Filed 7/9/26 P. v. FigueroaLanza CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D087445
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. FVI24002394)
DARWIN ANTONIO
FIGUEROALANZA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, John Peter Vander Feer, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Laura Arnold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C.
Cavalier and Emily Reeves, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted Darwin Antonio FigueroaLanza of two counts of
assault with a deadly weapon, criminal threats, child abuse, false
imprisonment, and spousal battery. On appeal, FigueroaLanza and the
People agree that trial court incorrectly imposed a consecutive subordinate
term for the child abuse and a concurrent term for the false imprisonment
because those counts were stayed under Penal Code1 section 654. The
parties also agree that the abstract of judgment does not reflect the correct
amount of FigueroaLanza’s local conduct credits. We therefore exercise our
inherent authority to modify the judgment to correct these errors.
FigueroaLanza further contends that section 654 barred punishment
for his criminal threats because that offense involved the same course of
conduct and objective as the assault counts. We disagree and affirm the
judgment as modified.2
II. BACKGROUND
On August 8, 2024, FigueroaLanza and his wife, Samantha Figueroa
Valdivia, got into an argument inside their home. Suspecting infidelity,
FigueroaLanza pushed and hit Valdivia.
Valdivia attempted to leave with the couple’s three-year-old daughter,
V. FigueroaLanza went into the bedroom, grabbed a revolver, loaded it, and
blocked Valdivia and V. at the front door. FigueroaLanza held the gun at
waist level and aimed it towards Valdivia and V. FigueroaLanza stated,
“ ‘I’m going to kill the three of us, and none of us are going to make it out
alive.’ ” Valdivia feared for her and V.’s safety, believing that FigueroaLanza
1 All further undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
2 FigueroaLanza also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
imposing a consecutive sentence for the criminal threats, but that claim is
forfeited because he failed to object on that ground at sentencing. (People v.
Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 730–731.)
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would carry out his threat. FigueroaLanza abruptly returned to the
bedroom, threw the gun on the bed, and the couple continued arguing.
At some point during the altercation, Valdivia called her sister, D.V.3
D.V. called the police because FigueroaLanza had previously threatened to
kill Valdivia and V. D.V. and several other family members went to
Valdivia’s home, and the police arrived shortly after. Valdivia directed the
police to the firearm, which was loaded and operable.
The San Bernardino District Attorney’s Office charged FigueroaLanza
with two counts of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); counts 1–2),
child abuse likely to cause great bodily injury or death (§ 273a, subd. (a);
count 3), criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a); count 4), false imprisonment
(§ 236; count 5), and spousal battery (§ 243, subd. (e)(1); count 6). In counts
1, 2, 4 and 5, prosecutors alleged appellant personally used a firearm
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).
The jury convicted FigueroaLanza of all counts, finding true each
personal firearm use allegation. The trial court sentenced FigueroaLanza to
prison for 10 years. FigueroaLanza’s sentence consisted of three years for
count 1, plus four years for the firearm enhancement; one year for count 2,
plus one year and four months for the firearm enhancement; and eight
months for count 4. Pursuant to section 654, the trial court imposed but
stayed sentences for count 3, the firearm enhancement attached to count 4,
and count 5 and its enhancement. The trial court found section 654
inapplicable to the criminal threats count because it was a separate crime in
which FigueroaLanza terrorized Valdivia. The trial court imposed a
3 We identify Valdivia’s sister by the sister’s initials. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.90(b)(10).)
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concurrent 233 days, matching FigueroaLanza’s actual custody credits, for
the misdemeanor domestic battery in count 6. FigueroaLanza appealed.4
III. DISCUSSION
A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Determination That
Section 654 Did Not Bar Punishment for the Criminal Threats Count
FigueroaLanza argues that after sentencing him on the two felony
assault charges, section 654 barred the court from imposing additional
punishment on the criminal threats charge. He claims the criminal threats
offense and the two assault counts were an indivisible transaction pursuant
to the single objective of terrifying Valdivia so she would not leave the
house.5 We find the evidence adequately supports the trial court’s decision to
impose, and not stay, a prison term on the criminal threats conviction.
“Section 654 ‘generally precludes multiple punishments for a single
physical act that violates different provisions of law [citation] as well as
multiple punishments for an indivisible course of conduct that violates more
than one criminal statute.’ [Citations.] ‘ “Whether a course of criminal
conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one act within the
meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the actor. If all
of the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished
for any one of such offenses but not for more than one.” ’ [Citation.] ‘If, on
the other hand, “[the defendant] entertained multiple criminal objectives
4 FigueroaLanza’s notice of appeal was premature, but we treat it as
being filed immediately after rendition of the judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.308(c).)
5 FigueroaLanza acknowledges that section 654 does not bar punishment
for both assaults because each involved a different victim. (In re L.J. (2021)
72 Cal.App.5th 37, 46.)
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which were independent of and not merely incidental to each other, he may
be punished for independent violations committed in pursuit of each objective
even though the violations shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise
indivisible course of conduct.” ’ ” (In re Raymundo M. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th
78, 94, fn. omitted.)
“ ‘The question whether section 654 is factually applicable to a given
series of offenses is for the trial court, and the law gives the trial court broad
latitude in making this determination. Its findings on this question must be
upheld on appeal if there is any substantial evidence to support them.’
[Citation.] We view the evidence favorably to support the judgment and
presume every factual finding that could reasonably be deduced from the
evidence.” (People v. Roles (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 935, 946–947.)
Here, the evidence reflects that FigueroaLanza previously threatened
to kill Valdivia and V. Based on his belief that Valdivia had been unfaithful,
FigueroaLanza pushed and hit Valdivia, loaded his gun, aimed at Valdivia
and V., and stated he would kill Valdivia, V., and then himself. Valdivia
believed FigueroaLanza would carry out this threat.
Although a single criminal intent could be inferred under these
circumstances, that is not the only potential interpretation of the evidence.
The trial court could have reasonably found that during the heated
argument, FigueroaLanza pointed the loaded gun at Valdivia and V. with the
objective of inflicting physical harm on them. It could have also reasonably
found that FigueroaLanza stated he would kill the whole family with the
separate objective of inflicting emotional harm on Valdivia. (See, e.g., In re
Raymundo M., supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 95 [where juvenile chased and
lunged towards victim with a knife and stated victim would die, “the court
could reasonably have found that [juvenile] committed the assault with the
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objective of inflicting physical harm on [victim], whereas [juvenile] criminally
threatened [victim] with the separate objective of inflicting mental or
emotional harm. Courts routinely recognize similar distinctions”].)
Consequently, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings,
and we must affirm. (People v. Mary H. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 246, 261–262
[“ ‘If “ ‘there is “substantial evidence,” the appellate court must affirm. . .
even if the reviewing justices personally would have ruled differently had
they presided over the proceedings below, and even if other substantial
evidence would have supported a different result.’ ” ’ ”].)
B. The Abstract of Judgment Must be Amended
When pronouncing the judgment, the trial court stated it was imposing
one year and four months for count 3, which is one-third of the middle term,
stayed pursuant to section 654. The abstract of judgment indicates the
sentence for count 3 is “1/3 consecutive” and stayed, but the box for “654 stay”
is not checked.
On count 5, the trial court stated it would impose a two-year concurrent
term, stayed under section 654. The abstract of judgment does not state that
count 5 is concurrent. It indicates that count 5 is stayed; however, the box for
“654 stay” is not checked.
The parties agree that because the court stayed counts 3 and 5 under
section 654, count 3 should not be a consecutive one-third term and count 5
should not be concurrent. (People v. Duff (2010) 50 Cal.4th 787, 796; People
v. Cantrell (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1164.) However, contrary to
FigueroaLanza’s assertion, remand is not necessary to correct these matters.
The trial court clearly intended to impose the midterm for all counts and
enhancements, and to stay execution of the sentences in counts 3 and 5 and
the enhancement attached to count 5. We will therefore exercise our
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authority to modify the judgment to correct the unauthorized sentence.
(People v. Alford (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1473.)
We modify the judgment to impose four years on count 3 (middle term)
and two years on count 5 (middle term), both stayed pursuant to section 654.
Additionally, although not mentioned by the parties, the trial court
erroneously imposed one-third of the middle term on the enhancement
attached to count 4. We therefore modify the judgment to impose four years
on the firearm enhancement attached to count 4 (middle term), stayed
pursuant to section 654. We direct the trial court to amend the abstract of
judgment to reflect these modifications, including checking the “654 stay”
boxes for counts 3 and 5.
Finally, FigueroaLanza had 34 days of local conduct credits at the time
of sentencing, but the abstract of judgment incorrectly lists this amount as
27. We exercise our authority to correct this error as well (People v. Mitchell
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185) and direct the trial court to amend the abstract of
judgment to state 34 days of local conduct credits.
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IV. DISPOSITION
FigueroaLanza’s convictions are affirmed. We modify the judgment to
impose: a four-year term on count 3, stayed pursuant to section 654; a
four-year term on the firearm enhancement attached to count 4, stayed
pursuant to section 654; and a two-year term on count 5, stayed pursuant to
section 654. We also modify the judgment to award 34 days of local conduct
credits. The trial court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of
judgment to reflect the corrected sentence and send a copy of the amended
abstract to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. As modified,
the judgment is affirmed.
RUBIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
DO, Acting P. J.
CASTILLO, J.
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