
focused on the prosecutor’s colloquy with Gonzalez-Guerra at the
plea hearing, during which Gonzalez-Guerra stated that (1) she
understood her plea would cause her to be deported and denied
re-entry and naturalization; and (2) she had discussed those
immigration consequences with her plea counsel (Kidd). Based
on that colloquy, the trial court discredited Gonzalez-Guerra’s
declaration that Kidd had not discussed her plea’s specific
immigration consequences with her, and impliedly found that she
understood those consequences.
As Hernandez subsequently clarified, however, “[b]ecause
the error inquiry focuses on the defendant’s subjective
understanding, courts evaluating section 1473.7(a)(1) motions
must look beyond the record of the plea and consider the totality
of the circumstances bearing on the inquiry.” (Hernandez, supra,
20 Cal.5th at p. 615, italics added.) Particularly in light of
Gonzalez-Guerra’s declaration that Kidd never inquired about
her immigration status, the plea colloquy “does not alone show
that [Gonzalez-Guerra] received complete and accurate advice
and meaningfully understood that advice.” (Id. at p. 616; see also
id. at p. 615 [“Relevant evidence includes evidence of whether
counsel inquired about the defendant’s current immigration
status”].)
Although not dispositive, Gonzalez-Guerra’s statement
during the plea colloquy that she understood her plea would
cause her to be deported and denied re-entry and naturalization

15
is direct evidence that she subjectively understood her plea’s
immigration consequences. (Hernandez, supra, 20 Cal.5th at
p. 617 [“The most direct evidence of a defendant’s subjective
understanding consists of the defendant’s own statements to the
court when entering the plea and in declarations or testimony
given in support of their section 1473.7(a)(1) motion” (italics
added)]; see also People v. Patterson (2017) 2 Cal.5th 885, 899
[“whether the defendant acknowledged understanding the
[section 1016.5] advisement . . . bear[s] on the defendant’s state of
mind at the time of the plea, [and] may assist courts in
evaluating a later claim that the defendant would not have
entered the plea had he or she understood the plea would render
the defendant deportable”].)
No evidence in the record directly impeaches Gonzalez-
Guerra’s statement during the plea hearing about her subjective
understanding. Gonzalez-Guerra’s declaration did not assert she
misunderstood her plea’s immigration consequences or the
prosecutor’s advisement that her plea would cause her to be
deported and denied re-entry and naturalization. Nor did the
declaration assert Gonzalez-Guerra would not have entered her
plea had she understood the immigration consequences.
Even had the declaration made those assertions, they
would have been insufficient to establish prejudicial error unless
objective evidence corroborated them. (See Hernandez, supra, 20
Cal.5th at pp. 615, 627.) Aside from identifying Gonzalez-
Guerra’s ties to the United States, her declaration did not
address most types of objective evidence identified in Hernandez.
(See id. at pp. 615-618, 627.)
Thus, we conclude that unlike the evidentiary record in
Hernandez, the record before us does not render remand

16
unnecessary by establishing prejudicial error in the first
instance. (See Hernandez, supra, 20 Cal.5th at p. 621, fn. 4; id.
at pp. 619-620, 627-628 [objective evidence, including defendant’s
voluntarily presenting herself to immigration authorities,
corroborated defendant’s testimony she did not understand she
would be deported and would not have entered her plea had she
so understood].)
In short, guided by Hernandez’s statement that remand
will be appropriate in “many” appeals pending when Hernandez
issued, we conclude remand is appropriate in this case to “allow
the defendant an opportunity to make a fuller presentation of
evidence with the guidance [Hernandez has] provided in mind
and [to] permit the trial court to make a new ruling taking that
additional evidence into account.” (Hernandez, supra, 20 Cal.5th
at p. 621, fn. 4; see also People v. Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 325 [“The more robust and inclusive a record, the greater the
opportunity for effective persuasion and meaningful judicial
review”].)

DISPOSITION
The order denying Gonzalez-Guerra’s section 1473.7(a)(1)
motion is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court
with directions to allow the parties to present additional evidence

17
and to rehear the motion in light of that additional evidence,
Hernandez, and other applicable law at the time of rehearing.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

M. KIM, J.

We concur:

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

WEINGART, J.

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