Filed 9/11/26 P. v. Flowers CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B347475
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
XCNBA156760)
v.
RUBEN ALLEN FLOWERS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ronald S. Coen, Judge. Reversed and
remanded.
William L. Heyman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Stephanie C. Brenan and Nancy Lii Ladner,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Ruben Allen Flowers appeals the trial court’s denial of his
motion pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261
(Franklin), for a hearing to preserve youth-related evidence for
use in a future parole hearing. Flowers contends that the trial
court abused its discretion and asks that this court remand the
matter and instruct the trial court to grant a Franklin hearing.
The People agree that Flowers’s motion was sufficient to initiate
Franklin proceedings and that Flowers was entitled to describe to
the court the evidence he sought to introduce at a Franklin
hearing. Contrary to Flowers, however, the People assert that a
limited remand for the court to reconsider Flowers’s motion is the
appropriate course, rather than an instruction to the trial court
to grant the motion. We agree with the People. We therefore
reverse the trial court’s order denying Flowers’s motion and
remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1999, a jury found Flowers guilty of attempted murder
(Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, subd. (a) & 664, count 1) and assault with a
firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2), count 2). The jury found that the
attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated.
(§ 1192.7, subd. (c).) The jury further found that, as to both
counts, Flowers personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)),
and inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). Flowers
was 23 years old when he committed the crimes.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2
The trial court sentenced Flowers to life in prison with the
possibility of parole on the murder count, plus three years for the
personal firearm use enhancement and three years for the great
bodily injury enhancement. The court imposed and stayed the
sentence in the assault with a firearm count.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment and remittitur
issued in 2000.2
On June 17, 2025, Flowers in pro se filed a motion for a
Franklin hearing to preserve youth-related evidence for
consideration at future parole hearings. Flowers specifically
requested a Franklin hearing pursuant to sections 1203.1 and
4801, subdivision (c). Flowers stated in the motion that he was
25 years of age or younger at the time he committed the offenses.
Flowers cited In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 452 (Cook) and
section 1203.1 as extending the opportunity to preserve youth-
related evidence to defendants after final judgment, and Flowers
noted that the proper procedure was to file the motion under the
original caption and case number and cite to Cook and section
1203.1 as he had done.
The court denied Flowers’s motion in a minute order on the
same day. The court recounted that Flowers committed the
offenses on September 20, 1997, and the remittitur issued on
September 1, 2000. Flowers became parole eligible in June 2019
and had had at least four parole hearings at which parole was
2 The People request in a footnote in their respondent’s
brief that this court take judicial notice of the opinion on direct
appeal. The request is denied: the footnote request does not
comply with California Rules of Court, rule 8.252. In particular,
the People do not provide this court with a copy of the prior
opinion, and this court does not have ready access to a copy in
court records, given that the opinion issued 26 years ago.
3
denied since that time. Flowers’s next scheduled parole hearing
was August 28, 2025.
The court ruled that Flowers failed to include in the motion
the date of his future parole hearing and also failed to state that
he had already had parole hearings, as Cook requires. The court
noted that the purpose of a Franklin hearing was to allow the
defendant to assemble evidence at or near the time of the
juvenile’s offense rather than decades later when memories have
faded, records may have been lost or destroyed, or family or
community members may have relocated or passed away.
Pursuant to Cook, a court could consider whether a Franklin
proceeding was likely to produce fruitful evidence or whether the
defendant has had parole hearings, or whether there has been a
significant passage of time.3 The court cited In re Brownlee
(2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 720 (Brownlee), which held that a
defendant was not entitled to a youthful offender parole hearing
or a Franklin hearing where the defendant already had two
parole hearings and had a third parole hearing scheduled in the
near future. The court likened Flowers’s situation to that of the
defendant in Brownlee because, like Brownlee, Flowers was
already parole eligible. The court ruled that Flowers had not
shown he was entitled to a Franklin hearing and denied the
motion.
Flowers timely appealed.
3 Although the court made this statement it did not
explicitly find that a Franklin hearing was unlikely to produce
fruitful evidence.
4
DISCUSSION
A. Franklin Proceedings
Section 3051, subdivision (a)(1), provides for a “youth
offender parole hearing” by the Board of Parole Hearings “for the
purpose of reviewing the parole suitability of any prisoner who
was 25 years of age or younger . . . at the time of [his or her]
controlling offense.” Where, as here, the defendant is convicted of
a controlling offense “when the person was 25 years of age or
younger and for which the sentence is a life term of less than 25
years to life[, the defendant] shall be eligible for release on parole
at a youth offender parole hearing during the person’s 20th year
of incarceration. The youth parole eligible date for a person
eligible for a youth offender parole hearing under this paragraph
shall be the first day of the person’s 20th year of incarceration.”
(Id., subd. (b)(2).) “In assessing growth and maturity,
psychological evaluations and risk assessment instruments, if
used by the board, shall be administered by licensed
psychologists employed by the board and shall take into
consideration the diminished culpability of youth as compared to
that of adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any
subsequent growth and increased maturity of the individual.”
(Id., subd. (f)(1).) In addition, “[f]amily members, friends, school
personnel, faith leaders, and representatives from community-
based organizations with knowledge about the individual before
the crime or the individual’s growth and maturity since the time
of the crime may submit statements for review by the board.”
(Id., subd. (f)(2).)
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Section 4801, subdivision (c), provides, “When a prisoner
committed his or her controlling offense, as defined in subdivision
(a) of Section 3051, when he or she was 25 years of age or
younger, the board, in reviewing a prisoner’s suitability for parole
pursuant to Section 3041.5, shall give great weight to the
diminished culpability of youth as compared to adults, the
hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and
increased maturity of the prisoner in accordance with relevant
case law.”
In Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pages 283 to 284, the
Supreme Court held a defendant who did not have an
opportunity to make a record of mitigating “youth-related factors”
relevant to a later youth offender parole hearing should have an
opportunity to make a record on remand. The court explained
that sections 3051 and 4801 “contemplate that information
regarding the juvenile offender’s characteristics and
circumstances at the time of the offense will be available at a
youth offender parole hearing to facilitate the Board’s
consideration. . . . Assembling such statements ‘about the
individual before the crime’ is typically a task more easily done at
or near the time of the juvenile’s offense rather than decades
later when memories have faded, records may have been lost or
destroyed, or family or community members may have relocated
or passed away.” (Id., at pp. 283–284.)
In Franklin, the Supreme Court remanded the matter to
determine whether the defendant “was afforded sufficient
opportunity to make a record of information relevant to his
eventual youth offender parole hearing[,]” and if not, to allow the
defendant to “place on the record any documents, evaluations, or
testimony (subject to cross-examination) that may be relevant at
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his eventual youth offender parole hearing, and the prosecution
likewise may put on the record any evidence that demonstrates
the juvenile offender’s culpability or cognitive maturity, or
otherwise bears on the influence of youth-related factors.”
(Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284.)
Three years after Franklin, the Supreme Court in Cook,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at page 458, held that a juvenile offender with a
final judgment could move for a postjudgment proceeding under
section 1203.01,4 to present evidence of youth-related factors.
The Cook court reasoned that “recognizing the court’s authority
under section 1203.01 to gather youth offender evidence
effectuates sections 3051 and 4801.” (Cook, at p. 453.) The court
continued, “For inmates like Cook who seek to preserve evidence
following a final judgment, the proper avenue is to file a motion
in superior court under the original caption and case number,
citing the authority of section 1203.01 and today’s decision,” that
“establish[es] the inmate’s entitlement to a youth offender parole
hearing” and “indicate[s] when such hearing is anticipated to
take place, or if one or more hearings have already occurred.”
4 Section 1203.01, subdivision (a), provides in part,
“Immediately after judgment has been pronounced, the judge and
the district attorney, respectively, may cause to be filed with the
clerk of the court a brief statement of their views respecting the
person convicted or sentenced and the crime committed, together
with any reports the probation officer may have filed relative to
the prisoner. The judge and district attorney shall cause those
statements to be filed if no probation officer’s report has been
filed. The attorney for the defendant and the law enforcement
agency that investigated the case may likewise file with the clerk
of the court statements of their views respecting the defendant
and the crime of which they were convicted.”
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(Id. at p. 458.) Further, “consistent with Franklin and the court’s
inherent authority, the offender shall have the opportunity to
‘place on the record any documents, evaluations, or testimony
(subject to cross-examination) that may be relevant at his
eventual youth offender parole hearing, and the prosecution
likewise may put on the record any evidence that demonstrates
the juvenile offender’s culpability or cognitive maturity, or
otherwise bears on the influence of youth-related
factors.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 458–459.)
The Cook court observed: “Some offenders who file these
postjudgment motions in the trial court may have spent a decade
or more in prison. Some may have even come before the Board
for a youth offender parole hearing. The court may consider
whether a Franklin proceeding is likely to produce fruitful
evidence considering such factors as the passage of time and
whether the offender has already benefitted from the factfinding
procedures set forth in section 3051, subdivision (f)(1) and (2)
with the assistance of appointed counsel (§ 3041.7; Cal. Code
Regs., tit. 15, § 2256, subd. (c)). Additionally, some offenders may
choose not to present certain forms of evidence, such as live
testimony, or to forgo a Franklin proceeding altogether.” (Cook,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 459.)
We review the trial court’s denial of a Franklin proceeding
for abuse of discretion. (See People v. Benzler (2021) 72
Cal.App.5th 743, 749 (Benzler).) “[I]n deciding whether the trial
court has abused its discretion we are required to ‘ask whether
the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial
evidence, whether its rulings of law are correct, and whether its
application of the law to the facts was neither arbitrary nor
capricious. [Citation.] Critical to the resolution of this case, we
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note that when a trial court’s decision rests on an error of law,
that decision is an abuse of discretion.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
B. Analysis
We agree with the parties that Flowers’s motion contained
sufficient information. In People v. Howard (2021) 74
Cal.App.5th 141, 150, the Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
Division Three observed that “[n]othing in Cook indicates the
motion must describe with precision the evidence the offender
seeks to introduce. Moreover, as this court recently explained,
‘[t]he court’s commentary [in Cook] about what a motion should
include is not the same as creating mandatory pleading
requirements.’ ([People v.] Lipptrapp [(2021)] 59 Cal.App.5th
[886,] 896 (Lipptrapp).) [Courts have] found there are no
mandatory pleading requirements for a Franklin motion, and the
required showing to initiate the process for a Franklin proceeding
is minimal: ‘[d]ue to the limited resources generally available to
inmates, the Cook court reasonably envisioned a simple pleading
mechanism to get the process started.’ (Ibid., italics added.)”
In Lipptrapp, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at page 889, the
defendant filed a motion for Franklin proceedings nearly 25 years
after committing the offenses at issue. The Court of Appeal held
that the defendant’s motion was sufficient to initiate a Franklin
proceeding because it (1) “include[d] the relevant criminal case
information and pertinent legal authority. . . [and therefore]
clearly notified about the basis for the motion as well as the cases
giving the trial court authority to conduct evidence preservation
proceedings[;]” (2) established the defendant’s eligibility for a
section 3051 youth offender parole hearing by including his age
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at the time of the offense and the sentence imposed; and (3)
“discussed legal principles concerning youthful offenders, the
nature and purpose of youth offender parole hearings, the goal of
section 3051, and what evidence was relevant for a Franklin
proceeding.” (Id. at pp. 893–894.)
Flowers’s motion contained these same elements. Flowers
filed the motion in superior court under the original caption and
case number. He cited to the relevant authority, including
Franklin, Cook, and sections 3051, 4801, and 1203.01. Flowers
established that he was under the age of 25 at the time he
committed the offenses and would have been eligible for a youth
offender parole hearing at the time of his conviction if youth
offender parole hearings had been available. Flowers discussed
the relevance of youthful factors to culpability, and in particular,
the impact of the combination of racial and youthful factors on
criminal penalties.
The trial court faulted Flowers for failing to note that he
previously had parole hearings and also had an upcoming parole
hearing. The court denied Flowers’s request based on Brownlee,
supra, 50 Cal.App.5th 720, wherein the appellate court held that
the defendant was ineligible for a youth parole hearing because
he had already had several parole hearings and had another
parole hearing scheduled in the near future.
Brownlee is distinguishable. There, the court denied the
defendant a youth parole hearing. The Brownlee court did not
hold that the defendant had no right to place youth-related
evidence on the record for other future parole hearings. To the
contrary, Brownlee stated: “Put simply, within this statutory
framework, if a prisoner’s first parole hearing is not a youth
offender parole hearing, then the prisoner does not receive a
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youth offender parole hearing. Those prisoners are, however, still
entitled to have ‘the board, in reviewing [the] prisoner’s
suitability for parole pursuant to [s]ection 3041.5, . . . give great
weight to the diminished culpability of juveniles as compared to
adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent
growth and increased maturity of the prisoner in accordance with
relevant case law.’ (§ 4801, subd. (c).) This is true because
section 4801, subdivision (c) is not limited to youth offender
parole hearings—it applies to all parole hearings.” (Id. at p. 725.)
Cook made clear that neither the passage of significant
time, nor the fact that the defendant has had prior parole
hearings is a bar to the court granting a Franklin hearing.
(Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 459 [stating that some defendants
who seek a Franklin hearing “may have spent a decade or more
in prison. Some may have even come before the Board for a
youth offender parole hearing”]; see also Benzler, supra, 72
Cal.App.5th at p. 751 [“The Legislature intended that the
benefits of youth offender parole hearings be available even to
those prisoners with decades-old convictions”].) That a defendant
has been in prison for a significant period of time and has had
prior parole hearings may weigh against granting the defendant
a Franklin hearing even if they do not bar granting a hearing
altogether. (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 459.) However, here
there is no evidence that Flowers has had the opportunity to put
youth-related evidence on the record for past or future parole
hearings or that the specific evidence he seeks to present is
evidence that he has presented at a past parole hearing. (See
Benzler, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at pp. 750–751 [whether a
defendant has had the opportunity to present youth-related
evidence is relevant to determining whether a Franklin hearing
11
is warranted].) Under the circumstances, we conclude that the
trial court erred by denying Flowers’s motion absent evidence
that Flowers had past opportunities to present youth-related
evidence and absent information regarding the substance of the
evidence that Flowers intended to present.
Finally, although the superior court erred in denying
Flowers’s motion for the reasons given, the court has discretion to
set the parameters of the proceeding going forward. “[T]he trial
court may ‘exercise its discretion to conduct this process
efficiently, ensuring that the information introduced is relevant,
noncumulative, and otherwise in accord with the governing rules,
statutes, and regulations.’ [Citation.] The court may, for
example, require an offer of proof regarding the evidence
[Flowers] seeks to present, so that it can determine whether such
evidence is relevant to youth-related factors and meaningfully
adds to the already available record. It may also determine
whether testimony is ‘appropriate’ (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
p. 284), or if other types of evidentiary submissions will suffice.”
(Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 459.) We therefore decline to direct
the trial court to grant Flowers’s motion. We instead remand the
matter to permit the court to conduct further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
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DISPOSITION
We reverse the trial court’s order and remand the matter
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. If, upon
remand, the trial court opts to require an offer of proof, the court
shall first appoint counsel to assist Flowers.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
WE CONCUR:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
BAKER, J.
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