Filed 10/29/26 (unmodified opn. attached)
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B349508
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA071779)
v.
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
JUSTIN ASHLEY FLINT, (NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT);
ORDER DENYING APPELLANT’S
Defendant and Appellant. PETITION FOR REHEARING
The published opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on
October 2, 2026 is modified as follows:
1. At the bottom of page 17, the words “the Governor” are
replaced with the following words: individual lawmakers.
2. At the bottom of page 17 through page 18, the entire
sentence beginning with the words “We decline to do so” is deleted
and replaced with the following sentence (including a newly inserted
footnote 7):
We decline to do so, as neither letter bears any indicia that its
contents reflect the views of the Legislature as a whole or a
reiteration of legislative discussion.7
3. At the top of page 18, the citation and parenthetical to
Kaufman & Broad Communities, Inc. v. Performance Plastering, Inc.
shall be expanded to include the following additional citation (and
corresponding parenthetical):
; Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc. (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1056,
1085 [letters reflecting the views of individual lawmakers are “neither
authoritative nor definitive” evidence of legislative intent].)
4. On page 18, the sentence “We likewise reject Flint’s
argument concerning the Legislative Digests for amendments to
the subdivision enacted in 2000 through 2004.” shall be reformatted
as the first sentence of a new paragraph. Additionally, the two
sentences (and citation) following that sentence at the bottom
of page 18 shall be deleted and replaced with the following two
paragraphs (which include the sentence referenced above):
We likewise reject Flint’s argument concerning the Legislative
Digests for amendments to the subdivision enacted in 2000 through
2004. The amendments did not alter the disputed language in
section 830.1, subdivision (c) at issue in this appeal. Instead,
the amendments added new counties to the list in section 830.1,
7 Flint contends that “we know the Senate Committee
on Criminal Procedure considered [the Sheriff ’s] letter because
it is referenced on page 2 of the August 7, 1996 Conference Report
Committee Analysis.” Flint is mistaken. Although the report and
letter address some of the same subject matter, no reference to the
letter appears in the report.
2
subdivision (c) and replaced the phrase “county of the first class”
with “County of Los Angeles.” (See, e.g., Legis. Counsel’s Dig.,
Assem. Bill No. 1254 (2003–2004 Reg. Sess.) 5 Stats. 2003, Summary
Dig., p. 24.) Flint argues the digests for these amendments support
his construction because they refer only to a deputy sheriff ’s
“assignment” and omit the word “employed.” The 2003 digest, for
example, provides in pertinent part: “Existing law . . . provides that
any deputy sheriff of the County of Los Angeles . . . who is assigned
to perform duties exclusively or initially relating to specified
custodial assignments is a peace officer whose authority [is limited
in specified ways].” (Ibid., italics added.) But Flint ignores that—
immediately below the language he cites—the 2003 digest uses the
word “employed” in describing the applicability of section 830.1,
subdivision (c): “This bill would provide that this . . . provision is
also applicable to deputy sheriffs employed by the County of Shasta
who are assigned to perform duties exclusively or initially related to
specified custodial assignments.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill
No. 1254 (2003–2004 Reg. Sess.) 5 Stats. 2003, Summary Dig., p. 24,
italics added.) The 2004 digest contains similar language. (See Legis.
Counsel’s Dig., Assem Bill. No. 1931 (2003–2004 Reg. Sess.) 6 Stats.
2004, Summary Dig., p. 254 [“[t]his bill would add deputy sheriffs of
Butte County and Tuolumne County employed to perform those duties
relating to custodial assignments to th[e] category of peace officers [in
section 830.1, subdivision (c)]”] (italics added).) The digests therefore
do not “leave it unmistakably clear that lawmakers understood that
‘employed to perform duties’ refers to the deputy’s initial assignment,”
as Flint contends.
Nor are we persuaded by Flint’s related argument that the
amendment replacing the phrase “county of the first class” with
“County of Los Angeles” demonstrates that the Legislature views
all deputies initially assigned to work in the jails in Los Angeles as
3
modified deputies. It is equally plausible that the language merely
reflects the Legislature’s understanding that Los Angeles is one of the
counties permitted—but not required—to institute a modified deputy
program.
5. On page 23, the following sentences and citations
are deleted: Flint, however, ignores that the current version of
section 1005 distinguishes between modified deputies employed
pursuant to section 830.1, subdivision (c) and regular deputies
assigned to work in the jails: Subdivision (a)(7) of section 1005
identifies “jail deputies” as those governed by section 830.1,
subdivision (c). (See Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 11, § 1005, subd. (a)(7)
[“[e]very jail deputy (section 830.1, subd. (c)) shall satisfactorily
complete [certain training courses]”].) Section 1005, subdivision
(a)(1), in turn, exempts both (1) “jail deputies” (i.e., modified,
section 830.1, subdivision (c) deputies) and (2) other officers whose
“assignment remains custodial”—such as regular deputies initially
assigned to the jails— from certain field training requirements. (Cal.
Code of Regs., tit. 11, § 1005, subds. (a)(1)(A) & (B).) Each exemption
has independent significance only if we treat modified deputies as a
category of officers distinct from other deputies assigned to the jails.
(See Fischl v. Pacific Life Ins. Co. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 108, 121
[“we interpret regulations the same way we interpret statutes”];
Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles
(2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 764, 783 [“ ‘ “[s]tatutes must be interpreted, if
possible, to give each word some operative effect” ’ ”].) The regulation
thus implicitly recognizes that not all jail-assigned deputies are
modified, section 830.1, subdivision (c) deputies.
6. On page 24, the words “Flint likewise ignores” shall be
replaced with the words “Flint, however, ignores.”
4
7. On pages 24 through 25, the following sentence is deleted:
These distinctions in section 1005 support that the Legislature
(1) understands that modified deputies and jail-assigned regular
deputies are separate categories of officers, and (2) intends that a
regular deputy who completes the full POST basic training will wield
plenary peace officer authority, even if that deputy has not yet been
assigned to a patrol position and remains assigned to the jails.
That deleted sentence is replaced with the following sentence:
This distinction in section 1005 supports that the Legislature intends
that a regular deputy who completes the full POST basic training will
wield plenary peace officer authority, even if that deputy has not yet
been assigned to a patrol position and remains assigned to the jails.
8. All subsequent footnotes following the newly inserted
footnote 7 shall be renumbered.
These modifications do not constitute a change in judgment.
Appellant’s petition for rehearing filed on October 6, 2026 is
denied.
_________________________________________________________________
ROTHSCHILD, P. J. BENDIX, J. WEINGART, J.
5
Filed 10/2/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B349508
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA071779)
v.
JUSTIN ASHLEY FLINT,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Daniel J. Lowenthal, Judge. Affirmed.
David Andreasen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. Wise,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
In 2006, Justin Ashley Flint acted as a lookout for his
associate, Frank Gonzalez, as Gonzalez attempted to rob Maria
Cecilia Rosa, an off-duty Los Angeles County Sheriff ’s Department
(LASD) Deputy. During the attempt, Gonzalez shot Rosa, killing
her. In 2007, the district attorney charged Gonzalez and Flint with
first degree murder and attempted robbery. The court instructed
Flint’s jury2 on the felony-murder rule. The jury convicted Flint
on both counts.
In 2019, Flint filed a petition pursuant to Penal Code3
section 1172.6 (former § 1170.95)4 challenging his murder
conviction. That section permits defendants convicted under
certain theories of homicide invalidated by Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015)—including certain
felony-murder theories—to file a petition seeking resentencing.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) Section 1172.6, however, does not afford relief
to a defendant convicted under the felony-murder rule “when the
victim is a peace officer who was killed while in the course of the
peace officer’s duties, where the defendant knew or reasonably
should have known that the victim was a peace officer engaged
in the performance of the peace officer’s duties.” (§ 189, subd. (f);
see People v. Flint (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 607, 616–618 (Flint).)
Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that
Gonzalez had killed Rosa in the course of her peace officer duties.
The court therefore denied Flint’s petition.
In this appeal—the third arising out of Flint’s pursuit of
section 1172.6 resentencing—Flint argues we must reverse the
denial of his petition because Rosa lacked peace officer authority
while off duty. His argument hinges on the construction of
2 The district attorney tried Gonzalez separately. Gonzalez received the death penalty,
which the Supreme Court affirmed. (People v. Gonzalez (2021) 12 Cal.5th 367.)
3 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
4 For consistency, we refer only to the current statutory designation.
2
section 830.1, subdivision (c), which provides in pertinent part that
“[a] deputy sheriff . . . who is employed to perform duties exclusively
or initially relating to custodial assignments . . . is a peace officer
whose authority extends to any place in the state only while
engaged in the performance of the duties of the officer’s respective
employment.” (§ 830.1, subd. (c).) Flint contends that under
section 830.1, subdivision (c), any deputy initially placed in a
custodial assignment lacks off-duty peace officer authority unless
and until the deputy transitions to a field assignment. He further
contends that, because Rosa remained primarily assigned to the
jails during her career, she lacked peace officer authority at the
time Gonzalez shot her.
The Attorney General counters that section 830.1,
subdivision (c) applies only to a discrete class of so-called “modified”
deputies hired for the specific purpose of serving in a limited
custodial role and provided more limited training commensurate
with that role. The Attorney General further contends that
Rosa was not part of this modified deputy class, and that she
instead enjoyed the off-duty peace officer authority conferred
by section 830.1, subdivision (a). (See § 830.1, subd. (a)(3) [“A . . .
deputy sheriff . . . is a peace officer” whose “authority . . . extends
to any place in the state . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [a]s to a public offense
committed . . . in the peace officer’s presence, and with respect to
which there is immediate danger to person or property, or of the
escape of the perpetrator of the offense”].)
We conclude that—construed in light of the broader statutory
scheme and the pertinent legislative history—section 830.1,
subdivision (c) applies only to deputies (1) hired, trained, and
utilized for the limited purpose of working exclusively in a custodial
assignment, or (2) hired, trained, and utilized for the limited
purpose of working initially in a custodial assignment prior to
3
completing the full training required to transition to employment
as a regular deputy under section 830.1, subdivision (a).
We further conclude that substantial evidence supports that
Rosa was not a modified deputy trained, hired, or utilized for this
limited purpose. As such, she was acting in the course of her peace
officer duties when Gonzalez shot her, and Flint is not entitled to
section 1172.6 relief.5 (See § 189, subd. (f).)
Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY
We summarize only the facts and procedural history relevant
to our resolution of this appeal.
A. Trial Proceedings
In 2007, a jury convicted Flint of one count of first degree
murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and one count of attempted robbery
(§§ 211, 664), and found that a principal was armed with a
firearm in the commission of both counts. (See Flint, supra, 75
Cal.App.5th at p. 611.) The prosecution alleged that a felony-
murder special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)) applied to the
murder, but the jury found this allegation “not true.” (See Flint,
supra, at p. 611.) The trial court sentenced Flint to 29 years to life
in prison. (See ibid.) We affirmed the convictions, but stayed the
sentence on the attempted robbery conviction, reducing Flint’s
sentence to 26 years to life. (See People v. Flint (July 6, 2010,
B205374) [nonpub. opn.].)
5 Flint does not challenge any other elements of his conviction. (Cf. People v. Curiel
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 462 [a section 1172.6 petition “puts at issue all elements of the
[challenged homicide] offense under a valid theory”].)
4
B. Section 1172.6 Proceedings
1. Senate Bill No. 1437’s Changes to the Felony-Murder Rule
A decade later, “[i]n 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate
Bill No. 1437.” (Flint, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 609.) Among
other changes, the bill “restricted the application of the felony-
murder doctrine. Prior to the enactment of the law, if a defendant
committed one of certain serious felonies in which an accomplice
killed someone, the defendant was liable for first degree murder
even if the killing was inadvertent and unforeseeable. [Citations.]
Under the new law, this is no longer the case. To obtain a
conviction for felony murder, the prosecution must prove the
defendant was the actual killer, acted with the intent to kill in
aiding, abetting, counseling, or soliciting the killing, or was ‘a
major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life.’ ” (Ibid., citing Stats. 2018, ch. 1015,
§ 3, enacting § 189, subd. (e)(3).)
“The statute created a single exception to these requirements,
for cases where ‘the victim is a peace officer who was killed while
in the course of [the peace officer’s] duties, where the defendant
knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was a peace
officer engaged in the performance of [the peace officer’s] duties.’ ”
(Flint, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 610, citing Stats. 2018, ch. 1015,
§ 3, enacting § 189, subd. (f).) “In such a case, the felony-murder
doctrine applies as it did before the enactment of Senate Bill
No. 1437, with no requirement to show that the defendant was a
major participant in the felony or acted with reckless indifference
to human life.” (Flint, supra, at p. 610.)
Senate Bill No. 1437 “also created a special procedural
mechanism for those convicted under the former law to seek
retroactive relief under the law as amended.” (People v. Strong
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.) This mechanism, now codified in
5
section 1172.6, allows “defendants previously convicted of felony
murder who ‘could not be convicted of first or second degree murder
because of changes’ in the law to petition to vacate their convictions
and be resentenced.” (Flint, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 610.) If the
defendant establishes a prima facie claim for relief, the defendant
is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c) & (d)(1);
Strong, supra, at p. 708.) At the hearing, the trial court acts as an
independent fact finder, and the prosecution bears the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of
murder under the amended law. (See § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); People
v. Guiffreda (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 112, 123 (Guiffreda).) “If the
prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the prior conviction,
and any allegations and enhancements attached to the conviction,
shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be resentenced on the
remaining charges.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
2. Flint’s Section 1172.6 Petition
In January 2019, Flint filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6. (See Flint, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 611.) The
trial court found that Flint had failed to make a prima facie case
for relief and denied the petition. (Ibid.) Flint appealed. (Ibid.)
We reversed, explaining the trial court had reached its conclusion
by weighing the evidence and exercising discretion, which the court
could not do at the prima facie stage. (Id. at p. 612.) We directed
the court to issue an order to show cause and hold further
proceedings in conformance with our opinion. (Id. at p. 618.)
Following remand, the court issued an order to show cause
and held an evidentiary hearing. (People v. Flint (Oct. 31, 2024,
B333482) [nonpub. opn.].) At the hearing, Flint did not challenge
Rosa’s off-duty authority as a peace officer. (Ibid.) Rather, “Flint
asserted, and the prosecution and the court agreed, that the issue to
be decided was whether, for purposes of section 189, subdivision (f),
6
Flint knew or reasonably should have known that Rosa was a
peace officer engaged in the performance of her duties at the time
Gonzalez shot her.” (People v. Flint, supra, B333482, italics added.)
The court found “ ‘[b]ased on the totality of the evidence’ ” presented
at the hearing—which included the reporter’s transcript from
Flint’s 2007 trial, certain trial exhibits, and live testimony from
sheriff ’s deputies—that “ ‘[the prosecution] ha[d] proven, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that Flint was aware, before the shooting,
that Deputy Rosa was a peace officer who was engaged in the
performance of her duties.’ ” (Ibid.)
Flint again appealed, arguing for the first time that Rosa
“was a deputy described in subdivision (c) of section 830.1, which
created ‘a new lower-tier category of custodial peace officer,’ with
‘limited custodial duties, more limited training than other sheriff ’s
deputies, and limited peace officer powers.’ ” (People v. Flint,
supra, B333482, quoting People v. Orosco (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th
348, 356 (Orosco).) He argued that Rosa therefore had no
peace officer authority while off duty and thus was not killed “in
the course of her duties” for purposes of section 189, subdivision (f).
(People v. Flint, supra, B333482.) Because Flint had failed to raise
this argument before the trial court, we reversed and directed the
court on remand to hold a further evidentiary hearing to determine
whether Rosa was, at the time of her murder, acting “in the course
of [her] duties” as a peace officer. (§ 189, subd. (f); see § 830.1,
subds. (a) & (c); People v. Flint, supra, B333482.)
3. September 2025 Evidentiary Hearing
Following remand, in September 2025, the court held the
further evidentiary hearing on Flint’s resentencing petition. At the
outset of the proceeding, the court summarized its understanding of
the scope of the hearing:
7
“By way of background, the Sheriff of [Los Angeles]
County went to [the Commission on Peace Officer Standards
and Training (POST)], I think it was [in] 1996, to request that
a new classification of personnel be created to facilitate staffing
shortages. . . . [¶] The Legislature’s intent was not to detract, or
take away, from peace officer powers pursuant to [section] 830.1[,
subdivision] (a), but solely to create a new category of personnel
that would have limited, or modified, peace officer duties. [¶]
[Section] 830.1[, subdivision] (c) states[,] in pertinent part, that
a deputy sheriff who is employed to perform duties exclusively
or initially relating to custodial assignments is not a peace officer
outside of his or her custodial assignment. [¶] The Legislature
clearly meant that a deputy who is hired for the purpose of
working exclusively, or initially, in a custodial facility will have
that limited power; otherwise, construing it to mean that any
deputy who initially works in a custodial facility has limited power,
I think would lead to an absurd result, because then, necessarily,
no current sheriff[’s] deputy would be a full deputy, because
everyone, I think, initially has an assignment in a custodial facility.
[¶] And so I think that the scope of today’s hearing, therefore,
is just to determine whether or not Deputy Rosa was hired as a
full deputy with full [POST] training pursuant to [section] 830.1[,
subdivision] (a).” (Capitalization added.)
Defense counsel disputed the court’s interpretation of
the statutory language, but both parties agreed with the court’s
characterization of the hearing’s scope. In addition, defense counsel
lodged a standing objection “to any witness . . . testifying that a
particular officer satisfies, or meets, the definition of . . . an officer
under [sections] 830.1[, subdivision] (a) or 830.1[, subdivision] (c)”
because “that’s an issue of statutory construction.”
8
The prosecution then introduced 14 exhibits, including
the sheriff ’s deputy job bulletin in effect when Rosa applied to
the LASD, records reflecting Rosa’s training as a deputy sheriff,
and Rosa’s performance evaluations. The prosecution also called
two witnesses: Investigator Brian Steinwand and Commander
Bryan Aguilera. The defense did not call any witnesses, but it
introduced four exhibits—consisting of more of Rosa’s performance
evaluations and documents describing the duties of patrol-assigned
and custody-assigned deputies—that it used to cross-examine the
prosecution’s witnesses.
Investigator Steinwand, a retired sergeant with LASD,
testified that Rosa worked with his homicide task force in
2004 and 2005. Rosa’s role “was to assist homicide investigators
with their investigations in several ways, but . . . her main
role was to monitor wire intercepts that were coming in related
to homicide[ ] investigations, or other cases that were being
investigated via wiretap.” He further testified that this work
was not within the “custodial division” of LASD; rather, “[it was]
within . . . the detective bureau of [LASD].” Finally, Investigator
Steinwand testified that he “could not accept the [section 830.1,
subdivision] (c) classification [deputies] to . . . help with [these
types of] investigations.”
Commander Aguilera, an “almost 23-year veteran” of LASD
then serving in the custody division, testified that he previously
served as captain of the personnel admission bureau, “which is
essentially the human resources arm of [LASD]” and is “responsible
for hiring and all department records.” He explained that the
POST training for a full sheriff ’s deputy—training identified
as “academy basic” in LASD personnel files—is approximately
720 hours. In contrast, modified deputies hired pursuant to
section 830.1, subdivision (c) received a “maximum of 297 hours
9
of academy training.” And the full and modified deputy training
academies “were completely bifurcated.” In addition, Commander
Aguilera testified that LASD hired and trained modified deputies
only between 1997 and 1999, and that “[t]he start date of the last
academy that included modified deputies was on February 23rd,
1999.” When the prosecutor asked whether “any deputies that
were hired on or after August 1st, 1999 . . . [were] hired, appointed,
or employed to perform duties exclusively . . . or initially relating
to custodial assignments,” Commander Aguilera responded, “No.”
Finally, Commander Aguilera opined that Rosa could not
have been hired or trained as a modified deputy because her
personnel records reflect that she was hired in July 2000 and
completed the “academy basic” training required of full deputies.
He further opined that other materials and entries in Rosa’s
personnel file were inconsistent with the possibility that she
was employed as a section 830.1, subdivision (c) deputy: Rosa’s
performance evaluations reflected that she had assisted the major
crimes bureau with prostitution sweeps “in the field, [i.e.,] not
in custody,” had been “loan[ed] to the homicide task force,” and
had served as a member of the “noncompliance team,” arresting
absconding inmates out in the field. Commander Aguilera added
that “[it] is a very common practice for [LASD] to take individuals
and temporarily assign them somewhere else without permanently
moving them, because of the way that the county and [LASD] has
to deal with items and the movement of personnel.”
At the close of evidence, defense counsel reiterated his
argument that Rosa was not acting as a peace officer within the
meaning of section 189, subdivision (f) when Gonzalez shot her
because she qualified as a modified deputy subject to section 830.1,
subdivision (c).
10
The court rejected defense counsel’s argument and denied
Flint’s petition. In doing so, the court elected not to rely on the
witnesses’ opinion testimony concerning Rosa’s classification for
purposes of section 830.1. Instead, the court relied exclusively on
the prosecution’s exhibits in finding “beyond all doubt” that Rosa
was employed as a full sheriff ’s deputy pursuant to section 830.1,
subdivision (a). As a result, the court found, Rosa “was a full peace
officer conferred with the authority to effectuate an arrest outside
of a custodial setting” when Gonzalez shot her, and Flint was not
entitled to section 1172.6 relief.
Flint timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Overview of the Statutory Scheme Governing
the “Peace Officer” Designation
“ ‘Prior to 1968, the designation of peace officers and the
description of their powers were dispersed throughout the codes.’
[Citation.] . . . [Citation.] By adopting chapter 4.5 [of the Penal
Code], the Legislature brought those scattered statutes together
in one place and exclusively ‘define[d] peace officers, the extent
of their jurisdiction, and the nature and scope of their authority,
powers and duties.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Pennington (2017) 3
Cal.5th 786, 792 (Pennington).)
“Chapter 4.5 [of the Penal Code] contains over 100 sections
and subdivisions authorizing public agencies to confer the status
and powers of a peace officer on the members of a host of state and
local personnel categories, subject to an intricate array of conditions
and limitations. [Citations.] In this statutory scheme, only the
Attorney General and special agents and investigators of the
Department of Justice are defined as peace officers categorically,
11
simply by reference to their office or job title and without further
conditions. [Citation.] Most deputy sheriffs and municipal police
officers are peace officers so long as they are formally appointed
to and actually employed in that capacity. [Citations.] In contrast,
the Legislature has defined the vast majority of peace officers by
reference to their ‘primary duties’ or ‘primary function,’ and has
also imposed geographic, temporal, and other limitations on these
officers’ authority.” (Pennington, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 792–793.)
As relevant here, section 830.1, subdivision (a) provides
in relevant part that “[a] sheriff, undersheriff, or deputy sheriff,
employed in that capacity, of a county, . . . is a peace officer. The
authority of these peace officers extends to any place in the state,
as follows: [¶] . . . [¶] (3) As to a public offense committed or for
which there is probable cause to believe has been committed in
the peace officer’s presence, and with respect to which there is
immediate danger to person or property, or of the escape of the
perpetrator of the offense.” (§ 830.1, subd. (a)(3).) Section 832.3,
in turn, requires “any sheriff, undersheriff, or deputy sheriff . . .
who is first employed after January 1, 1975,” to “complete a course
of training prescribed by [POST] before exercising the powers of a
peace officer,” subject to certain exceptions. (See § 832, subd. (a).)
In 1996, via Assembly Bill No. 574 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.)
(Assembly Bill No. 574), the Legislature enacted subdivision (c)
of section 830.1 “to create a new, lower-tier category of custodial
peace officer specifically for the [LASD].” (Orosco, supra, 82
Cal.App.5th at p. 356.) “The Legislature has since expanded the
statute to many other counties.” (Id. at p. 357.) Subdivision (c)
provides, in pertinent part:
12
“A[6] deputy sheriff of the County of Los Angeles . . . who
is employed to perform duties exclusively or initially relating to
custodial assignments with responsibilities for maintaining the
operations of county custodial facilities, including the custody, care,
supervision, security, movement, and transportation of inmates,
is a peace officer whose authority extends to any place in the state
only while engaged in the performance of the duties of the officer’s
respective employment and for the purpose of carrying out the
primary function of employment relating to the officer’s custodial
assignments, or when performing other law enforcement duties
directed by the officer’s employing agency during a local state of
emergency.” (§ 830.1, subd. (c).)
“When it enacted subdivision (c) of section 830.1, the
Legislature also amended section 832.3 to exempt this new category
of custodial peace officer from the full course of training required
for regular sheriff ’s deputies by [POST], and it substituted more
limited training requirements.” (Orosco, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at
p. 357, citing § 832.3, subd. (e).) “The Legislature also enacted a
new provision stating that custodial deputy sheriffs described in
section 830.1, subdivision (c) ‘shall complete’ the full POST training
‘prior to being reassigned from custodial assignments to duties
with responsibility for the prevention and detection of crime
and the general enforcement of the criminal laws of this state.’ ”
(Orosco, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 357, quoting § 832.3,
subd. (e)(3).)
6 When originally enacted, section 830.1, subdivision (c) referred to “any deputy sheriff,”
rather than “a deputy sheriff.” (Assem. Bill No. 574 (1995–1996 Reg. Sess.),
capitalization omitted.) Neither party contends this change is material in construing
the statute’s meaning.
13
B. Section 830.1, Subdivision (c) Applies Only to Deputies
Hired, Trained, and Utilized for the Limited Purpose of Working
Exclusively or Initially in a Custodial Assignment
Flint contends we must reverse the denial of his resentencing
petition because the plain language and legislative history of
section 830.1, subdivision (c) compel the conclusion that Rosa
was a modified deputy without off-duty peace officer authority.
Interpreting the statute independently, we disagree. (See People v.
Lopez (2026) 19 Cal.5th 639, 657 [“ ‘[t]he proper interpretation of a
statute is a question of law we review de novo’ ”].)
“ ‘ “Our fundamental task in construing” ’ ” section 830.1,
subdivision (c), “as with any statute, ‘ “is to ascertain the intent of
the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute.” . . .
We begin as always with the statute’s actual words, the “most
reliable indicator” of legislative intent, “assigning them their
usual and ordinary meanings, and construing them in context.” ’
[Citation.] If the words appear susceptible of more than one
reasonable construction, we look to other indicia of legislative
intent, bearing in mind the admonition that ‘[t]he meaning of
a statute may not be determined from a single word or sentence’
[citation] and that apparent ‘ambiguities often may be resolved
by examining the context in which the language appears and
adopting the construction which best serves to harmonize the
statute internally and with related statutes[.]’ [Citations.]”
(Pennington, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 795; see Poole v. Orange
County Fire Authority (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1378, 1393 (conc. opn.
of Cuéllar, J.) [“understanding whether [a statute’s] meaning is
plain is not a project well served by reading statutory provisions
as isolated fragments”].)
The crux of the parties’ dispute concerns the meaning of
the phrase “deputy sheriff . . . who is employed to perform duties
14
exclusively or initially relating to custodial assignments.” (§ 830.1,
subd. (c), italics added.) Flint contends the language means that
any sheriff ’s deputy whose first assignment is to the jails qualifies
as a modified deputy who lacks off-duty peace officer authority
“until she is reassigned to a role that involves the performance of
general law enforcement duties.” The Attorney General contends
that the language means that only deputies hired, trained, and
utilized for the limited purpose of working in the jails—whether
exclusively or initially—qualify as modified deputies subject to
section 830.1, subdivision (c). Because the usual and ordinary
meaning of “employed” can encompass both (1) the hiring and
training process and (2) an employee’s ultimate assignment or
duties, we find each construction reasonable on its face. (See,
e.g., “employ,” Black’s Law Dict. (12th ed. 2024) [defining “employ”
as: “1. To make use of. [¶] 2. To hire. [¶] 3. To use as an agent
or substitute in transacting business. [¶] 4. To commission and
entrust with the performance of certain acts or functions or with the
management of one’s affairs”].) We therefore turn to other indicia
of legislative intent to construe section 830.1, subdivision (c).
We conclude that—viewed in the context of the broader
statutory scheme and the pertinent legislative history7—the
Attorney General’s construction best harmonizes the statute
internally and with related statutes. (See Pennington, supra,
7 The Attorney General argues that Flint forfeited any arguments concerning Assembly
Bill No. 574 by failing to present them (and related legislative history materials) to the
trial court. But as set forth, ante, Flint argued his proposed construction of section
830.1, subdivision (c) at the evidentiary hearing. Further,“[t]he interpretation of a
statute . . . is a question of law, and we are not bound by evidence presented . . . in the
trial court.” (California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28
Cal.3d 692, 699.) We therefore take judicial notice of the legislative history materials
cited in this opinion. (See Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19
Cal.4th 26, 45, fn. 9 [“The court will take judicial notice of the legislative history of
a statute in order to ascertain the purpose of and meaning of an ambiguous statute.
[Citation.] This includes reports of Senate and Assembly committees”].)
15
3 Cal.5th at p. 795.) “The Legislature enacted subdivision (c)
of section 830.1 in 1996 against the backdrop of subdivision (a),
which already conferred peace officer status on all deputy
sheriffs employed in that capacity. The Legislature did not
amend subdivision (a) when it added subdivision (c).” (Orosco,
supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 356.) And nothing in the legislative
history supports that the Legislature intended to strip fully trained
sheriff ’s deputies then-assigned to the jails of their off-duty peace
officer authority.
Rather, the legislative history supports that “[t]he original
purpose of [section 830.1,] subdivision (c)” was to hire an entirely
new category of modified deputies who would receive more limited
training tailored specifically to a limited custodial assignment.
(Orosco, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 356.) The August 7, 1996
Conference Committee Report Analysis for Assembly Bill No. 574,
for example, provides in pertinent part:
“The Los Angeles County Sheriff indicates that deputy
sheriff[s] initially hired are currently being assigned to custodial
duties for 4–6 years.” (Sen. Com. on Crim. Proc., Conf. Rep.
Com. Analysis, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 574 (1995–1996 Reg. Sess.)
Aug 7, 1996, italics added.) “[This bill would] allow the county to
provide part of the regular peace officer training—plus training
for custodial personnel—to deputy sheriff[s] exclusively or initially
assigned to custodial duties in the county. . . . Those sheriff ’s
deputies would then be required to complete the remainder of the
basic peace officer training prior to being reassigned to regular
peace officer patrol duties. . . . [¶] This conference report would
specifically include those . . . deputies assigned to custodial duties
and trained pursuant to this bill as peace officers with powers
extending anywhere in this state when performing his or her
primary duties or when directed by the county to perform other
16
peace officer duties during a local state[ ]of[ ]emergency.” (Ibid.,
italics added & underscoring omitted.)
In addition, the Legislature’s contemporaneous amendment
of section 832.3 to exempt this new category of modified deputies
from the full POST basic training required of regular deputies
supports the Attorney General’s construction. (See § 832.3,
subd. (e)(1).) We therefore conclude that the Legislature intended
section 830.1, subdivision (c) to apply only to deputies hired and
utilized for the express purpose of serving as modified deputies
and who, as a result, received the more limited training created
for modified deputies. (See § 832.3, subd. (e)(1).)
None of Flint’s arguments persuades us to adopt his
competing construction. First, Flint asks us to consider two 1996
letters to the Governor (one from Assembly Bill No. 574’s author
and one from the then-Sheriff of Los Angeles County) that he
contends support his interpretation of section 830.1, subdivision (c).
We decline to do so, as neither letter bears any indicia that its
contents reflect the views of the Legislature as a whole. (See
Kaufman & Broad Communities, Inc. v. Performance Plastering,
Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 26, 30 [“ ‘the statements of an
individual legislator, including the author of a bill, are generally not
considered in construing a statute, as the court’s task is to ascertain
the intent of the Legislature as a whole in adopting a piece of
legislation’ ”].)
Second, Flint contends that the 1996 Legislative Counsel’s
Digest for Assembly Bill No. 574 supports his construction because
it uses the phrase “any deputy” and the word “assignments” in
describing the effect of the bill: “This bill would provide that
any deputy sheriff of a county of the first class who is employed
to perform duties exclusively or initially relating to custodial
assignments . . . is a peace officer whose authority extends to any
17
place in the state only while engaged in the performance of the
duties of his or her respective employment.” (Legis. Counsel’s
Dig., Assem. Bill No. 574 (1995–1996 Reg. Sess.) 6 Stats. 1996,
Summary Dig., p. 391.) This description, however, merely repeats
the ambiguous language of the statute, and we therefore reject
Flint’s argument that the 1996 digest sheds any light on the
proper construction of section 830.1, subdivision (c). We likewise
reject Flint’s argument concerning the Legislative Digests for
amendments to the subdivision enacted in 2000 through 2004.
He argues that the digests support his construction because they
refer only to a deputy sheriff ’s “assignment” and omit the word
“employed.” (See, e.g., Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 1931
(2003–2004 Reg. Sess.) 6 Stats. 2004, Summary Dig., p. 254.)
But because the Legislature enacted these amendments for the
limited purpose of adding new counties to the list in section 830.1,
subdivision (c), we are not persuaded that the 2000 through 2004
digests illuminate the 1996 Legislature’s intent in originally
enacting the subdivision.
Third, Flint argues that the Attorney General’s construction
renders the word “initially” superfluous. But under the Attorney
General’s reading, the word “initially” retains independent
significance: It refers to deputies originally hired and trained
as modified deputies who may eventually be permitted to complete
the full POST basic training required to become regular deputies.
(See 85 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 130, 133, fn. 3 (2002) [“[the] legislative
history . . . explains the phrase ‘or initially relating to’ in
subdivision (c) of section 830.1 as referring to officers who would not
be expected to perform custodial assignments on a permanent basis
but rather would be expected to transfer into regular peace officer
assignments after a period of, for example, five or six years”].)
Flint’s surplusage argument thus fails.
18
Fourth, Flint contends that a July 2002 Attorney General
opinion supports that the Legislature intended for a deputy’s
assignment—and not the deputy’s level of training—to dictate
whether the restrictions in section 830.1, subdivision (c) apply
to that deputy. The Attorney General opinion, however, supports
that level of training is a critical distinguishing factor between
regular and modified deputies: “The Legislature was advised at
the time [it considered Assembly Bill No. 574] that these [modified]
officers would receive only part of the usual training given to peace
officers and ‘would then be required to complete the remainder of
the basic peace officer training prior to being reassigned to regular
peace officer patrol duties.’ [Citation.] Hence, it is apparent that
the Legislature’s limitations placed upon the exercise of peace officer
powers in section 830.1, subdivision (c), were in recognition of the
fact that these deputies would not be receiving full peace officer
training until reassigned to other duties.” (85 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen.,
supra, 130, 132–133, italics added.)
Fifth, and finally, Flint contends that the Attorney General’s
construction of section 830.1, subdivision (c) is at odds with the
Legislature’s purpose in enacting Assembly Bill No. 574. Flint
argues that “[t]he issue that led the Legislature to pass [the bill] is
that, after completing the [full POST basic] course in the academy,
LASD deputies would then spend the first four[ ]to[ ]six years
of their careers ‘assigned to custodial duties,’ ” and “the skills
they needed for . . . patrol assignments were no longer ‘fresh’
when it came time for them to transfer [to patrol].” Flint further
argues that certain statutes and regulations governing deputies’
training—namely, section 832.3, subdivision (e), section 13510,
subdivision (d), and section 1005, subdivisions (a)(1) and (d) of
title 11 of the California Code of Regulations—underscore that the
Legislature enacted section 830.1, subdivision (c) for the purpose of
19
ensuring that jail-assigned deputies receive fresh training prior to
transitioning to a patrol assignment.
We are not persuaded. We reiterate that nothing in the
legislative history supports that the Legislature believed that fully
trained, regular deputies working in the jails should be stripped of
their off-duty peace officer status. Rather, the legislative history
reflects that the cost savings section 830.1, subdivision (c) was
expected to generate were of equal (if not greater) concern to
the Legislature. (See Sen. Com. on Crim. Proc., Conf. Rep. Com.
Analysis, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 574 (1995–1996 Reg. Sess.)
Aug. 7, 1996 [“These . . . amendments are expected to initially
save approximately $6 million in training costs and to also ensure
that when deputies are assigned to patrol duties, the relevant
training will be ‘fresh’ for that type of assignment” (italics added)];
Governor’s Off. of Planning and Research, Enrolled Bill Rep. on
Assem. Bill No. 574 (1995–1996 Reg. Sess.) (Sept. 9, 1996) p. 3
[“Los Angeles County, facing a significant fiscal cris[is], has
recently sought innovative ways to cut its budget. The sponsor
[of the bill] stated that the bifurcation of POST training would save
the County approximately $6 million in costs”]; see also Elsner v.
Uveges (2004) 34 Cal.4th 915, 934, fn. 19 [an enrolled bill report
may be “instructive on matters of legislative intent”].)
Indeed, the initial draft of Assembly Bill No. 574 did not
include any provisions concerning sheriff’s deputies or their
training. (See Assem. Bill No. 574 (1995–1996 Reg. Sess.) as
introduced Feb. 17, 1995.) The original bill merely proposed
(1) including Los Angeles County safety police officers and park
rangers within the category of peace officers required to complete
certain POST training requirements, and (2) allocating funds to
facilitate that training. (See ibid.) The California State Sheriff ’s
Association opposed this initial version of the bill (see Assem.
20
Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 574 (1995–1996
Reg. Sess.) Apr. 4, 1995), but transitioned to a “ ‘soft’ oppos[ition]”
stance in response to the final version of the bill that included
section 830.1, subdivision (c)’s cost-saving measures (see Governor’s
Off. of Planning and Research, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill
No. 574 (1995–1996 Reg. Sess.) (Sept. 9, 1996) p. 4).
The statutes and regulations on which Flint relies likewise
fail to support his argument that the Legislature enacted
section 830.1, subdivision (c) “to address problems stemming
from” jail-assigned deputies’ purportedly “obsolete” training.
Section 832.3, subdivision (e)(3) provides in pertinent part that “[a]
deputy sheriff who has completed the [full POST basic training]
and has been hired as a deputy sheriff described in subdivision (c)
of Section 830.1 shall be eligible to be reassigned from custodial
assignments to duties with the responsibility for the prevention
and detection of crime and the general enforcement of the criminal
laws of this state within three years of completing the training.”
(§ 832.3, subd. (e)(3).) And section 13510, subdivision (d)
permits local agencies to establish training requirements that
exceed POST ’s minimum standards. (See § 13510, subd. (d).)
Flint contends that, read together, these subdivisions reflect the
Legislature’s understanding that some modified deputies will
receive the full POST basic training, and that we therefore should
not look to a deputy’s level of training in determining whether
an officer is a modified deputy. Flint further contends that
section 832.3, subdivision (e)(3)’s requirement that modified
deputies transition to a field assignment within three years
of completing the full POST basic training—a requirement first
added to the subdivision in 2016 (see Stats. 2015, ch. 207 (Assem.
Bill No. 1168) (2015–2016 Reg. Sess.))—demonstrates that the
21
Legislature was and remains uniquely concerned with preventing
jail-assigned deputies’ patrol-related training from growing stale.
Flint’s first argument fails because the Legislature’s
expectation that some modified deputies eventually will go on to
complete the full POST basic training is entirely consistent with
the Attorney General’s construction of section 830.1, subdivision (c)
as applying only to deputies hired, trained, and utilized for the
limited purpose of working exclusively or initially in a custodial
assignment. Indeed, as set forth, ante, this appears to have been
the Legislature’s purpose in including the word “initially” in the
subdivision.
Flint’s second argument fails because all deputies are subject
to certain laws that appear intended to prevent their training from
growing stale. (See, e.g., § 832, subd. (a) [“[e]very person described
in this chapter as a peace officer shall satisfactorily complete
an introductory training course prescribed by [POST]”]; § 832,
subd. (e)(1) [“[a] person completing the training described in
subdivision (a) who does not become employed as a peace officer
within three years from the date of passing the examination
described in subdivision (a), or who has a three-year or longer break
in service as a peace officer, shall pass the examination described
in subdivision (a) prior to the exercise of the powers of a peace
officer”]; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 1008 [imposing certain training-
related time restrictions on any officer seeking requalification for
employment as a peace officer].) Thus, although we agree that
the statutory scheme as a whole reflects a legislative concern with
ensuring that deputies’ training remains fresh, Flint identifies
nothing in the scheme supporting that this concern is unique to
jail-assigned deputies, or that the Legislature enacted section 830.1,
subdivision (c) in response to such a concern.
22
We reach a similar conclusion with respect to
subdivisions (a)(1) and (d) of section 1005 of title 11 of the
California Code of Regulations. Flint contends that the current
and 2006 versions of these provisions—which exempt deputies
assigned to the jail from certain continuing training requirements
related to field work—demonstrate that the Legislature did not
intend even fully trained deputies assigned to the jails to wield
off-duty peace officer authority. Flint further contends that Rosa’s
failure to complete the continuing training required of patrol-
assigned deputies demonstrates that she qualified as a modified
deputy under section 830.1, subdivision (c). Flint, however,
ignores that the current version of section 1005 distinguishes
between modified deputies employed pursuant to section 830.1,
subdivision (c) and regular deputies assigned to work in the jails:
Subdivision (a)(7) of section 1005 identifies “jail deputies” as those
governed by section 830.1, subdivision (c). (See Cal. Code of Regs.,
tit. 11, § 1005, subd. (a)(7) [“[e]very jail deputy (section 830.1,
subd. (c)) shall satisfactorily complete [certain training courses]”].)
Section 1005, subdivision (a)(1), in turn, exempts both (1) “jail
deputies” (i.e., modified, section 830.1, subdivision (c) deputies) and
(2) other officers whose “assignment remains custodial”—such as
regular deputies initially assigned to the jails— from certain field
training requirements. (Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 11, § 1005, subds.
(a)(1)(A) & (B).) Each exemption has independent significance only
if we treat modified deputies as a category of officers distinct from
other deputies assigned to the jails. (See Fischl v. Pacific Life
Ins. Co. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 108, 121 [“we interpret regulations
the same way we interpret statutes”]; Association for Los Angeles
Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th
764, 783 [“ ‘ “[s]tatutes must be interpreted, if possible, to give
each word some operative effect” ’ ”].) The regulation thus
23
implicitly recognizes that not all jail-assigned deputies are
modified, section 830.1, subdivision (c) deputies.
Flint likewise ignores that both the current and 2006 versions
of section 1005 of title 11 of the California Code of Regulations
draw a distinction between the training a deputy requires to wield
plenary peace officer authority and the training a deputy requires
to serve in a patrol assignment. Subdivision (a)(1) provides, in
pertinent part: “Every peace officer . . . shall complete the regular
basic course [i.e., the full POST basic training] before being assigned
duties which include the exercise of peace officer powers. . . . [¶]
(A) Field Training Program Requirement [¶] Every peace
officer, . . . following completion of the regular basic course and
before being assigned to perform general law enforcement uniformed
patrol duties without direct and immediate supervision, shall
complete a POST-approved field training program.” (Cal. Code
of Regs., tit. 11, § 1005, subds. (a)(1) & (a)(1)(A), capitalization
omitted & italics added.) These distinctions in section 1005 support
that the Legislature (1) understands that modified deputies and
jail-assigned regular deputies are separate categories of officers,
and (2) intends that a regular deputy who completes the full POST
basic training will wield plenary peace officer authority, even if that
deputy has not yet been assigned to a patrol position and remains
assigned to the jails.
Accordingly, we conclude that section 830.1, subdivision (c)
applies only to modified deputies—i.e., those deputies expressly
hired, trained, and utilized for the limited purpose of working in
a custodial assignment.
24
C. Substantial Evidence Supports the Court’s Finding that
Section 830.1, Subdivision (c) Did Not Apply to Rosa
Having construed section 830.1, subdivision (c), we now
turn to determining whether substantial evidence supports the
court’s finding that Rosa did not fall within the subdivision. (See
Guiffreda, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 125 [an appellate court
reviews a trial court’s factual findings following a section 1172.6
evidentiary hearing for substantial evidence].) “ ‘Our job on review
is different from the trial judge’s job in deciding the petition. While
the trial judge must review all the relevant evidence, evaluate and
resolve contradictions, and make determinations as to credibility,
all under the reasonable doubt standard, our job is to determine
whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, to support a rational fact finder’s findings beyond
a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.]” (Guiffreda, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th
at p. 125.)
Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding here that
Rosa was not a modified deputy hired, trained, and utilized for the
limited purpose of working in a custodial assignment: Commander
Aguilera testified that LASD terminated the limited training
program for modified deputies before Rosa even applied to the
department. The LASD job bulletin in effect when Rosa applied
to the department provided that deputy sheriff appointees would
“be required to serve two . . . mandatory assignments—the first
assignment will be in the custody division; the second, in field
operations (patrol).” (Capitalization omitted & italics added.)
Rosa’s personnel file reflects that she completed the full POST
basic training required of regular sheriff ’s deputies. And Rosa’s
25
performance evaluations reflect that she completed several field
assignment rotations, including prostitution sweeps.8
Flint contends that Rosa’s participation in field work is
not dispositive because the July 2002 Attorney General opinion
supports that modified deputies can “perform[ ] non-custody
related functions” without changing their modified status. (See
85 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, 130.) Flint further contends that
other evidence—namely, Rosa’s purported failure to complete
certain continuing training requirements for patrol deputies—
supports that she qualified as a modified deputy under
section 830.1, subdivision (c). But the non-custody related
functions the Attorney General opinion addresses—which include
participation in community outreach events—are not analogous
to the field work Rosa performed. (See 85 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen.,
supra, 130.) And in reviewing for substantial evidence, “ ‘[w]e
cannot reweigh the evidence.’ ” (People v. Player (2026) 119
Cal.App.5th 931, 963, review granted on unrelated issue July 8,
2026, S296683.)
We therefore conclude substantial evidence supports that
Rosa was not a modified section 830.1, subdivision (c) deputy, but
rather a regular section 830.1, subdivision (a) deputy vested with
off-duty peace officer authority. As such, Rosa was “killed while in
the course of [her] peace officer’s duties,” and Flint is ineligible for
section 1172.6 relief. (See § 189, subd. (f).) Accordingly, we affirm
the denial of his resentencing petition.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Flint’s section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.
8 Because we do not rely on the opinions offered by Investigator Steinwand or
Commander Aguilera that Rosa qualified as a section 830.1, subdivision (a) deputy, we
need not address Flint’s argument that such opinions were improper.
26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:
BENDIX, J.
WEINGART, J.
27