Filed 9/23/26 P. v. Gonzalez CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B343827
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA100818)
v.
RICARDO GONZALEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Judith L. Meyer, Judge. Affirmed.
Christina Vanarelli, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Gary A. Lieberman,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Ricardo Gonzalez (defendant)
appeals from a 2025 resentencing order. In his opening brief, for
the first time, defendant contends the trial court violated the
California Racial Justice Act (RJA) at his original sentencing in
2019. We conclude defendant’s claim regarding events that took
place during his original sentencing hearing has been forfeited.
As defendant has not alleged any issues arising from his 2025
resentencing hearing, we affirm the order.
In 2018, defendant and his codefendant were convicted of
the murder of Enrique Lopez, Jr. (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a);
count 1), attempted murder of David Osuna (§§ 187, subd. (a),
664; count 2), and attempted murder of Jerry Frazier (§§ 187,
subd. (a), 664; count 4). As to count 1, the jury found true two
special circumstance allegations—that the murder was
perpetrated by means of discharging a firearm from a motor
vehicle at persons outside the vehicle with the intent to cause
death (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(21)) and that defendant and his
codefendant killed Lopez, Jr., while they were active participants
in a criminal street gang and to further the activities of the gang
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)). As to counts 1, 2, and 4, the jury found
true allegations that defendant and his codefendant committed
the offense for the benefit of a gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)) and that
a principal discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury
(§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)). The jury also convicted defendant
of transportation for sale of a controlled substance (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11379, subd. (a); count 8) and possession of a controlled
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2
substance with a firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd.
(a); count 9).
Defendant was sentenced to life without the possibility of
parole (LWOP) plus 55 years to life. In 2022, we vacated the
gang-murder special-circumstance allegation and the gang
enhancement and the gang-related firearm enhancement as to
counts 1, 2 and 4. We remanded the matter to the trial court for
further proceedings. The judgment was affirmed in all other
respects. (People v. Gonzalez (Nov. 30, 2022, B302834) [nonpub.
opn.].)
In January 2025, the trial court held a resentencing
hearing. Ahead of the hearing, defense counsel2 filed a
resentencing motion asking the court to strike the “shooting from
a vehicle” special circumstance and sentence defendant to an
indeterminate life sentence. In support of the motion, counsel
attached defendant’s mitigation report originally submitted as
part of his “Franklin Proceeding.” The People indicated they
would not retry defendant on the gang allegations or the gang-
murder special circumstance. The court explained it was unable
to consider the defense request to strike the remaining special
circumstance based on section 1385.1. The court also indicated,
even if the court had discretion to strike the allegation, it would
not.
The court struck the firearm enhancement, finding it to be
“duplicative” of the allegation that the murder occurred by use of
a gun. As to count 1, the court sentenced defendant to LWOP.
As to counts 2 and 4, the court sentenced defendant to life with
2 Defendant was represented by Murray Meyer at trial and
again for purposes of his 2025 resentencing.
3
the possibility of parole after seven years, and as to counts 8 and
9, the court sentenced defendant to the middle term of three
years.3 The court ordered counts 8 and 9 to run concurrent to the
sentence imposed in count 1.
Defendant timely appealed.
Defendant’s only contention on appeal is that the trial court
violated the RJA at the time of his 2019 sentencing. Specifically,
defendant argues, the trial court’s statement, “these guys went
hunting. They are savages who were hunting for pr[e]y” was a
per se violation because it “directly label[ed] him an animal.”
Respondent contends defendant’s claim is moot because he
has been resentenced, his claim was forfeited because he failed to
bring the claim “as soon as practicable,” and the RJA was not
violated or, if it was, any violation was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. To support the contention that defendant’s
claim has been forfeited, respondent relies on People v. Lashon
(2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 804 (Lashon), People v. Quintero (2024)
107 Cal.App.5th 1060 (Quintero), People v. Corbi (2024) 106
Cal.App.5th 25 (Corbi), and People v. Singh (2024) 103
Cal.App.5th 76. Presenting no authority, defendant contends his
claim has not been forfeited because his “trial counsel, Murray
Meyer, did not represent [him] in Gonzalez I[, his direct appeal,
and a]t the time of the 2025 resentencing, there would have been
no obvious reason for Mr. Meyer to have obtained the transcript
of the 2019 sentencing.” As such, defendant asserts he “has
3 Defendant was originally sentenced to the upper term of
four years on each count 8 and 9.
4
raised his RJA claim as soon as practicable after discovering the
violation.”4 We disagree and find defendant forfeited his claim.
Effective January 1, 2021, the RJA permits a criminal
defendant to challenge a conviction or sentence on the ground it
was obtained “on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin.”
(§ 745, subd. (a).) “When it was first passed, the RJA applied
only prospectively, to cases in which judgment had not yet been
entered as of the [RJA]’s effective date ….” (People v. Wilson
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 874, 946.) “But in 2022, the Legislature
extended the [RJA] to additional categories of cases, effective at
various points over the next several years.” (Ibid.) Relevant
here, the 2022 amendments, which became effective January 1,
2023, made the RJA retroactively applicable to all cases in which
the judgments were not final. (Wilson, at p. 946; Lashon, supra,
98 Cal.App.5th at p. 810.) Thus the RJA applied to defendant’s
case as of January 2023, two years before his January 2025
resentencing hearing. (Lashon, at p. 810.)
An RJA claim may be raised on direct appeal from
conviction or sentence if the claim is based on the trial record.
(§ 745, subd. (b).) However, such claims are still subject to
appellate rules of forfeiture. (Lashon, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 810–811.) In Lashon, the court observed the Legislature “did
not include any language indicating a section 745 claim could be
presented on direct appeal for the first time.” (Id. at p. 812.)
Lashon also noted the Legislature included a waiver provision,
providing that an RJA motion may be deemed waived if not
4 We note, defendant requested a stay of this appeal to
“remand to the superior court to file a[n] [RJA] motion” (see
§ 745, subd. (b)), but this court denied the request.
5
“made as soon as practicable upon the defendant learning of the
alleged violation.” (§ 745, subd. (c); see Lashon, at p. 813.)
Here, as noted, Meyer was defendant’s attorney during his
2019 trial and sentencing and again during his 2025
resentencing. Therefore Meyer would have been aware of the
grounds for an RJA claim in the trial court and could have
brought an RJA motion prior to or during the 2025 resentencing.
He did not. We find defendant’s claim there would have been no
reason to review the 2019 sentencing transcript in preparation
for the 2025 resentencing is unavailing. First, as noted, Meyer
was present for the 2019 sentencing hearing, and second, the idea
that counsel would fail to review the 16-page sentencing
transcript in preparation for the upcoming resentencing hearing
is unpersuasive. Thus, because the proper time to bring the RJA
claim in the trial court would have been any time after January
2023, defendant “forfeited [his] RJA claim by failing to raise it in
the trial court.” (Quintero, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 1077,
citing Lashon, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 813.) Moreover, “had
defense counsel presented the RJA claim to the trial court as soon
as practicable, the defense could have pursued ‘a remedy specific
to the [potential] violation’ much sooner”—specifically, at the
time of his resentencing. (Corbi, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 42,
citing § 745, subd. (e).) The claim is forfeited.5
5 We note, defendant is not without remedy, as he may raise
claims concerning the RJA in a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
(Lashon, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 817; see § 745, subd. (b).)
We express no opinion on the merits of defendant’s claim.
6
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s orders upon resentencing are affirmed.
CHAVEZ, J.
We concur:
LUI, P. J.
GOORVITCH, J.
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