Filed 11/6/26 P. v. Garcia CA5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F087778
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. F22905367)
v.
SANDRA GARCIA,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Alvin M.
Harrell III, Judge.
Elizabeth Campbell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill and
William C. Moine, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
In 2016, appellant Sandra Garcia participated in a conspiracy to kidnap E.G., a 13-
year-old girl. E.G. was abducted from her home, transported to a remote location, and
subjected to sexual penetration by force. Appellant was not present when E.G. was
physically kidnapped or when the sexual assault occurred, but the prosecution sought to
hold her criminally responsible based on her role in planning and facilitating the
conspiracy.
Appellant was tried jointly with her son, M.R., who participated in the kidnapping
and sexual assault. M.R. was 17 years old when these crimes occurred. 1 Another
member of the conspiracy, Miguel Carriedo, 2 reached a plea agreement and he testified
against the defendants.
The jury convicted appellant of five felonies:
(1) Conspiracy to commit kidnapping (Pen. Code, §§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 207,
subd. (a); 3 count 1);
(2) Sexual penetration by force (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(B); count 2). The jury
found true that the movement of E.G. substantially increased the risk of harm to her
beyond that inherent in a sexual penetration offense (§ 667.61, subd. (d)(2)); that E.G.
was tied or bound during the commission of the offense (id., subd. (e)(1) & (5)); and that
E.G. was under 14 years of age (id., subds. (j)(1) & (2));
(3) Kidnapping a child under 14 years of age (§§ 207, subd. (a), 208, subd. (b);
count 3);
(4) Torture (§ 206; count 4); and
1 Like appellant, M.R. was found guilty of all charges. On August 10, 2026, a
different panel from this court remanded M.R.’s matter to the juvenile court for further
proceedings regarding his amenability to remain under the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court. (In re M.R. (Aug. 10, 2026, F089235) [nonpub. opn.].)
2 Carriedo is appellant’s second cousin.
3 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
2.
(5) Dissuading a witness by force or threat (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1); count 5).
Based on the special circumstance allegations, which the jury found true, the trial
court sentenced appellant to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for the sexual
penetration by force (count 2). Appellant also received a consecutive full middle term of
three years for dissuading a witness (count 5), and a concurrent term of seven years to life
for the torture (count 4). For the conspiracy (count 1) and the kidnapping (count 3), the
court imposed but stayed middle terms of eight years, respectively.
Appellant raises four claims on appeal. First, she argues that her Sixth
Amendment right of autonomy over her own defense was violated when her trial counsel
conceded guilt on three counts during closing argument. Second, she contends that
various instructional errors occurred. Third, she asserts the evidence was insufficient to
support her convictions of torture and sexual penetration by force. Finally, she maintains
that an $8,400 restitution fine imposed at sentencing is constitutionally excessive. 4
We reject each of appellant’s claims and affirm. However, on our own motion, we
order correction of the indeterminate abstract of judgment to reflect that the sentence
imposed on count 4 runs concurrently with the sentence imposed on count 2.
BACKGROUND
The presentation of evidence in this trial began on September 19, 2023, and
continued through October 16, 2023. The jury heard extensive testimony concerning
appellant’s possible motives to commit these crimes, numerous details surrounding the
offenses, the defendants’ respective postcrime efforts to hide evidence, and the
investigation by law enforcement. The parties recount the trial evidence in their briefs at
considerable length and detail.
Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her
convictions for conspiracy to commit kidnapping (count 1), the kidnapping itself
4 In her opening brief, appellant argued that the parole revocation fine imposed
under section 1202.45 should be stricken. Appellant subsequently withdrew that claim.
3.
(count 3), or the dissuasion of E.G. as a witness (count 5). We summarize only the facts
pertinent to appellant’s convictions, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the
judgment. (See In re Jesus O. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 859, 861; People v. Johnson (1980)
26 Cal.3d 557, 578.)
I. Appellant Enters into a Conspiracy To Assault E.G.
Starting in 2014 and continuing through 2015, appellant was in a romantic
relationship with Johan, the father of E.G., who is the victim in this case. Friction began
to develop in that relationship. The problem stemmed from Johan’s daughters, E.G. and
K.G., who felt uncomfortable with appellant and appellant’s two youngest sons living in
their home. 5
When these events occurred, E.G. was 13 years old and K.G. was 11 years old.
This trial did not occur for another eight years. At the time of their trial testimony, E.G.
was 21 years old and K.G. was 19 years old.
In January 2016, Johan told appellant that she and her two youngest sons had to
move out of his residence. Appellant was “mad” and “upset” with this development. She
did not want to leave, and she wanted Johan’s girls to move away and live with their
mother. Appellant was unemployed, and she was having trouble finding her own place to
live.
After being asked to move out, appellant continued to interact with Johan and his
two daughters. Johan traveled for business. Appellant would assist in watching E.G. and
K.G. when Johan was away. Appellant continued to spend nights in Johan’s residence.
After being told that she had to move out, appellant explored different ways in
which she could get Johan in trouble with authorities. Appellant thought about creating a
false domestic violence case against him. She also attempted unsuccessfully to have
5 Appellant’s two youngest sons were very young, and they were not involved in the
charged conspiracy. Appellant’s two older sons, Brandon and M.R., were charged as
coconspirators in the conspiracy to kidnap E.G.
4.
Johan arrested for driving while intoxicated. Appellant told Carriedo, her eventual
codefendant, that, when Johan was in custody, she and Carriedo could live in Johan’s
residence.
On February 8, 2016, appellant spoke with Carriedo on the telephone. This call
was recorded and played for the jury. 6 Appellant asked Carriedo if he knew any
“corrupted people” who could “scare” E.G. and K.G. Appellant explained that the girls
went home by themselves after school, and somebody could hide near their home.
Appellant told Carriedo that she needed him to see the house for himself to understand
“exactly what I’m trying to do. I want someone to scare the shit out of these girls.”
Appellant explained that she wanted E.G. and K.G. so scared they would want to move
out of their father’s home and live with their mother.
In this recorded conversation, appellant told Carriedo that Johan’s residence had
no cameras, security or dogs. Appellant said she wanted someone to “cover [the girls’]
faces and stuff.” When Carriedo said she was “crazy,” appellant responded that she
wanted something “like, crazy, crazy, crazy. Even, you know, like, kind of rip her
clothes and like make her feel like she’s—just scare the fuck out of her. That’s what I
want.” Carriedo told appellant that she needed a secure phone line if she was going to
speak like this. During this same recorded conversation, appellant explained that, if
someone scared E.G. and K.G., appellant could show Johan that it was better if she
continued living with him in his house. She said that this plan was “the only solution”
because, if Johan’s girls were scared, then Johan “can’t fucking kick me out.”7
6 At the time, Carriedo happened to be recording all of his phone conversations
because he was going through a custody dispute otherwise unrelated to this matter.
7 In part, the prosecutor argued to the jury during closing argument that appellant
had a financial motive to commit these charged crimes because she wanted to remain
living with Johan.
5.
II. The Conspirators Meet and Discuss Their Plans.
On or about February 13, 2016, appellant met with Carriedo in person. Also
present were two of appellant’s older sons, Brandon and M.R. A fourth male, K.R., was
also there. During this meeting, the group discussed a plan to scare Johan’s daughters as
retaliation for Johan’s decision that appellant and her two youngest sons had to move out
of his residence. Carriedo told everyone to download a “burner” application for the cell
phones so they could talk and message in a more untraceable way.
On February 14, 2016, appellant installed the burner application on her cell phone.
Carriedo, M.R., and K.R. also downloaded this application on their respective phones.
III. Appellant and Carriedo Scout for a Location To Take E.G.
On the day of these crimes, February 16, 2016, appellant paid for gasoline for
Carriedo’s vehicle. Appellant directed Carriedo to Johan’s house, which they drove past.
She then directed Carriedo to drive them into the mountains.
In the mountains, they stopped at three locations, and appellant discussed the
merits of each as a potential site where E.G. could be taken. At the third and final
location, appellant said that this would be the best place to take E.G.
IV. Appellant Searched for Registered Sex Offenders.
About 12 days before this crime, appellant downloaded a phone application that
allowed her to search for sex offenders based on their address. Multiple registered sex
offenders lived within three miles of the third and final location that appellant selected as
the site to take E.G. One registered sex offender lived only about 100 feet away. Law
enforcement determined that none of these registered offenders had any involvement in
this matter.
V. E.G. Is Kidnapped and Sexually Assaulted.
The day of E.G.’s kidnapping happened about 13 days after Johan told appellant
that she and her two youngest sons had to move out of his residence. After the scouting
trip into the mountains, appellant and Carriedo returned to Fresno. Later that same day
6.
and sometime before 3:00 p.m., Carriedo drove M.R. and K.R. to Johan’s house. A third
male whom Carriedo did not know also accompanied them.
Johan was out of town that day on business. He had told appellant about two
weeks before that he would be gone on this trip.
E.G. was alone when she came home from school that afternoon. She did not have
her cell phone with her that day. The prosecution presented evidence that strongly
suggested appellant took and kept E.G.’s phone that morning before E.G. left for school.
M.R., K.R., and the third male confronted E.G. just outside her front door. The
males wore masks. They grabbed her and placed her inside the trunk of Carriedo’s
vehicle. Either K.R. or M.R. told Carriedo to drive to the remote site in the mountains
that appellant had selected earlier that day. According to Carriedo, it seemed “like they
knew where to go.” With E.G. in the trunk, Carriedo drove the group to that same remote
location. Either K.R. or M.R. gave him directions on how to find that location again.
The remote location was in Tollhouse, California. At that site, E.G. was stripped
of her clothes and she was tied to a tree. She was told that she would be shot if she
screamed, and she was instructed not to call law enforcement, or the assailants would find
her. E.G. was terrified and thought she was going to die.
One of the perpetrators took a toilet plunger and used the handle to repeatedly
penetrate E.G.’s vagina. She estimated that this sexual assault with the plunger lasted for
several minutes. She was crying and in pain. She vomited on the person who was
abusing her with the plunger, and two of the suspects punched her face multiple times.
Carriedo, M.R., K.R. and the fourth male drove away, leaving E.G. naked and tied
to the tree. Surveillance video showed Carriedo’s vehicle driving up the mountain at
approximately 3:50 p.m. and returning down the mountain at about 4:20 p.m.
The knot on the rope used to tie E.G. was not very tight and she managed to untie
herself. After finding some of her clothes and dressing, she wandered down the road
7.
until she found some people who assisted her by calling authorities. First responders
transported her to a hospital in Fresno.
At trial, E.G. testified that, during the kidnapping, she had recognized M.R.’s
voice, and possibly Brandon’s voice. The attack left E.G. with scratches, swelling and
bruises on her body. When Johan arrived at the hospital, he saw that E.G. “was bloody.”
One side of her face was bruised “pretty badly.” She had bruises and scratches on her
arms and legs. She had dry blood around her mouth and scratches, discoloration, and
swelling around her cheeks and face. Her back hurt, and she had redness and scratch
marks from being tied to the tree. Her left eye had some possible bruising and redness.
Her tank top had apparent blood and vomit on it, and it was missing a tassel, which
investigators later located at the crime scene. E.G.’s pants also had apparent blood on
them. As a result of this attack, E.G. bled from her vagina for about two days.
At the hospital, E.G. refused to have a nurse examine her vagina internally.
However, the nurse examining E.G. saw bruising near her vaginal opening, and
discoloration in the area of her hymen.
VI. Appellant Scheduled a Doctor’s Appointment as an Alibi.
On February 8, 2016, appellant told Carriedo that she planned on making a
doctor’s appointment for herself as an alibi to use when this crime occurred. About one
week before E.G. was kidnapped, appellant made a medical appointment for herself for
3:15 p.m. on the afternoon of these crimes.
The prosecutor established that, on the afternoon when this kidnapping occurred,
appellant attended a doctor’s appointment after she and Carriedo returned from their
scouting trip to the mountains. Appellant picked up and took Johan’s other daughter,
K.G., with her to this appointment. That day, K.G. had stayed home from school because
she was sick. By taking K.G. with her, nobody was home when E.G. was kidnapped.
8.
VII. The Defendants Are Arrested.
The day after this kidnapping, law enforcement interviewed appellant. This
interview was recorded and played for the jury. At the time of this interview, appellant
was not under arrest. When asked if she knew who might have kidnapped and attacked
E.G., appellant denied any knowledge. She also repeatedly denied that her older boys
might have been involved.
A few days after this incident, appellant spoke with Carriedo over the telephone.
She was “frantic” because law enforcement was investigating her role in this incident.
Carriedo sent her information regarding how to delete data on a cellular phone.
In February 2016, law enforcement arrested Carriedo, but he was released from
custody. He took that opportunity to flee to Mexico. Appellant helped him by driving
him to Los Angeles, where he purchased a bus ticket for Tijuana.
Appellant and M.R. were arrested in February 2016. Both before and after she
was arrested, appellant never disclosed to law enforcement that Carriedo was responsible
for this kidnapping.
In 2020, Carriedo was extradited back to the United States. It was not until 2022
that a grand jury indicted the defendants on the present charges.
VIII. E.G. Delayed Reporting the Details of the Sexual Assault.
On the day of the kidnapping, E.G. did not disclose to anyone that a perpetrator
had used a plunger to penetrate her vagina. At trial, she explained to the jury that when
this crime occurred, she was 13 years old, and the details of the sexual assault had greatly
embarrassed her. It took E.G. until 2019—three years after the assault—that she finally
disclosed these intimate details about her ordeal.
The jury in this trial heard testimony from a psychologist, who explained about the
Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome. Within the professional psychological
community, there is a broad consensus that children do not tend to reveal the details of
9.
sexual abuse quickly. It can take months or even years until a minor victim discloses
such details.
IX. Brandon and Carriedo Enter Plea Agreements.
On September 6, 2023, the same month that this trial started, Carriedo reached a
plea agreement in which he pleaded guilty to torture and conspiracy to commit
kidnapping. As part of his plea agreement, Carriedo testified at trial against appellant and
M.R. For his role in this conspiracy, Carriedo was sentenced to prison for 15 years to
life.
On September 11, 2023, about eight days before testimony was received in this
trial, Brandon pleaded no contest to conspiracy to commit torture. He faced a maximum
sentence of seven years to life. Brandon was not part of this trial.
X. Appellant Testified in Her Own Defense.
Appellant testified in her own defense. Her son, M.R., elected not to testify in this
trial.
Appellant admitted to the jury that she told Carriedo she wanted E.G. and K.G.
scared, their faces covered, and their clothes stripped off. She also admitted telling
Carriedo that Johan’s residence lacked security, and that she planned on making a
doctor’s appointment so she “wouldn’t be there.” At trial, she claimed that she said all of
this because she was mad and “just venting.” She claimed she was just saying “random”
and “dumb stuff” that did not make sense. According to appellant, she never talked about
kidnapping, just to “scare the girls.” She claimed that, after this one conversation, she
and Carriedo never discussed this idea again.
Appellant admitted that, on the day of this kidnapping, she paid to put some
gasoline in Carriedo’s vehicle. However, she claimed that she did that so Carriedo could
drive home. She asserted that, when they were getting gasoline in Carriedo’s vehicle, she
“didn’t have no idea that he was going to still do it or that he was planning to do
10.
something like this.” According to appellant, Carriedo acted on his own in continuing the
kidnapping plan.
At trial, appellant denied that this plan was her idea. She told the jury that she had
“said it out of anger,” but she did not think that Carriedo was going to do something like
what occurred. However, she also admitted that, afterwards, she realized that she had
started the process.
When initially speaking with law enforcement, appellant admitted that, at that
time, she had believed Carriedo was responsible for this kidnapping, but she never
disclosed that information to authorities.
Appellant admitted that, starting on February 14, 2016, a burner application was
installed on her cellular phone. However, she claimed that it was Carriedo who installed
it on her phone, and she asserted that she used it to block bill collectors. She
acknowledged that she had used that application to communicate with M.R. She
admitted that two or three days after this kidnapping she deleted the burner app from her
phone.
Appellant acknowledged at trial that she had shown Carriedo the location of
Johan’s house so he could scare the girls. However, she also denied directing Carriedo or
anyone else on the day of this crime to go to Johan’s house.
On cross-examination, appellant denied having any involvement in this conspiracy
or plan to kidnap E.G. She denied ever driving with Carriedo up to Tollhouse.
DISCUSSION
I. Appellant’s Sixth Amendment Rights Were Not Violated.
Appellant contends that her Sixth Amendment rights under the United States
Constitution were violated. Her claim is based on concessions of guilt that her trial
counsel made to the jury.
During closing argument, appellant’s trial counsel conceded to the jury that the
conspiracy to kidnap E.G. began on February 8, 2016, when appellant spoke with
11.
Carriedo about scaring the girls and ripping their clothes. Counsel stated that appellant
had “left it up to Carriedo for the details” but acknowledged that false imprisonment and
kidnapping were the natural and probable consequences of her plan. Her counsel further
conceded that appellant had installed a burner application on her cell phone, which
constituted an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Counsel acknowledged that
proof existed beyond a reasonable doubt for the charges in count 1 (conspiracy), count 3
(kidnapping), and count 5 (dissuading a witness).
Despite these concessions, appellant’s counsel argued to the jury that the
prosecution had failed to meet its burden regarding the sexual penetration by force
(count 2) and torture (count 4). In part, counsel asked the jury to reject E.G.’s account of
the sexual penetration. Counsel noted that E.G. delayed disclosing these details, and the
alleged plunger used in this attack had never been located. Counsel asserted that the
evidence did not corroborate E.G.’s claim that the handle of a plunger had actually been
used to penetrate her vagina. Counsel argued that appellant “shouldn’t be convicted for
more than what she’s really guilty of.” The jurors were asked to find appellant guilty
only in counts 1, 3 and 5, and to find her not guilty in counts 2 and 4. 8
In the present claim, appellant argues that, based on McCoy v. Louisiana (2018)
584 U.S. 414 (McCoy), her trial counsel violated her Sixth Amendment right to autonomy
by conceding her guilt on those three charges without her permission. She separately
contends that her counsel’s concessions were tantamount to guilty pleas requiring her
personal waiver of trial rights. She seeks reversal of all convictions.
We reject appellant’s arguments. This record does not establish McCoy error, and
no Sixth Amendment violation occurred. Moreover, her counsel’s concessions during the
contested jury trial were not tantamount to guilty pleas.
8 Appellant’s potential LWOP sentence depended on a conviction for sexual
penetration by force of a minor under the age of 14 years, coupled with a true finding of
aggravated kidnapping. (§§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(B), 667.61, subds. (c)(5), (d)(2), (j)(1).)
12.
A. The applicable law.
The parties agree, as do we, that appellant’s claim raises a question of law, which
we review de novo. We independently examine whether appellant’s constitutional rights
were violated. (People v. Palmer (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 268, 280; People v. Cromer
(2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 894.)
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to the assistance
of counsel. (McCoy, supra, 584 U.S. at p. 421.) This right applies to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment. (Pointer v. Texas (1965) 380 U.S. 400, 401.)
Although counsel generally controls matters of trial management, certain
fundamental decisions belong to the defendant. (McCoy, supra, 584 U.S. at p. 422.)
Among them is the decision whether to maintain innocence. (Ibid.) When a defendant
communicates that specific objective, her counsel may not override that choice by
conceding guilt. (Id. at pp. 423–424.)
McCoy error does not occur unless a defendant expressly communicates her desire
to maintain innocence, and her counsel violates that express directive. When a defendant
expressly communicates that objective, counsel may not override it regardless of trial
strategy. (McCoy, supra, 584 U.S. at p. 428; People v. Chhuon and Pan (2026)
19 Cal.5th 1018, 1055; People v. Bloom (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1008, 1038–1039 (Bloom);
People v. Eddy (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 472, 482–483 (Eddy).) However, if the defendant
does not expressly object, then the attorney may act in what is believed to be the client’s
best interest. (McCoy, supra, 584 U.S. at p. 424 [“If a client declines to participate in his
defense, then an attorney may permissibly guide the defense pursuant to the strategy she
believes to be in the defendant’s best interest”]; In re Smith (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 377,
390 [defendant did not object and make plain his objective of maintaining his innocence
before defense counsel presented closing argument]; People v. Franks (2019)
35 Cal.App.5th 883, 891 [defendant must make his intention clear to his counsel to
maintain innocence]; People v. Lopez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 55, 66 [no authority exists
13.
to extend McCoy’s holding “to a situation where the defendant does not expressly
disagree with a decision relating to his right to control the objective of his defense”].)
The issue before us is whether appellant made it sufficiently clear to her counsel—
before the challenged concessions—that her objective was to maintain innocence and
pursue acquittal on all charges. Based on our review of this record, we reject appellant’s
contentions that she expressly made such a directive known to her counsel prior to
closing argument.
B. This record does not support appellant’s arguments.
To establish McCoy error, appellant points to various portions of this record.
According to appellant, these passages demonstrate that her trial counsel knew that she
wanted to maintain her innocence. We disagree.
1. The Marsden hearing.
After she was convicted, but before sentencing, appellant sought to relieve her
appointed counsel and have a new attorney represent her. The trial court conducted a
hearing pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.
During the Marsden hearing, appellant complained that her attorney had not hired
a private investigator, had failed to meet with her sufficiently, and had accused her of
lying. Appellant stated that her attorney “wants me to sign for something I don’t feel I
deserve.” She felt that she had received inadequate representation.
The court asked appellant to clarify what she was supposed “to sign.” Her
response was vague. She said that her sentencing hearing was approaching but “we
didn’t even get to that part because he stormed off and left me in the room.” She felt that
her counsel had not “represented me the way he should have represented me. I feel like I
represented my own self.” She complained that she felt like they did not have an
attorney-client relationship.
In response, appellant’s counsel said he had gone over “a thousand pages of
discovery” with appellant, had met with her multiple times, and he “went over everything
14.
with her.” Counsel reported that the evidence against appellant had been “overwhelming
on everything” except for the allegation of sexual penetration and “maybe” the allegation
of torture. According to defense counsel, appellant had been “willing to make a deal for
12 years and admit her guilt” before the penetration allegation was added to the charges
against her. Defense counsel explained that there had been no need for an investigator.
According to counsel, appellant was unreasonably blaming everything on Carriedo.
Defense counsel explained to the court that, because E.G. had not initially
disclosed the penetration and that allegation rested solely on E.G.’s trial testimony,
counsel had decided appellant should testify at trial. According to counsel, appellant had
“agreed to admit her guilt on all the things except for the penetration,” and he was hoping
that she would “fully admit” the other charges at trial. Counsel stated that his opening
statement to the jurors had also been intended as a guide to appellant regarding how to
present her trial testimony. 9 Counsel complained to the court that appellant “went south
on me, [and] denied everything.” Counsel explained that, the day before the Marsden
hearing, he was upset with appellant because, even with the probation officer, she was
sticking to her story and she “was not being reasonable.” Counsel stated he would have
never put appellant on the witness stand “if I knew she was going to testify the way that
she did. She denied when the evidence is overwhelming against her on those counts.”
When given her chance to respond, appellant stated that she and her attorney did
not have adequate communication and she had wanted a fair trial. The court responded
that she had “definitely received a fair trial.” The court denied the Marsden motion. 10
Nothing from the Marsden hearing affirmatively demonstrates that appellant made
it sufficiently clear to her counsel—before he made the challenged concessions—that the
9 During appellant’s opening statement, which her counsel gave about two days
before appellant’s trial testimony, her attorney conceded that appellant had entered the
conspiracy but stated that the evidence would show she had subsequently withdrawn
from it and urged Carriedo not to hurt the girls.
10 In this appeal, appellant does not challenge the denial of her Marsden motion.
15.
objective of the defense was to maintain her innocence and pursue acquittal on all
charges. Instead, appellant complained that her counsel had not done sufficient
investigation, had accused her of lying, and they had not adequately communicated.
Although those complaints show dissatisfaction and disagreement, they do not identify
any express instruction that counsel could not partially concede guilt.
In contrast, defense counsel described frustration because appellant had deviated
from the expected testimony. When given a chance to respond, appellant never informed
the court or even reasonably suggested that she had instructed her counsel to maintain her
innocence, to seek acquittal on all charges, or to refrain from making any concessions.
Indeed, appellant never refuted the assertion that she was willing at some point to enter
guilty pleas.
Finally, appellant’s statement that counsel wanted her to “sign” for something
does not establish McCoy error. When the court sought clarification about that statement,
appellant focused on the pending sentencing hearing, and her general dissatisfaction with
the representation. In short, the statements from the Marsden hearing do not support
appellant’s contention that she expressly informed her counsel that she wished to
maintain her innocence on all charges, but he nevertheless failed to respect her wishes.
2. Appellant’s trial testimony.
Appellant also relies on her trial testimony to show that her counsel knew she had
decided to maintain her innocence. We are not persuaded.
At trial, appellant acknowledged that, during a recorded telephone conversation
with Carriedo, she had expressed her desire for Carriedo to arrange to scare E.G. and
K.G. Appellant agreed that she had wanted E.G. and K.G. to have their faces covered,
their clothes stripped, and to make them afraid. However, she maintained that she was
only mad and venting when she made these statements. She also admitted that she agreed
to show Carriedo the location of the house where the girls could be found “[s]o he could
scare the girls.”
16.
Appellant further admitted at trial certain conduct that the prosecution used to
establish overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. Appellant acknowledged scheduling
a medical appointment for herself on the day of the crime. She admitted installing a
burner application on her telephone and using it to communicate with M.R. on the day of
this kidnapping. And she acknowledged directing her son, Brandon, to exchange fake
text messages with her about him needing to be picked up on the day of this kidnapping.
On cross-examination, appellant expressly denied participating in the kidnapping.
When asked by the prosecutor whether she was involved “in any way” in the kidnapping
of E.G., she answered no. She likewise denied planning the kidnapping, making an
agreement with anyone to kidnap E.G., or telling the coconspirators that she wanted E.G.
kidnapped.
After reviewing appellant’s trial testimony, we reject her contention that her
counsel was on notice that he could not concede guilt on any charges. Although
appellant denied participating or planning a kidnapping, she admitted conduct that
established her role in the conspiracy.
The totality of appellant’s testimony merely shows that a substantial disagreement
developed between appellant’s factual account and the defense that her counsel had
anticipated. The subsequent Marsden hearing reinforces that conclusion. As discussed
above, counsel understood appellant’s testimony as an unexpected departure from the
defense he believed they had previously agreed upon. However, at no time did appellant
expressly communicate that maintaining innocence and pursuing acquittal was the
objective he was required to pursue.
Appellant’s trial testimony does not demonstrate McCoy error.
3. The pretrial statements.
Appellant also relies on a pretrial exchange. The prosecutor raised the possibility
that one or more of the defense attorneys might strategically concede charges in order to
17.
avoid greater criminal liability. The prosecutor stated it was his understanding that any
such concession must be made with the defendants’ approval.
In response, counsel for M.R. asserted that the defense could modify its tactics up
to and including the closing argument. M.R.’s counsel maintained that the defense was
allowed to argue “whatever we want, when we want.” M.R.’s counsel further noted that
any discussions with the defendants were privileged communications, and counsel
complained that defense tactics should not be revealed in advance.
Appellant’s counsel then stated: “If the evidence is overwhelming, we should be
able to concede to certain things, Your Honor.” The prosecutor reiterated that he was not
seeking disclosure of defense strategy but remained concerned that any concession of
guilt should occur with the defendants’ understanding. The court observed that this
discussion was speculative and stated that it would address this issue if it actually
materialized.
Appellant argues that this pretrial conversation shows that her counsel believed it
was his decision whether to concede guilt. We disagree that this brief exchange
demonstrates McCoy error.
This exchange does not establish that appellant had communicated opposition to
any concession, that counsel knew she wanted to maintain innocence on all charges, or
that any actual disagreement between appellant and counsel existed at that point. That
distinction is critical. McCoy is implicated when counsel overrides a defense objective
the defendant has expressly communicated. (McCoy, supra, 584 U.S. at pp. 424, 428;
Bloom, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 1038–1039; Eddy, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at pp. 482–
483.)
The pretrial exchange here concerned a hypothetical future possibility, and it does
not demonstrate that appellant had expressly objected against certain concessions or that
counsel was on notice of a contrary objective he later disregarded. Nor does counsel’s
statement, viewed in isolation, establish a McCoy violation in light of the subsequent
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record. As discussed above, the later Marsden hearing reflected counsel’s understanding
that appellant had agreed to admit guilt except as to the penetration allegation, and the
record does not establish that she thereafter communicated a contrary objective before
closing argument. Counsel’s pretrial statement therefore does not supply the missing
evidence that he knowingly overrode appellant’s chosen objective.
C. Appellant’s cited authorities.
In addition to McCoy, appellant relies principally on People v. Flores (2019)
34 Cal.App.5th 270 (Flores) and Eddy, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th 472. None of these
opinions assist her.
In each of these cases, the defendants expressly objected to their counsel
conceding guilt, but the respective attorneys went against their clients’ express directives.
Reversal was required because each counsel ignored the clients’ articulated goals.
(McCoy, supra, 584 U.S. at pp. 417, 424; Flores, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at pp. 275, 280–
281, 283; Eddy, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at pp. 478–479, 481–483.)
These opinions are distinguishable. Nothing in appellant’s trial testimony or the
later Marsden hearing establishes that, before closing argument, she expressly made it
clear to her counsel that he was required to maintain her innocence and pursue acquittal
on the charges he later conceded. Thus, appellant has not established that a Sixth
Amendment autonomy violation occurred. Reversal is not required.
D. Counsel’s concessions were not tantamount to guilty pleas.
Appellant alternatively contends that her counsel’s concessions were the
functional equivalent of guilty pleas, requiring her to give a knowing and intelligent
waiver of her constitutional trial rights. Appellant’s contention has already been rejected.
Both the United States Supreme Court and our own high court hold that an
attorney’s concessions during closing argument are not tantamount to guilty pleas
requiring the defendant’s personal waiver of trial rights. (Florida v. Nixon (2004)
543 U.S. 175, 188 (Nixon); People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 29–30 (Cain).) Despite a
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defense attorney’s concessions, the defendant still retains the rights associated with trial,
and the prosecution remains obligated to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (Nixon,
at p. 188.)
Appellant argues that, following McCoy, we should not give any continued weight
to either Nixon or Cain. We disagree.
McCoy examined the consequences when a defendant wishes to maintain
innocence, but counsel concedes guilt. (McCoy, supra, 584 U.S. at pp. 422–424.) In
contrast, Nixon and Cain addressed whether a concession made during a contested jury
trial is itself the functional equivalent of a guilty plea requiring personal waivers. (Nixon,
supra, 543 U.S. at p. 188; Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 30.) These opinions focused on
different issues. Moreover, in resolving the question of a Sixth Amendment right to
autonomy, the McCoy court expressly acknowledged the Nixon opinion. McCoy
distinguished Nixon, but the McCoy majority did not overrule Nixon or question its
continued validity. (McCoy, at p. 424.)
We reject appellant’s contention that McCoy must be read as undermining the
holding in Nixon and, by extension, the holding in Cain. An intermediate appellate court
is bound by controlling decisions of the California Supreme Court. (See Auto Equity
Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [an inferior court must follow the
decision of a court exercising superior jurisdiction].) Likewise, we must follow the
United States Supreme Court on questions involving the federal Constitution. (People v.
Bradley (1969) 1 Cal.3d 80, 86.) Consequently, we decline appellant’s invitation to part
ways with Cain or Nixon.
Based on this record, appellant has not established a constitutional violation
arising from her counsel’s concessions during closing argument. This record does not
show that counsel overrode appellant’s express directive of maintaining innocence on all
counts. As such, McCoy error is not present. In addition, counsel’s concessions were not
the functional equivalent of guilty pleas requiring appellant’s personal waiver of trial
20.
rights. We therefore reject appellant’s various assertions. Her constitutional rights were
not impacted, and this claim fails. Accordingly, we do not reach her assertions regarding
the appropriate remedy.
II. Appellant Has Forfeited Her Claim of Instructional Error and This Claim
Alternatively Fails from a Lack of Prejudice; Appellant Does Not
Demonstrate Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
Appellant contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury to consider the
natural and probable consequences doctrine regarding her potential derivative liability for
sexual penetration by force and torture. According to appellant, the natural and probable
consequences doctrine should be excluded as a potential theory of liability for a
defendant who was not the direct perpetrator of either torture or sexual penetration. She
also argues that the instructions given under CALCRIM Nos. 402 and 417 improperly
blurred the distinction between theories of aiding and abetting, and conspiracy liability.
Appellant’s various arguments are unpersuasive. This claim is forfeited from a
failure to raise these issues below. In any event, this claim also fails from a lack of
prejudice and appellant does not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel.
A. This claim is forfeited.
Appellant concedes that she did not object in the trial court to the instructions she
now challenges. As a general rule, a defendant’s failure to object to an asserted
instructional error forfeits the claim on appeal. (People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561,
579.) As a result, we agree with respondent that appellant has forfeited this claim.
Appellant seeks to avoid forfeiture under section 1259. This statute states that the
failure to object to instructional error will not result in forfeiture if the substantial rights
of the defendant are affected. (§ 1259; People v. Mitchell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 579.)
Section 1259 does not assist appellant. As we explain below, the asserted errors
did not affect appellant’s substantial rights because they are harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. This claim is deemed forfeited.
21.
B. This claim fails on the merits.
Even if appellant’s instructional claim is not forfeited, it fails on the merits.
Appellant advances two theories of error. First, she contends the trial court should not
have instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine as a theory of liability
for torture and sexual penetration by force. Second, she argues that, even if the doctrine
was legally available, the instructions given under CALCRIM Nos. 402 and 417
improperly conflated conspiracy with aiding and abetting, creating a reasonable
likelihood that the jury misapplied the law.
We reject both of appellant’s contentions.
1. The trial court had no duty to withhold instruction on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine.
In People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155 (Chiu), 11 the Supreme Court held that an
aider and abettor may not be convicted of first degree premeditated murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine because the connection between the aider
and abettor’s culpability was too attenuated from the perpetrator’s premeditative state of
mind. (Id. at p. 166.) The Legislature went further and eliminated the natural and
probable consequences doctrine as a theory of potential liability for accomplices in all
forms of murder. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 846;
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th
839, 869.)
Appellant contends that these developments reflect a broader policy against
imposing derivative liability based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine
when a nontarget offense requires the perpetrator’s heightened and highly personal
mental state. She argues that torture and sexual penetration by force share the same
essential concerns identified in Chiu. According to appellant, both torture and sexual
11 Chiu was superseded by statute as stated in People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952,
959, fn. 3.
22.
penetration by force require a deliberate personal decision by the perpetrator to inflict a
particular form of harm, a heightened intent that an accomplice likely did not share.
Appellant asks this court to extend the policy restrictions recognized in Chiu and the
recent legislation. According to appellant, this court should find that the natural and
probable consequences doctrine is not a permissible theory of derivative liability for the
nontarget offenses of torture and sexual penetration by force. As a result, appellant
contends the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that it could find appellant guilty
of torture and/or sexual penetration by force based on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine stemming from the conspiracy to commit kidnapping.
Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive. Outside the homicide context, the
natural and probable consequences doctrine remains a valid theory of derivative liability.
Each member of a conspiracy is criminally responsible for the acts of fellow conspirators
committed in furtherance of, and which follow as a natural and probable consequence of,
the conspiracy. (People v. Guillen (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 934, 998–999; People v.
Zielesch (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 731, 739 (Zielesch).) Likewise, an aider and abettor is
“ ‘equally guilty’ with the direct perpetrator of an unintended crime that is the natural and
probable consequence of the intended crime.” (People v. Canizalez (2011)
197 Cal.App.4th 832, 852 (Canizalez); People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 920
(Medina).)
We decline appellant’s invitation to restrict the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. Chiu addressed first degree premeditated murder. That majority opinion did
not hold that every offense requiring a heightened or personal mental state is
categorically excluded from potential liability under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 166.) A decision is not authority
for a proposition it did not consider or decide. (Loeffler v. Target Corp. (2014)
58 Cal.4th 1081, 1134.) Therefore, we decline to extend Chiu to the crimes of torture and
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sexual penetration by force. Chiu does not establish that the trial court erred when it
instructed appellant’s jury on the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
Likewise, the subsequent statutory amendments do not establish a broader
limitation. The Legislature specifically restricted derivative liability under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine in the homicide context. The Legislature later
extended resentencing relief to certain attempted murder and manslaughter convictions.
The Legislature did not extend the restriction of the natural and probable consequences
doctrine to other offenses. (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 1172.6.) Accordingly, we decline to
extend the Legislature’s homicide-only limitations for derivative liability to offenses it
left untouched. (See People v. Guzman (2005) 35 Cal.4th 577, 587 [a court may not add
provisions to a statute].)
Published authority has expressly rejected the contention that Chiu precludes the
natural and probable consequences liability for the crime of torture. (People v. Flores
(2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 855, 869–870.) Published authority has likewise rejected a
proposition that forcible sexual penetration with a foreign object cannot constitute a
reasonably foreseeable natural and probable consequence of a target crime, such as
robbery. (People v. Nguyen (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 533.) Under principles of stare
decisis, the trial court was required to follow these authorities. (See Auto Equity Sales,
Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 57 Cal.2d at p. 455.)
Appellant argues that Flores and Nguyen should now carry less force in light of
Chiu and the legislative changes. We disagree. As explained above, we decline to
further limit the natural and probable consequences doctrine in ways not contemplated in
Chiu or in the subsequent legislative amendments. In short, appellant has not shown that
the trial court erred when it instructed the jury on this theory of derivative liability.
2. The instructional errors are harmless.
Appellant identifies two instructional defects. With CALCRIM No. 402, the court
made an oral mistake. When discussing whether a defendant could be guilty of other
24.
crimes stemming from the conspiracy charged in count 1, the court stated that a
“coconspirator” was the perpetrator or anyone who aided and abetted the perpetrator.
The court meant to say “coparticipant” instead of “coconspirator.” This was error
because a person may aid and abet a crime without being a member of a conspiracy, and
conspiracy requires an agreement. (See CALCRIM Nos. 400, 415.) By defining a
“coconspirator” in terms of aiding and abetting, the oral instruction risked suggesting that
an aider and abettor could be treated as a conspirator without the jury first finding the
agreement required for conspiracy liability.
The other instructional defect occurred with CALCRIM No. 417. The jury was
erroneously told that, to find appellant guilty of the conspiracy charged in count 1, the
prosecution had to prove that appellant conspired to commit kidnapping, a member of the
conspiracy committed an overt act to further the conspiracy, and “kidnapping” was a
natural and probable consequence of the common plan or design. This formulation was
circular because kidnapping was identified both as the object of the conspiracy and as the
offense that was a natural and probable consequence of that conspiracy. The crimes of
sexual penetration by force (count 2), torture (count 4) and dissuading a witness
(count 5)—the nontarget offenses actually at issue—were never identified in CALCRIM
No. 417.
Appellant argues that these instructional errors collectively require reversal.
According to appellant, the jurors were misled on how to apply the law of conspiracy,
and it is possible they conflated the concepts of aiding and abetting with conspiracy. We
disagree that reversal is required. Even assuming these errors implicated appellant’s
federal constitutional rights, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.)
The written instructions were provided to the jury for use during deliberations.
The written version of CALCRIM No. 402 was correct, using “co-participant” and not
“coconspirator” as the trial court erroneously stated one time. (See CALCRIM No. 402.)
25.
We presume the jurors understood and followed the written instructions over the court’s
isolated misstatement. (People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 803; People v. Davis
(1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 542.) Nothing in this record reasonably rebuts this presumption.
With CALCRIM Nos. 400 and 401, the jury was correctly instructed on the
concept of aiding and abetting. The jury was told that, to find appellant guilty as an aider
and abettor, the prosecution had to prove: (1) that a perpetrator committed a crime;
(2) appellant knew the perpetrator intended to commit that crime; (3) before or during the
commission of the crime, appellant intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing
the crime; and (4) appellant’s words or conduct did in fact aid and abet the perpetrator’s
commission of the crime.
CALCRIM No. 402 told the jury that it should first decide whether appellant was
guilty of conspiracy to commit kidnapping, and only then whether a coparticipant in that
conspiracy committed nontarget crimes, such as sexual penetration by force and/or
torture. The jury was asked to decide if those nontarget offenses were the natural and
probable consequences of the conspiracy. The jury was instructed that a “natural and
probable consequence” is one that “a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if
nothing unusual intervenes.” The jury was told to consider all of the circumstances
established by the evidence.
Moreover, other instructions independently required the jury to find an actual
agreement for conspiracy liability. CALCRIM Nos. 415 and 416 told the jury that
appellant had to intend to agree and actually agree to commit kidnapping, that mere
association was not enough, and that helping accomplish the conspiracy’s goal did not,
by itself, make someone a conspirator. These instructions made clear that a person could
not be treated as a conspirator merely because that person aided or abetted a crime.
To establish appellant’s guilt for the sexual penetration with force (count 2) and
the torture (count 4), the prosecutor presented two theories of liability: (1) appellant was
guilty either as a direct aider and abettor or (2) she was guilty based on the natural and
26.
probable consequences of the conspiracy. The prosecutor argued the theory of aiding and
abetting separately from the natural and probable consequences doctrine stemming from
the conspiracy. The prosecutor argued that the sexual penetration and torture of E.G.
were the natural and probable consequences of the conspiracy.
During closing argument, appellant’s trial counsel conceded to the jurors that the
evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty for the charged
conspiracy (count 1), kidnapping (count 3), and dissuading a witness (count 5).
However, defense counsel argued that the prosecution had failed to meet its burden
regarding sexual penetration by force (count 2) and torture (count 4). Defense counsel
asked the jury to find appellant not guilty on those two counts.
The evidence against appellant was overwhelming. She was recorded telling
Carriedo to assault E.G. and K.G. by ripping their clothes. Appellant wanted their faces
covered and she wanted E.G. and K.G. “to be so fucking scared.” Carriedo said she
needed a program to hide their conversations “if you’re gonna be really talking like this.”
Appellant downloaded a burner application on her cell phone, which permitted her
to communicate with other members of the conspiracy. On the day of this kidnapping,
appellant purchased gasoline for Carriedo. Appellant acknowledged that she showed
Carriedo the location of Johan’s house so he could scare the girls. Appellant selected the
remote site where E.G. was taken by force, and that site was located near registered sex
offenders. It was appellant who searched on her phone for the location of these registered
sex offenders.
Based on the totality of these circumstances, a reasonable inference exists that
appellant intended for law enforcement to focus on the registered sex offenders as
suspects in this attack. A reasonable inference may also be drawn that appellant knew a
sexual crime was going to occur. Indeed, appellant acknowledged at trial that she had
wanted E.G.’s clothes to be stripped off, her face covered, and E.G. to be rendered afraid.
Given the nature of the planned assault, E.G.’s vulnerability, and the isolated location
27.
near registered sex offenders, the jury could reasonably find that sexual penetration by
force and torture were reasonably foreseeable consequences of the criminal enterprise
that appellant devised.
The verdict forms in this matter are critical. For counts 2 and 4, the jury
separately found appellant guilty “by aiding and abetting the perpetrator of the crime”
and also guilty because each nontarget offense was a natural and probable consequence
of the conspiracy charged in count 1. Therefore, this record conclusively establishes that
the jury accepted each theory independently, and the jury did not conflate the theories.
Based on the totality of this record, we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt
that the instructional errors did not contribute to these verdicts. (See Chapman v.
California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.) Likewise, it is not reasonably probable appellant
would have obtained a more favorable result absent these errors. (See People v. Watson
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) Consequently, prejudice is not present under either the
federal or state standard of review.
C. Appellant fails to establish ineffective assistance of counsel.
Appellant contends that her counsel was ineffective by failing to raise these
instructional issues below. We disagree.
Contrary to appellant’s position, the trial court did not err when instructing the
jury on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Further, the instructional errors
identified above were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As such, appellant cannot
establish a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s failure to raise these instructional
issues below, the result would have been different. (Strickland v. Washington (1984)
466 U.S. 668, 694 (Strickland).) As such, appellant does not establish ineffective
assistance of counsel.
In conclusion, appellant has forfeited the present claim, and section 1259 does not
excuse that forfeiture because she has not shown that her substantial rights were
28.
impacted. The instructional errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As such,
this claim is meritless and reversal is not warranted.
III. Sufficient Evidence Supports Appellant’s Convictions.
Appellant contends that her convictions for sexual penetration by force (count 2)
and torture (count 4) are not supported by sufficient evidence. She argues that the
“heinous” acts committed on E.G. were not reasonably foreseeable. Appellant seeks
reversal of her convictions in counts 2 and 4.
We reject appellant’s arguments. This record contains substantial evidence from
which a rational jury could find her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in counts 2 and 4.
A. The standard of review.
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains
reasonable, credible, and solid evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We presume every fact the jury
reasonably could have deduced from the evidence and do not reweigh the evidence,
resolve conflicts, or reevaluate credibility. Nor may we reverse merely because the
evidence could reasonably support a contrary finding. (People v. D’Arcy (2010)
48 Cal.4th 257, 293.)
The same standard applies when the conviction rests primarily on circumstantial
evidence. If the circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s findings, reversal is not
warranted merely because they might also reasonably support a contrary conclusion.
(People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.)
B. This record contains substantial evidence to support the convictions.
Appellant argues that the crimes of sexual penetration by force (§ 289,
subd. (a)(1)(B); count 2) and torture (§ 206; count 4) were not the natural and probable
consequences of the conspiracy to kidnap E.G. We disagree.
29.
Aiders and abettors are principals in the commission of an offense. (§ 31.) A
person aids and abets when, with knowledge of the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and
the intent to facilitate or encourage the crime, the person aids, promotes, encourages, or
instigates its commission. (People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560.) An aider and
abettor is “ ‘equally guilty’ with the direct perpetrator of an unintended crime that is the
natural and probable consequence of the intended crime.” (Canizalez, supra,
197 Cal.App.4th at p. 852; Medina, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 920.) Likewise, members of a
conspiracy are criminally liable for acts of fellow conspirators committed in furtherance
of, and as natural and probable consequences of, the conspiracy. (People v. Guillen,
supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at pp. 998–999; Zielesch, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 739.)
Whether a nontarget offense was reasonably foreseeable is ordinarily a factual
question for the jury based on all the circumstances. (Medina, supra, 46 Cal.4th at
p. 920; Zielesch, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at pp. 739–740.) The prosecution need not
establish that the nontarget offense was a strong probability. It is enough that the offense
was a “ ‘ “possible consequence” ’ ” that reasonably might have been contemplated.
(Medina, at p. 920.)
In this matter, the jury was instructed on principles of direct aiding and abetting.
The jury was separately instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine
stemming from the charged conspiracy. The jury was told that a “natural and probable
consequence” is one that “a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing
unusual intervenes” based on all the circumstances established by the evidence.
The jury found appellant guilty in counts 2 and 4 under both theories of liability—
that appellant aided and abetted the perpetrator, and each offense was a natural and
probable consequence of the conspiracy charged in count 1.
Substantial evidence supports appellant’s convictions for sexual penetration by
force and torture. These crimes began when appellant asked Carriedo if he knew any
“corrupted people” who could “scare” E.G. and K.G. Appellant explained that she
30.
wanted E.G. and K.G. so scared they would want to move out of their father’s home and
live with their mother. Appellant specifically stated that she wanted someone to “rip”
E.G.’s clothes to “scare the fuck out of her.”
Appellant downloaded a burner application onto her cell phone to conceal her
communications with other coconspirators. Appellant purchased gasoline for Carriedo,
and on the day of the kidnapping, she directed him to the residence in question and then
into the mountains to inspect possible sites.
Appellant selected the secluded location where E.G. was ultimately taken. About
a week before this kidnapping, appellant searched for registered sex offenders in the area.
The location that appellant selected was near multiple registered sex offenders.
Appellant argues that the “heinous” manner in which the sexual penetration and
torture occurred were not foreseeable consequences stemming from her criminal conduct.
We disagree. Foreseeability does not turn on whether appellant anticipated the precise
instrument or a specific detail of the sexual assault. Instead, the question is whether the
crimes themselves were consequences that reasonably might have been contemplated.
(Medina, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 920.)
From the totality of the evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that appellant
knowingly set in motion a plan involving far more than simply removing E.G. from her
home. The plan contemplated the forcible isolation, stripping, humiliation, and
intimidation of a 13-year-old girl at a secluded location appellant herself chose near
registered sex offenders.
Reasonable inferences may be drawn that appellant intended for a sexual crime to
occur, and she intended for law enforcement to focus on the local registered sex offenders
as the suspects. Given appellant’s articulated desire that E.G. be kidnapped, taken to an
isolated location, stripped of her clothes, and terrified, together with appellant’s personal
selection of the remote site near registered sex offenders, a reasonable jury could find that
the sexual penetration by force and torture were reasonably foreseeable consequences of
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the criminal enterprise that appellant devised. These facts permitted the jury to find that
appellant knew of the perpetrators’ unlawful purpose, intended to facilitate that conduct,
and in fact aided its commission.
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the judgment, substantial
evidence supports the jury’s findings that appellant was criminally responsible for sexual
penetration by force and torture. These nontarget offenses were the natural and probable
consequences stemming from appellant’s criminal intent and conduct. Accordingly, the
evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions in counts 2 and 4, and this claim fails.
IV. Appellant Has Forfeited Her Challenge to the Restitution Fine; This Claim
Also Fails on Its Merits.
Whenever a person is convicted of a crime, section 1202.4 requires a trial court to
impose a separate and additional restitution fine unless the court finds compelling and
extraordinary reasons not to do so. (§ 1202.4, subds. (b), (c).) For a felony, the
restitution fine must be at least $300 and may not exceed $10,000. The court has
discretion to set the amount in proportion to the seriousness of the offense. (Id., at
subd. (b)(1).) A court must impose the statutory minimum regardless of a defendant’s
ability to pay. However, when setting a fine above the statutory minimum, the court must
consider relevant factors, including the defendant’s ability to pay and the seriousness of
the offense. The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating an inability to pay, and the
court need not make express findings concerning the factors it considers. (Id., at
subds. (c), (d).)
Appellant committed these crimes in 2016, and she was sentenced in 2024. The
relevant provisions of section 1202.4 remained unchanged during this period. (§ 1202.4,
former subds. (b)(1), (c), & (d).)
Prior to the sentencing in this matter, the probation department recommended a
restitution fine in the amount of $8,400. At sentencing, the trial court adopted that
recommendation and imposed the fine in that amount. The court also imposed a
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corresponding parole revocation restitution fine under section 1202.45, which it stayed
unless parole is revoked. Pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (f), appellant was also
ordered to pay $5,838.33 to the California Victim Compensation Board.
At sentencing, the court found that appellant was prevented from paying monetary
obligations based on her LWOP sentence. For this reason, the court stayed an operations
assessment under section 1465.8, the court facilities assessment under Government Code
section 70373, and a fine under section 290.3, subdivision (a).
Appellant contends that the trial court erred by imposing the $8,400 restitution
fine. According to appellant, this record does not support the court’s implicit finding that
she had the ability to pay this fine. She further contends this fine is excessive under the
federal and state Constitutions. She asks us to strike this amount, or alternatively reduce
this fine to the statutory minimum, or remand this matter for a further hearing.
A. This claim is forfeited.
The parties disagree whether appellant has preserved this claim for appellate
review. We agree with respondent that this claim is forfeited.
It is undisputed that appellant did not request a hearing in the trial court regarding
her ability to pay. “In general, a defendant who fails to object to the imposition of fines,
fees, and assessments at sentencing forfeits the right to challenge those fines, fees, and
assessments on appeal.” (People v. Greeley (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 609, 624 (Greeley).)
Appellant’s sentencing occurred after the issuance of People v. Dueñas (2019)
30 Cal.App.5th 1157. As such, appellant could have requested an ability-to-pay hearing
based on Dueñas. Her failure to do so results in forfeiture. (Greeley, supra, 70
Cal.App.5th at p. 624.)
B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion under section 1202.4.
Even if this claim is not deemed forfeited, it fails on the merits. A trial court’s
determination of the amount of a restitution fine is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 24 (Kopp).) A trial court does not abuse its
33.
discretion unless its decision is “so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could
agree with it.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377.) We presume, absent
evidence to the contrary, that the lower court properly performed its statutory duties.
(People v. Wilson, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 868; People v. Williams (2015) 61 Cal.4th
1244, 1291.)
In both 2016 and 2024, section 1202.4 supplied an optional formula for
determining the amount of a felony restitution fine. A court could multiply the statutory
minimum of $300 “by the number of years of imprisonment the defendant is ordered to
serve, multiplied by the number of felony counts of which the defendant is convicted.”
(§ 1202.4, subd. (b)(2).)
Here, appellant was convicted of five felonies and sentenced, among other terms,
to LWOP. Viewed against the statutory framework, the $8,400 restitution fine that the
court imposed was well within the amount contemplated by section 1202.4.
Appellant’s argument rests in part on the premise that, by imposing the $8,400
restitution fine, the court necessarily made an implied finding that she was able to pay
that amount. However, section 1202.4 did not require the court to make any findings.
(§ 1202.4, subd. (d).) Imposing a fine above the statutory minimum does not itself
constitute an implied finding of a present ability to pay. An inability to pay is not a
reason to withhold the minimum fine, and it is only one factor the court must consider
when setting an amount above the minimum. Accordingly, whether substantial evidence
supports an implied finding that appellant could pay the $8,400 fine is not the relevant
inquiry.
For this reason, we need not resolve the parties’ dispute about whether appellant
has the potential to earn wages while in prison. Our analysis does not depend on any
assumption that appellant will obtain prison employment or earn sufficient wages to
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satisfy the fine. 12 Section 1202.4 expressly permits consideration of future earning
capacity, but the statutory question here is whether the court properly considered the
relevant factors in setting the amount of the fine—not whether the record establishes that
appellant will ultimately be able to pay every dollar imposed. (§ 1202.4, subd. (d).)
The question is whether the court properly exercised its discretion after
considering the relevant statutory factors. The record demonstrates that it did. The court
was plainly aware of appellant’s financial circumstances. The court expressly found, in
connection with the fine under section 290.3, that appellant’s LWOP sentence left her
without the ability to pay, and the court stayed that fine. The court also stayed the court
operations and facilities assessments for the same reason. Nothing in the record suggests
the court disregarded those financial limitations when setting this restitution fine of
$8,400. Instead, the court was entitled to consider appellant’s financial circumstances
with the other factors specified in section 1202.4, subdivision (d), including the
seriousness and gravity of appellant’s offenses, and the circumstances of their
commission. Nothing in this record rebuts the presumption that the court understood and
performed its statutory duties.
The sentencing record demonstrates that the court placed substantial weight on the
nature and gravity of appellant’s conduct. In discussing appellant’s offenses at
sentencing, the court described her case as involving “one of the most desperate,
diabolical, sadistic, evil, and repugnant acts I’ve ever seen.” It was proper for the court to
consider the seriousness and gravity of appellant’s heinous offenses. (§ 1202.4,
subd. (d).) This record amply reflects that the court was aware of appellant’s financial
limitations but nevertheless determined, in light of the gravity and circumstances of the
offenses, that the $8,400 amount recommended by probation was warranted.
12 We note that 10 years after appellant’s judgment was imposed, her restitution fine
will be unenforceable and uncollectible, and that portion of her judgment will be deemed
vacated as a matter of law. (§ 1465.9, subd. (d).) Thus, notwithstanding appellant’s
LWOP sentence, the restitution fine does not remain enforceable indefinitely.
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In sum, the record does not demonstrate an irrational or arbitrary exercise of
sentencing discretion. The court was aware of appellant’s financial limitations and
expressly considered her inability to pay when addressing other monetary obligations.
Under section 1202.4, the court was authorized to weigh those limitations against the
seriousness and gravity of appellant’s offenses and the circumstances of their
commission. Nothing in the record suggests the court misunderstood the scope of its
discretion or failed to consider the relevant statutory factors. Accordingly, appellant has
not shown that the decision to impose the $8,400 restitution fine was so irrational or
arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it. Therefore, she has not established
an abuse of sentencing discretion.
C. Appellant’s restitution fine was not constitutionally excessive.
According to appellant, we should deem this $8,400 restitution fine
constitutionally excessive because she lacks the ability to pay. We disagree.
Both the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I,
section 17 of the California Constitution prohibit excessive fines. (Kopp, supra,
19 Cal.5th at p. 24.) The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry is proportionality. A
punitive fine is constitutionally excessive if it is “grossly disproportional” to the gravity
of the offense it is designed to punish. (United States v. Bajakajian (1998) 524 U.S. 321,
334.) In assessing proportionality, we consider “ ‘(1) the defendant’s culpability; (2) the
relationship between the harm and the penalty; (3) the penalties imposed in similar
statutes; and (4) the defendant’s ability to pay.’ ” (People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 707, 728 (R.J. Reynolds).)
As previously mentioned, the trial court recognized appellant’s limited financial
circumstances given her LWOP sentence. However, her ability to pay was only one of
several factors the court was permitted to consider in determining proportionality. (R.J.
Reynolds, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 728.) Appellant’s argument treats that single factor as
dispositive. However, Kopp and R.J. Reynolds reject that approach.
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The remaining proportionality considerations amply demonstrate why no
constitutional violation occurred. Appellant’s culpability was substantial. The jury
convicted her of five felonies arising from conduct that resulted in the kidnapping,
forcible sexual penetration, and torture of a 13-year-old girl. Appellant orchestrated this
conspiracy, and a reasonable inference may be drawn that appellant intended for some
type of sex crime to occur. She wanted E.G. to be frightened, and she wanted E.G.’s
clothes ripped from her body. Appellant selected the secluded location to which E.G.
was taken. Appellant chose a site near registered sex offenders. The harm inflicted on
E.G. was extremely severe, and the sentencing court regarded appellant’s conduct as
exceptionally grave.
The statute’s optional formula demonstrates that the Legislature contemplated
substantial fines where a defendant is convicted of multiple felonies and receives a
lengthy prison sentence. (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)(1), (2).) Given the nature and severity of
the harm that appellant inflicted, the $8,400 restitution fine does not indicate gross
disproportionality. Section 1202.4 authorized a felony restitution fine as high as $10,000,
and the amount imposed here remained well below that statutory maximum.
Considering the factors—including appellant’s financial limitations—we conclude
that the $8,400 restitution fine is not grossly disproportional. Our conclusion is
supported by appellant’s substantial culpability, the extraordinary seriousness of the
underlying conduct, the harm inflicted on the victim, and the amount of the fine in
relation to the statutorily authorized maximum penalty of $10,000. (§ 1202.4,
subd. (b)(1).) As such, this fine did not violate either the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution or article I, section 17 of the California Constitution.
Appellant has not established either an abuse of discretion or a constitutional
violation. 13 Consequently, we reject her requests to strike this fine, or reduce it to the
13 Because this claim fails on its merits, appellant does not demonstrate ineffective
assistance of counsel stemming from a failure to request an ability-to-pay hearing. (See
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statutory minimum of $300, or to remand for further proceedings. This claim is forfeited
and it also fails on the merits.
V. We Order Correction of the Indeterminate Abstract of Judgment.
Appellant received a term of seven years to life on count 4, torture, which was
ordered to run concurrently with the LWOP sentence imposed on count 2, sexual
penetration by force on a child under the age of 14 years. The court’s minute order
reflects that sentence. However, the indeterminate abstract of judgment does not reflect
that the life sentence on count 4 is concurrent to the term of LWOP in count 2.
On our own motion, we direct the trial court to prepare an amended indeterminate
abstract of judgment reflecting that oral sentence imposed. (See People v. Mitchell
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 186–187 [an appellate court may correct clerical errors appearing
in an abstract of judgment].) The abstract must reflect that the sentence imposed on
count 4 runs concurrently with the sentence imposed on count 2.
DISPOSITION
The trial court is directed to prepare an amended indeterminate abstract of
judgment reflecting that the seven-year-to-life term imposed on count 4 runs concurrently
with the sentence imposed on count 2, and to forward a certified copy of the amended
abstract to the appropriate authorities. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
LEVY, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DESANTOS, J.
SANDHU, J.
Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 687 [a defendant must establish both deficient legal
performance and prejudice to show ineffective assistance].)
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