Filed 6/30/26 P. v. Estrada CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A171412
v.
MIGUEL ANGEL ESTRADA, (San Francisco City & County
Super. Ct. Nos. CRI21008360,
Defendant and Appellant.
SCN234411)
Defendant Miguel Angel Estrada appeals following a jury conviction of
assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)),1 battery with
serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)), and mayhem (§ 203). As to the assault
count, the jury found true that defendant personally inflicted great bodily
injury (GBI) (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) and further found as a factor in
aggravation California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1).2 The trial court
subsequently sentenced defendant to the midterm of three years on the
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
1
otherwise indicated.
2 All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
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assault conviction (rather than the presumptive low term)3 and an additional
three years for the personal infliction of GBI enhancement.
Defendant maintains the trial court improperly made dual use of
facts—namely infliction of GBI—in imposing both the midterm for assault
and the GBI enhancement. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In August 2021, defendant went on a date with E.R.4 E.R. owned a
small-handled switchblade with a two-inch blade, which they kept in their
bag or car. At the beginning of the date, E.R. showed the knife to defendant,
while sharing a story about another date and stating they were not “to be
messed around with.”
The two went to dinner and a show before heading to an arcade and bar
around 11:00 p.m. J.N. and his girlfriend Z.B. arrived at the arcade around
the same time.
Hours later, around closing time, defendant and Z.B. exchanged words.
J.N. walked over to see what was happening. Defendant approached him and
was “checking me for no reason,” meaning they “came up to [J.N.’s] face and
kind of wanted to start problems for no reason.” J.N. shoved defendant once
or twice as he started to exit the arcade. The arcade’s bouncer then asked the
entire group to leave. J.N. and Z.B. went to J.N.’s car. Defendant went in
the opposite direction to wait for E.R.
E.R. found defendant standing outside. Defendant seemed upset and
told E.R. what had happened. Defendant added that J.N. was the same
person who had hurt a friend. The two then walked to, and got into, E.R.’s
3 The Attorney General does not dispute that the low term
presumption set forth in section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(B) applied.
4 Defendant and E.R. both use they/them pronouns. We therefore use
these pronouns throughout the opinion.
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car. Defendant, who was drunk, then got out of the car, telling E.R. they
were going back to talk to J.N. E.R. told defendant they had “two minutes”
because E.R. wanted to go home.
J.N. and Z.B. were sitting inside J.N.’s car talking, when J.N. saw
defendant walk up to the car. J.N. got out of the car to “defend myself again,”
and asked defendant “ ‘Did you come back for me?’ ” J.N. saw a “black object
in [defendant’s] hand.” Defendant then punched him and the two began
fighting. J.N. next remembered feeling weak, pushing defendant off him,
looking down, and seeing “a lot of blood” on his hands and sweatshirt. He
started “freaking out” and saw his “stomach hanging out from the outside in.”
After telling Z.B. to get back in the car, J.N. drove to a nearby location and
called 911.
Meanwhile, E.R. had pulled up to the front of the arcade to find
defendant and take them home. E.R. saw defendant on the ground with J.N.
“hitting them” and “a lady who was with” J.N. who was “on top of
[defendant].” E.R. then saw J.N. and Z.B. get into their car and speed off.
When E.R. got to defendant, they seemed “a little stunned,” and a few
people nearby suggested they needed to go to the hospital. Defendant was
“covered in blood, [their] whole face was covered in flood [sic], whole shirt was
covered in blood and the back of [their] shirt was covered in blood.” E.R. got
defendant into their car, drove to a nearby emergency room, and called 911.
San Francisco Police Officers responded to both J.N.’s and defendant’s
locations.
At J.N.’s location, officers found Z.B. standing outside of the car,
“frantic, hysterical,” and “very shocked.” She had “some small cuts to her
hand.” J.N. was in the driver’s seat “bleeding profusely from his torso area.”
Officer Brian Alston found J.N. “barely conscious” and saw what he “believed
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was [J.N.’s] stomach” or what he thought were J.N.’s intestines “hanging out
of his body.” Alston also observed multiple stab wounds, a slice to J.N.’s
stomach, and a “sucking chest wound.” Alston rendered aid, applying
pressure and trying to keep J.N. conscious. Before he was taken to the
hospital, J.N. told Alston someone had stabbed him.
It was ultimately determined J.N. suffered multiple stab wounds to
both chest walls, his abdomen, both hands, and his left bicep. The chest
wound was a “sucking chest wound,” which is an “injury to the chest wall
which went into the pleural cavity,” where the lungs are located, and it “can
cause a lung to collapse and [an] inability to breathe.” He also suffered a
“bubbling chest wound” on his right side, which happens when there is “air
coming out of it as well as fluid.” J.N. was bedbound for a month after the
incident. Additionally, he sustained nerve damage to his left thumb, which
required surgery, and as of the time of trial, he still could not “feel anything
with [his] thumb.”
After seeing J.N. off to the hospital, Officer Alston went to the arcade,
finding other units already on the scene. He observed blood on the street a
few feet from the arcade’s entrance and recovered the video footage from the
arcade.
Officer Romari Collins responded to defendant’s location. On arrival,
he found defendant and E.R. inside a gray Subaru. Defendant, sitting on the
passenger side, was nonresponsive, “going in and out of consciousness” and
bleeding from “multiple areas of [their] body” and “bleeding pretty much all
over the front side of [their] body.” Collins and another officer administered
aid until paramedics arrived and took defendant for treatment. Collins then
found a “blue knife on the floorboard of the front passenger side of the
vehicle.” The knife was “spring loaded,” with the blade extending after the
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user presses a lever on the side of the knife. Collins saw what “appeared to
be blood on the . . . blade part of the knife.”
It was ultimately determined that defendant suffered a scalp
laceration, “abdominal stab wounds, a liver laceration, multiple back stab
wounds, right thigh stab wound, a right frontal parietal laceration,” which is
a “laceration to the forehead,” as well as a sucking left chest wound.
The San Francisco County District Attorney filed an amended
information alleging defendant committed one count of attempted murder
(§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)—count 1); assault with a deadly weapon, a knife
(§ 245, subd. (a)(1)—count 2); battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243,
subd. (d)—count 3); mayhem (§ 203—count 4); and possession of a
switchblade in a motor vehicle (§ 21510, subd. (a)—count 5). As to counts 1
and 2, the information further alleged defendant personally inflicted GBI
(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)); as to counts 1, 3, and 4 that they personally used a
deadly and dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)); and as to count 3 that
defendant personally inflicted serious bodily injury (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)).
Finally, the information alleged several aggravating factors: that the crime
involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm, or
other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness
(rule 4.421(a)(1)), defendant was armed with or used a weapon at the time of
the commission of the crime (rule 4.421(a)(2)), and defendant engaged in
violent conduct which indicated a serious danger to society (rule 4.421(b)(1)).
The jury returned a verdict of not guilty on count 1 (attempted murder)
and guilty on the remaining counts. The jury further found the allegations as
to counts 2, 3, and 4 true. The jury also found the following aggravating
factors true: the crime involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of
great bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty,
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viciousness, or callousness (rule 4.421(a)(1)), and defendant was armed with
or used a weapon at the time of the commission of the crime
(rule 4.421(a)(2)). The jury did not find true that defendant engaged in
violent conduct indicating a danger to society (rule 4.421(b)(1)).
At the sentencing hearing, the court began by stating it had considered
the probation report and recommendation and defendant’s sentencing
memorandum, which included a report by a psychiatrist. The court
sentenced defendant to the midterm of three years for count 2, imposed a
three-year term for the infliction of great bodily injury enhancement, and
stayed sentence on counts 3 and 4 as well as the remaining enhancements for
a total term of six years.5
The court explained it had considered all of the circumstances in
mitigation, but this was “a very serious case,” and J.N. “was very seriously
injured; [¶] . . . [E.R.] testified at trial and was obviously incredibly impacted
by what they saw that night; [¶] And one witness, one eye witness[, Z.B.,] was
no longer available, a young woman who died by suicide after the
circumstances of this case. [¶] I don’t know anything about the circumstances
of her life and how that terrible thing came to pass, but it was evident in the
9-1-1 video that we saw that she was deeply traumatized by the events of
that night as well. [¶] And I also don’t doubt that [defendant] was
traumatized by the events of that night. I know that they suffered serious
physical injuries and subsequent surgery, and—but I’m sure that they are
impacted by thinking about what happened. [¶] . . . [¶] But only one person is
responsible for what happened that night in this courtroom. [¶] Even if [J.N.]
acted aggressively at the club, it’s only because [defendant] went back to
5The court also imposed a term of 180 days in county jail for count 5 to
run concurrent with defendant’s sentence.
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[J.N.’s] car with a knife that the events unfolded as they did. [¶] And so I do
think it’s appropriate to punish [defendant] for the terrible things that
happened to [J.N.], while also understanding that [defendant] is not—it’s not
their worst moment; it’s not exclusively what happened that night. [¶] And I
also recognize that [defendant] was under 26 at the time of the crime.
[¶] . . . [¶] Penal Code [section] 1170(b)(6) states that I shall impose the low
term if I find that [defendant’s] youth was a contributing factor in this crime.
Unless I find that imposition of the low term is contrary to the interests of
justice, the defense presentation has made a strong argument for the low
term here, but I do find it would be contrary to the interests of justice here.
[¶] The mitigating factors with respect to [defendant’s] [section] 245(a)(1)
conviction are outweighed, in my view, by the aggravating factor of great
violence, cruelty, or viciousness that the jury found true beyond a reasonable
doubt. [¶] I will also say that this aggravating factor does not duplicate the
GBI enhancement because it requires a finding of violence, cruelty, or
viciousness beyond GBI. [¶] Balancing the aggravating and mitigating
factors, I do find the middle term appropriate here.”
DISCUSSION
A trial court’s sentencing decisions are generally reviewed for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847, superseded by
statute on another ground as stated in People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730,
757 (Lynch).) “A court abuses its sentencing discretion when it acts
arbitrarily and capriciously, relies on improper matter in reaching its
decision, or is unaware of the scope of its discretion so that it does not
exercise informed discretion at all.” (People v. Knowles (2024)
105 Cal.App.5th 757, 765.) Thus, a court’s sentencing “ ‘decision will not be
reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. “An appellate
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tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for
the judgment of the trial court.” ’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997)
14 Cal.4th 968, 978.)
However, if the sentencing court has acted in a manner contrary to the
law, it has necessarily abused its discretion. “ ‘ “The scope of discretion
always reside[s] in the particular law being applied, i.e., in the ‘legal
principles governing the subject of [the] action. . . .’ Action that transgresses
the confines of the applicable principles of law is outside the scope of
discretion and we call such action an ‘abuse’ of discretion. [Citation.] . . . [¶]
The legal principles that govern the subject of discretionary action vary
greatly with context. . . . To determine if a court abused its discretion, we
must thus consider “the legal principles and policies that should have guided
the court’s actions.” ’ ” (People v. Tran (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1218.)
Here, the relevant legal principles concern the prohibition against
“dual use” of the same fact in making multiple sentencing choices. Although
a single fact may be relevant to more than one sentencing choice, the dual or
overlapping use of facts is prohibited in certain circumstances. (People v.
Gutierrez (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1729, 1735.) Thus, a sentencing court
“generally cannot use a single fact both to aggravate the base term and to
impose an enhancement, nor may it use a fact constituting an element of the
offense either to aggravate or to enhance a sentence.” (People v. Scott (1994)
9 Cal.4th 331, 350; § 1170, subd. (b); rule 4.420(g).) But “where the facts
surrounding the charged offense exceed the minimum necessary to establish
the elements of the crime, the trial court can use such evidence to aggravate
the sentence. [Citation.] Stated another way, rule 420(d) [now rule 4.420(g)]
does not preclude a court from using facts to aggravate a sentence when those
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facts establish the elements not required for the underlying crime.” (People v.
Castorena (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 558, 562, italics omitted.)
The essence of defendant’s “dual use” argument is as follows: As to
count 2, the jury found true the personal infliction of GBI enhancement. It
also found rule 4.421(a)(1) applied, but did not make a specific finding as to
what facet of the rule applied, i.e., whether the crime “involved great
violence, great bodily harm, a threat of great bodily harm, or other acts
disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness.”
(Rule 4.421(a)(1).) Because the jury made a specific finding only of GBI, and
because GBI and great bodily harm are identically defined (see CALCRIM
Nos. 3160 [defining term for purposes of GBI enhancement] and 3224
[defining great bodily harm for purposes of the rule 4.421(a)(1)],) GBI was,
according to defendant, the one and only finding the trial court could
consider. But under the “dual use” prohibition, it could not impose both the
GBI enhancement and a higher sentence, i.e., the midterm rather than the
presumptive low term, under rule 4.421(a)(1) based on great bodily harm.
We are not clear as to what the analytical basis is for defendant’s claim
of error. The record is clear that the trial court did not impose the midterm
sentence on the basis of the jury’s GBI finding. To the contrary, as we have
recited, the court expressly stated it was relying on other facets of
rule 4.421(a)(1), namely “great violence, cruelty, or viciousness.”
Thus, the issue defendant’s argument seems to raise is whether the
trial court could rely on facets of rule 4.421(a)(1), other than great bodily
harm, in the absence of specific findings of such by the jury. While defendant
hints that a jury must make a specific finding as to each facet of
rule 4.421(a)(1) on which a sentencing court relies, defendant does not
actually make such an argument. Nor do they argue what would be a
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necessary corollary—that the prosecution must identify all potentially
applicable facets of the rule, and the jury must be instructed to make a
finding as to each potentially applicable facet and be provided with the
special verdict forms to do so.
Defendant cites no authority that suggests that in imposing a midterm
sentence a trial court must have before it jury findings of aggravating factors,
let alone, specific findings on the potential facets of rule 4.421(a)(1). In fact,
authority is squarely to the contrary. In People v. Hilburn (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 189, 193 (Hilburn), the trial court, as did the trial court here,
did not impose the presumptive low term but, instead, imposed the midterm.
The defendant appealed, claiming he was entitled to have a jury determine
the aggravating factors on which the court based its sentencing decision. (Id.
at pp. 194–195.) The Court of Appeal affirmed, explaining that imposition of
a midterm sentence does not transgress Apprendi6 or its statutory
implementation through section 1170. (Hilburn, at pp. 203–204.) “[T]he
language and framework of the amended law makes clear the Legislature
intended to maintain the sentencing court’s discretion to impose the middle
term even if it finds the defendant falls within one of the three categories of
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)” providing for a presumptive low term
sentence. (Id. at p. 204.) Moreover, “the imposition of the low term becomes
presumptive only after the sentencing court makes findings in addition to
those supporting the jury’s verdict. Under the amended statute, the low term
is presumed only if the sentencing court first finds the defendant falls into
one of the three special categories set forth in section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)
and, second, finds that circumstance was a contributing factor in the
commission of the offense. Thus, unlike the middle term, the lower term is
6 Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 (Apprendi).
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presumed only after the court makes additional findings beyond those of the
jury. Because those findings occur after the defendant is convicted, and are
not necessary for imposition of the presumptive middle term, they do not
create a new statutory maximum sentence,” that cannot be aggravated only
upon facts found by a jury or to which the defendant stipulates. (Id. at
pp. 204–205.)
Accordingly, as in Hilburn, there was no impediment to the trial court
here finding that additional facets of rule 4.421(a)(1) warranted imposition of
the midterm.
Finally, even if imposing the midterm implicated Apprendi, any error
was not, on this record, prejudicial. When reviewing a claim of Apprendi
error, we use “the Chapman[7] standard of review.” (People v. Wiley (2025)
17 Cal.5th 1069, 1087.) And “[u]nder that standard, ‘a sentence imposed
under . . . section 1170(b) must be reversed and remanded unless the
reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury, applying
that same standard, would have found true all of the aggravating facts upon
which the court relied to conclude the upper term was justified. . . .’ ” (Wiley,
at p. 1087; accord, Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 761.)
We have no difficulty in concluding the jury, had it been instructed to
return separate and express verdicts as to rule 4.421(a)(1), would have found
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant’s assault involved “great violence,”
a “high degree of cruelty,” and “viciousness.” As we have recited, after having
left the arcade and gotten into E.R.’s car to drive home, defendant, without
provocation, got back out of the car, walked over to J.N.’s car, and attacked
J.N. when they got out from the driver’s side. The attack was brutal. Indeed,
defendant partially disemboweled J.N.–– with J.N. and a responding officer
7 Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.
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describing seeing J.N.’s intestines “hanging out of his body”—as well as
stabbed J.N. multiple times in both chest walls, in the abdomen, in the
hands, and in the left bicep. The chest wounds were severe. One was a
“sucking chest wound” that “went into the pleural cavity.” The other was a
“bubbling chest wound,” with “air coming out of it as well as fluid.” J.N. also
sustained nerve damage to his left thumb, which required surgery, and as of
the time of trial, he still could not “feel anything with [his] thumb.” J.N. was
bedbound for a month after the incident. Given the brutality of the attack,
we have no doubt any reasonable juror, had they been asked to do so, would
expressly have found that defendant acted with “great violence,” a “high
degree of cruelty,” and “viciousness.”
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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_________________________
Banke, Acting P. J.
We concur:
_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.
_________________________
Smiley, J.
A171412, People v. Estrada
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