Filed 8/20/26 P. v. Farmer CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B337979
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA487955-01)
v.
DENNIS FARMER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Ray G. Jurado, Judge. Affirmed.
Teresa Biagini, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Blake Armstrong,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________
Dennis Farmer argues his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance at his attempted murder trial. We affirm the
judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
After Farmer repeatedly shot Emilio Mayes, his fellow
resident in a transitional housing building, he was charged with
willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder (Pen.
Code, §§ 664/187, subd. (a)). It was alleged that in the
commission of the offense, Farmer used a handgun within the
meaning of Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivisions (b)
through (d) and inflicted great bodily injury on Mayes (Pen. Code,
§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).
Farmer’s first trial ended with a hung jury and mistrial.
On retrial, the jury convicted Farmer as charged and found the
special allegations true. Farmer’s total sentence was 14 years to
life in state prison. Farmer appeals.
DISCUSSION
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Farmer
“ ‘must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that
the deficiency prejudiced the defense.’ [Citation.] On direct
appeal, a finding of deficient performance is warranted where
‘(1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational
tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel
was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there
simply could be no satisfactory explanation.’ [Citation.] ‘[W]here
counsel’s trial tactics or strategic reasons for challenged decisions
do not appear on the record, we will not find ineffective
assistance of counsel on appeal unless there could be no
2
conceivable reason for counsel’s acts or omissions.’ ” (People v.
Johnsen (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1116, 1165 (Johnsen).)
Farmer claims his trial counsel’s representation fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms because counsel failed to cross-examine
Mayes “about his drug and alcohol use on the day of the incident
and to offer medical testimony on how that affected his ability to
perceive and recall.” He contends there could be no satisfactory
explanation for failing to cross-examine Mayes on this topic or for
failing to present testimony from the trauma surgeon or an
expert witness on drug and alcohol use. Farmer argues that
because the entire case rested on Mayes’s testimony, the “need to
attack [Mayes’s] credibility by exploiting his drug and alcohol use
outweighed any possible tactical reason defense counsel could
have had for failing to do so.” Therefore, he argues, counsel’s
alleged omissions “cannot be explained away as tactical decisions
because they were unreasonable.”
The scope of cross-examination and the decision of what
witnesses to call are classic examples of tactical decisions given
great deference by reviewing courts. “Once an attorney is
appointed to represent a client, [they] assume[] the authority and
duty to control the proceedings. The scope of this authority
extends to matters such as deciding what witnesses to call,
whether and how to conduct cross-examination, what jurors to
accept or reject, what motions to make, and most other strategic
and tactical determinations.” (People v. McKenzie (1983)
34 Cal.3d 616, 631, limited on another ground in People v.
Crayton (2002) 28 Cal.4th 346, 364–365; see People v. Cleveland
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 746 [“normally the decision to what extent
and how to cross-examine witnesses comes within the wide range
3
of tactical decisions competent counsel must make”]; People v.
Carrasco (2014) 59 Cal.4th 924, 989 [“The decision whether to
call certain witnesses is a ‘matter[ ] of trial tactics and strategy
which a reviewing court generally may not second-guess’ ”].)
We cannot say there could be no satisfactory explanation
for failing to cross-examine Mayes about his drug and alcohol
use, or for failing to call the trauma surgeon or a defense expert
on alcohol and drugs. The basis for this possible line of
questioning is the presence of four statements in Mayes’s hospital
records, which were marked for identification at Farmer’s first
trial but not introduced into evidence at either trial. Two notes
indicate Mayes had reported drug and alcohol use on the day of
the incident. The notes from the orthopedic consultation
performed in the early hours of June 3, 2020, include the
statement, “Per patient report in the [emergency department], he
had used meth and etoh [alcohol] earlier in the day.” The
surgical report for the June 3, 2020 surgery states Mayes “had
previously used meth and was drinking alcohol during the day.”
The other two statements relate to a June 15, 2020 psychosocial
assessment in preparation for Mayes’s discharge. The social
worker’s notes from that assessment include an entry that reads,
“Patient denies Substance Abuse history,” and a statement that
Mayes was assessed for substance use and denied using drugs.
The two statements about Mayes’s drug and alcohol use on
the day of the incident in the medical records were vague as to
time—“earlier in the day” and “during the day.” Given that the
911 call was placed at 11:14 p.m., “earlier in the day” could
encompass up to 23 hours. The statements also included no
information about the quantity of either alcohol or
methamphetamine used by Mayes. Without evidence of how
4
much of these substances Mayes used and when he took them,
counsel could easily have concluded this evidence was insufficient
to lead to meaningful medical expert testimony about possible
impairment of Mayes’s abilities to perceive and recall. Testimony
from the trauma surgeon, moreover, would have run the risk of
strengthening the prosecution’s case for the sentencing
enhancements alleging great bodily injury, and counsel may have
concluded that the value likely to be yielded by inquiring into the
very limited evidence of drug and alcohol use was not worth the
risk of the other damaging evidence this witness could provide.1
Similarly, trial counsel could reasonably have concluded
that cross-examining Mayes on the brief references in the
medical records to drug and alcohol use in some unidentified
amount and at an unspecified time during the day was unlikely
to significantly undermine Mayes’s credibility and risked
alienating the jury, particularly given that Mayes and Farmer
knew each other—they lived in the same transitional housing
1 The trauma surgeon had testified at the first trial to the
nature and extent of Mayes’s wounds: he had five gunshot
wounds, four in his upper extremities and one in his buttocks.
His injuries were life-threatening. The surgeon testified he
performed an exploratory laparotomy requiring a large incision
extending across Mayes’s torso, and that during the surgery he
removed a bullet from the right front side of Mayes’s abdomen.
The surgeon also testified Mayes remained in intensive care for
five days and stayed in the hospital for two weeks. During part
of that time Mayes was intubated, meaning there was a
breathing tube down his windpipe and a breathing machine sent
oxygen to his lungs.
5
residence and got along well—and Mayes consistently and
emphatically identified Farmer as the person who had shot him.2
Moreover, defense counsel already had a wealth of material
for cross-examination and a theory that made Mayes’s perception
and recall abilities irrelevant. Mayes presented himself as a
respectful, religious man who was focused on helping others,
looked after his neighbors, spent his free time cleaning up the
streets in his community, fed the homeless, and bore no ill will or
animosity toward Farmer for shooting him. Defense counsel
cross-examined Mayes thoroughly about his recent prior
conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, eliciting Mayes’s
admissions that this conviction arose from an incident in which
he jumped into a woman’s car, drove away at a high rate of speed
while she was hanging out the car window, used a metal pipe and
a belt to fight a bystander who attempted to intervene, locked
himself inside a nearby business, and then fled, breaking a glass
door in the process. Indeed, in closing argument, defense counsel
caricatured Mayes as a self-proclaimed saint, argued extensively
that he could not be trusted, exhorted the jury not to believe
Mayes’s testimony, and accused Mayes of “lying about the whole
thing.” Whether Mayes’s perception or memory could have been
2 Before he was even transported to the hospital, Mayes told
police who responded to the scene that “Dennis,” another resident
of the house, shot him. On the way to the hospital, he told the
officer who accompanied him in the ambulance that “Dennis,”
who lived in the same house, was the shooter. While recovering
in the hospital, Mayes told police Farmer shot him and identified
Farmer from a photographic lineup, describing himself as “a
thousand percent sure it’s him.” He again identified Farmer as
the shooter with “one thousand percent” certainty at trial.
6
impacted by the substances he used at an unknown time of day in
an unknown quantity was beside the point when the defense
theory was that Mayes deliberately fabricated the entire account.
As a general rule, ineffective assistance of counsel claims
are more suited to petitions for habeas corpus than direct
appeals. (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266–267
[a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel relating to “ ‘ “why
counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged” ’ . . . is
more appropriately decided in a habeas corpus proceeding”].)
This case is no exception. Because the record does not
affirmatively disclose counsel had no rational tactical purpose for
these choices, and we cannot say there could be no satisfactory
reason for failing to cross-examine Mayes, call the trauma
surgeon as a witness, or present a medical expert’s testimony on
drug and alcohol use, Farmer’s claim must be denied on direct
appeal. (See Johnsen, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 1165.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
STRATTON, P. J.
We concur:
VIRAMONTES, J. SCHERB, J.
7