Filed 6/11/26; Certified for Publication 7/8/36 (order attached)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
THE PEOPLE, C102729
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. STK-CR-FE-
v. 2001-0009057)
JARVIS GARNER,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Jarvis Garner appeals from an order denying his petition for recall and
resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1170, subdivision (d)(1). At age 15, defendant
was sentenced to a determinate prison term of 50 years after he pled guilty to four
felonies. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in denying his petition because his
50-year sentence is the functional equivalent of a term of life without the possibility of
parole (LWOP), making him eligible for relief under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1).
The Attorney General concedes that defendant’s 50-year determinate sentence is the
functional equivalent of LWOP and urges reversal. The People’s representative in the
trial court, the San Joaquin County District Attorney’s Office, appears as amicus curiae to
oppose the concession and seek affirmance of the trial court’s order. We conclude
defendant’s sentence is not the functional equivalent of LWOP and therefore affirm.
1 Undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
1
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A detailed recitation of the facts underlying defendant’s convictions is
unnecessary for the issues raised on appeal. Briefly, when defendant was 14 years old, he
and his 18-year-old codefendant robbed the victim and her boyfriend, kidnapped the
victim at gunpoint, and took turns raping her. Defendant pled guilty to: (1) carjacking
(§ 215, subd. (a)); (2) rape by force in concert with another person (§ 264.1); (3) oral
copulation in concert with another person (§ 288a, subd. (d)); (4) sodomy in concert with
another person (§ 286, subd. (d)); and (5) enhancements under sections 12022.53,
subdivision (b), and 12022.3, subdivision (a).
In December 2002, the trial court sentenced defendant, by then 15 years old, to a
determinate sentence of 50 years in state prison.
On June 28, 2024, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1), and the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s decision in People v. Heard
(2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608 (Heard). The trial court denied the petition. It determined
section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), did not apply because defendant was not sentenced to
“ ‘life without the possibility of parole,’ but a determinate term of 50 years.” Further,
Heard did not apply to defendant because defendant’s 50-year determinate sentence was
not the functional equivalent of LWOP like the sentence the court imposed in Heard.
Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues, based on Heard, that his 50-year determinate sentence is the
functional equivalent of LWOP and the trial court therefore erred in denying his petition
under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1). Specifically, he contends that given that “the
average age of death for a California inmate [is] 54 years,” defendant’s 50-year
determinate sentence made it unlikely defendant would be released before he died and
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“guarantees that he [would] not be released in time to be rehabilitated and become a
productive and respected member of the citizenry.”
The Attorney General, as the People’s representative on appeal, concedes that
under Heard defendant “received a de facto LWOP sentence” (boldface and some
capitalization omitted), and agrees we should remand with directions for the trial court to
hold a hearing on defendant’s petition. To support his concession, the Attorney General
cites statistical evidence regarding the life expectancy of Black Californians (74.6 years).
Our court requested supplemental briefing from the parties on two questions—
whether defendant is eligible for youth offender parole consideration under section 3051
and, if so, whether his 50-year determinate sentence remains the functional equivalent of
LWOP.
In a supplemental letter brief, defendant acknowledges his eligibility for a youth
offender parole hearing under section 3051. Relying on the analysis in Heard, however,
he nonetheless contends that his sentence remains the functional equivalent of LWOP
because he was sentenced before section 3051 was enacted, and he filed his petition
under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1). Under that provision, he argues, the court must
determine whether the sentence he received when he was sentenced is the functional
equivalent of LWOP, and the later enactment of section 3051 does not impact whether
the sentence he received in 2002 was the functional equivalent of LWOP. Defendant also
asserts in his supplemental brief that his parole hearing was canceled in 2016 and that his
next parole hearing is scheduled for July 2047 at age 60.
The Attorney General also filed a supplemental letter brief. He likewise
acknowledges that defendant was eligible for a parole hearing under section 3051, but
citing our Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349, 369
(Contreras), maintains that defendant’s 50-year determinate sentence is the functional
equivalent of LWOP. The Attorney General fails to meaningfully answer the second
question posed by this court.
3
After the parties submitted their supplemental briefs, we granted the District
Attorney of San Joaquin County’s application to file an amicus curiae brief “to address
matters not fully examined by the parties’ briefs.” In their brief, amicus curiae argues
that defendant’s sentence is not the functional equivalent of LWOP for two reasons.
First, defendant received a determinate sentence of 50 years. “[B]ased upon the sentence
itself, and his age at the time of the offense, [defendant] does have a realistic opportunity
for release within his natural life expectancy.” Second, “section 3051 should be
considered in determining if a sentence is the functional equivalent of LWOP, because
parole consideration may greatly impact an inmate’s meaningful opportunity for release
within his or her natural life expectancy.” “Based upon [defendant’s] sentence …
[defendant] should have been eligible for a parole hearing during his 15th year of
incarceration.”
Amicus curiae also argues that although defendant stated in his supplemental brief
that his 2016 suitability hearing was canceled, defendant did “not provide the full
picture.” Amicus curiae asserts, “that [defendant] has been convicted of a new offense
resulting in a subsequent 25 to life sentence impacting [his] parole eligibility.” Assuming
that defendant’s life expectancy was about 74.6 years as asserted in the People’s brief,
defendant “is still eligible for release within his natural life expectancy in 2047 at the age
of 60,” despite any additional sentence. For those reasons, amicus curiae asks this court
to find that defendant’s determinate sentence is not the functional equivalent of LWOP.
In his reply, defendant addresses amicus curiae’s assertion that he has a realistic
opportunity of being released within his natural life expectancy. Defendant argues that
his life expectancy could be significantly shorter than the 74.6 years amicus curiae
referenced, and that “[t]he trial court should assess this factor upon remand.” In response
to amicus curiae’s assertion that he suffered a subsequent conviction and determinate life
sentence in prison, defendant contends that even if the conviction and sentence were
upheld, they “cannot support the trial court’s ruling that [defendant’s] sentence was not
4
the functional equivalent of LWOP,” because the Heard analysis focuses on “defendant’s
sentence at the time it was imposed.” The possibility that he “could be released under
section 3051 has no impact on whether his sentence was the functional equivalent of
LWOP.”
A. Standard of Review and Legal Principles
We review the trial court’s denial of a petition for recall and resentencing for
abuse of discretion. (People v. Frazier (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 858, 863-864.) A court
abuses its discretion when it bases its decision on an incorrect legal standard. (People v.
Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 156.) Whether a defendant is eligible to petition for recall
and resentencing under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A) is a question of statutory
interpretation that we review de novo. (People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1032.)
United States Supreme Court Decisions
Beginning with Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 (Roper), the United States
Supreme Court announced several limitations on the sentencing of juvenile offenders
grounded in the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
In Roper, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the execution of juvenile
offenders. (Roper, at p. 568.) The Court explained that the death penalty is reserved for
the worst offenders “who commit ‘a narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and
whose extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execution.’ ” (Ibid.) The
general differences between juveniles and adults, including the documented lack of
maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility in youth, their vulnerability or
susceptibility to negative influence and peer pressure, and the fact that their personality
traits are less fixed, “render suspect any conclusion that a juvenile falls among the worst
offenders.” (Id. at pp. 569-570.)
After categorially banning the death penalty for juvenile offenders in Roper, the
United States Supreme Court also held that the Eighth Amendment prohibition against
5
cruel and unusual punishment prohibits LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders who
commit nonhomicide offenses (Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 74 (Graham)),
and automatic LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders convicted of homicide (Miller v.
Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 479 (Miller)). The court further explained in Miller that
“[d]eciding that a ‘juvenile offender will forever be a danger to society’ ” requires a
judgment that the offender “ ‘is incorrigible.’ ” (Id. at pp. 472-473.) “ ‘[I]ncorrigibility
is inconsistent with youth.’ ” (Id. at p. 473.) “Life without parole ‘forswears altogether
the rehabilitative ideal.’ [Citation.] It reflects ‘an irrevocable judgment about [an
offender’s] value and place in society,’ at odds with a child’s capacity for change.”
(Ibid.) The Court’s decisions are rooted in its conclusion that the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment encompasses the “ ‘foundational
principle’ ” that the State cannot proceed in imposing its “most severe penalties on
juvenile offenders … as though they were not children.” (Miller, at p. 474.)
California Case Law and Legislative Enactments
Based on the Eighth Amendment limitations the United States Supreme Court
identified in Roper, Graham, and Miller, the California Supreme Court held in People v.
Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262 that the prohibition on LWOP terms for juvenile
offenders sentenced on nonhomicide offenses also applied to sentences that were the
functional equivalent of LWOP. (Id. at p. 268.) Our Supreme Court concluded that
“sentencing a juvenile offender for a nonhomicide offense to a term of years with a
parole eligibility date that falls outside the juvenile offender’s natural life expectancy
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” (Ibid.)
In response to the United States Supreme Court and California Supreme Court
decisions, the California Legislature enacted former section 1170, subdivision (d)(2),
now subdivision (d)(1), to create “ ‘a procedural mechanism for resentencing of
defendants who were under the age of 18 at the time of the commission of their offenses
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and who were given [life without parole] sentences.’ ” (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 617-618.) Under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), “[w]hen a defendant, who was
under 18 years of age at the time of commission of the offense for which the defendant
was sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole has been
incarcerated for at least 15 years, the defendant may submit to the sentencing court a
petition for recall and resentencing.”
After our Supreme Court held in In re Kirchner (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1040 that section
1170, subdivision (d)(1) inadequately addressed the concerns the United States Supreme
Court identified in Miller (In re Kirchner, at pp. 1043, 1052-1056), the Legislature
enacted Senate Bill No. 260 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) to “explicitly to bring juvenile
sentencing into conformity with Graham, Miller, and Caballero.” (People v. Franklin
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 277 (Franklin).) “At the heart of Senate Bill No. 260 was the
addition of section 3051,” which requires youth offender parole board hearings held
during the 15th, 20th, or 25th year of a juvenile offender’s incarceration, depending on
the offender’s controlling offense. (Ibid.)
In Franklin, which was decided after section 3051 was enacted, our Supreme
Court confronted the issue of whether a juvenile offender’s two mandatory consecutive
25-years-to-life terms for homicide violated the Eighth Amendment under Miller.
(Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 271.) After holding that Miller applies to functionally
equivalent LWOP sentences like the sentence defendant received when he was first
sentenced, the Court concluded that section 3051 “mooted” defendant’s “Miller claim”
because defendant is now serving a life sentence that includes a meaningful opportunity
for release during his 25th year of incarceration. (Franklin, at pp. 276-277, 280.) “Such
a sentence is neither LWOP nor its functional equivalent.” (Id. at p. 280.)
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1. People v. Heard
In Heard, the defendant filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170,
former subdivision (d)(2), now subdivision (d)(1), contending that because his sentence
of 23 years plus 80 years-to-life was a “de facto life without parole sentence,” he was
eligible for relief under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1). (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th
at p. 621.) The trial court denied the petition, concluding that defendant was statutorily
ineligible for relief under the statute. (Id. at pp. 621-622.)
On appeal, defendant argued that he was eligible for relief under the provision. He
also argued that the denial of his petition violated equal protection. (Heard, supra,
83 Cal.App.5th at p. 622.) The court of appeal agreed as to defendant’s equal protection
claim, holding that “denying juvenile offenders sentenced to the functional equivalent of
[LWOP] the opportunity to petition for resentencing under this provision violates the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws.” (Ibid.)
In concluding that defendant had a right to petition for recall under section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1), under the Equal Protection Clause, the court rejected the argument
that “Heard’s eligibility for a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051” meant
that his sentence could not be considered “a de facto” LWOP sentence. (Heard, supra,
83 Cal.App.5th at p. 628.) The court explained that the statute’s use of the phrase “was
sentenced” refers to defendant’s sentence as it existed before section 3051 was enacted.
(Heard, at pp. 628-629.) “At the time Heard was sentenced, section 3051 had not yet
been enacted, and he was required to serve his determinate term plus the full minimum
period of confinement of each of his life sentences before becoming parole eligible.
[Citation]. Put another way, Heard would have to serve 103 years before becoming
parole eligible. Such a sentence constitutes a de facto [LWOP] sentence.” (Id. at p. 629.)
The court further explained that Franklin did not require a different result because
although defendant’s “sentence as it currently operates is no longer the functional
equivalent of [LWOP], this does not change the fact that the sentence was a de facto
8
[LWOP] sentence at the time it was imposed.” (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 629,
italics omitted.)
The opinions in People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435 and People v. Bagsby
(2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040 followed Heard’s reasoning, finding that the availability of
a parole hearing under section 3051 does not affect a defendant’s eligibility for
resentencing under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1). (Sorto, at p. 448 [“We agree with
Heard and Lopez that the plain language of section 1170 [,subdivision] (d) does not
require that the defendant currently be serving an LWOP sentence.”]; Bagsby, at p. 1054
[stating that Heard was correctly decided].)
2. People v. Isayev
In People v. Isayev (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1117, review granted November 12,
2025, S292860, briefing deferred (Isayev), a different panel of this court addressed the
question of whether a defendant’s “50 years-to-life sentence [was] functionally
equivalent to LWOP for purposes of section 1170, subdivision (d).” (Id. at p. 1141.)
Rejecting the analysis in Heard, we held that defendant’s sentence was not the functional
equivalent of an LWOP term because he was eligible for a parole hearing under section
3051. (Isayev, at p. 1142.) Specifically, we rejected Heard’s reasoning that “because
section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), uses the phrase “ ‘was sentenced,’ ” eligibility for relief
depends only on the character of the original sentence imposed, not the sentence being
served at the time of the petition.” (Ibid.) We explained that in enacting section 1170,
subdivision (d), the Legislature sought “to provide (certain) juvenile offenders serving
LWOP terms an avenue ‘to seek recall of their sentences and resentencing to a term that
includes an opportunity for parole.’ ” (Isayev, at p. 1142, quoting In re Kirchner, supra,
2 Cal.5th at p. 1049.) “Given this purpose, it seems clear to us that the focus of section
1170, subdivision (d)(1), is the sentence being served at the time the petition for recall
9
and resentencing is filed, not whatever sentence may have been imposed at the original
sentencing.” (Isayev, at p. 1142.)
Section 3051 transformed LWOP terms for youthful offenders and terms that are
the functional equivalent of LWOP into sentences where a youthful offender is eligible
for a parole hearing either during their 15th, 20th, or 25th year of incarceration,
depending on the sentence for the controlling offense. (Isayev, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1144, citing Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 279, 281.) “Such a sentence is neither
LWOP nor its functional equivalent.” (Franklin, at p. 280.) And because defendants
eligible for a parole hearing under section 3051 are not serving an LWOP term or its
functional equivalent, they are ineligible for relief under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1).
(Isayev, at p. 1144.)
Against this background, we consider defendant’s claim.
B. Analysis
Defendant asks us to follow the “ ‘was sentenced’ reasoning” in Heard and
remand for the trial court to hold a hearing on defendant’s petition because “[t]he fact
that [defendant] could be released under section 3051 has no impact on whether his
sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP.” The Attorney General, relying on
Heard and Contreras concedes defendant’s 50-year sentence is the functional equivalent
of LWOP. For the reasons we explain below, we do not accept the concession and see no
reason to depart from the reasoning in Franklin and Isayev, which defendant and the
Attorney General fail to address in their briefing.
As an initial matter, we decline to consider the extrinsic data and statistical
evidence cited by the parties and amicus curiae regarding life expectancy because “[t]he
record … contains no findings by the trial court on these matters.” (Contreras, supra,
4 Cal.5th at p. 363.) More importantly, as our Supreme Court explained in declining “to
adopt a constitutional rule that employs a concept of life expectancy whose meaning
10
depends on the facts presented in each case…. [¶] … The proper starting point is not a
life expectancy table but the reasoning of the high court in Graham.” (Id. at pp. 363-
364.)
“Graham ‘does prohibit States from making the judgment at the outset that those
[youthful] offenders never will be fit to reenter society.’ ” (Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at
p. 367.) As even Heard acknowledged, “[t]o avoid violating the Eighth Amendment …
states ‘need not guarantee the [nonhomicide] offender eventual release’ but must provide
‘some realistic opportunity to obtain release.’ ” (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 616,
quoting Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 82.) Section 3051 does that. (Franklin, supra,
63 Cal.4th at pp. 279-280.) Therefore, we continue to disagree with Heard’s reasoning
that when determining whether a juvenile offender’s lengthy sentence is the functional
equivalent of LWOP for purposes of section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) eligibility, we need
not consider the effect of section 3051 on the defendant’s sentence. (Isayev, supra,
113 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1141-1142.)
By operation of law, section 3051 transformed defendant’s sentence from a
determinate sentence of 50 years to one where he was eligible for parole in his 15th year
of incarceration at the age of 30. (§ 3051, subd. (b)(1); Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
pp. 278–279.) In doing so, section 3051 provided him a “meaningful opportunity to
obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” (Contreras, supra,
4 Cal.5th at pp. 360, 364, italics added; see also Franklin, at pp. 279-280 [stating that
section 3051 provides “meaningful opportunity for release”].) Therefore, “[t]he
retroactive operation of section 3051 on [] defendant’s sentence is not irrelevant.”
(Isayev, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 1144.) Because section 3051 provides the
opportunity for a parole hearing to obtain release based on his demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation during the 15th year of incarceration, defendant’s sentence is not the
functional equivalent of LWOP. (Isayev, at p. 1144.)
11
We note that defendant and amicus curiae aver that defendant’s parole hearing
during his 15th year of incarceration was canceled. Although amicus curiae speculates
about the reason for that, the record before us provides no information that negates
defendant’s statutory eligibility for a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051.
In fact, both defendant and the Attorney General acknowledge defendant’s eligibility.
Therefore, on the record before us, we must presume that defendant is eligible for a
hearing under section 3051, which negates any claim that his 50-year determinate
sentence is the functional equivalent of LWOP.2 (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 279-
280.)
For these reasons, we reject the Attorney General’s concession and conclude that a
determinate sentence of 50 years where defendant was eligible for a youth offender
parole hearing during his 15th year of incarceration at the age of 30, is not the functional
equivalent of LWOP. (Isayev, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 1144.) As such, the trial
court did not err by denying defendant’s section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) petition.
2 Should defendant’s ineligibility for a parole hearing under section 3051 be
established in the future, section 1170, subdivision (d) still permits youthful offenders to
file petitions in their 24th and 25th year of incarceration.
12
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
\s\
KRAUSE, J.
We concur:
\s\
EARL, P. J.
\s\
MAURO, J.
13
Filed 7/8/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
THE PEOPLE, C102729
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. STK-CR-FE-
v. 2001-0009057)
JARVIS GARNER, ORDER CERTIFYING
Defendant and Appellant. OPINION FOR
PUBLICATION
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Joaquin County, Lauren
P. Thomasson, Judge. Affirmed.
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Galen N. Farris and Barton
Bowers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Ronald J. Freitas, District Attorney (San Joaquin), Richard B. Price, Assistant
District Attorney (San Joaquin), and Nicole Devencenzi, Deputy District Attorney, for
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.
1
THE COURT:
The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on June 11, 2026, was not certified
for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause, it now appears that the opinion
should be published in the Official Reports and it is so ordered.
BY THE COURT:
\s\
KRAUSE, J.
\s\
EARL, P. J.
\s\
MAURO, J.
2