Filed 9/18/26 P. v. Gomez CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A174335
v.
(San Mateo County Super.
MARIO EDWIN GOMEZ, Ct. No. 16SF013151A)
Defendant and Appellant.
In 2019, Mario Edwin Gomez pled no contest to offenses and sentence
enhancements related to his abuse of his wife, Jane Doe, in exchange for a
stipulated 20-year prison term. Years later, he petitioned for resentencing
based on his military service-related post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
and substance abuse or, in the alternative, dismissal of a five-year sentence
enhancement for a prior felony conviction; the trial court denied both
requests. (Pen. Code, §§ 1170.91, 1385; undesignated statutory references
are to this code.) He appeals, arguing the court failed to consider his service-
related trauma as a mitigating factor or conduct an individualized
assessment regarding his suitability for resentencing. He also argues the
court failed to consider other ameliorative sentencing statutes or properly
consider his request to dismiss his prior felony enhancement. We affirm.
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BACKGROUND
Between 2004 and 2016, Gomez was convicted of offenses related to
separate assaults on Doe. In 2005, he pled guilty to felony assault with force
likely to produce great bodily injury for punching her in the face and
stomach, kicking her legs, and dragging her by her hair. He was sentenced to
three years of probation. In 2008, he pled guilty to inflicting corporal injury
on a spouse for punching Doe in the forehead, thigh, and pulling her hair,
and he received a suspended sentence, three years probation, and nine
months in county jail. In 2011, he pled no contest to violating a domestic
violence protective order. In December 2014, he was convicted of felony
assault with a deadly weapon and inflicting corporal injury for stabbing Doe
in the leg with a pocketknife, resulting in two years in prison.
While on parole, Gomez strangled and threatened to kill Doe in 2016.
He beat her and struck her in the back of her head with a metal object,
resulting in rib fractures and bleeding in her skull. In February 2019, he
pled no contest to infliction of corporal injury on a spouse within seven years
of a prior conviction (§ 273.5, subd. (f)(1)) and two counts of misdemeanor
contempt of court for violating a protective order (§ 166, subd. (c)(1)). He also
admitted having one prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1) & (b),
1170.12, subds. (b), (c)(1)) and committing corporal injury and assault by
inflicting great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)). The trial court imposed an
aggregate stipulated 20-year prison term — the upper term of five years for
corporal injury, doubled for his prior strike conviction and enhanced by five
years for inflicting great bodily injury, and five years for his prior serious
conviction.
In 2023, Gomez petitioned for resentencing under section 1170.91,
claiming he suffers from ongoing mental health problems, including PTSD
2
and substance abuse, as a result of his military service. In support, he
included an assessment by a licensed social worker and a clinical
psychologist, diagnosing him with PTSD based on incidents that occurred
while he was in the U.S. Navy. In one, sailors grabbed him, took his pants
off, and sexually assaulted him with a grease gun. They applied an anti-rust
paint to his genitals and legs, resulting in chemical burns. In another, he
observed a friend dying from being electrocuted on a ship. The Department
of Veteran Affairs found him completely disabled due to the severity of his
symptoms, including unprovoked irritability, depression, and impaired
impulse control. The psychologist also diagnosed him with major depressive
disorder and alcohol use disorder, the result of binge drinking to cope with
this psychological distress. He opined Gomez’s disorders caused distorted
thinking and impaired judgment, resulting in aggressive outbursts, such as
criminal conduct.
The psychologist further noted that Gomez actively engaged with
behavioral health treatment, including structured psychotherapy and
medications, resulting in his PTSD and depressive disorder being in
remission. In addition, he attended Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) and
Narcotics Anonymous meetings. During his incarceration, Gomez attended
college classes, completed an associate’s degree, and was working towards a
bachelor’s degree. A proposed reentry plan included psychiatric and
behavioral health treatment, including psychotropic medication if needed,
abstaining from alcohol and substances, and community engagement with
other veterans and volunteering. He accepted responsibility for his offenses,
acknowledging the lack of justification for his actions and the gravity of the
harm he caused. According to the psychologist, Gomez’s risk of reoffending
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was low, given his older age, and his plans to engage with behavioral
treatment upon release.
The prosecutor opposed the petition, arguing Gomez’s positive behavior
and active programming were relatively recent, noting that his rehabilitative
efforts only began once he started pursuing resentencing relief. It also
reminded the trial court of the long period of violence against Doe, who
continued to fear Gomez. According to the prosecutor, Doe believed she
would need to relocate if he was released.
After a hearing, the trial court found Gomez eligible based on his
disorders related to military service but unsuitable for resentencing and
denied the petition.1 It concluded the gravity of the instant offense, the
lengthy history of domestic violence with the same victim, his poor
performance on probation and parole — including his committing the instant
offense while on parole — and Doe’s ongoing fear of him outweighed his
service-related trauma and the limited rehabilitative evidence. It further
found dismissing his enhancements was not in the interests of justice based
on his “ ‘incredibly harmful and dangerous conduct,’ ” violent pattern, and the
danger he presents to public safety and Doe.
DISCUSSION
I.
Gomez contends the trial court erred by finding him unsuitable for
resentencing under section 1170.91. We discern no error.
1 The trial court originally denied the petition in August 2023, which
Gomez appealed. We reversed that decision because the court improperly
found him ineligible for consideration for resentencing due to his stipulated
sentence. (People v. Gomez (Mar. 21, 2025, A168710) [nonpub. opn.] 2025 WL
879996.)
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As of 2015, courts must consider “as mitigating factors weighing in
favor of a low-term determinate sentence, any trauma, substance abuse, and
mental health problems caused by a defendant’s service in the United States
military.” (People v. Estrada (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 839, 841; § 1170.91,
subd. (a); Stats. 2014, ch. 163, § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2015.) Any service member
currently serving a felony sentence may petition for resentencing if the court
did not consider those mitigating factors related to military service at the
time of sentencing. (§ 1170.91, subd. (b)(1).) The court must first assess
whether the defendant is eligible for resentencing — “whether the petitioner
may be suffering from a qualifying disorder from his military service and that
circumstance was not considered as a mitigating factor at his original
sentencing hearing.” (People v. Hayde (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 587, 597
(Hayde).) Upon making an eligibility finding, the court must make an
individualized determination regarding the defendant’s suitability for
resentencing — whether resentencing the defendant to a lesser term is in the
interests of justice. (Ibid.) This latter determination is discretionary and
must not be made in an “arbitrary or capricious manner” or be based “on
improper considerations.” (Ibid.) We review the court’s decision for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 988.)
Defendants have the burden of affirmatively demonstrating the court
misunderstood its sentencing discretion or considered impermissible factors
when making its determination. (Id., at p. 989.)
Gomez contends the trial court failed to consider his service-related
trauma as a mitigating factor under section 1170.91. The record
demonstrates otherwise. Before his resentencing hearing, he filed briefs
accompanied by reports from a licensed clinical psychologist and social
worker, discussing his various psychological evaluations, diagnoses,
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rehabilitation, prison disciplinary record, and reentry plan. At the hearing,
his counsel emphasized this information in addition to discussing the nexus
between his service-related trauma and offenses. The court expressly cited
section 1170.91 when determining his eligibility for resentencing. Indeed, it
found he was diagnosed with PTSD, depressive disorder, and substance use
disorder as a result of his military service. (Hayde, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th
at p. 597 [“section 1170.91 turns on whether the defendant’s mental disorders
are related to his military service, not whether those disorders were related
to his criminal conduct”].)
Turning to “suitability, after an individualized assessment, [it found]
that reduction is not in the interest of justice” because this service-related
trauma was outweighed by other factors. This constitutes “affirmative
evidence . . . that the trial court knew” service-related trauma was a
mitigating factor that must be assessed when making a section 1170.91
resentencing determination. (People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042.)
Gomez fails to present any affirmative evidence the court was unaware of or
failed to follow the applicable law. (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler
(2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 398.)
Relying on Hayde, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th 587, Gomez insists the trial
court treated his service-related mitigation in a perfunctory manner — two
brief paragraphs in its decision — when compared to its discussion of his
underlying offense and criminal history. His reliance is misplaced. In
Hayde, the trial court made a “sweeping, conclusory statement that it had
‘considered any and all discretionary and/or ameliorative laws and given
weight to factors that may apply to the defendant’s case,’ ” but “it did not
identify what factors arising from the new ameliorative statutes it had ‘given
weight to’ or explain how it had weighed them or why it concluded they were
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outweighed by other factors.” (Id., at p. 599.) Here, in contrast, the court
expressly weighed the relevant factors as required under section 1170.91.
Nothing required the court — nor does Gomez identify anything — to assign
any specific weight to his service-related trauma.
Gomez also contends the trial court failed to conduct an individualized
assessment of his mitigating circumstances — that is, assessing him, “his
offenses, and the public interest.” (Hayde, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 597.)
Not so. The court discussed his mental health disorders, lack of a
disciplinary record while in prison, completion of coursework, and
participation in AA programming. (Compare with id., at p. 598 [trial court
expressly refused to consider defendant’s “exemplary rehabilitation efforts
during his lengthy incarceration”].) It then weighed those mitigating factors
against the seriousness of his underlying offense and criminal history, both
which Gomez concedes are relevant. The court highlighted a pattern of
escalating violence against Doe, including weapon use, multiple violations of
protective orders, and his commission of the instant offense while on parole.
It noted the instant offense — a two-day assault involving punching,
strangling, kicking, and hitting Doe in the head with a metal object —
resulted in serious injuries and her ongoing fear of him. (Compare with id.,
at p. 599 [trial court overlooked defendant’s offense was a nonviolent,
possession-related offense that resulted in a 20-year sentence mainly
attributable to a prior strike offense].) After conducting this assessment, the
court concluded a reduction in sentence was not in the interests of justice.
We reject Gomez’s remaining arguments. Nothing prohibited the trial
court from weighing his rehabilitation efforts against his offense, contrary to
his assertions. (Hayde, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 598 [“Resentencing
decisions necessarily encompass a wide range of factors, including ‘ “any
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pertinent circumstances which have arisen since the prior sentence was
imposed” ’ ”], italics added.) Nor was the court required to expressly assess
his current dangerousness based on the psychologist’s statements and
academic research on recidivism. Nothing in Hayde — his cited authority —
supports this assertion. More importantly, he fails to identify anything in the
record suggesting that the court did not consider this information. (People v.
Ramirez, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 1042.) And substantial evidence supports
the court’s finding that his positive post-sentencing programming was “in line
with when” he applied for resentencing relief. Though he stated at the
resentencing hearing that he had been in AA for seven years — after
committing the instant offense — no record evidence addressed resources
used during his prior prison terms. Many of his rehabilitative achievement
credits accrued after he petitioned for resentencing. The court acknowledged
his current positive rehabilitative record, which includes obtaining an
associate and bachelor’s degree, but juxtaposed it against his relatively
recent period of incarceration since 2019. As the court noted, that time did
not exceed the amount of time Doe was victimized by Gomez’s actions.
Viewing the evidence most favorably to judgment, the court could reasonably
infer that his positive behavior was relatively recent while his offenses
against Doe spanned decades. (Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001)
90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1100.)
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the
petition for resentencing under section 1170.91.
II.
Gomez argues the trial court failed to properly apply section 1170 —
articulating the presumption for imposing the low term of imprisonment
where psychological trauma contributed to a criminal offense — and section
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1385 — authorizing dismissal of enhancements in the interests of justice.
Having reviewed the record, we disagree. (People v. Superior Court (Frezier)
(2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 652, 659 [de novo standard of review for sentencing
issues of law]; People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376–377 [abuse of
discretion standard of review for sentencing decisions].)
First, where there are three possible terms of imprisonment for an
offense, “the court shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of a
sentence not to exceed the middle term.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1).) Courts “shall
order imposition of the lower term” if any of certain enumerated factors, such
as psychological or childhood trauma, contributed to the commission of the
offense. (Id., subd. (b)(6)(A).) But imposing the lower term is not required.
(People v. Flores (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1039.) A higher term is
authorized if “the court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh
the mitigating circumstances [so] that imposition of the lower term would be
contrary to the interests of justice.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6); People v. Salazar
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 426 (Salazar).)
The trial court fulfilled its duty under section 1170. Pursuant to that
statute, Gomez requested a one-year reduction in his five-year aggravated
sentence for his corporal injury conviction — the mid-term sentence was four
years — arguing his psychological trauma contributed to his offense. The
court expressly considered section 1170, subdivision (b) and his trauma, but
it determined the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating
circumstance. (Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 426.) It cited the gravity of
the instant offense, which involved a weapon and resulted in great bodily
harm (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1), (a)(2)); the lengthy history of
domestic violence against the same victim; the fact that he committed the
instant offense while on parole (id., rule 4.421(b)(4)); and his poor
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performance while on probation and parole (id., rule 4.421 (b)(5)) — all
unchallenged findings. The court thereafter concluded retention of the
sentence was appropriate. It was “fully aware of the scope of its discretionary
powers,” it “carefully considered [Gomez’s] arguments, addressed the relevant
factors, and arrived at a conclusion that was neither arbitrary nor irrational.”
(Salazar, at p. 425; People v. Mathis (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 359, 370, review
granted Aug. 13, 2025, S291628.) Given its findings, imposing the higher
term was not an abuse of discretion. (Salazar, at p. 426.)
Second, we reject Gomez’s assertion that the trial court improperly
analyzed whether to dismiss his enhancements under section 1385 in a
conclusory manner. Courts “shall dismiss” an enhancement “if it is in the
furtherance of justice to do so,” subject to certain exceptions. (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(1).) Whether dismissal of an enhancement is in furtherance of justice is a
discretionary determination. (Id., subd. (c)(1)–(3).) When exercising its
discretion, the court “shall consider and afford great weight” to certain
“mitigating circumstances,” such as whether the offenses were connected to
mental illness or childhood trauma, if proven by the defendant. (Id., subd.
(c)(2).) “Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs
greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that
dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety” — i.e., a
“likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical
injury or other serious danger to others.” (Ibid.)
Here, the trial court found Gomez engaged in “ ‘incredibly harmful and
dangerous’ ” conduct. According to the court, there was a violent pattern, and
given all the evidence presented — including evidence of his rehabilitative
efforts — he continues to be a danger to public safety and Doe. Indeed, the
court noted he had been in custody for harming the same victim, was
10
released, and continued with that conduct. Those facts were “concerning” to
the court and something it “consider[ed] greatly when weighing the
mitigations that have been presented on behalf of [Gomez].” On that record,
the court determined the dismissal of the enhancements would not be in the
interests of justice. It did not abuse its discretion by so concluding. (People v.
Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 857 [“risk finding” that dismissal of an
enhancement would endanger public safety will be upheld “ ‘if it falls within
“the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered” ’ ”].)
Nothing in the record indicates that the court failed to properly engage in
this inquiry. It reviewed all the filings provided by the parties — including
the reports by Gomez’s clinical psychologist and social worker — and
considered all the additional arguments presented at the resentencing
hearing. Thus, the record establishes the court was well aware of Gomez’s
rehabilitative efforts, even if it did not detail them when making its decision.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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_________________________
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
FUJISAKI, Acting P. J.
_________________________
PETROU, J.
A174335; People v. Gomez
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