Filed 7/13/26 P. v. Garcia CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085603
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. FSB22001636)
VICTORIA GARCIA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Rafael A. Arreola, Judge.* Affirmed.
Debbie Yen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Steve
Oetting and Daniel J. Hilton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
* Retired Judge of the San Diego Superior Court assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Victoria Garcia was sentenced to supervised probation for her
conviction of one count of assault with a deadly weapon.2 After a contested
restitution hearing, she was ordered to reimburse State Restitution Fund
(the Fund) for the assistance it provided to the victim for his injuries
sustained from jumping headfirst out of a second-story window to avoid
another confrontation with Garcia a few hours after the assault for which
she was convicted (the order). She claims that the trial court abused its
discretion in ordering restitution for this purpose. (People v. Giordano (2007)
42 Cal.4th 644, 663–664 [standard of review].)
Convicted criminals may be required to pay restitution directly to
the victim under Penal Code3 section 1202.4 or to the victim or the Fund
as a condition of probation under section 1203.1. (People v. Martinez
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1093, 1100; §§ 1202.4, subd. (a)(1), 1203.1, subd. (b).)
Direct restitution, which is usually mandatory, is limited to economic
losses incurred “as a result of the crime of which defendant was convicted.”
(Martinez, at p. 1101.) By contrast, restitution as a condition of probation is
discretionary and may include economic losses “ ‘caused by related conduct
not resulting in a conviction.’ ” (Ibid., italics added.)
1 This case is appropriate for resolution by memorandum opinion
because it raises “no substantial issues of law or fact.” (Cal. Stds. Jud.
Admin., § 8.1; see People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847.)
2 We refer the reader to our opinion affirming the judgment for
additional factual background. (People v. Garcia (Mar. 6, 2026, D085446)
[nonpub. opn.].)
3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Garcia first asserts that the order was entered under section 1202.4
and must be stricken as an abuse of discretion because it requires her to
reimburse the Fund for losses corresponding to acts for which she was not
convicted. Were we to conclude that the order was instead imposed as a
probation condition under section 1203.1, Garcia contends that the court
abused its discretion because it (1) mistakenly thought that restitution was
mandatory, (2) imposed restitution that violated People v. Lent (1975) 15
Cal.3d 481 (Lent), and (3) failed to account for the victim’s comparative
negligence in jumping head-first out of a window rather than exiting the
cabin another way.
To start, the record leaves us with no doubt that restitution was
imposed as a probation condition because the court’s oral pronouncement
of sentence and its minute orders summarizing Garcia’s sentencing and
restitution hearings all refer to restitution exclusively as such. Garcia
counters by pointing to the fact that the court invoked section 1202.46 to
retain jurisdiction to determine the amount of restitution after sentencing,
a procedure she suggests applies only to restitution orders entered under
section 1202.1. We disagree. (See, e.g., People v. Zuniga (2022) 79
Cal.App.5th 870, 871, 875–876 [discussing § 1202.46 in context of restitution
ordered as probation condition].) She also asserts that the court must
have entered the order under section 1202.4 because the judge said that
“restitution as far as I’m concerned is mandatory.” But as we read this
statement in context of the proceedings as a whole, the judge was merely
signaling his unequivocal intent to modify Garcia’s probation terms to require
restitution.
3
Garcia’s remaining arguments are forfeited because they were not
specifically raised as objections below. (People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228,
237 (Welch) [forfeiture of Lent objection]; People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th
428, 434 [specific objection required to preserve issue for appeal].) She
attempts to avoid forfeiture by urging us to deem her trial counsel ineffective
for failing to make these objections. But as explained in Garcia, we will not
assess counsel’s effectiveness on a record that is silent as to the reason for
the challenged omission. (People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 966; People
v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.) That same rationale applies here.
A court enjoys discretion to order restitution as a probation condition
to regulate noncriminal conduct “ ‘reasonably ... related to the crime of which
the defendant was convicted or to future criminality.’ ” (Welch, supra, 5
Cal.4th at pp. 233–234.) Here, the court noted that the victim “jumped out
the window ... because he was afraid of the threat from [Garcia] with knives.”
Considering that the victim had already been assaulted with a knife and that
he believed taking the only other exit from second floor could have provoked
another confrontation, the court’s order was hardly outside the bounds of
reason.4 (See Welch, at p. 234 [“As with any exercise of discretion, the
sentencing court violates this standard when its determination ... ‘ “exceeds
the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered” ’ ”].)
4 Nor, for that matter, did it violate Lent, which states that a probation
condition is invalid only if it “ ‘(1) has no relationship to the crime of which
the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not itself criminal,
and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future
criminality.’ ” (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.)
4
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
DATO, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
KELETY, J.
CASTILLO, J.
5