P. v. Garcia CA5 — Fear Not Law

Filed 10/7/26 P. v. Garcia CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, F090030

v. (Super. Ct. No. PCF376862A)

ISAIAH ELIAS GARCIA, MODIFICATION OF OPINION
[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
Defendant and Appellant.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.264(c), it is ordered that the opinion
filed herein on October 5, 2026, be modified as follows:
1. On page 2, in the first sentence of the first paragraph under
STATEMENT OF THE CASE, “Visalia County District Attorney” is
deleted and replaced with “Tulare County District Attorney.”
Except for the modification set forth, the opinion previously filed remains
unchanged. This modification does not effect a change in the judgment.

GUERRA, J.

WE CONCUR:

FRANSON, Acting P. J.

SNAUFFER, J.
Filed 10/5/26 P. v. Garcia CA5 (unmodified opinion)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F090030
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. PCF376862A)
v.

ISAIAH ELIAS GARCIA,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Nathan G.
Leedy, Judge.
Scott Concklin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Dina Petrushenko and
Jeffrey D. Firestone, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Defendant Isaiah Elias Garcia (defendant) was convicted of second degree murder
with a deadly weapon enhancement. He contends the trial court improperly took judicial
notice of a witness’s identification of him as the killer at the preliminary hearing. He also
argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to lodge certain objections at trial. Finally,
he posits the court erred in including a bracketed portion of CALCRIM No. 571 and in
failing to define the words “wrongful” and “justify” as used in the instruction. We find
no reversible error and affirm the judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In an amended information filed on March 27, 2025, the Visalia County District
Attorney charged defendant with murder (§ 187, subd. (a))1 with a use of deadly weapon
enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The information also alleged aggravating
circumstances under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), and (b)(1).
The jury acquitted defendant of first degree murder but convicted him of the lesser
included offense of second degree murder. The jury found the deadly weapon
enhancement true. The aggravating circumstance allegations were dismissed.
The trial court sentenced defendant to 15 years to life in prison for second degree
murder, plus one year consecutive for the deadly weapon enhancement.
FACTS
First Fight
Miranda B.2 and her friends went to a party on February 22, 2019. The group
included Isaiah Q., Matthew A., and Mary Kate S. While they were hanging out at the
party, their friend Bryan Inzunza came “in and out of the picture.” (Collectively, the
Tulare group.)

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise indicated.

2 To protect the privacy of the witnesses, we refer to them by their first name and
last initial. No disrespect is intended.

2.
Also at the party was a group of people from Visalia, including Evelyn B.,
Alex G., defendant’s codefendant Isaha Marquez, and several others (collectively, the
Visalia group). The two groups “didn’t get along.” Someone from the Tulare group
asked for a shot from a bottle the Visalia group had. The Visalia group refused, and
“things … escalated” to yelling and a fight. According to Matthew A., “[e]verybody just
started fighting.”
In Miranda B.’s opinion, her group (i.e., the Tulare group) won the fight and the
other group was annoyed. Matthew A. similarly testified that the Visalia group “had got
beat up pretty good.” Someone3 fired gunshots and the fighting stopped.
Outside the party, another altercation began between Isaiah Q. and someone
named Kevin C. After they fought, Kevin C. told Isaiah Q. he was going to grab his gun
and shoot him. Isaiah Q. and Mary Kate S. walked down the street away from the party
until Bryan Inzunza (the alleged victim) picked them up and took them to Matthew A.’s
house.
At one point after the initial fight, Marquez pointed a gun at Matthew A., racked
the slide, and pulled the trigger, but the gun jammed. Matthew A. grabbed the slide of
the gun and deflected it.
Inzunza, who had been in his car, was not involved in the fighting.
The Two Groups Gather Separately
Members of the Visalia group went to Brandon N.’s residence. The group
included defendant, Marquez, Ciara T., Johnie C., Kevin C., and others. Ciara T.
appeared to have been “pretty beat up.” The group was angry, “amped up and wanting to
fight again.”
The Tulare group went to Matthew A.’s residence, including Inzunza, Isaiah Q.,
Mary Kate S., Miranda B., and someone named Rexy. They drank alcoholic drinks,

3 Evelyn B. told law enforcement that Alex G. had fired the shots.

3.
talked about what happened, and everyone’s “blood pressures [were] boiling.”
Matthew A. spoke on the phone with an unknown male and said, “[H]ey, you know what,
I understand you’re upset but just talk to me in the morning, we’ll figure it out from
there.” Matthew A. was hoping the other group would come to their senses and talk
about it in the morning when everyone was clearheaded. Matthew A. believed the entire
problem was just a misunderstanding between Ciara T. and Isaiah Q.
Fight Outside of Matthew A.’s Residence
Within five to ten minutes of the phone call, eight to twelve people from the
Visalia group walked up to Matthew A.’s residence. At first, Matthew A. believed the
phone call had worked because the Visalia group was not being “so hotheaded.”
However, Ciara T. eventually attacked Miranda B., which led to a second fight.
“Everybody just started fighting everybody again.”
Matthew A.’s Account
Matthew A. fought with Marquez, Ciara T., and Kevin C. To Matthew A.’s left,
he saw Inzunza was fighting defendant and Johnie C. Matthew A. testified that Inzunza
“was fighting the same two people from the start to the finish. He was doing a good job.
I was proud of him, you know, but I had my hands full over here on this side.”
Matthew A. saw Inzunza “hitting ‘em with wrestling moves, and it was working.”
At one point, Matthew A. saw Inzunza and a reflection of something. Matthew A.
testified at trial that at a prior hearing, he had said the reflection was a knife. The knife
was being held by defendant.
Matthew A. kicked someone to the ground, turned around, and heard crying and
screaming. Inzunza did not get up after that and there was a river of blood. Matthew A.
tried to stop the bleeding but could not.
Matthew A. initially refused to identify anyone to law enforcement because
he feared retaliation.

4.
Miranda B.’s Account
Miranda B. testified that either in transit or after arriving at Matthew A.’s home,
they received a social media communication from the “other side” about fighting again.
Ciara T. posted a video saying she was going to “get [them]” and “fight [them] again.”
While the Tulare group was outside, two cars with people from the Visalia group arrived.
Ciara T. exited the vehicle and said to Miranda B., “ ‘You and me round two.’ ”
Matthew A. told Ciara T. that Miranda B. was not going to fight. Someone Miranda B.
did not recognize attacked her (i.e., Miranda B.). Miranda B. ended up on the ground and
saw her friends fighting. When Miranda B. got back up, she saw Inzunza on the ground.
She could not get him to get up and he was not talking.
Miranda B.’s purported identification of the stabber is central to an issue on appeal
and is discussed in detail later in this opinion.
Ruby C.’s Account
Matthew A.’s mother, Ruby C., testified at trial. Ruby C. went outside her home
in the early morning hours of February 23, 2019, and saw “like[] 50 people” fighting
everywhere in the street. Ruby C. saw Inzunza surrounded by people hitting him. Ruby
C. said, “[S]top fighting, stop fighting,” and then saw someone fall down and blood
pouring down the street. Several people carried Inzunza from the street to the yard until
police officers arrived.
Ruby C. told law enforcement that Inzunza had been fighting three people and was
getting backed up to the fence.
Isaiah Q.’s Account
Isaiah Q. testified that the weekend prior to the incident, defendant apologized for
a prior incident where Ciara T. had wrongfully accused Isaiah Q. of stealing defendant’s
wallet. In fact, Ciara T. and defendant found it in a vehicle. Isaiah Q. told Ciara T. they
were not friends and need not act like it.

5.
While at Matthew A.’s house following the first fight, Isaiah Q. answered a social
media voice call from Ciara T. Ciara T. insisted that Isaiah Q. and his friends go to
Brandon N.’s house for “ ‘round two.’ ” Isaiah Q. refused.
Not long after receiving Ciara T.’s call, Isaiah Q. heard voices yelling around the
corner. Around eight individuals including Marquez, Ciara T., defendant, Mariah G.,
Kevin C., an unknown female, and “likely” Johnie C. approached Isaiah Q.’s group (i.e.,
Isaiah Q., Matthew A., Miranda B., Mary Kate S., and Inzunza) on the driveway.
Ciara T. was “livid” and was persistent in seeking another altercation with Miranda B.
Matthew A. tried to deescalate the situation and told Ciara T. she was drunk and needed
to go home. During the conversation, an unknown female, possibly Evelyn B., jumped a
gate in front of Matthew A.’s home and “ambushed” Miranda B. Isaiah Q. and Ciara T.
began fighting. Isaiah Q. saw defendant and Inzunza fighting. Isaiah Q. stopped fighting
Ciara T. when he saw Inzunza on the ground with blood running down the driveway.
Ciara T. had tears in her eyes and said, “ ‘I didn’t do it.’ ” Isaiah Q. went to Inzunza and
Ciara T. ran away. Inzunza’s pulse was slow and he was incoherent.
Isaiah Q. did not know who stabbed Inzunza.
Corporal Art Cabello testified Isaiah Q. told him the two groups had a
conversation “leading to everyone[] saying that there would be no weapons at the fight.”
At trial, Isaiah Q. denied that such a conversation had occurred.
Evelyn B.’s Account
Evelyn B. claimed at trial that she did not remember much and was under the
influence of Xanax around the time of the incident. Evelyn B. “slightly remember[ed]”
defendant saying they should go to the “opposing group’s house” to “talk it out.” She
remembered that a fight broke out and that her ex-boyfriend, Alex G., saw her get hit.
Evelyn B. testified she was honest when she spoke with law enforcement and was
honest when she said she believed defendant was looking to stab somebody. She told law

6.
enforcement defendant was making odd movements that gave her a bad feeling. She also
saw defendant reaching for his waistband.
Evelyn B. testified she was being honest with law enforcement when she said she
saw defendant with a knife and sheath after leaving the scene. And while she did not
presently recall, she was being honest with law enforcement when she told them
defendant said that he used the knife to stab someone.
Cabello interviewed Evelyn B. and she said that while at Brandon N.’s house,
defendant said there should be retaliation for what was done to Ciara T.’s face during the
first fight. Evelyn B. said the two groups agreed no weapons would be used.
Nonetheless, Evelyn B. said she believed defendant intended to stab someone. Evelyn B.
told Cabello that defendant was “taking a no-fight walk and that he was making odd
movements that scared her, and that she believed that his intention was to stab
somebody.” Evelyn B. also said she saw defendant pop a button on a knife sheath.
Evelyn B. said she saw Johnie C. knock Inzunza down twice. Evelyn B. also said
she saw “ ‘[t]he kid who stabbed the kid’ ” holding “something.”
After the second fight, Evelyn B.’s group agreed they would tell law enforcement
about the first fight but then claim they went home afterward. The next day, there was a
group conversation in which defendant showed a black knife and said, “this is what I
used.”
Mariah G.’s Account
According to Cabello’s testimony at trial, Mariah G. initially told law enforcement
that everybody went home after the party but eventually admitted they went to
Brandon N.’s house. They were “all amped up and wanting to fight again.” Defendant
said he wanted to go to the residence in Tulare “regarding” the injuries to Ciara T.
Defendant “mentioned no weapons.” Mariah G. indicated to Cabello that defendant’s
statement did not make sense since she had realized defendant had a weapon. Her group

7.
asked Inzunza’s group to come to Brandon N.’s house to fight. They eventually decided
to go to Matthew A.’s residence to fight.
Mariah G. said that Miranda B., Ciara T., Matthew A., Evelyn B., and Kevin C.
were fighting. There was also another fight occurring concurrently between Johnie C.,
defendant, and Inzunza.
When Mariah G. and Kevin C. got in her car to leave, defendant jumped in the car
with them. After defendant got in the car, Mariah G. saw defendant had blood on him
and had a knife.
At trial, Mariah G. testified that she did not recall what she had told Cabello
shortly after the events took place because she said she had taken two Xanax before the
party, two at the party, and one the next day.
Kevin C.’s Account
Kevin C. saw Inzunza and defendant fighting, presumably at Matthew A.’s house.
When Kevin C., defendant, and Mariah G. left in a vehicle, defendant showed Kevin C.
his hands, which were bloody. Defendant also showed Kevin C. “the knife,” which had
blood on it. Defendant said, “ ‘I stabbed him.’ ”
Ciara T.’s Account
Ciara T. testified at trial that she did not remember going to a party with Kevin C.
and defendant, did not remember Brandon N., and did not remember a fight at
Matthew A.’s house.
According to Cabello’s testimony at trial, the day after the incident, Ciara T. told
Cabello that defendant had openly admitted to having committed the stabbing.
Defendant said he had “stuck” him, then “the guy” tried to take off running but “he had
grabbed him and then he had did it again.” While Ciara T. explained that defendant had
stabbed someone, she “pantomime[d]” a stabbing motion that Cabello reenacted for the
jury. The motion was to reach his left hand out and wrap around as if to put his arm
around another person.

8.
Ciara T. said she was with “Zay” (i.e., defendant) all the time and he kept a large
hunting knife in his car with a sheath.
Some of Ciara T.’s calls from jail were admitted into evidence, showing she was
told by someone “not to change up,” and to keep saying she does not recall and nothing
else.
Other Individuals
Mary Kate S. told law enforcement that Matthew A. told the other group to leave
and that they did not want to fight. Mary Kate S. testified she was not involved in the
fighting because she was dealing with a dog that was trying to get out of a fence.
Johnie C. only agreed to testify after receiving immunity and even then, recanted
his prior statements, claiming he did not recall the answer to substantive questions and
did not recognize most of the parties involved in the case. When asked if he could
identify Isaiah Garcia in court, Johnie C. said no and that he did not recognize anyone in
court before indicating that defendant appeared “familiar to” the picture exhibit he had
seen.
Ufficial ROZAE’s Social Media Post
Isaiah Q. testified that Cambria G. told him that defendant asked to hide
something at her home. Cambria G. told defendant she was out of town, and he hung up
on her.
Cambria G. provided Isaiah Q. a screenshot of a social media post by an account
called “Ufficial ROZAE.” According to Isaiah Q., Ufficial ROZAE was defendant’s
account.4 The post stated, “Im the one who stabbed that n[**]ga[.] Put it on your soul u
wont say shit i gotta stay low ken it aint even funny dont tell allison plz i trust u thats why

4 The prosecution also admitted screenshots of an account with a different social
media provider under the name “ufficialrozae,” which was populated with pictures of
defendant.

9.
im telling u.” (Sic.) After “Im the one who stabbed that n[**]ga,” the post contains an
emoji of a face with a finger in front of its mouth as if to say, “keep quiet.”
Cabello spoke with Cambria G., who provided the social media screenshots
discussed above. Cambria G. said she believed it was a mistaken post that was probably
supposed to be a direct message.
Forensic Pathologist’s Testimony
A forensic pathologist reviewed Inzunza’s case. Inzunza was 19 years old, 5 feet
10 inches tall, and 136 pounds at the time of his passing. Crime scene photographs
showed considerable blood loss. Photographs of Inzunza’s body showed sharp
instrument wounds, including a wound 19 inches down from the top of his head, just
below his left breast. The cut went into the left ventricle of Inzunza’s heart, which is the
main chamber that pumps blood out to the rest of the body. The cut also hit his left lung,
causing it to collapse.
Two other wounds were not deep enough to enter the chest cavity. Inzunza also
had “incidental” scrapes and abrasions on his right shoulder and bruises on his right knee.
Inzunza likely lost consciousness within 30 to 60 seconds after being stabbed and
died within minutes.
Location Services
The location services on defendant’s phone were turned off for 27 minutes, which
included the time the stabbing occurred.
Defendant’s Testimony
Defendant testified that he did not participate in the fight at the party. He heard
gunshots and ran to Brandon N.’s car. They then went to Brandon N.’s house.
Outside of Brandon N.’s house, Ciara T. was upset and showed defendant her
face, which was “badly beat up.” Defendant was upset because Ciara T. was his friend.
Defendant could not “really recall” whether they spoke of pursuing a fight. Ciara T. “felt
played” and wanted “a round two.” Ciara T. asked defendant where he was during the

10.
first fight. Ciara T. asked in a way that made defendant believe she was trying to make
him feel guilty for not participating. Defendant agreed to leave with Ciara T. and others.
Defendant claimed he thought the fight would be one-on-one—Ciara T. against someone
else—and that he would not be participating. Defendant was concerned Ciara T. would
“get jumped again.”
When they left, defendant did not bring any weapons with him. Once they
arrived, defendant was last out of the car and already heard “shit talking” from
Matthew A. A physical altercation began involving Ciara T., Kevin C., Matthew A.,
and others defendant did not know. Ciara T. also fought Miranda B.
While defendant watched, someone approached him from behind and punched
him. The punch dazed defendant a little bit. Defendant turned around and saw someone
in black whom he did not know. The person struck him again in the head and defendant
punched back but missed. Eventually, the person tried to wrestle with defendant, and a
knife fell out of the person’s pocket. Defendant picked up the knife, which had fallen
inches away from him. The person hit defendant in the head and then tried to swing
again when defendant “utilized the knife.” It felt like “a popping.” The person had a
“weird” reaction that was audible. Defendant knew he might have hurt the person at that
time. Defendant denied grabbing onto the person when he tried to get away after the first
stabbing. At no point was the other person holding the knife.
Defendant did not recall how many times he used the knife because “everything
[was] a blur at that point.” Defendant claimed he was scared for his life. Defendant
claimed he did not intend to kill anyone.
When he got into the car afterwards, he had the knife and blood on his hands.
Defendant did not remember saying anything in the car. Defendant thought, “I fucked
up.” Once he got back to Brandon N.’s, he got in his car, “threw the knife,” and drove to
Marquez’s house. There, he learned the person who was stabbed had died and he felt

11.
guilty. Defendant sent a communication through social media but “accidentally sent it
public.”
DISCUSSION

I. Defendant has not Established the Trial Court Erred in Taking Judicial
Notice of Miranda B.’s Identification of Defendant at the Preliminary
Hearing or Briefly Instructing the Jury Thereon
Defendant contends the trial court erred when it took judicial notice of testimony
Miranda B. gave at the preliminary hearing, described below. He also argues the court
erred in how it instructed the jury upon taking judicial notice.
Additional Background
Miranda B.’s Preliminary Hearing Testimony
Miranda B. testified at the preliminary hearing where the following exchange
occurred:
“Q. Do you recognize anybody in this courtroom?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Can you point to where that person is?
“A. This person.
“Q. And—
“A. This person.
“Q. All right. Let’s start you pointed to this person. Who is that person? Do
you know his name?
“A. Isaiah.
“Q. Do you know his last name?
“A. Garcia.
“Q. Isaiah Garcia?
“A. Yeah.
“Q. How do you know him?

12.
“A. Well, I’ve seen him a couple of times. He’s the person that killed my
Br[y]an.”
Shortly thereafter, the trial court stated that the record would reflect that
Miranda B. had identified Isaiah Garcia.
Miranda B. later testified at the preliminary hearing as follows:
“Q. And at the second fight, did you see—well, you told us that Mr. Garcia
killed your friend. What did you actually see about that?
“A. I seen him, him—
“Q. Mr. Garcia and Mr. Marquez?
“A. —and all their other friends that came, several other friends that came. And
I was right next to Br[y]an when it happened.
“Q. Br[y]an Inzunza?
“A. Yes.
“Q. And what did you see?
“A. Well, there was two people on Br[y]an and one person had got me. When I
looked at Br[y]an, but I was on the floor already.
“Q. Could you see which two people were on Br[y]an?
“A. Not really because it was dark.
“Q. Okay. Were either of those people male or female? Do you know?
“A. They were males.”
Miranda B.’s Trial Testimony
Miranda B. testified differently at trial. When shown a picture of Marquez and
asked whom it depicted, Miranda B. testified, “I think that’s Isaiah” Garcia. When
shown a picture of defendant, Miranda B. testified she did not recognize that person.
Miranda B. was then asked to look around the courtroom and see if she recognized
“Mr. Garcia.” She replied, “I—I don’t.”
Miranda B. was then asked about her preliminary hearing testimony as follows:

13.
“Q. And do you recall testifying at a prior court hearing back in 2021 with
regard to this case?
“A. In Porterville?
“Q. Yes.
“A. Yes.
“Q. And isn’t it true that at that time you were able to identify the person—
“A. Yes.
“Q. —Isaiah Garcia, at that hearing?
“A. Hm-hmm, yes.
“Q. And you identified him as ‘he’s the person that killed my Bryan’; isn’t that
correct?
“A. Yes.
“Q. And in court, you actually identified that person by pointing them out in
court in person; correct?
“A. Yes.
“Q. And isn’t it true that the person that you pointed out was identified on the
record as Isaiah Garcia?
“A. Yes.
“Q. And so, if someone has changed in appearance in the past six years, is it
possible that you might have a hard time now remembering what they looked like?
“A. Six years, like, their appearance?
“Q. Yes.
“A. Well, for me, yeah.
“Q. So it’s likely that your identification in 2021 since it was closer to the
incident was accurate?
“A. Yeah.
“Q. And it was true?

14.
“A. Yes.
“Q. And you were being honest at that time?
“A. Yes.
“Q. And at this court hearing that you testified at previously, there were
two individuals that you identified; is that correct?
“A. Yes.
“Q. There was Isaha Marquez, as well?
“A. Yes.
“Q. And you specifically identified each of them separately; isn’t that correct?
“A. Yes.
“Q. And you identified both of them in court?
“A. Yes.
“Q. And with both, you were honest with the court?
“A. Yes.
“Q. And the only person that you identified as having fought and killed Bryan
[Inzunza] was Isaiah Garcia; is that correct?
“A. Yes.”
Request for Judicial Notice
The prosecutor then requested that the trial court take judicial notice of the
preliminary hearing transcript “and the identification at that time.” Defense counsel
objected on hearsay and lack of notice grounds.5 The prosecutor said she had a copy of
the transcript and stated, “[T]he identification starts on [p]age 66 and ends on [p]age 67
[with] the court stating that the record reflects she’s identified Mr. Garcia, Marquez.”
The court deferred its ruling and invited counsel to research relevant legal authorities.

5 Counsel also stated that since Miranda B. admitted she identified defendant
before, there was no basis for the transcript to come in. We understand counsel’s
argument to be that the transcript was not admissible as impeachment evidence.

15.
The trial court reviewed the two pages of the preliminary hearing transcript
referenced by the prosecutor and said it did not seem there was any dispute that
Miranda B. had identified defendant, and defense counsel agreed. The court then
observed that the prior identification was already made and “it’s just a matter of taking
judicial notice of who she was pointing to at the proceeding. That obviously isn’t
something that can be recreated, but it’s not really subject to dispute.” Consequently, the
court ruled it would take judicial notice “of the fact that [defendant] was identified by this
witness at the preliminary hearing.”
When the jury returned, the trial court stated, “The court will take judicial notice
of the fact that at the preliminary hearing in this case, as the witness testified to
previously, she identified the defendant in this case, Mr. Garcia.” The court continued,
“What that means, folks, is I’m taking judicial notice of it so you can just receive that fact
as true.”
Miranda B.’s Trial Testimony Resumes
Miranda B. then resumed her trial testimony. Miranda B. testified that she did not
recall telling a law enforcement officer that she did not see who stabbed Inzunza because
she was fighting Ciara T. Miranda B. provided a description of “the suspect” to law
enforcement: “a dark-skinned Hispanic male” who was slightly taller than Inzunza.
However, Miranda B. later testified she could not see who stabbed Inzunza because it
was dark and Ciara T. had grabbed her by the hair.
Corporal Cabello’s Testimony
Corporal Cabello testified later at trial as follows,
“Q. Okay. And were you present when Miranda [B.] testified at a prior hearing
or preliminary hearing that was mentioned during the course of her testimony?
“A. Yes, I was.

16.
“Q. And while you were present at the preliminary hearing, did you also see her
identify … defendant, Mr. Garcia, as the course—in the portion or the course of her
testifying?
“A. Yes. That occurred in 2021, and in her defense, he looks very different from
2019 or 2021.
“Q. Okay. And in that identification, did you hear her say in court, ‘Well, I seen
him a couple of times. He’s the person who killed my Bryan’?
“A. Yes, ma’am.”
Law
A court may take judicial notice of court records. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)
“ ‘[W]hile courts are free to take judicial notice of the existence of each document in a
court file, including the truth of results reached, they may not take judicial notice of the
truth of hearsay statements in decisions and court files. [Citation.] Courts may not take
judicial notice of allegations in affidavits, declarations and probation reports in court
records because such matters are reasonably subject to dispute and therefore require
formal proof.’ ” (Kilroy v. State of California (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 145.)
“ ‘ “ ‘[A] constitutional right,’ or a right of any other sort, ‘may be forfeited in
criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a
tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.’ ” ’ ” (People v. McCullough (2013) 56
Cal.4th 589, 593.)
We review the trial court’s ruling on judicial notice for abuse of discretion. (Vo v.
Technology Credit Union (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 632, 639.) To the extent we must
engage in a critical consideration of legal principles, we do so independently. (Crocker
National Bank v. City and County of San Francisco (1989) 49 Cal.3d 881, 888.)
We independently review defendant’s claims of instructional error. (People v.
Mijares (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 428, 432.)

17.
Analysis
The Matter Noticed by the Trial Court
Defendant argues the trial court did not merely take judicial notice of the
preliminary hearing transcript as a true transcript but instead took notice of the testimony
set forth therein as true testimony. Then, by telling the jury to “ ‘receive that fact as
true,’ ” the court effectively instructed the jury to find that Miranda B. truthfully
identified defendant as the killer at the preliminary hearing. Defendant argues this
improperly removed the issue of identity from the jury.
Defendant’s factual premises are incorrect. The trial court was clearly taking
judicial notice of the fact that Miranda B. had identified defendant at the preliminary
hearing, rather than taking judicial notice of the truthfulness of that identification. The
court’s instruction makes quite clear that the fact the jury was to “receive … as true” was
the fact expressly identified by the court immediately beforehand, i.e., “the fact that at the
preliminary hearing in this case, as the witness testified to previously, she identified
… defendant …, Mr. Garcia.”
There is a crucial difference between taking judicial notice that certain testimony
occurred versus notice of the underlying facts to which the witness testified. One is,
“Miranda B. said x, y, and z.” The other is, “What Miranda B. said about x, y, and z is
true.” Applied here, there would be a vital distinction between judicially noticing the fact
that Miranda B.’s identification of defendant occurred at the preliminary hearing versus
judicially noticing the fact that defendant killed Inzunza (i.e., that the identification
testimony was correct). Judicial notice that Miranda B.’s identification occurred does not
remove the issue of identity from the jury because the jury was still free to determine
whether Miranda B.’s identification—which undoubtedly occurred—was accurate.
Defendant relies on People v. Barre (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 961, but that reliance
is misplaced. In Barre, the trial court said, “ ‘The court having the original court file
which is utilized in the Superior Court in front of me, the court does take judicial

18.
notice that this defendant was convicted on December 13[,] 1989 by his own plea of
guilty. [¶] [H]e was convicted before Judge Cecil Mills in Department K[,] which is the
court right next door to this one[,] and he was sentenced to three years formal probation.
And as a condition of that three years formal probation[,] the court sentenced him to
181 days in the Los Angeles County Jail. County jail is a penal institution. [¶] The court
does take judicial notice of that fact of that conviction.’ ” (Barre, at p. 964, fn. omitted,
italics added.) Thus, the trial court in Barre clearly took judicial notice of the fact of the
defendant’s conviction, rather than merely taking judicial notice of the court file. Here,
the trial court did not say, “The court, having the preliminary hearing transcript in front
of me, takes judicial notice that defendant killed Inzunza.”
Defendant cites page 52 of the respondent’s brief and argues the Attorney
General’s position is that the trial court only took judicial notice of Miranda B. pointing
at defendant at the preliminary hearing. Defendant argues this is incorrect because
Miranda B. testified that she pointed at defendant and said he killed Inzunza. Defendant
misstates the Attorney General’s position. The respondent’s brief, on page 52, argues,
“In stating ‘as the witness testified to previously’ [citation], the trial court was
referencing Miranda B.’s trial testimony that she pointed at the person and identified him
at the preliminary hearing.” (Italics omitted & added.) Thus, the Attorney General does
not deny, and indeed admits, that judicial notice was taken of Miranda B.’s identification
of defendant as the killer. What the Attorney General rejects is that judicial notice was
taken of the underlying truth of Miranda B.’s identification, not whether Miranda B.
identified defendant as the killer.
Defendant claims the judicial notice was “false” because Miranda B. did not
identify him as the killer because she later testified she did not see the killing. But the
transcript is clear that Miranda B. testified that defendant killed Inzunza. The fact that
the testimony likely lacked proper foundation does not mean it was not an identification
of defendant as the killer—it clearly was.

19.
Forfeiture
Defendant next argues that Miranda B. lacked personal knowledge to identify
defendant as the killer at the preliminary hearing. But defendant made no objection on
grounds of lack of foundation or speculation, either at the preliminary hearing or at trial.
Similarly, defendant claims on appeal the prosecutor committed misconduct by seeking
judicial notice of testimony that lacked foundation, eliciting trial testimony to that effect,
and providing only two pages of the preliminary hearing transcript but did not make an
objection on those grounds.6 Consequently, these contentions have been forfeited, and
we decline to exercise any discretion we may have to excuse the forfeiture.7
Opportunity to Object
Defense counsel says the prosecutor’s failure to provide notice of the request for
judicial notice (Evid. Code, § 453) deprived counsel of a reasonable opportunity to object
on additional grounds. But the trial court did not rule on the request for judicial notice
immediately and instead gave all counsel an opportunity to research the issue.
Consequently, defense counsel did have a reasonable opportunity to formulate objections.

6 Defendant argues that forfeiture does not apply because the prosecutor misled
defense counsel by only providing two pages of the preliminary hearing transcript and
asserting that they contained the entire identification. He cites no legal authority to
support this contention. Moreover, all the prosecutor said was that the identification
“starts on [p]age 66 and ends on [p]age 67 [with] the court stating that the record reflects
that she’s identified Mr. Garcia, Marquez.” The prosecutor was saying that the
“identification”—meaning the part of Miranda B.’s testimony where she identified who
in the courtroom was the person who “killed her” Bryan—occurred on those transcript
pages. That was a correct statement. The fact that Miranda B. later testified about the
events of that night, including facts that might bear on the weight or foundation for her
identification, does not render the prosecutor’s statement misleading or untruthful.
7 Defendant contends that no objection is required for his claims of instructional
error. We do not reject his instructional error claims on forfeiture grounds.

20.
Hearsay
Defendant argues the trial court judicially noticed hearsay but contends the
possible application of a hearsay exemption is immaterial because the issue is whether
the court can take judicial notice of the truth of the matter asserted. However, whether a
hearsay exemption applies, or whether the noticed matters are offered for a nonhearsay
purpose, is material. Defendant’s argument to the contrary invokes purportedly broad
rules, such as, “it is error to take judicial notice of testimony given in a prior proceeding.”
But the law of judicial notice is more nuanced, as defendant’s subsequent citations
reflect. “[A] witness’ prior testimony, even though given under oath and having been
subjected to full cross-examination, is considered to be a declarant’s hearsay statements
and inadmissible unless satisfying the requirements of some hearsay exception.”
(Williams v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 893, 899, italics added.)
Similarly, defendant posits that “[s]tatements in the transcript attributable to the
court are not the proper subject of judicial notice.” But, again, the actual rule is not so
broad. Defendant cites People v. Rubio (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 757, disapproved on other
grounds in People v. Freeman (1978) 22 Cal.3d 434, 438–439, but the appellate court’s
concern in that case was that the judicially noticed statements of a judge were hearsay.
(Rubio, at p. 766.) In contrast, when there are applicable hearsay exceptions, or the
evidence is offered for a nonhearsay purpose, then judicial notice of such statements in
transcripts or opinions has been upheld. For example, in Hart v. Darwish (2017) 12
Cal.App.5th 218, the appellate court upheld a trial court taking judicial notice of a
judge’s statements as reflected in a reporter’s transcript. Hart noted that a hearsay
exception applied and that the statements were being offered for a nonhearsay purpose.
(Id. at pp. 224–225; see People v. Woodell (1998) 17 Cal.4th 448, 455–456, 458–459
[appellate opinion can be judicially noticed to determine whether the defendant had
suffered a particular prior conviction and was being offered for a nonhearsay purpose].)

21.
In sum, there is no blanket ban on taking judicial notice of statements/testimony
reflected in a transcript. The core concern in such cases usually centers on whether the
transcribed statements/testimony were hearsay and/or whether a hearsay exception
applied. Thus, whether there is an applicable hearsay exception and whether the
testimony was offered for a nonhearsay purpose is relevant.
Defendant argues that the judicial notice here involved two levels of hearsay:
(1) Miranda B.’s testimony and (2) the preliminary hearing transcript as evidence of that
testimony. But Miranda B.’s testimony that defendant killed Inzunza was not hearsay. It
was not evidence of an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted. Indeed, it was not evidence of a statement at all. Miranda B. did not testify that
she or anyone else had said defendant “killed my Br[y]an,” she simply testified:
defendant “killed my Br[y]an.” In any event, no hearsay objection was lodged at
preliminary hearing as to her testimony on this point.
In contrast, the preliminary hearing transcript was evidence of an out-of-court8
statement (i.e., Miranda B.’s preliminary hearing testimony) being offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted (i.e., that Miranda B. testified as the transcript reflects).
However, that evidence is covered by Evidence Code section 1238, which provides,

“Evidence of a statement previously made by a witness is not made
inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement would have been
admissible if made by him while testifying and:

“(a) The statement is an identification of a party or another as a
person who participated in a crime or other occurrence;

“(b) The statement was made at a time when the crime or other
occurrence was fresh in the witness’ memory; and

8 While the prior testimony was given in a courtroom, it was still “out of court” in
the sense that it was not testimony given at trial.

22.
“(c) The evidence of the statement is offered after the witness
testifies that he made the identification and that it was a true reflection of
his opinion at that time.”
Miranda B. testified at trial that (1) she made the identification at the court hearing
in 2021, (2) at a time that was closer to the incident and therefore likely accurate, and that
(3) the identification was true. After the bases for admissibility under Evidence Code
section 1238 were established, the prosecutor then sought judicial notice of the
preliminary hearing transcript. Defendant has not established that the trial court violated
the hearsay rule. Because we rely on the hearsay exception in Evidence Code
section 1238, we do not address whether the exception for prior inconsistent statements
also applies.
More fundamentally, even defendant admits that merely taking judicial notice of
the transcript would have “allow[ed] the jury to consider the prior testimony as mere
evidence.” But that is essentially what the trial court did here. The court did not instruct
the jury that Miranda B.’s identification was true, but instead that the identification
occurred. The jury remained free to accept or reject the underlying truth or falsity of the
identification.
Prejudice
Alleged Error in Taking Judicial Notice
As explained above, defendant has failed to establish error. However, even if the
trial court’s decision to take judicial notice had been erroneous, we would find it
harmless. The judicially noticed matters overlapped significantly with evidence that was
admitted elsewhere at trial. Miranda B. testified at trial she had identified Isaiah Garcia
at the preliminary hearing as the person who fought and killed Inzunza. Cabello also
testified at trial that Miranda B. had identified defendant at the preliminary hearing as the
person who “ ‘killed my Bryan.’ ” Given this testimony, we fail to see how the taking of
judicial notice of the same identification was so incrementally harmful to defendant’s

23.
case as to cause prejudice or compel him to testify when he otherwise would not have.9
Consequently, while we find no error, we also conclude even if it were error to take
judicial notice that Miranda B.’s identification of defendant at the preliminary hearing
occurred, that error would have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.10

II. Defendant has not Established Ineffective Assistance of Counsel on Direct
Appeal
Defendant next claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
leading questions posed by the prosecutor to Miranda B., to Miranda B.’s prior
identification of defendant, and to Cabello’s recounting of Miranda B.’s prior
identification.
Law
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant
must show counsel acted deficiently and that he was prejudiced thereby. (People v.
Goldman (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 950, 957.) Deficiency is shown when counsel’s
“ ‘ “representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness … under prevailing
professional norms.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Declining to object to questions or testimony is “a
tactical decision that rarely establishes ineffective assistance.” (People v. Lancaster
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 82.)
“ ‘Unless a defendant establishes the contrary, we shall presume that “counsel's
performance fell within the wide range of professional competence and that counsel’s
actions and inactions can be explained as a matter of sound trial strategy.” ’ [Citation.]
When the record on direct appeal sheds no light on why counsel failed to act in the

9 Under this reasoning, defendant’s claims that there was reason to doubt some of
the testimony that incriminated him and that there was some evidence someone else
stabbed Inzunza are immaterial.
10 In contrast, if the trial court had erroneously instructed the jury to accept that
Miranda B. had correctly and truthfully identified defendant as the killer, that would have
been prejudicial. However, that did not occur here.

24.
manner challenged, defendant must show that there was ‘ “ ‘no conceivable tactical
purpose’ ” for counsel’s act or omission.’ ” (People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659,
674–675.) “[I]n general, because the appellate record usually does not reveal information
sufficient to evaluate counsel’s performance, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
are not appropriate for resolution on direct appeal,” but instead are to be resolved in a
habeas proceeding. (People v. Jasso (2025) 17 Cal.5th 646, 695–696.)
Analysis
Defendant cites as objectionably leading these two questions posed to Miranda B.:
(1) “ ‘And you identified him as “he’s the person that killed my Bryan”; isn’t that
correct?’ ”; (2) “ ‘And the only person that you identified as having fought and killed
Bryan was Isaiah Garcia; is that correct?’ ” He also contends her identifications of
defendant lacked foundation and constituted hearsay. He further argues it was leading for
the prosecutor to ask Cabello whether Miranda B. said in her prior “ ‘identification’ ” of
defendant that he was “ ‘the person that killed my Bryan.’ ”
The parties dispute whether these questions and/or testimony were truly
objectionable. However, “competent counsel may often choose to forgo even a valid
objection. ‘[I]n the heat of a trial, defense counsel is best able to determine proper tactics
in the light of the jury’s apparent reaction to the proceedings. The choice of when to
object is inherently a matter of trial tactics not ordinarily reviewable on appeal.’ ”
(People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1197.) Even if the testimony were vulnerable to
a valid objection, defense counsel may have concluded that allowing in the evidence of
Miranda B.’s purported identification and then undermining it with clear evidence that
she did not personally see the stabbing would be a better tactic than preventing the
evidence from being admitted altogether.11

11 If counsel so concluded, then he would not have followed defendant’s
suggestion on appeal that he should “do[] both”—i.e., object and, if that did not work,
elicit the lack of personal knowledge.

25.
In cross-examining Miranda B., defense counsel elicited testimony that she was
face down on the ground with her arms covering her face and did not see Inzunza get
hurt. In closing, defense counsel argued to the jury, “The truth is the facts are m[u]rky
and cloudy. That’s the truth because we don’t know what these kids actually saw or
didn’t see. They’re telling us they didn’t see much. Then they talk to the police, they
still didn’t see much .…” Shortly thereafter, defense counsel continued, “I got from them
on cross-examination[: ] bloody noses dripping, running to the other side of the street,
face down on the floor with their hands over their head. Nothing was observed to the
degree that needs to be observed to support their theory, nothing, because in each of their
statements, ultimately, when it came to the actual event, I didn’t really see it. I didn’t see
it.” (Italics added.)
Miranda B.’s arguably unsupported identification of defendant fit with the
narrative counsel presented to the jury.12 Thus, it remains entirely plausible that defense
counsel made a tactical decision to allow the evidence in so that he could undermine it
and present a cohesive narrative about multiple adverse witnesses to the jury.13 Because
there is a conceivable tactical reason for defense counsel’s lack of objection, defendant’s
claim cannot prevail on direct appeal.

12 Defendant observes that counsel’s objection to the request for judicial notice
shows that, at the time, he was not planning to concede the issue of identity. But the
conceivable tactical explanation we set forth herein is entirely consistent with counsel
planning to contest identity. Again, counsel may have decided that presenting a cohesive
narrative explaining the adverse testimony of multiple witnesses (i.e., that they wanted to
identify defendant but in fact had no proper basis for doing so), would help convince the
jury that incriminating testimony from the Tulare group—including identity evidence—
was unreliable.
13 In his reply brief, defendant argues counsel should have also tried to discredit
Miranda B. with the preliminary hearing transcript. But defendant’s claim in his opening
brief was that counsel failed to make certain objections, not that he failed to introduce
additional evidence in the form of additional preliminary hearing transcript excerpts. He
cannot raise this issue without having developed it in the opening brief, which would
have afforded the Attorney General an opportunity to respond.

26.
III. Defendant Has Not Established Reversible Instructional Error
Defendant contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury with a bracketed
portion of CALCRIM No. 571, and in failing to define “wrongful” and “justify” as those
terms were used in the challenged portion of the instruction.
Additional Background
While discussing instructions, the trial court stated it was inclined to give several
instructions including CALCRIM No. 571, which concerns imperfect self-defense. The
prosecutor had not included that instruction in her “packet,” but submitted to the court on
the issue of whether to give it. Defense counsel objected to a portion of the instruction
set off by brackets—i.e., that imperfect self-defense does not apply when the defendant
through his conduct created a circumstance to justify his adversary’s use of force.
Counsel argued that there was overwhelming evidence the two sides engaged in mutual
battles in both locations. The court noted the objection but concluded the language was
appropriate. The court stated that the jury would sort out the facts, but one possible
determination was that defendant was armed and part of a group that was “ganging up”
on the victim.
The trial court later instructed the jury as follows,

“A killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary
manslaughter if … defendant killed a person because he acted in imperfect
self-defense. If you conclude that … defendant acted in complete
self-defense, his action was lawful, and you must find him not guilty of any
crime.

“The difference between complete self-defense and imperfect
self-defense depends on whether … defendant’s belief in the need to use
deadly force was reasonable.

“[D]efendant acted in imperfect self-defense if:

“Number one, … defendant actually believed that he was in
imminent danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury;

27.
“And, number two, … defendant actually believed that the
immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend against the danger
but,

“Number three, at least one of those beliefs was unreasonable.

“Belief in future harm is not sufficient no matter how great or how
likely the harm is believed to be.

“In evaluating … defendant’s beliefs, consider all the circumstances
as they were known and appeared to … defendant.

“A danger is imminent if when the fatal wound occurred the danger
actually existed or … defendant believed it existed. The danger must seem
immediate and present so that it must be instantly dealt with. It may not be
merely prospective or in the near future.”

“Imperfect self-defense does not apply when … defendant through
his own wrongful conduct has created circumstances that justify his
adversary’s use of force.

“Great bodily injury means significant or substantial physical injury.
It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.

“The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that … defendant was not acting in imperfect self-defense. If the People
have not met this burden, you must find … defendant not guilty of murder.”
(Italics added).
Law
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. (§ 187,
subd.(a).) “ ‘[I]f a person kills … in the unreasonable but good faith belief in having to
act in self-defense, the belief negates what would otherwise be malice, and that person is
guilty of voluntary manslaughter …, not murder.’ ” (People v. Schuller (2023) 15
Cal.5th 237, 243.) This is called imperfect self-defense.
However, if the defendant was the initial aggressor, and the victim’s response
thereto was justified, the defendant cannot rely on the imperfect self-defense doctrine.
(People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 664.) Similarly, if the defendant commits a
felony and thereby creates circumstances that justify the victim’s attack or pursuit, he or

28.
she may not invoke the imperfect self-defense doctrine. (In re Christian S. (1994) 7
Cal.4th 768, 773, fn. 1.) This concept is embodied in the bracketed portion of the
imperfect defense instruction (CALCRIM No. 571), which defendant challenges:
“Imperfect self-defense does not apply when the defendant, through [his] own wrongful
conduct, has created circumstances that justify [his] adversary’s use of force.”
The test for whether ambiguous instructions warrant reversal is whether there is a
reasonable likelihood that the jury actually misunderstood and misapplied the instruction.
(People v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 544.) “ ‘ “ ‘A defendant challenging an
instruction as being subject to erroneous interpretation by the jury must demonstrate a
reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instruction in the way asserted by the
defendant.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 905.)
Analysis
Defendant first argues that the trial court should not have given the bracketed
portion of the instruction because there was “no evidence” he engaged in illegal conduct
that gave Inzunza the legal right to use force. Not so. As detailed below, there was
evidence from which the jury could infer that defendant was the initial aggressor and that
force used by Inzunza in response was justified.
After the first fight at the party, defendant’s group was angry, “amped up and
wanting to fight again.” Defendant said there should be retaliation for what was done to
Ciara T.’s face during the first fight. One member of the group, Evelyn B., said she
believed defendant intended to stab someone. Defendant “mentioned no weapons,”
which made no sense to Mariah G. because defendant had a weapon. The location
services of defendant’s phone did not return location data for 27 minutes, including
during the time of the homicide.
Three people, including defendant, fought Inzunza and he was getting backed up
to the fence. Inzunza was stabbed three times. After the incident, Ciara T. heard
defendant say he had “stuck” him, then “the guy” tried to take off running but “he had

29.
grabbed him and then he had did it again.” While Ciara T. was explaining that defendant
had stabbed someone, she “pantomime[d]” a stabbing motion, which was reenacted as the
motion of reaching a hand out and wrapping it around as if to put the arm around another
person.
Defendant then posted on social media, “Im the one who stabbed that n[**]ga,”
and he got rid of the knife.
From this evidence, the jury could have reasonably inferred the following.
Defendant went to the fight at Matthew A.’s house intending to stab someone in
retaliation for Ciara T.’s injuries, he told others not to bring weapons while he himself
had a knife, he initiated a three-on-one fight against Inzunza in accordance with his plan
to stab someone, did in fact stab him, then grabbed him when he tried to run away and
stabbed him again. Defendant knew his conduct was wrongful because he turned off his
phone’s location services ahead of time and got rid of the knife afterward. Defendant
went on to social media and posted (possibly intending to send a private message),
admitting responsibility for the stabbing he planned and carried out.
Thus, even in the absence of direct eyewitness observation of defendant initiating
the fight with Inzunza, there was evidence from which a jury could infer that defendant in
fact did so in accordance with a plan of stabbing in retaliation for Ciara T.’s injuries.
Thus, the jury could infer not only that defendant was looking for a fight but looking for
an opportunity to stab someone and acted in accordance with that plan. If the jury
accepted these inferences, defendant would clearly not be entitled to invoke imperfect
self-defense. Consequently, the instruction was supported by the record.
Of course, there was also evidence from which the jury could have concluded
differently, including defendant’s own testimony that he was attacked from behind and
grabbed a knife dropped by Inzunza to defend himself. But, for purposes of the present
issue, contrary evidence is immaterial. So long as there was evidence supporting the

30.
instruction, it is immaterial that there was also contrary evidence on the issue. That
merely means it was a factual issue for a fully instructed jury to decide.
Defendant next contends the trial court erred in failing to define “wrongful” and
“justify.” He argues that the plain meaning of “wrongful” is broader than how the word
is used in defining the scope of the exception to the imperfect self-defense doctrine. In
the latter context, only initiation of a physical altercation or commission of a felony that
justifies the victim’s response qualifies as “wrongful.”
Similarly, he contends that the plain meaning of “justify” is broader than the scope
of how a victim’s response may be considered “justified” in the context of the exception
to imperfect self-defense. The victim’s response must be legally justified, and not merely
morally justified.
We understand defendant’s point and how the lack of specificity with respect to
the term “wrongful” could cause issues in edge cases. However, even if we find the
instruction could be ambiguous in the abstract, the test for ambiguous instructions is
whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury actually misunderstood and
misapplied the instruction. (People v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 544.) “ ‘ “ ‘A
defendant challenging an instruction as being subject to erroneous interpretation by the
jury must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instruction in
the way asserted by the defendant.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Covarrubias, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
p. 905.)
We do not find there is a reasonable likelihood the jury misapplied the instruction
here. The only reasonable wrongful conduct that would satisfy the instruction would be
defendant physically attacking or threatening Inzunza. No other conduct by defendant
satisfied the instruction, whether using the plain or technical meanings of “wrongful” or
“justify.”
Defendant claims that the jury might have considered his “bringing or using a
knife” in violation of a no-weapon agreement between the groups to be “morally

31.
wrongful” even though it would not be the type of “ ‘wrongful conduct’ ” to trigger the
exception to imperfect self-defense.14 We are convinced the jury did not rely on
defendant’s possession or use of the knife in an improper fashion. The instruction’s
limitation to conduct that created the “circumstances that justify [his] adversary’s use of
force” precluded improper reasoning by the jury even if the jury employed the overbroad
definitions of “wrongful” or “justify” raised by defendant. If defendant merely possessed
a knife, without more, it clearly would not have “justif[ied]” Inzunza’s use of force under
the legal or general use of “justify.” If defendant merely stabbed Inzunza in self-defense,
it would not have justified Inzunza’s use of force under the legal or general use of
“justify.” The only way defendant’s possession or use of the knife could have reasonably
invoked this portion of the instruction is if defendant unjustifiably threatened Inzunza
with the knife or stabbed him with it. Any other reliance on defendant’s possession or
use of the knife would not satisfy the instruction’s limitation to conduct that created the
“circumstances that justify [his] adversary’s use of force”—regardless of whether the jury
used the plain meaning or some technical meaning of “justify.”
For these reasons, we are convinced there is no reasonable likelihood the jury
“actually” misapplied the instruction here.

14 Defendant contends the no-weapon agreement “had no apparent relevance to the
issues at trial” other than to portray him as an unfair fighter who violated the moral code
of street fighting. Not so. If, as Mariah G. stated, defendant “mentioned” no weapons
while he himself was armed with a knife, that would raise an inference he wanted to be
able to use a weapon against others without one being used against him in response. This
was relevant to premeditation and/or malice. Thus, there was a proper basis for the
prosecutor’s emphasis on the issue.

The jury did ultimately reject premeditation by acquitting on first degree murder,
but that does not alter the fact that the no-weapons agreement did have relevance to the
issues at trial.

32.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

GUERRA, J.

WE CONCUR:

FRANSON, Acting P. J.

SNAUFFER, J.

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