IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
MIGUEL ALBERTO ESQUIVIAS,
Defendant and Appellant.
S286371
Second Appellate District, Division Two
B329800
Los Angeles County Superior Court
PA077370
August 17, 2026
Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which
Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Kruger, and
Gooding* concurred.
Justice Evans filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Liu
concurred.
*
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate
District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
S286371
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
A habeas corpus proceeding is equitable in nature, and a
court “has broad authority to craft a remedy ‘as the justice of the
case may require.’ ” (In re Palmer (2021) 10 Cal.5th 959, 976
(Palmer), quoting Pen. Code,1 § 1484.) Petitioner Miguel
Alberto Esquivias filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the
Los Angeles County Superior Court alleging only that he was
entitled to relief from his firearm enhancements under Senate
Bill No. 620 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 620) (Stats.
2017, ch. 682), which granted trial courts discretion to strike
these previously mandatory enhancements. The superior court
ultimately granted relief on that sole claim by striking
petitioner’s firearm enhancements. On appeal, petitioner
argued that the superior court’s habeas corpus remedy, affecting
one aspect of his sentence, entitled him to reconsideration of his
entire sentence with the benefit of all relevant ameliorative
laws. The Court of Appeal disagreed, explaining that a grant of
habeas corpus relief is not an “ ‘all-or-nothing’ proposition” and
“a trial court is not obligated to revisit a defendant’s entire
sentence on habeas corpus review merely because it grants
review to revisit a portion of that sentence.” (People v. Esquivias
(2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 969, 976 (Esquivias).) We affirm the
Court of Appeal’s decision. Since a full resentencing was neither
1
Subsequent section numbers refer to the Penal Code
unless otherwise specified.
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
constitutionally nor statutorily compelled to remedy petitioner’s
specific claim for discretionary, retroactive sentencing relief
pursuant to Senate Bill No. 620, the habeas corpus court had
broad equitable authority to conclude that “the justice of the
case” only required striking petitioner’s firearm enhancements.
(§ 1484.) Habeas corpus petitions must be assessed on a case-
by-case basis, and this is not a case where petitioner’s original
sentence was constitutionally infirm or unauthorized.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In June 2013, petitioner fatally shot a rival gang member
several times. Approximately two weeks after the killing,
petitioner and his friend robbed two people at gunpoint. During
the robbery, petitioner asked one of the victims for his gang
affiliation.
In May 2015, a jury convicted petitioner of first degree
murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), two counts of robbery (§ 211), and
possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). The
jury found that the crimes, except the felon in possession count,
were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)), that a principal personally discharged a
firearm causing death in connection with the murder
(§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)), and that petitioner personally used
a firearm and a principal was armed in the commission of the
robberies (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022, subd. (a)). Petitioner
admitted that he had suffered a prior conviction that qualified
as a strike (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(j), 1170.12) and a prior serious
felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)).
The trial court sentenced petitioner to prison for 37 years
and 8 months, plus 75 years to life. As relevant, petitioner’s
firearm enhancements accounted for an indeterminate term of
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PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
25 years to life, plus 13 years 4 months of his determinate
sentence.
On July 26, 2017, the Court of Appeal affirmed petitioner’s
judgment of conviction. We thereafter denied his petition for
review on November 1, 2017. Senate Bill No. 620 then became
effective after our decision to deny review but before petitioner’s
time to petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court expired. As a result, the parties agree that
petitioner’s judgment was not final on direct review when
Senate Bill No. 620 took effect. Effective January 1, 2018,
Senate Bill No. 620 amended sections 12022.53 and 12022.5 to
provide trial courts, “in the interest of justice pursuant to
Section 1385,” the discretion to “strike or dismiss” previously
mandatory firearm enhancements. (Stats. 2017, ch. 682, §§ 1,
2; Pen. Code, §§ 12022.5, subd. (c), 12022.53, subd. (h).)
Petitioner’s judgment became final on January 30, 2018.2 (See
Esquivias, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 974.)
On January 24, 2022, almost four years after his criminal
judgment became final, petitioner, in propria persona, filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Los Angeles County
Superior Court seeking retroactive application of Senate Bill
No. 620 pursuant to Estrada. (See In re Estrada (1965)
2
Petitioner did not file a petition for writ of certiorari in the
United States Supreme Court, so his judgment became final 90
days after we denied his petition for review. (See People v.
Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 306.) Before the trial court, the
district attorney incorrectly calculated the date of finality as
February 27, 2018, and the superior court accepted this
concession. However, this miscalculation has no impact on the
analysis since it is undisputed that petitioner’s case was not
final on direct review when Senate Bill No. 620 took effect on
January 1, 2018.
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
63 Cal.2d 740, 745, 747 (Estrada) [holding that, absent a
contrary savings clause, ameliorative legislation is presumed to
“apply to every case to which it constitutionally could apply,” i.e.,
all cases not “reduced to final judgment”].) In their informal
response, the People (per the district attorney) conceded that
Senate Bill No. 620 applied to petitioner’s case because his
judgment was not final on appeal when it became effective. In
a supplemental response, the People asserted that the superior
court should not exercise its discretion to strike or dismiss
petitioner’s firearm enhancements because “the interests of
justice would not be served by doing so in this particular case.”
In his reply, petitioner asked the court to favorably exercise its
discretion under Senate Bill No. 620. He also raised for the first
time a request for the court to dismiss his prior strike conviction
(see People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497
(Romero)). He additionally asked that the court dismiss his
other enhancements, including his gang enhancements after
applying Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Assembly Bill No. 333) (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 4, eff. Jan. 1,
2022), which became effective after his case was final on direct
review.
On February 24, 2023, at a hearing in petitioner’s habeas
corpus matter, the superior court explained that the parties
agreed petitioner had made a prima facie showing that he was
entitled to relief, i.e., petitioner was entitled to an opportunity
for the trial court to consider exercising its discretion to strike
his firearm enhancements under Senate Bill No. 620. At a
subsequent hearing in March 2023, the superior court first
explained that petitioner’s habeas corpus petition sought
“specific relief” under Senate Bill No. 620. The court rejected
petitioner’s argument that he was entitled to a full resentencing
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
with the benefit of all ameliorative laws “that have been enacted
into law up to today’s date.” The court observed that petitioner’s
case was final in 2018 and “limit[ed] this particular habeas
petition’s scope to whether or not to exercise” discretion under
Senate Bill No. 620. The court struck petitioner’s firearm
enhancements, thereby reducing his sentence by 38 years and
four months. The court rejected petitioner’s claim that he was
entitled to full resentencing, which he argued should have
resulted in the reduction of his sentence by over 40 more years.
The court explained that any further reduction in petitioner’s
sentence would “undermine the intentions of how I exercise this
discretion today.”
Petitioner appealed, arguing again that, when the
superior court exercised its discretion under Senate Bill No. 620
to strike his firearm enhancements, he was entitled to full
resentencing with the benefit of all ameliorative laws that took
effect after his judgment became final on direct review,
including Assembly Bill No. 333 and Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017–
2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 1393). In relevant part,
“Assembly Bill [No.] 333 [effective January 1, 2022] amended
Penal Code section 186.22 by imposing new substantive
requirements relating to gang enhancements . . . .” (People v.
Burgos (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1, 7.) Senate Bill No. 1393, effective
January 1, 2019 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1013), expanded a court’s
discretion to dismiss a serious felony enhancement in
furtherance of justice. The Court of Appeal disagreed with
petitioner, holding that the habeas corpus court could strike
petitioner’s firearm enhancements without rendering the
remainder of petitioner’s sentence subject to reconsideration.
(See Esquivias, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 980.) We granted
review. In People v. Duenas (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 553, review
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
granted July 30, 2025, S291631 (Duenas), a divided Court of
Appeal subsequently disagreed with Esquivias’s relevant
reasoning, concluding instead that when a habeas corpus court
strikes part of a sentence, it is “required to conduct a full
resentencing” (Duenas, at p. 560) with the benefit of all
intervening ameliorative laws. (See id. at p. 563.)
We affirm the Court of Appeal’s decision below and
disapprove Duenas’s broad proposition that a habeas corpus
petitioner is always entitled to full resentencing whenever a
habeas corpus court grants relief as to a portion of a petitioner’s
sentence. While some habeas corpus claims may require
vacating a petitioner’s entire sentence (see People v. Padilla
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 152 (Padilla) [discussed post]), petitioner’s
claim for retroactive relief under Senate Bill No. 620’s statutory
amendments did not. When presented with a meritorious
habeas corpus claim, the court necessarily assesses the
appropriate remedy on a case-by-case basis.
II. DISCUSSION
“The court will determine the appropriate disposition of a
petition for writ of habeas corpus based on the allegations of the
petition as originally filed and any amended or supplemental
petition for which leave to file has been granted.” (In re Clark
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 781, fn. 16.) It is “improper to state new
claims or theories for the first time in the informal reply or
traverse.” (In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 444 (Reno).)
Applying these accepted pleading principles here, petitioner
admits the superior court was initially required only to consider
“the sole issue raised” in his habeas corpus petition, i.e., whether
he was entitled to seek relief from his firearm enhancements
under Senate Bill No. 620.
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
Where the parties disagree is on the question of what is
required when a habeas corpus court determines partial
resentencing is an appropriate remedy for the specific claim
before it. According to petitioner, “because a criminal sentence
constitutes an integrated whole,” once the superior court
decided to strike his firearm enhancements, it “effectively
vacated [petitioner’s] entire sentence, which rendered the
sentence nonfinal” for purposes of applying all applicable
ameliorative laws. In petitioner’s view, which is echoed by the
dissent, the court could have maintained finality by leaving his
sentence intact, but its exercise of discretion with respect to part
of his sentence triggered entitlement to full resentencing with
Estrada’s presumption of retroactivity. (See Estrada, supra,
63 Cal.2d at pp. 745, 747; see also dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at
pp. 8–10.) Petitioner alleges that his judgment was reopened
and he is thus entitled to the benefit of all ameliorative laws,
including Assembly Bill No. 333 and Senate Bill No. 1393, which
became effective after his criminal judgment was final on direct
review in January 2018.
The People instead argue that the question of “whether a
judgment becomes nonfinal on habeas corpus will depend on the
particular remedy fashioned by the court.” The People concede
that, if a particular claim requires vacating a petitioner’s entire
sentence, “then the judgment is nonfinal and the petitioner is
entitled to full resentencing.” However, “not all habeas
remedies operate in a way that makes a once-final judgment
nonfinal.”
We reject petitioner’s and the dissent’s sweeping
proposition that, in all cases, any habeas corpus remedy
affecting part of a petitioner’s sentence requires the habeas
corpus court to conduct a full resentencing. “The applicable
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
procedure [in a habeas corpus matter] generally has depended
upon the nature of the relief sought in the petition.” (In re
Roberts (2005) 36 Cal.4th 575, 583, italics omitted.) The Court
of Appeal below properly concluded that petitioner’s claim for
habeas corpus relief under Senate Bill No. 620’s statutory
amendments did not leave the habeas corpus court with an “ ‘all-
or-nothing’ ” choice, thereby requiring the court to resentence
petitioner in full or not at all. (Esquivias, supra,
103 Cal.App.5th at p. 976.) Rather, “habeas corpus is, at its
core, an equitable remedy.” (Schlup v. Delo (1995) 513 U.S 298,
319.) Under well-established habeas corpus principles, “[a]
court considering a petition for writ of habeas corpus has broad
authority to craft a remedy ‘as the justice of the case may
require.’ ” (Palmer, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 976, quoting § 1484.)
“ ‘[I]t is well settled that the writ of habeas corpus does not
afford an all-inclusive remedy available at all times as a matter
of right.’ ” (People v. Villa (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1063, 1068–1069;
cf. Reno, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 451 [“ ‘ “the availability of the
writ properly must be tempered by the necessity of giving due
consideration to the interest of the public in the orderly and
reasonably prompt implementation of its laws and to the
important public interest in the finality of judgments” ’ ”].) It
may well be that the equities of a particular case require the
habeas corpus court to vacate a petitioner’s entire sentence and
conduct a full resentencing, applying all relevant ameliorative
laws, but that will not always be the case. Rather, a court’s
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
determination of the most appropriate equitable remedy in a
habeas corpus matter is a case- and fact-specific inquiry.3
Our dissenting colleagues would have us employ a one-
size-fits-all approach that is at odds with the traditional
flexibility afforded to habeas corpus courts to meet the demands
of a particular case. The dissent criticizes the majority for not
citing a “single case” (dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 18) that is
directly on point. But this is occasioned by the fact, recognized
by the dissent and with which we agree, that the procedural
posture here is “rare and idiosyncratic.” (Id. at p. 25.) More to
the point, Estrada has been binding precedent for 60 years, and
habeas corpus relief has been available for much longer. If the
issue before us is as “straightforward” (id. at p. 5) as the dissent
suggests, thereby necessitating a simple application of the full
resentencing rule, then the dissent should be able to cite myriad
habeas corpus cases where full resentencing has occurred on
similar facts. But it cannot.
The dissent’s analysis suffers from one fatal flaw at its
inception. The dissent asserts that “the only way the superior
court could afford relief was to initiate a new sentencing
3
The dissent argues that our “bespoke rule has several
potential drawbacks if applied more generally to cases involving
partial sentencing relief after a grant of a habeas corpus
petition.” (Dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 4.) As an initial
matter, we do not understand why the dissent would try to
broaden the potential impact of a decision that it thinks is so
patently incorrect. But, more to the point, we mean what we
say: this case arises under a unique procedural history; our
holding should not be “applied more generally” given that
habeas corpus relief is claim specific; and our holding is (as the
Attorney General agrees) specific to petitioner’s state statutory
claim pursuant to Estrada.
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
hearing” (dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 3) because habeas
corpus courts have no authority “to define the scope of a
sentencing court’s jurisdiction to conduct resentencing or to
determine the application of Estrada retroactivity” (id. at p. 5).
This is simply incorrect in the context of a petitioner who raised
a single habeas corpus claim for discretionary, statutory relief
under Estrada’s presumption of retroactivity to nonfinal
judgments from his concededly valid, final judgment. (See
Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 745, 747.) But once the dissent
embraces this faulty premise, then all its conclusions seemingly
“fall into place:” this case requires a basic application of
Estrada; Estrada should be applied broadly; the full
resentencing rule requires that every aspect of petitioner’s
sentence be reconsidered. (See dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at
pp. 1–2, 5–8.) This reasoning gets it wrong at the crucial first
step. Because petitioner’s judgment was final, absent a petition
for writ of habeas corpus in the superior court, petitioner had no
avenue to assert his claim for discretionary, retroactive
sentencing relief under Senate Bill No. 620 pursuant to Estrada.
If, as the dissent maintains, a habeas corpus court is unable to
assume jurisdiction and “determine the application of Estrada
retroactivity” (dis. opn., at p. 5), then petitioner’s Estrada claim
would have failed at the outset because it depended on just such
a determination. Nor is a habeas corpus court, having
determined that a remedy is warranted, obligated in the
situation presented here to reopen a sentence for all purposes
instead of ordering tailored relief. Our case law affords habeas
corpus courts greater flexibility than the dissent’s position
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
would allow them.4 (See, e.g., Palmer, supra, 10 Cal.5th at
p. 976; In re Roberts, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 583.) Without
recognizing the fault in its underlying premise that the habeas
corpus court could not determine the appropriate scope of
sentencing relief and Estrada’s application, the dissent asks us
to adopt an ever-shifting formulation of finality under Estrada
for purposes of this case: (1) a petitioner seeks habeas corpus
relief under Estrada only because his judgment is already final
and he cannot be aided on direct appeal; then (2) after the
habeas corpus court exercises its discretion to aid petitioner
post-finality; (3) a pivot to a new finality date for Estrada (which
now is after the time he asserted his case was final for purposes
of (1)). Contrary to the dissent’s circular logic, and for reasons
explained in greater detail below, our holding better honors
Estrada’s presumption that “new laws that lessen punishment
4
As noted, habeas corpus proceedings are equitable in
nature. The high court has “said that courts of equity ‘must be
governed by rules and precedents no less than the courts of law.’
. . . [But] often the ‘exercise of a court’s equity powers . . . must
be made on a case-by-case basis.’ ” (Holland v. Florida (2010)
560 U.S. 631, 649–650, citation omitted.) The high court has
“followed a tradition in which courts of equity have sought to
‘relieve hardships which, from time to time, arise from a hard
and fast adherence’ to more absolute legal rules, which, if
strictly applied, threaten the ‘evils of archaic rigidity.’ ” (Id. at
p. 650.) We, too, recognize that habeas corpus courts should
“exercise judgment in light of prior precedent, but with
awareness of the fact that specific circumstances, often hard to
predict in advance, could warrant special treatment in an
appropriate case.” (Ibid.) This is such an “appropriate case” and
the habeas corpus court was not limited to a rigid, all-or-nothing
choice between providing no relief to petitioner or fully
resentencing him.
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
apply retroactively to all defendants whose judgments are not
final” (dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 1), better preserves
society’s interest in the finality of judgments (see Reno, supra,
55 Cal.4th at p. 451), and best maintains a habeas corpus court’s
traditional flexibility to fashion relief as the justice of a
particular case may require (see Palmer, at p. 976).
The dissent also criticizes our case-specific affirmance of
the habeas corpus court’s tailored grant of relief as “significantly
more complicated” (dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 3) than the
dissent’s “easy-to-apply” approach. (Id. at p. 5.) We disagree
with the premise that our framework is more complicated. But
even accepting the dissent’s view, our job is to interpret the law
as dictated by precedent and statute, even if that interpretation
requires a more “complicated” approach. We are also more
confident than our dissenting colleagues in the ability of our
lower courts to understand and apply our holding going forward.
(See id. at pp. 21–23.) Moreover, it is certainly the case that the
dissent’s proposed interpretation may inure to petitioner’s
benefit in this individual matter. But its one-size-fits-all
approach to sentencing steals from the habeas corpus court,
sitting in equity, the opportunity to fashion tailored relief on a
case-by-case basis as justice requires. We think it ill advised to
sacrifice equity for simplicity.
In support of their contrary position, petitioner and the
dissent rely on our decisions in Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th 152
and People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388 (Lopez). Those cases
are readily distinguishable.
The dissent posits that “[t]he case that most clearly
articulates the governing principles of finality here” and “the
proper application of Estrada” is Padilla. (Dis. opn. of Evans,
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
J., post, at p. 8.) The dissent boldly states that Padilla stands
for the broad proposition that, “[s]imply put, habeas corpus
relief resulting in a modification of sentence renders a case
nonfinal.” (Dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 9.) But Padilla did
not consider whether a habeas corpus court that credits a
delayed claim for statutory relief under Estrada must fully
resentence the petitioner. (See B.B. v. County of Los Angeles
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 1, 11 [“As we have repeatedly observed,
‘ “cases are not authority for propositions not considered” ’ ”].)
In fact, Padilla actually lends support to our conclusion here
that, on different facts, the remedy for the specific habeas corpus
claim pled and proven will necessitate vacating the petitioner’s
sentence and thereby unwinding its finality for purposes of
applying intervening ameliorative laws. The Padilla petitioner,
who had been sentenced to life without the possibility of parole
as a juvenile, came before our court on appeal after his original
sentence was deemed unconstitutional and vacated in habeas
corpus proceedings. (See Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 159;
see also Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 [holding that
mandatory life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders
violate the 8th Amend.], Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016)
577 U.S. 190, 208 [concluding that “Miller announced a
substantive rule of constitutional law” that is retroactive in
cases on collateral review].) This court in Padilla explained that
“a criminal judgment’s finality may be interrupted by a
subsequent habeas corpus action . . . . When a habeas corpus
court vacates a prior judgment and orders a new trial or new
sentencing hearing, the prior judgment — now ineffective — can
no longer be a final one [for purposes of Estrada’s inference of
retroactivity for ameliorative laws].” (Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th
at p. 164, italics added.) In discussing why the retroactive
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application of ameliorative laws was appropriate in Padilla, we
emphasized, “[w]hen a defendant’s sentence has been vacated,
the parties’ interests in repose and finality are necessarily
diminished; at that point, the countervailing interest in
effectuating current legislative policy decisions may
appropriately control.” (Id. at p. 168, italics added.) The same
cannot be said here. As the dissent concedes, “[t]o be sure,
Esquivias’s case was final.” (Dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 9.)
Petitioner’s sole claim in his habeas corpus petition was that
though his case was long-since final, he was nonetheless entitled
to relief because his case was not final when Senate Bill No. 620
became effective. In other words, petitioner’s habeas corpus
action reinforced that his criminal judgment was final on direct
review in 2018 and the parties’ interest in finality was in no way
diminished by petitioner’s limited Estrada claim or the remedy
ultimately granted to redress his claim. On these facts, it cannot
be said, as the dissent would have us say, that finality was
“ ‘interrupted.’ ” (Dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 9.) It is the
dissent who, in fact, “completely ignores” (id. at p. 10) the
distinct procedural posture in Padilla.
Because the Padilla petitioner’s original sentence was
unconstitutional, “the justice of the case” (§ 1484) necessitated
that it be vacated and, as the Attorney General concedes, “[i]n
that event,” his judgment rightly “returned to nonfinal status,”
interrupting finality. As the Court of Appeal explained, “[i]n
Padilla, the question was the effect of an earlier order on a
habeas corpus petition that had already vacated the defendant’s
entire sentence (Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 158); here, the
question is whether a court is required to vacate the entire
sentence in the first place.” (Esquivias, supra¸ 103 Cal.App.5th
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at p. 979.)5 The answer to that question in this matter is “no.”
After imposition of petitioner’s sentence, Senate Bill No. 620
simply expanded the trial court’s discretion to strike firearm
enhancements to his potential benefit. (Cf. People v. Stamps
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 696 [the appellant’s claim for relief
pursuant to Estrada under ameliorative legislation conferring
greater discretion to trial courts to strike serious felony
enhancements did “not constitute an attack on the validity of his
plea because the claim does not challenge his plea as defective
when made”].) Petitioner acknowledges that his original
sentence was constitutional and did not need to be vacated by
admitting that the superior court could have completely
declined to exercise its discretion under Senate Bill No. 620 and
left his original sentence undisturbed. And we are not
persuaded by petitioner’s circular logic, which is echoed by
Amici Curiae the California Public Defenders Association and
the California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, as well as our
dissenting colleagues, that the superior court’s choice to exercise
its discretion under Senate Bill No. 620 to strike the firearm
enhancements, in turn, required the court to “reconsider the
sentence as a whole” as though it had been vacated. Instead,
the superior court could conclude “the justice of the case”
5
Contrary to the dissent’s logic, this is not about whether
the “magic word ‘vacate’ ” was uttered by the trial court. (Dis.
opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 4.) Instead, it is in recognition that
Padilla arose in a completely different context, i.e., in light of
binding United States Supreme Court precedent regarding the
sentencing of juveniles — the sentence that was imposed in
Padilla of life without the possibility of parole as a juvenile was
unconstitutional in toto.
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(§ 1484) required a more targeted approach to remedy
petitioner’s claim pursuant to Senate Bill No. 620.
Petitioner’s and the dissent’s reliance on our decision in
Lopez, supra, 17 Cal.5th 388 for the sweeping proposition that
any modification to a sentence on habeas corpus “reopens the
entire case” (dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 7) fares no better.
Petitioner and the dissent argue that Lopez’s reasoning supports
the view that the habeas corpus court could not divide
petitioner’s judgment for finality purposes. (See dis. opn. of
Evans, J., post, at pp. 2, 7, 13–14.) According to petitioner, the
Attorney General’s “insistence that every aspect of [his]
sentence other than the firearm enhancements remained final
sidesteps” Lopez’s articulation of “the Estrada inquiry, which
asks ‘whether the criminal prosecution or proceeding as a whole
is complete.’ ” But crucially, Lopez did not involve habeas corpus
proceedings collaterally attacking a final judgment. Rather, in
Lopez, on direct review, the Court of Appeal affirmed appellant
Oscar Lopez’s convictions, but remanded “to the trial court for
further sentencing.” (Lopez, at p. 393.) While awaiting
resentencing, Assembly Bill No. 333 took effect. (Lopez, at
p. 394.) However, the trial court declined to apply its provisions
to Lopez’s case “on the ground that [Lopez’s] conviction was
final” for Estrada purposes. (Ibid.) We rejected this premise
under our well-established precedent, explaining that “[a] case
is final when ‘the courts can no longer provide a remedy to a
defendant on direct review.’ [Citation.] For Estrada purposes,
the ‘judgment’ means the ‘ “judgment of conviction” ’ and the
sentence.” (Id. at p. 395, last italics added.) “Because Estrada
requires ameliorative legislation to be applied as broadly as
constitutionally permissible, and because Lopez’s judgment was
not reduced to a final disposition, his case [wa]s not final for
16
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
purposes of Estrada.” (Id. at p. 400.) Lopez was therefore
“entitled to retroactive application of Assembly Bill [No.] 333’s
substantive changes.” (Ibid.) We observed in closing, “It would
tax judicial resources to require defendants like Lopez to take a
second appeal to secure a second remand to the superior court
in order to obtain any relief to which they may be entitled.”
(Ibid., italics added.)
Here, unlike the ongoing direct appeal in Lopez (the more
typical procedural posture for an Estrada claim) that prevented
Lopez’s judgment from being reduced to a final disposition,
petitioner conceded in his habeas corpus petition that his
criminal judgment had been final on direct review for nearly
four years, i.e., the remittitur had issued and “ ‘the courts [could]
no longer provide a remedy to [petitioner] on direct review.’ ”
(Lopez, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 395.) As we have said, “[a]
habeas corpus proceeding is” “an independent, collateral
challenge to an earlier, completed criminal prosecution.” (Maas
v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 962, 975, italics added.) “[A]
petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeks to collaterally attack a
presumptively final criminal judgment . . . .” (People v. Duvall
(1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474.) Where petitioner admitted his
judgment was reduced to a final and authorized disposition in
2018, the habeas corpus court could conclude that petitioner was
not automatically entitled to the benefit of all ameliorative
legislation that was enacted after that valid 2018 finality date.
This situation is wholly distinct from Lopez, where ameliorative
legislation became effective while the appeal was still pending
on direct review. (Cf. In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 452
[explaining that “resort to habeas corpus” was unnecessary
because the petitioner had “a plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy at law”].) For these reasons, petitioner’s and the
17
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
dissent’s reliance on Lopez’s statements about Estrada’s
application to nonfinal criminal judgments do not answer the
distinct question presented in this habeas corpus matter.
Nor do we read In re Cortez (1971) 6 Cal.3d 78 (Cortez) as
requiring a different habeas corpus procedure here, as the
dissent would have us do. (See dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at
pp. 10–11.) In Cortez, similar to Padilla, the habeas corpus
petitioner sought retroactive relief following our decision in
People v. Tenorio (1970) 3 Cal.3d 89 (Tenorio), in which we
invalidated as unconstitutional a statute preventing the
sentencing court from striking prior narcotics convictions
without the approval of the district attorney. We held that if the
habeas corpus court decided to strike a prior conviction, it
should vacate the sentence. (Id. at p. 89.) But, as stated, unlike
in Cortez, petitioner was not originally sentenced under any
unconstitutional statute. Rather, he belatedly sought only the
retroactive benefit of Senate Bill No. 620 pursuant to Estrada’s
logic (because his judgment was not final until January 30,
2018). We see no inconsistency between our limited holding
here and our holding in Cortez, both of which provide procedures
well-suited to “the nature of the relief sought in the petition.”
(In re Roberts, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 583.)
If anything, Cortez, supra, 6 Cal.3d 78 contradicts the
dissent’s stance that the habeas corpus court “had no authority”
to strike petitioner’s firearm enhancements (dis. opn. of Evans,
J., post, at p. 3). Petitioner’s counsel and the dissent express
concern that habeas corpus courts, or “nonsentencing courts”
(id. at p. 16), especially appellate habeas corpus courts, are ill-
equipped to make resentencing decisions. (See id. at pp. 14–23.)
But Cortez makes clear (see Cortez, at p. 88) that habeas corpus
claims like petitioner’s should always originate in the superior
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PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
court that rendered judgment and “[t]he superior court that
rendered the judgment is best equipped to consider the claim in
the first instance, to hold an evidentiary hearing when
necessary, and to grant relief if appropriate.” (Robinson v. Lewis
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 883, 895, italics added; see also ibid. [“A higher
court ‘has discretion to deny without prejudice a habeas corpus
petition that was not filed first in a proper lower court’ ”].) As
the dissent points out, “in Cortez, we emphasized that the
sentencing court was the appropriate jurisdiction for resolving
the habeas claim and the potential resentencing ‘since the
sentencing court has the files which are necessary’ to adjudicate
the claim. (Cortez, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 88, fn. 9.)” (Dis. opn. of
Evans, J., post, at p. 22.) The additional cases relied on by the
dissent only reinforce this principle. (See id. at pp. 11, 26, citing
People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335, 348, fn. 8 (Belmontes)
[a habeas corpus petition alleging “a court may have been
influenced by an erroneous understanding of the scope of its
sentencing powers” should “be filed in the sentencing court”];
Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 530, fn. 13 [a habeas corpus
petition seeking retroactive discretionary relief under our
holding should be filed in the sentencing court].) For this
reason, the dissent’s concerns about habeas corpus courts
making uninformed sentencing decisions, lacking an
appropriate record, or “ceding California sentencing authority to
federal courts” (dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 21) are
misplaced.6 Petitioner correctly presented his claim for
6
The dissent does not quarrel with, nor could it, the well-
accepted proposition that habeas corpus claims like petitioner’s
should always originate in the superior court that rendered
judgment. (See dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 21.) Instead,
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PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
discretionary sentencing relief pursuant to Estrada and Senate
Bill No. 620 in the “superior court that rendered the judgment.”
(Robinson, at p. 895.) In Cortez, after identifying the superior
court as the proper habeas corpus venue, we directed the habeas
corpus court to both determine whether to strike the prior
convictions at issue and, if the court did so, to resentence the
petitioner. (Cortez, at p. 89.) The same result was appropriate
here.7
the dissent posits various hypotheticals not presented here. For
example, the dissent asserts that petitioner “might have argued
. . . that his appellate counsel was ineffective” and thereby could
have transformed his claim into a federal constitutional claim.
(Ibid.) But petitioner did not raise any such claim. This case
concerns only state courts applying state law. Nothing in this
opinion addresses the division of authority between state courts
and a federal habeas corpus court that grants relief to a state
prisoner. (See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Gunn v. Ignacio (9th Cir. 2001)
263 F.3d 965, 971 [“we do not constrain the state’s
determination of how to formulate the relief.”].) The dissent’s
hypothetical argument about a distinct type of claim not raised
here has no bearing on our analysis.
7
While we directed the habeas corpus courts in Cortez to
“vacate the sentence” after favorably exercising discretion, it
was necessary to do so because the prior convictions at issue
affected the petitioners’ eligibility for probation and striking a
prior conviction “substantially affect[ed] the rights of the
defendant.” (Cortez, supra, 6 Cal.3d at pp. 83, 89.) Petitioner
makes no claim that his firearm enhancements had any similar
impact on his overall sentence. Again, petitioner’s sentence was
validly imposed and the habeas corpus court was not
constitutionally compelled to revisit it, as were the habeas
corpus courts in Cortez. In addition, as the dissent
acknowledges, Cortez predated “cases detailing the full
resentencing rule” (dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 11), so our
20
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
In advocating for the result we adopt, the People
underscore the Court of Appeal’s observation that constraining
a habeas corpus court to an all-or-nothing choice under the
circumstances of petitioner’s case “may end up hurting
defendants.” (Esquivias, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 978,
italics omitted.) This is so, the Court of Appeal reasoned,
because a court may be hesitant to resentence on one component
of the sentence if this means that the court is then legally
compelled to resentence the petitioner with respect to other
facets of the sentence. (See id. at p. 972.) While we need not
accept this premise as true in order to reach our holding, it is
worth acknowledging the possibility that petitioner’s (and the
dissent’s) proposed approach may, in some instances, actually
work to a petitioner’s detriment. If a habeas corpus court is
confined to an all-or-nothing choice of full resentencing or no
resentencing at all when a petitioner belatedly seeks the benefit
of statutorily conferred sentencing discretion directed at a
portion of his or her sentence, then the “justice of the case”
(§ 1484) calculus for the habeas corpus court looks very
different. Unlike an unauthorized sentence, which is subject to
correction by a habeas corpus court at any time, the habeas
corpus court here was not required to revisit petitioner’s valid
direction to vacate a habeas corpus petitioner’s sentence after
exercising discretion to strike a prior conviction did not
implicate the core issues facing the court here. We also reject
the dissent’s reliance on People v. Superior Court (Guevara)
(2025) 18 Cal.5th 838. Guevara considered the application of
section 1172.75, which, as the dissent admits, “is distinct from
habeas corpus in that it contains an explicit requirement to
apply changes in law during resentencing.” (Dis. opn. of Evans,
J., post, at p. 12.)
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PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
sentence. (Cf. In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 840
[“ ‘Fundamental jurisdictional defects [i.e., acts in excess of
jurisdiction], like constitutional defects, do not become
irremediable when a judgment of conviction becomes final, even
after affirmance on appeal’ ”].) Petitioner raised his statutory
claim almost four years after his case became final and four
years after the relevant statute became effective. The Attorney
General could have asked the court to deny the petition at the
outset as untimely. (See In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770,
780 [courts will not entertain habeas corpus claims that are
untimely].) Instead, the parties and the habeas corpus court
agreed petitioner made a prima facie showing that Senate Bill
No. 620 applied to his case. And, as petitioner concedes, the
habeas corpus court could have lawfully applied Senate Bill
No. 620 on the merits and decided to afford no relief at all,
maintaining his original sentence. But as a remedy, the habeas
corpus court equitably concluded the justice of the case
warranted striking petitioner’s firearm enhancements, reducing
his sentence by more than 38 years. Again, petitioner’s sentence
was authorized when it was imposed and, as petitioner
concedes, it would continue to be permissible under current law.
(Cf. People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 356, fn. 18 [“We have
concluded that defects in the court’s discretionary sentencing
choices and statement of reasons do not result in an
‘unauthorized sentence’ ”].) The habeas corpus court’s act in
equity to strike petitioner’s firearm enhancements did not
mandate that petitioner’s lawful sentence be completely
revisited. The court did not have to then entertain petitioner’s
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PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
argument that he was entitled to a reduction of his sentence by
another 40-plus years pursuant to other laws.8
Again, our opinion is confined to the unusual
circumstances of petitioner’s case. Habeas corpus is an
extraordinary remedy that permits individuals to collaterally
attack their final criminal judgments four, 14, or even 40 years
after finality and, as the Attorney General has conceded, every
8
As an additional argument, the dissent urges us to remand
because the trial court erroneously concluded that it “ ‘lacked
jurisdiction’ ” (dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 15) to apply other
ameliorative laws. (See also id. at p. 15, fn. 5.) While the habeas
corpus court said “I don’t believe that’s my jurisdiction to do that
right now” in reference to applying laws effective after
petitioner’s case became final, the habeas corpus court made
clear that it would choose to grant no relief whatsoever if forced
to apply post-finality ameliorative laws. More specifically, the
habeas corpus court expressly stated that it was “not going
beyond” striking the firearm enhancements and “to downgrade
and reduce that overall sentence left behind from today’s ruling,
it would further undermine the intentions of how I exercise this
discretion today.” We do not perceive any ambiguity in the
habeas corpus court’s statements nor any “uncertain[ty]” in
what the habeas corpus court would have done if forced to apply
post-finality ameliorative laws (see contra, dis. opn. of Evans, J.,
post, at p. 15, fn. 5). Nor do we agree with the dissent’s view
that the additional relief sought by petitioner was of such
insignificance that it would not have impacted the trial court’s
decision to strike the firearm enhancements. (See ibid.)
Petitioner sought to have his sentence markedly reduced by an
additional 18 years, four months under Assembly Bill No. 333
and Senate Bill No. 1393. (See post, at p. 24; see also ante, at
pp. 5, 7.) The court clearly explained that it would not
contemplate a further reduction in petitioner’s sentence. Since
we agree with the habeas corpus court that it did not have to
apply post-finality ameliorative laws, the habeas corpus court
did not act under any misunderstanding that might merit a
remand.
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PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
habeas corpus case is different. Petitioner’s claim for statutory
relief pursuant to Estrada is one that most typically would be
raised on direct appeal before an individual’s judgment becomes
final. (See, e.g., People v. Hargis (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 199, 209
[“Senate Bill No. 620 and the associated amendment to section
12022.53 apply retroactively to nonfinal cases”].) Here,
however, the issue presented arose under a unique set of
circumstances: Senate Bill No. 620 became effective in the
narrow window of time between when our court denied
petitioner’s petition for review on direct appeal and the time to
seek certiorari in the United States Supreme Court expired. As
a result, petitioner’s claim evaded detection on direct appeal
before finality, when resentencing could have occurred
expeditiously. But, as stated, rather than bar petitioner from
seeking habeas corpus relief pursuant to Estrada from his long-
final judgment under these unique circumstances, the habeas
corpus court exercised its equitable authority to entertain
petitioner’s claim and grant a remedy that reduced his sentence
by nearly four decades. In effectuating this remedy, the habeas
corpus court was not required to consider petitioner’s new
contentions that he was entitled to have his gang enhancements
dismissed and his prior serious felony enhancement dismissed
(reducing his sentence by an additional 18 years, four months)
under ameliorative laws that became effective after finality.
Our dissenting colleagues contend that our holding “is
inconsistent with uniform sentencing” and “two defendants,
sentenced in the same court on the same day for identical
conduct, may receive wildly disparate sentences.” (Dis. opn. of
Evans, J., post, at p. 4.) But this is not so. Petitioner was
sentenced in 2015 and his appeal was final for Estrada purposes
on direct review in 2018. Another defendant sentenced on the
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PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
same day in 2015 whose judgment became final in 2018 would
not be eligible for habeas corpus relief under Assembly Bill
No. 333 pursuant to Estrada because his or her case, like
petitioner’s, was final before Assembly Bill No. 333 became
effective in 2022. (See Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 746 [ “the
Legislature must have intended that the amendatory statute
should operate in all cases not reduced to final judgment at the
time of its passage” (italics added)].) Had petitioner raised his
claim for Estrada relief under Senate Bill No. 620 in the normal
course (on appeal), he would have been entitled to a
straightforward application of Estrada. But he did not. So the
habeas corpus court, acting in equity, essentially treated his
habeas corpus petition as if he had raised his Senate Bill
No. 620/Estrada claim in a timely manner on direct appeal —
and granted discretionary relief on that basis. Stated
differently, had petitioner raised this issue in a timely fashion
in 2018, he clearly would not have been entitled to relief
pursuant to statutes that had not even been enacted yet. But
that is the very relief petitioner now seeks. To require the
habeas corpus court to order such expansive relief, as petitioner
and the dissent would have us do, would go far beyond correcting
the Estrada error identified by petitioner in his writ petition and
provide him with a windfall unavailable to similarly situated
defendants convicted of the same offenses at the same time. The
dissent’s position is more likely to promote the disparate
sentencing and “uncertainty” (dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 5)
it proclaims to guard against.
We also observe that the plain language of Senate Bill
No. 620 reinforces our conclusion that a full resentencing
hearing was not required here. Subdivision (h) of section
12022.53 states: “The court may, in the interest of justice
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PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
pursuant to Section 1385 and at the time of sentencing, strike or
dismiss an enhancement otherwise required to be imposed by
this section. The authority provided by this subdivision applies
to any resentencing that may occur pursuant to any other law.”
(Italics added.) According to petitioner, this italicized language
“shows the Legislature understood that a grant of a petition for
writ of habeas corpus would result in a complete resentencing.”
But this argument reverses the plain language of
subdivision (h). As the People assert in their briefing, “The fact
that subdivision (h) applies when full resentencing is
independently required under another law does not mean that
modification of a sentence solely due to subdivision (h) calls for
resentencing under other laws.” For reasons explained ante,
petitioner’s unique habeas corpus claim for discretionary
statutory relief under Senate Bill No. 620 did not necessitate
“resentencing” as contemplated by subdivision (h) — in this
limited context, the habeas corpus court could simply strike the
firearm enhancements. In the absence of any statutory
language calling for full resentencing under such circumstances,
we will not read the statute to require one.9 (See People v.
9
Nor are we persuaded by the dissent’s position that
statutory resentencing provisions not at issue in this habeas
corpus matter support a different holding. (See dis. opn. of
Evans, J., post, at pp. 24–29.) Petitioner could not pursue relief
from his firearm enhancements under sections 1172.1, 1172.7
and 1172.75, and the Legislature’s intent in expanding
resentencing pursuant to these statutes does not shed light on
petitioner’s circumstances. As the dissent explains, “Senate Bill
620, unlike resentencing under sections 1172.1, 1172.7, and
1172.75, did not create its own retroactive mechanism for
resentencing relief.” (Dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 24.) Thus,
petitioner relied on Estrada to seek retroactive application of
26
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113, 1123 [in questions of
statutory interpretation, courts “begin with the text” and “ ‘[i]f
no ambiguity appears in the statutory language, we presume
that the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning
of the statute controls’ ”]; cf. People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th
857, 893–894 (Buycks) [where Prop. 47 created a statutory
procedure to “petition for a recall of sentence” (§ 1170.18, subd.
(a), italics added), “the resentencing court ha[d] jurisdiction to
modify every aspect of the sentence”].) The Legislature knows
how to provide for full resentencing, and it did not do so for
petitioner under the terms of section 12022.53, subdivision (h).10
Senate Bill No. 620 and, as explained ante, the habeas corpus
court’s grant of relief was appropriately tailored to that claim.
10
Petitioner also argues that section 12022.53,
subdivision (h)’s reliance on “Section 1385” to empower courts to
dismiss an enhancement necessitates the conclusion that his
judgment became nonfinal because “the power to dismiss under
section 1385 must be exercised before a judgment is final.” In
support of this argument, petitioner cites People v. Chavez
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 771, 777, where we held that a court may not
“exercise its dismissal power under section 1385 . . . after
judgment is final.” (Ibid.) Chavez arose from a freestanding
request to dismiss prior convictions pursuant to section 1385
“when the action is no longer before the court.” (Chavez, at
p. 781.) Its reasoning does not control the distinct question here
as to whether, when a matter is “before the court” in a habeas
corpus proceeding, the court may exercise discretion pursuant
to the terms of section 12022.53, subdivision (h). Arguably, if
we were to adopt petitioner’s position, then he would not be
entitled to any relief via section 1385 (pursuant to § 12022.53,
subd. (h)) because his judgment was admittedly final when he
filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus. But, as we conclude,
under well-established habeas corpus principles, the superior
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PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
(See contra, e.g., §§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1) [upon the
recommendation of certain designated parties, a trial court may
recall a sentence and commitment and “resentence the
defendant in the same manner as if they had not previously been
sentenced”], 1172.75, subd. (d)(2) [“The court shall apply the
sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other
changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial
discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to
promote uniformity of sentencing”].)11
Finally, we are unpersuaded by the dissent’s position that
the principles animating the full resentencing rule dictate a
different outcome under the particulars of this habeas corpus
matter. (See dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at pp. 5–8.) As
described ante, the habeas corpus court was not initially
required to reconsider its original sentence, but nonetheless
decided it would strike the firearm enhancements if it could do
so without reducing petitioner’s sentence any further. By
contrast, when a court is initially required to reexamine a
petitioner’s original sentence, the full resentencing rule entitles
the court “to rethink the entire sentence to achieve its original
and presumably unchanged goal.” (People v. Hill (1986)
court had equitable authority to strike petitioner’s firearm
enhancements under section 12022.53.
11
In addition to his record-specific arguments, petitioner
presents several hypothetical “arguments about different
choices the habeas [corpus] court in his case could have made in
ordering relief” and the impact those possible choices might
have had on finality. We need not assess whether different
factual scenarios not presented here might call for different
results.
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PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
185 Cal.App.3d 831, 834; accord, Buycks, supra, 5 Cal.5th at
p. 893.) Our opinion in this matter simply permits some relief
where there might otherwise be no relief and puts petitioner in
the position closest to that which he would have been in had he
timely pursued his Estrada claim on direct appeal (see ante, at
pp. 23–24). Under these unique circumstances, the dissent
would seemingly prefer no relief be granted. (Cf. dis. opn. of
Evans, J., post, at p. 10, fn. 2 [“sending a legally imposed
sentence to the trial court to contemplate some form of
discretion does not itself undo finality or implicate the full
resentencing rule where the sentencing court declines to
exercise its discretion, thereby leaving the original sentence
completely intact”].) We think the justice of a given case may
instead, like here, permit a middle ground and that there is
nothing “illogical” about this conclusion. (Dis. opn. of Evans, J.,
post, at p. 3.)12 For the same reasons, the mere fact that
12
The cases the dissent relies on for the proposition that full
resentencing is required whenever a habeas corpus court
concludes a petitioner is entitled to discretionary sentencing
relief involve claims under decisional law deemed fully
retroactive to final judgments, i.e., they do not depend on
Estrada’s time-capped presumption of retroactivity to nonfinal
judgments to plead a prima facie case for relief. (See dis. opn. of
Evans, J., post, at p. 26, citing Cortez, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 88
[prisoners “convicted of a narcotics offense between September
18, 1959, and September 1, 1970” could file a habeas corpus
petition for retroactive relief]; Belmontes, supra, 34 Cal.3d at
p. 348, fn. 8 [explaining that “[s]ince our holding . . . relates only
to sentencing and will not require any retrials, it shall have full
retroactive effect” (italics added)]; Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at
p. 530, fn. 13 [“Our holding, which relates only to sentencing, is
fully retroactive” (italics added)].) For this reason, these cases
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PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
petitioner was permitted to appeal the superior court’s order
striking his firearm enhancements (and the People could have
chosen to cross-appeal) does not transform petitioner’s
admittedly final criminal judgment into a nonfinal one for
purposes of Estrada retroactivity, as the dissent contends. (Dis.
opn. of Evans, J., post, at pp. 13–14.)13 Under the specific
circumstances of petitioner’s case, the dissent’s position flips the
appropriate order of inquiry. Petitioner alleged only
entitlement to retroactive relief under Senate Bill No. 620
because his criminal judgment did not become final until
January 30, 2018. The fact that petitioner has lodged an appeal
from the habeas corpus court’s tailored grant of relief on that
narrow claim does not function to modify the uncontested
finality date upon which the success of his initial claim
depended.
In sum, where petitioner belatedly sought retroactive
relief under Senate Bill No. 620 from his valid, final judgment,
the superior court had equitable authority, pursuant to well-
in no way “dictate” the result here. (Dis. opn. of Evans, J., post,
at p. 26, fn. 8.)
13
We do not disagree with the dissent’s view that “ ‘[a]
judgment is final “when it terminates the litigation between the
parties on the merits of the case and leaves nothing to be done
but to enforce by execution what has been
determined.” ’ (Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (1997) 15
Cal.4th 288, 304.)” (Dis. opn. by Evans, J., post, at p. 14, fn. 4.)
As repeatedly noted, petitioner’s valid judgment was concededly
final on January 30, 2018 for Estrada purposes and the habeas
corpus court’s act in equity to remedy petitioner’s delayed
Estrada claim did not alter “the uncontested finality date upon
which the success of his initial claim depended.” (Post, at p. 30.)
30
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
established habeas corpus principles, to strike petitioner’s
firearm enhancements without reconsidering the sentence as a
whole.14 Under these unique circumstances, the habeas corpus
court was neither constitutionally nor statutorily required to
vacate petitioner’s sentence in its entirety. We therefore affirm
the Court of Appeal’s judgment and disapprove of Duenas,
supra, 111 Cal.App.5th 553, review granted,15 to the extent it
14
Petitioner asserts the superior court departed from correct
sentencing procedures by failing to orally pronounce judgment,
which meant he was returned to prison “without a validly
imposed sentence.” He posits that an outcome like that reached
by the superior court is likely to engender “confusion.” But the
superior court announced that it would strike the firearm
enhancements and the clerk amended the 2015 minute order to
reflect petitioner’s new sentence. The parties do not exhibit any
confusion about the length of petitioner’s revised sentence. He
fails to persuade us that any alleged procedural irregularity is
material to the analysis here. We reiterate the well-established
principle that “[t]he applicable procedure generally has
depended upon the nature of the relief sought in the petition.”
(In re Roberts, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 583.)
15
In their joint amici curiae brief, California Attorneys for
Criminal Justice and the California Public Defenders
Association assert that two other published cases conflict with
the Court of Appeal’s decision below, but those cases are
distinguishable. (See People v. Cervantes (2025)
115 Cal.App.5th 825 [concluding the trial court had jurisdiction
to address an unauthorized sentence when the defendant sought
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6, with no mention of
Esquivias]; People v. Perez-Tinoco (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 861,
883–884 [relying on Padilla and distinguishing Esquivias as
follows: “Here, unlike Esquivias, the trial court more broadly
exercised its habeas corpus discretion and, in fact, vacated
Perez’s sentence . . . therefore, we find the Esquivias opinion to
be readily distinguishable on the relevant underlying facts”].)
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PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
concluded that any habeas corpus remedy affecting part of a
petitioner’s sentence necessarily requires a full resentencing.16
III. DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
GROBAN, J.
We Concur:
GUERRERO, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
KRUGER, J.
GOODING, J.*
16
While we disapprove of “Duenas’s broad proposition that a
habeas corpus petitioner is always entitled to a full resentencing
whenever a habeas corpus court grants relief as to a portion of
a petitioner’s sentence” (ante, at p. 6), we are not called on here
to analyze the distinct statutory basis for the Duenas
petitioner’s habeas corpus claim.
*
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate
District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
32
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
S286371
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Evans
In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada) creates a
presumption that new laws that lessen punishment apply
retroactively to all defendants whose judgments are not final.
This case concerns the application of Estrada where a
defendant’s sentence is partially modified after a grant of
habeas corpus relief. Below, petitioner Miguel Alberto
Esquivias argued in a habeas corpus petition that a new
ameliorative law applicable to his case, Senate Bill No. 620
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 620) (Stats. 2017, ch. 682),
provided the trial court discretion it lacked when initially
sentencing him: the power to strike firearm enhancements
imposed under Penal Code1 sections 12022.5, subdivision (a)
and 12022, subdivision (a). Importantly, and what I believe may
be the cause of some of the doctrinal confusion contained in the
majority opinion, the habeas court and the sentencing court
were presided over by the same judge. The superior court,
acting in its capacity as habeas corpus court, granted relief. It
found that defendant was eligible for retroactive relief under
Senate Bill 620 and set a hearing to potentially modify
defendant’s sentence. At the subsequent hearing, the same
judge, acting as a sentencing court, exercised its discretion to
strike all firearm enhancements. It explained that it lacked
1
All further unspecified statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
1
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Evans, J., dissenting
“jurisdiction,” however, to consider other ameliorative changes
available under current law and that applying any future
ameliorative change in law would “undermine” its intentions in
dismissing the firearm enhancements. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 5,
23, fn. 8.) Esquivias argues that, because his sentence had been
reopened due to the striking of the firearm enhancements, it was
no longer final and thus he was entitled to retroactive
application of Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Assembly Bill 333) (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 4, eff. Jan. 1, 2022).
As relevant here, Assembly Bill 333 narrows the scope of gang
enhancements. (People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 395
(Lopez).) For nonfinal judgments, when the existing record does
not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the revised
definition of the gang enhancement has been satisfied, this
ameliorative law requires that the enhancement be vacated and
retried. (See id. at pp. 399–400.)
Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, Esquivias is entitled
to application of Assembly Bill 333 under the principles of
Estrada and the full resentencing rule. We have long held that
Estrada allows application of ameliorative laws to “every case to
which it constitutionally could apply.” (Estrada, supra, 63
Cal.2d at p. 745.) As we recently underscored, the grant of
habeas corpus relief reopens the finality of the sentence for
purposes of Estrada. (People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152,
162 (Padilla).) The fact that Esquivias’s habeas corpus relief
relates only to the firearm enhancements and not to other parts
of his sentence does not change the calculus. Recognizing the
holistic and indivisible nature of a criminal sentence, we have
roundly rejected the concept of “part[ial]” finality for purposes
of Estrada. (Lopez, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 397; see id. at pp.
397–398.)
2
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Evans, J., dissenting
The majority, however, disregards this precedent and,
instead, announces a new and significantly more complicated
rule purportedly resting on the equitable nature of habeas
corpus remedies. However, the doctrine of full resentencing,
which Esquivias invokes, is not a rule of equity, but a rule of
jurisdiction. A sentencing court’s choice to apply, or not to apply,
ameliorative laws has nothing to do with a habeas corpus court’s
equitable authority. Indeed, the habeas corpus court, strictly
speaking, had no authority to even strike Esquivias’s firearm
enhancement in the first place, much less decide the
downstream consequences of this sentencing decision.
Further, the majority’s analysis of finality is illogical. This
case is before us because it has been appealed and the sentence
is nonfinal. There is no debate that if the Attorney General
believed the trial court had made an error in striking the firearm
enhancement, it would have the right to appeal the trial court’s
sentencing decision. Regardless of which legal issues are raised,
unless and until the habeas corpus petition is resolved,
Esquivias’s sentence is both nonfinal and appealable as a result
of the grant of habeas corpus relief and the modification of his
sentence.
Any suggestion that there was no sentencing because the
trial court merely struck the firearm enhancement and the
habeas corpus court did not “vacate[]” the prior sentence (see
maj opn., ante, at p. 13, italics omitted), is also unsupportable.
Senate Bill 620 explicitly states that the trial court’s discretion
to strike a firearm enhancement occurs “at the time of
sentencing.” (§ 12022.53, subd. (h).) In other words, the only
way the superior court could afford relief was to initiate a new
sentencing hearing and then exercise its discretion. “[O]nce a
court has determined that a defendant is entitled to
3
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Evans, J., dissenting
resentencing, the result is vacatur of the original sentence,
whereupon the trial court may impose any appropriate
sentence.” (Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 163, italics added.)
The majority’s apparent belief that a habeas corpus court must
use the magic word “vacate” when granting habeas corpus relief
in order to trigger nonfinality elevates form over substance.
Although seemingly crafted to apply only to the
idiosyncratic facts of Esquivias’s case, the majority’s bespoke
rule has several potential drawbacks if applied more generally
to cases involving partial sentencing relief after a grant of a
habeas corpus petition. First, the ruling is inconsistent with
uniform sentencing. Under the majority’s approach, two
defendants, sentenced in the same court on the same day for
identical conduct, may receive wildly disparate sentences. This
nonuniformity is particularly troubling where, as here, the
ameliorative statute sought to be applied was crafted to combat
racial inequities in sentencing.
Second, the rule cedes sentencing jurisdiction typically the
province of sentencing courts to habeas corpus courts, which
frequently include nonsentencing courts and even federal
courts. Under the majority’s proposed rule, habeas corpus
courts will now be able to dictate the breadth of resentencing
relief that accrues from a grant of habeas relief on a “case-by-
case basis.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 2.) This is a strange result
because habeas corpus courts, especially those foreign to the
sentencing jurisdiction, are comparatively unfamiliar with
sentencing proceedings and may have little or no information
upon which to ground the “equitable” determination that the
majority proposes they should now decide. (Ibid.) Relatedly,
granting nonsentencing habeas corpus courts the power to
dictate to sentencing courts whether to apply ameliorative laws
4
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Evans, J., dissenting
under Estrada may undermine the holistic sentencing that the
full resentencing rule was intended to safeguard.
Third, the majority’s narrow but ambiguous holding is
likely to breed uncertainty, litigation, and conflict between
courts, instead of the straightforward and easy-to-apply rule
dictated by our existing precedent.
The problems associated with the majority’s complicated
holding, however, may be resolved by the Legislature. The
Legislature can clarify that all resentencing, whether as a result
of habeas corpus or other procedure, should “apply the
sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any changes
in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so
as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity
of sentencing.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(2); see §§ 1172.7, subd. (d)(2)
[similar], 1172.75, subd. (d)(2) [similar].)
I. THE FULL RESENTENCING RULE IS ROOTED IN
JURISDICTION, NOT EQUITY
According to the majority, “the habeas corpus court had
broad equitable authority to conclude that ‘the justice of the
case’ only required striking petitioner’s firearm enhancement.”
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 2.) This conclusion, however, appears to
rest on a misapprehension of the equitable power of habeas
corpus courts. Habeas corpus courts are empowered to
remediate constitutional or statutory illegality (In re Crow
(1971) 4 Cal.3d 613, 619, fn. 7 (Crow)), not to define the scope of
a sentencing court’s jurisdiction to conduct resentencing or to
determine the application of Estrada retroactivity. The
majority overlooks that whether the full resentencing rule
applies to Esquivias is a question of jurisdiction, not equity.
5
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Evans, J., dissenting
The term “full resentencing rule” was first coined in our
decision in People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 (Buycks)
but stretches back to Court of Appeal cases from previous
decades. People v. Burbine (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1250
(Burbine), for instance, explained that “upon remand for
resentencing after the reversal of one or more subordinate
counts of a felony conviction, the trial court has jurisdiction to
modify every aspect of the defendant’s sentence on the counts
that were affirmed, including the term imposed as the principal
term.” (Id. at p. 1259, italics added.) Burbine, like this case,
arose in the context of a defendant obtaining partial relief.
Buycks cited Burbine’s jurisdictional language with approval
(Buycks, at p. 893), and, in exploring other Court of Appeal cases
which had applied the full resentencing rule in other
postconviction contexts, explained that full resentencing means
that “the resentencing court has jurisdiction to modify every
aspect of the sentence, and not just the portion subjected to the
recall.” (Buycks, at p. 893, first italics added.) As we later
emphasized in People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, the full
resentencing rule allows a court to “revisit all prior sentencing
decisions when resentencing a defendant.” (Id. at pp. 424–425.)
The full resentencing rule reopens jurisdiction for the
sentencing court to reexamine the entire sentence, and not just
an individual piece, because all aspects of a sentence are part of
an indivisible whole. Sentencing courts look at defendants and
their conduct holistically. As People v. Terwilligar (2025) 109
Cal.App.5th 585 explains, “[t]he reason for the ‘ “full
resentencing rule” ’ [citation] is that ‘ “an aggregate prison term
is not a series of separate independent terms, but one term made
up of interdependent components. The invalidity of one
component infects the entire scheme.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 601.) Thus,
6
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Evans, J., dissenting
in invoking the rule, courts have repeatedly observed that “ ‘a
criminal sentence is like an atom, indivisible.’ ” “ ‘By correcting
one part of [a defendant’s] sentence, the trial court is
resentencing the defendant and, in so doing, is not only
permitted, but also obligated to look at the facts and the law in
effect at the time of that resentencing, including “ ‘any pertinent
circumstances which have arisen since the prior sentence was
imposed.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Christianson (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 300,
315, quoting People v. Walker (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 198, 206;
see also People v. Hill (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 831, 834; People v.
Savala (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 63, 68–69.)
The application of full resentencing is, therefore, not a
question of equity, but one of jurisdiction. And the basis of
jurisdiction is the recognized indivisibility of criminal sentences,
even when only part of the sentence is disturbed. Our recent
opinions have made clear that, for nonfinal cases, any
modification of the sentence reopens the entire case to the
application of ameliorative laws. (Lopez, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
pp. 396–400.) In Esquivias’s case, which is nonfinal, this should
mean that the sentencing court, after granting relief changing
one part of his sentence, must address the entirety of his
sentence under current law. (Ibid.)
The majority resists application of Lopez on the basis of
finality, arguing that this case, unlike Lopez, had become final
in 2018, prior to the passage of the ameliorative law that
Esquivias seeks to apply. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 16 [“Lopez did
not involve habeas corpus proceedings collaterally attacking a
final judgment”].) The majority also contends that Esquivias’s
situation is “wholly distinct from Lopez, where ameliorative
legislation became effective while the direct appeal was still
7
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Evans, J., dissenting
pending.” (Id. at p. 17.) But the majority’s distinction is
incorrect on two levels.
First, we have held that the full resentencing rule applies
to cases in which the direct appeal has concluded when they
have been partially altered due to ameliorative legislation.
Buycks itself, our seminal case on the full resentencing rule,
sanctioned the application of this rule to a final sentence.
(Buycks, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 893 [noting the Court of Appeal
“properly recognized [the full resentencing] rule, even though
defendant’s conviction became final . . . before Proposition 47
took effect”].) As we explained, without regard to Estrada, a
court that has set aside even a portion of a defendant’s sentence
“must also resentence the defendant generally and must
therefore reevaluate the continued applicability of any
enhancement based on a prior felony conviction” under current
law. (Id. at p. 894; see also People v. Duenas (2025) 111
Cal.App.5th 553, 558 (Duenas) [applying full resentencing rule
to previous final sentence].) Second and more specifically, we
have held that habeas corpus relief such as that obtained by
Esquivias triggers the application of Estrada by rendering a
judgment nonfinal.
II. BECAUSE ESQUIVIAS OBTAINED A NEW SENTENCE AS
A RESULT OF HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF, HIS
SENTENCE IS NO LONGER FINAL
The case that most clearly articulates the governing
principles of finality here is Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th 152. Like
Padilla, this case involves the proper application of Estrada.
And Estrada, like the full sentencing rule, does not center on the
equities of a given case. Instead, Estrada turns on a more
concrete assessment, that of finality. (Padilla, at p. 162
8
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Evans, J., dissenting
[“[A]bsent a discernable intent to the contrary, ameliorative
criminal laws apply to all nonfinal cases” (italics added)].)
Simply put, habeas corpus relief resulting in a
modification of sentence renders a case nonfinal. As we have
explained, “the notion that a criminal judgment’s finality may
be interrupted by a subsequent habeas corpus action is
unexceptional.” (Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 164.) When a
habeas corpus “court vacates a prior judgment and orders a . . .
new sentencing hearing, the prior judgment — now
ineffective — can no longer be a final one” and Estrada applies.
(Ibid.)
The majority reasons that Esquivias’s case was final, as
he “conceded in his habeas corpus petition that his criminal
judgment had been final on direct review for nearly four years.”
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 17.) To be sure, Esquivias’s case was final.
No one disputes this. But, as we have stated, finality may be
“interrupted” by subsequent habeas corpus relief. (Padilla,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 164.) The majority acknowledges this
settled precedent. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 13, quoting Padilla, at
p. 164.)
The majority attempts to distinguish Padilla on the basis
that, in that case, the “original sentence was deemed
unconstitutional and vacated in habeas corpus proceedings.”
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 13; see also id. at pp. 13–14 [“In discussing
why the retroactive application of ameliorative laws was
appropriate in Padilla, we emphasized, ‘[w]hen a defendant’s
sentence has been vacated, the parties’ interests in repose and
finality are necessarily diminished; at that point, the
countervailing interest in effectuating current legislative policy
decisions may appropriately control.’ ”].) But this misreads
9
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Evans, J., dissenting
Padilla. Relief that leads to a new sentence, by its nature,
requires vacating the prior sentence. (Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th
at p. 163 [“once a court has determined that a defendant is
entitled to resentencing, the result is vacatur of the original
sentence, whereupon the trial court may impose any appropriate
sentence” (italics added)].) The majority completely ignores this
language in Padilla, which is directly applicable here. As the
Court of Appeal in Duenas explained: “While neither this court
nor the trial court stated that it was vacating [the defendant’s]
sentence such language was not required to render the judgment
nonfinal. . . .” and “vacatur of the original sentence occurs
automatically once a court determines that it must resentence
the defendant.” (Duenas, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 560,
italics added.)2
In re Cortez (1971) 6 Cal.3d 78 (Cortez) long ago described
the proper habeas corpus procedure when a habeas corpus court,
as here, also acts as a sentencing court and strikes an allegation
2
There are important limitations to this rule which address
many, if not all, of the concerns regarding potential unfairness
raised by the Attorney General and the majority. First, sending
a legally imposed sentence to the trial court to contemplate some
form of discretion does not itself undo finality or implicate the
full resentencing rule where the sentencing court declines to
exercise its discretion, thereby leaving the original sentence
completely intact. (People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20,
35.) Further, courts have held that minor modifications of the
judgment that do not modify the sentence — like adjusting a
miscalculated award of custody credits — do not implicate the
full resentencing rule. (People v. Gonzalez (2025) 108
Cal.App.5th 741, 748, review granted Apr. 30, 2025, S289974;
see also In re Mattison (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1062 [new law
requiring vacating restitution fines older than 10 years old did
not trigger full resentencing].)
10
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Evans, J., dissenting
that affects the total sentence. Cortez involved a statute, Health
and Safety Code former section 11718, found unconstitutional,
that limited trial courts’ discretion to strike any allegation that
would increase the penalty for certain narcotics-related
offenses.3 (Cortez, at p. 82.) Although predating cases detailing
the full resentencing rule, we explained that “[i]f the court
determines not to strike the prior conviction or convictions, then
it should enter an order denying the petition for writ of habeas
corpus and remanding the petitioner to prison to complete his
sentence pursuant to the original sentence. If, however, the
court determines to strike one or more of the prior convictions,
it should grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus, vacate the
sentence and rearraign the petitioner for judgment and
sentence.” (Id. at p. 89, italics added.) We further explained that
“in order to restore a prisoner seeking Tenorio relief as closely
as possible to his original position, he should be treated as
though before the court at the time of pronouncement of judgment
and should, therefore, be entitled to all the normal procedures
and rights available at that time.” (Id. at p. 88, italics added;
see also People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335, 348, fn.8
(Belmontes) [where a trial court “may have been influenced by
an erroneous understanding of the scope of its sentencing
powers” reaffirming that “habeas corpus is a proper remedy to
secure reconsideration of the sentence” and explaining that
where such a misunderstanding was present the sentencing
court “shall proceed to resentence the defendant, having in mind
the procedures suggested in In re Cortez” (first and second italics
added)].)
3
See People v Tenorio (1970) 3 Cal.3d 89.
11
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Evans, J., dissenting
The majority’s conclusion that a court resentencing after
a successful habeas corpus petition may still refuse “all the
normal procedures and rights available at that time” (Cortez,
supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 88), including application of current law,
conflicts with Cortez’s decades-old procedural guidance. It also
stands in significant tension with our recent decision in People
v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838. In Guevara,
we considered a section 1172.75 petition of a third strike
defendant whose sentence was altered, as in this case, by the
striking of an enhancement (a one-year prior prison term).
(Guevara, at p. 853.) Guevara, whose sentence had become final
before the enactment of section 1172.75, sought to apply
ameliorative law, much like Esquivias in this case — arguing
that he was “entitled to the application of the [Three Strikes]
Reform Act [of 2012]’s prospective change in law.” (Guevara, at
p. 853.) Despite the prior finality of Guevara’s sentence, we
explained he was entitled to the application of the prospective
ameliorative provisions of the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012
(Prop. 36, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012)
(Reform Act)), because the striking of his now-invalid prior term
“reopens sentencing” and thus provided for the application of the
prospective provisions of the Reform Act. (Guevara, at p. 875.)
To be sure, section 1172.75 is distinct from habeas corpus in that
it contains an explicit requirement to apply changes in law
during resentencing (id., subd. (d)(2)), but this does not change
Guevara’s implications regarding finality. We stated that the
recall and resentencing under section 1172.75 “reopens” the
sentence and allows the court to consider the application of
intervening ameliorative laws in the first instance. (Guevara,
at p. 875.) Guevara explicitly noted that the “distinction
between resentencing as a result of a section 1172.75 proceeding
12
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Evans, J., dissenting
and a resentencing through a successful habeas corpus petition
or other resentencing mechanism is unavailing.” (Id. at p. 864,
italics added.) As we noted, “a defendant serving an
indeterminate Three Strikes term who obtained resentencing
through a successful habeas corpus petition . . . might also have
invoked Proposition 36’s [prospective] ameliorative reforms at
resentencing.” (Ibid.) Esquivias’s case reflects precisely this
procedural posture. After the application of Senate Bill 620
“reopen[ed]” his sentence, he properly seeks application of
current law. (Guevara, at p. 875.)
The majority’s analysis contains another significant flaw.
The primary characteristic of finality — the inability to take an
appeal — is absent here. The fact that Esquivias’s sentence is
nonfinal and appealable is why we are able to review this case.
As explained in Padilla, when a “trial court regained the
jurisdiction and duty to consider what punishment was
appropriate for him, . . . Padilla regained the right to appeal
whatever new sentence was imposed. His judgment thus
became nonfinal, and it remains nonfinal in its present posture
because the Court of Appeal ordered a second resentencing,
from which the Attorney General now appeals.” (Padilla, supra,
13 Cal.5th at pp. 161–162.)
The same reasoning applies here. The People argued
below that the trial court should not have exercised its
discretion under Senate Bill 620 to strike the firearm
enhancements in the first place. Had the People chosen to cross-
appeal, there is no dispute that they would have been able to
challenge the trial court’s ruling if they believed it to be in error
or an abuse of discretion. Thus, since the firearm enhancement
is nonfinal and subject to appeal, the entirety of the sentence is
13
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Evans, J., dissenting
nonfinal, as we do not recognize the concept of “partial” finality.
(See Lopez, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 397–398.)4
III. HABEAS CORPUS COURTS LACK POWER TO DEFINE
OR RESTRICT SENTENCING COURT JURISDICTION
As noted, in this case the habeas corpus court and the
original sentencing court were the same court. The fact of a
singular judge acting in two different capacities led to a blurring
of roles. The superior court did not appear to distinguish
between actions specifically associated with its authority as a
habeas corpus court as opposed to its authority as a sentencing
court. Future cases will likely arise in which the habeas corpus
and sentencing courts are not the same judge. And, even when
habeas and sentencing courts are identical, examining the
distinct roles occupied by trial courts in this context illuminates
the doctrinal confusion created by the majority’s analysis.
4
The majority declares that the fact “that petitioner was
permitted to appeal the superior court’s order striking his
firearm enhancements (and the People could have chosen to
cross-appeal) does not transform petitioner’s admittedly final
criminal judgment into a nonfinal one for purposes of Estrada
retroactivity.” (Maj, opn., ante, at p. 30.) But as we have long
held, “[a] judgment is final ‘when it terminates the litigation
between the parties on the merits of the case and leaves nothing
to be done but to enforce by execution what has been
determined.’ ” (Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (1997) 15
Cal.4th 288, 304.) If the portion of Esquivias’s sentence relating
to the firearm enhancements is still subject to ongoing litigation,
it is unclear why the majority nonetheless believes it final. (Cf.
Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 163 [“It is clear that Padilla’s
present appeal from his resentencing is part of direct review of
a nonfinal judgment, not collateral review of a final judgment”].)
And if one portion of a sentence in nonfinal, the entire sentence
is nonfinal. (Lopez, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 397–398.)
14
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Evans, J., dissenting
As the majority recounts, the judge granted Esquivias’s
habeas corpus petition and exercised its discretion to strike the
firearm enhancement. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 5.) The court
simultaneously stated that the procedural history of this case
“limit[ed] this particular habeas petition’s scope to whether or
not to exercise” discretion under Senate Bill No. 620 and that it
“lacked jurisdiction” to apply other ameliorative laws, such as
Assembly Bill 333.5
Framing these decisions as the habeas corpus court
exercising its “equitable” power over the remedy, as the majority
and Court of Appeal below have done, incorrectly describes what
5
The majority fails to grapple with the trial court’s
apparent misunderstanding regarding its jurisdiction to apply
other ameliorative laws while acting as a sentencing court
following a grant of habeas corpus. “[R]emand is the default”
remedy to allow the court to exercise informed discretion.
(People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 431.) The majority
claims that “the habeas corpus court made clear that it would
choose to grant no relief whatsoever if forced to apply post-
finality ameliorative laws.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 23, fn. 8.) This
overstates the record. The trial court stated that its decision to
strike the firearm enhancements was “contingent on [its] overall
view of the sentence itself and its proportionality.” It also stated
that the application of unknown future ameliorative changes in
law passed by the Legislature would “undermine the intentions
of how I exercise this discretion today.” This statement did not
involve current ameliorative laws, which the trial court believed
it simply “lacked jurisdiction” to apply. Nor can we reasonably
infer from the trial court’s ambiguous statements that applying
Assembly Bill 333, which simply permits retrial on the gang
enhancements (see People v. Clark (2024) 15 Cal.5th 743, 764),
and may not have resulted in any ultimate change in Esquivias’s
sentence, would have caused the trial court not to strike the
firearm enhancements. Because it is uncertain what the trial
court would have done had it understood its jurisdiction to apply
Assembly Bill 333, remand is appropriate.
15
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Evans, J., dissenting
occurred below. Technically, the habeas corpus court itself had
no authority to strike the firearm enhancement. Senate Bill 620
gives discretionary power to the sentencing court to strike a
firearm enhancement in the interest of justice. (§ 12022.53,
subd. (h).) A habeas corpus court, giving effect to Senate Bill
620, cannot directly mandate that a firearm enhancement be
stricken; it can only order a proceeding at which the defendant
has an opportunity to request that the sentencing court exercise
its discretion.
That the habeas corpus court here had no authority to
strike the sentence enhancement might be more apparent had
Esquivias filed his habeas corpus petition before this court or a
Court of Appeal. His right to application of Senate Bill 620
would remain unchanged. But because nonsentencing courts
cannot exercise sentencing discretion, the only appropriate
remedy in such a case would be to grant the habeas corpus
petition and remand to a sentencing court for a new sentencing
hearing. And, indeed, various Court of Appeal decisions
considering retroactive Senate Bill 620 claims appropriately
frame the remedy as one in which “remand is required for a trial
court to exercise sentencing discretion.” (People v. McDaniels
(2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 420, 425, italics added; see also ibid.
[discussing cases in which the sentencing court must have the
“ ‘opportunity to exercise its sentencing discretion at a new
sentencing hearing’ ”].) When Senate Bill 620 was not in effect
at the time of original sentencing, the appropriate remedy is
that the “sentence is vacated [and] [t]he matter is remanded for
the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to exercise its
discretion under sections 12022.5, subdivision (c), and 12022.53,
subdivision (h).” (People v. Billingsley (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th
1076, 1082.)
16
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Evans, J., dissenting
According to the majority, “as a remedy, the habeas corpus
court equitably concluded the justice of the case warranted
striking petitioner’s firearm enhancements.” (Maj. opn., ante, at
p. 22, italics added.) The habeas corpus court, however, lacked
any such authority. A habeas corpus court could only order that
a sentencing court decide whether or not to exercise its
discretion to strike the firearm enhancements. As noted above,
the language of section 12022.53, subdivision (h) makes explicit
the sentencing court’s procedural role and the timing at which
the sentencing court acts: “The court may, in the interest of
justice pursuant to Section 1385 and at the time of sentencing,
strike or dismiss an enhancement otherwise required to be
imposed by this section.” (Italics added; see also § 1385, subd.
(c)(3) [trial court “court may exercise its discretion [to strike an
enhancement] at sentencing”].) Thus, the statute itself dictates
when the striking of an enhancement must occur: “at
sentencing” of the defendant. For this reason, the majority’s
claim that Padilla is distinguishable because the habeas corpus
court here did not “ ‘order[] a . . . new sentencing hearing’ ”
cannot be true. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 13.) The fact that the trial
court struck the firearm enhancement demonstrates that a new
sentencing occurred, irrespective of what terminology was
used.6 As discussed above, based on Estrada and the full
6
To the extent terminology is relevant, here the habeas
corpus court, too, seemed to recognize it needed to conduct a
sentencing hearing to exercise its discretion to strike the firearm
enhancement. After acknowledging the parties’ agreement that
Senate Bill 620 applied to the case, the trial court “set this case
for potential sentencing modification.” At that hearing, it
observed that Senate Bill 620 “added discretion for courts
sentencing defendants on firearms enhancements, such as this,
17
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Evans, J., dissenting
resentencing rule, Esquivias was entitled to have the court
apply Assembly Bill 333 during this resentencing.
Stepping outside the specific procedural context of this
case, there exists little support for the conclusion that habeas
corpus courts’ equitable discretion extends to deciding the
applicability of Estrada retroactivity or the full resentencing
rule at resentencing. Indeed, although both doctrines have
existed for many decades, neither the lower court, the Attorney
General, nor the majority, cite a single case for the proposition
that the power to resolve these questions during resentencing is
appropriately left to the discretion of a habeas court.
The power of the habeas corpus court is “the power to
fashion a remedy for the deprivation of any fundamental right
which is cognizable in habeas corpus.” (Crow, supra, 4 Cal.3d at
p. 619, fn. 7.) Here, the deprivation of the “right . . . cognizable
in habeas corpus” (ibid.) was the right to the application of
Senate Bill 620, which provided the trial court with discretion
to strike the firearm enhancements.7 In Cortez, it was the legal
to exercise discretion as to whether or not to impose that
enhancement” and characterized its decision as a “sentencing
decision.” (Italics added.)
7
The majority suggests that because the habeas corpus
court here must have had the power to answer one question of
Estrada retroactivity — the application of Senate Bill 620 — it
must also have had the jurisdiction to dictate the application of
Estrada with respect to other ameliorative laws at resentencing.
(See maj. opn., ante, at p. 10 [claiming that the dissent “gets it
wrong at the crucial first step” because, absent a habeas corpus
court’s jurisdiction to answer Estrada questions, “petitioner’s
Estrada claim would have failed at the outset because it
depended on just such a determination”].) But this claimed
18
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Evans, J., dissenting
authority of the sentencing court to consider striking prior
narcotics offenses (allegations of which would impose
mandatory minimums and increase statutory maximums).
(Cortez, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 84 & fn. 5.) In Belmontes, supra,
34 Cal.3d at pages 344–345 it was the sentencing court’s
discretion to sentence a defendant under section 667.6,
subdivision (c) rather than section 1170.1. In People v. Superior
Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero), it was the
sentencing court’s discretion to strike prior strike enhancements
under the “Three Strikes” law.
In the interplay between habeas corpus and sentencing
courts, habeas corpus courts, having determined eligibility for
resentencing, typically do not control whether or how
resentencing courts will exercise their discretion. (See, e.g.,
Lafler v. Cooper (2012) 566 U.S. 156, 174 [constitutional harm
of ineffective assistance during plea bargaining improperly
remedied by federal court by ordering specific performance of
plea; proper remedy was to reopen offer so that state trial court
“can then exercise its discretion in determining whether to
vacate the convictions and resentence respondent pursuant to
the plea agreement, to vacate only some of the convictions and
asymmetry is not a contradiction. Instead, it merely illustrates
the authority of habeas corpus courts. They have the power to
address the claimed illegality in a petitioner’s custody (Crow,
supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 619, fn. 7), which in certain unusual
instances may involve the application of Estrada’s presumption
of retroactivity to ameliorative laws that are cited as the basis
of the habeas corpus petition. This case presents such a rare
example. However, that habeas courts always have power to
address claimed illegality does not thereby confer authority to
dictate to sentencing courts that they should not apply current
law when conducting resentencing.
19
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Evans, J., dissenting
resentence respondent accordingly, or to leave the convictions
and sentence from trial undisturbed” pursuant to state law].)
Although the lines may blur when the habeas court and the
sentencing court are presided over by the same judge, the
doctrinal point remains the same. The habeas court provides a
remedy for the deprivation of a cognizable right while the
sentencing court exercises sentencing discretion. Whatever the
procedural context, a rule allowing habeas courts to dictate
questions of sentencing jurisdiction or finality is misguided.
The majority brushes aside concerns that “habeas corpus
courts, or ‘non-sentencing courts’ . . . especially appellate habeas
corpus courts, are ill-equipped to make resentencing decisions.”
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18.) Yet, the legitimacy of this concern is
well established in our cases. “Sentencing courts have wide
discretion in weighing aggravating and mitigating factors
[citation], and may balance them against each other in
qualitative as well as quantitative terms” in sentencing a
defendant. (People v. Roe (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 112, 119.) As
a result, the established rule is that a reviewing court “cannot
substitute its reasons for those omitted or misapplied by the
trial court, nor can it reweigh valid factors bearing on the
[sentencing] decision below.” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal. 4th
331, 355.)
I can conceive of no reason why a federal district or
appellate court considering a habeas corpus petition should
decide the applicability of Estrada and/or the full resentencing
rule at a resentencing hearing conducted by a state trial court.
The majority claims that any concern that uninformed appellate
or federal courts might be forced to resolve the equitable issues
this case presents is “misplaced.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 19.)
They argue that there is no basis for concern because our cases
20
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Evans, J., dissenting
hold that the proper venue to file claims relating to new-found
sentencing discretion, such as Esquivias’s, “should always
originate in the superior court that rendered judgment” and
because appellate habeas corpus courts “ ‘ha[ve] discretion to
deny without prejudice a habeas corpus petition that was not
filed first in a proper lower court.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18.)
The majority also notes that Esquivias’s specific, and admittedly
idiosyncratic, claim rests entirely on the application of state law.
If the majority means to suggest that its holding is limited
exclusively to the facts of this case, that is a wise and welcome
limitation. But its analysis fails to appreciate how cases that
might normally be filed in the sentencing jurisdiction could be
resolved elsewhere. For instance, if the trial court here had
improperly denied Esquivias’s petition, he would be entitled to
file a subsequent original petition in a higher court (Robinson v.
Lewis (2020) 9 Cal.5th 883, 895), which might then resolve it.
And even issues of state law, such as Esquivias’s, are frequently
transformed into constitutional claims involving ineffective
assistance of counsel. (See Sellan v. Kuhlman (2d Cir. 2001) 261
F.3d 303, 309–310 [habeas corpus petitioner may claim
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel based on counsel’s
failure to raise state law claim on appeal].) Indeed, Esquivias
might have argued, for example, in the alternative to his
existing claim, that his appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to move for reconsideration or recall of the remittitur in
light of the change in law created by the effective date of Senate
Bill 620 after our denial of his claim. Such a constitutional claim
could properly wend its way into a federal court.
Beyond obvious conundrums related to ceding California
sentencing authority to federal courts, allowing any
nonsentencing habeas corpus court the authority to decide
21
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Evans, J., dissenting
whether there will be full resentencing raises a host of difficult
and unanswered questions.
To begin with, under the majority’s approach, a habeas
corpus court may grant relief on a legal claim without having
the complete record, or any record, of the sentencing
proceedings. Thus, it may have limited information upon which
to ground the equitable decision the majority proposes it resolve.
Indeed, in Cortez, we emphasized that the sentencing court was
the appropriate jurisdiction for resolving the habeas claim and
the potential resentencing “since the sentencing court has the
files which are necessary” to adjudicate the claim. (Cortez,
supra, 6 Cal.3d at 88, fn. 9.) We also empowered the sentencing
court to “obtain a new probation report and/or a report from the
Director of Corrections as to the conduct of petitioner in prison
since his original sentencing.” (Id. at p. 89.) Such procedures
strongly suggest that a habeas court may sometimes be an
inappropriate venue to decide issues relating to sentencing
discretion.
The majority also does not provide guidelines for how or
when habeas corpus courts should exercise their newly minted
equitable authority. For instance, is it a relevant equitable
consideration that, as here, the Legislature has identified the
ameliorative law at issue as one that led to racially
discriminatory application? (See Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 2, subds.
(a), (d)(4), (10) [legislative findings that over 90 percent of
individuals in the state’s gang database are Black or
Latino, “over 98 percent of people sentenced to prison for a gang
enhancement” in our state’s largest county are people of color,
and that “gang enhancement statutes criminalize entire
neighborhoods historically impacted by poverty, racial
inequality, and mass incarceration as they punish people based
22
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Evans, J., dissenting
on their cultural identity, who they know, and where they
live.”].) Must the habeas corpus court provide any reasoning for
why it decided it allow or disallow the application of Estrada or,
is its specific word choice in the order granting relief (“strike”
versus “vacate”) alone controlling? What occurs if the habeas
and the sentencing courts disagree about the propriety of
applying ameliorative laws to the partially successful habeas
petitioner? I fear these and other unanswered questions, along
with the standardless discretion afforded by the majority’s
approach, will result in arbitrary and conflicting decisions.
Granting habeas corpus courts the power to determine
Estrada retroactivity will also hinder sentencing courts’
authority under the full resentencing rule. As that rule has long
described, sentencing courts reviewing a partially modified
sentence may adjust other aspects of a sentence to properly
reflect the individual culpability of the defendant. For instance,
if a significant sentence enhancement is invalidated through
habeas, the sentencing court may wish to adjust upwards other
aspects of the sentence to more fairly reflect the seriousness of
the offense. The Court of Appeal in Burbine took such an
approach. (See Burbine, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1258–
1259 [under full resentencing, trial court may reconsider all its
discretionary sentencing choices, so long as it does not impose a
term greater than original]; see also Buycks, supra, 5 Cal.5th at
p. 893 [approving of Burbine].) Under the majority’s approach,
if a habeas corpus court determines that only the enhancement
is stricken and full resentencing does not apply due to the
particular “equities” of the case, the sentencing court’s
discretion to adjust other aspects of the sentence may be
frustrated.
23
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Evans, J., dissenting
IV. THE LEGISLATURE HAS INDICATED THAT CURRENT
LAW SHOULD GOVERN AT RESENTENCING
PROCEEDINGS
In recent enactments, the Legislature has repeatedly
identified the full resentencing rule as its preference after
postconviction resentencing relief. (§§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1) [after
referral, a trial court may recall a sentence and “resentence the
defendant in the same manner as if they had not previously been
sentenced”], 1172.7, subd. (d)(2) [after striking drug-related
enhancements, “court shall apply the sentencing rules of the
Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce
sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate
disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing”],
1172.75, subd. (d)(2) [identical language requiring resentencing
under current law after striking a prior prison term
enhancement].) Citing these provisions, the majority reasons
that “[t]he Legislature knows how to provide for full
resentencing, and it did not do so for petitioner under the terms
of section 12022.53, subdivision (h).” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 27.)
This logic does not withstand scrutiny.
First, there would be no reason for the Legislature to
specify full resentencing as a direct consequence of relief under
Senate Bill 620, as it had for other Penal Code provisions.
Senate Bill 620, unlike resentencing under sections 1172.1,
1172.7, and 1172.75, did not create its own retroactive
mechanism for resentencing relief. As a result, there are only
two classes of cases in which Senate Bill 620 would be given
retroactive effect: (1) cases in which another mechanism
triggered resentencing, and (2) nonfinal cases pending on direct
appeal on the effective date of the legislation. The Legislature
explicitly addressed the cases in which Senate Bill 620 would
24
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Evans, J., dissenting
apply retroactively due to resentencing under another law.
(§12022.53, subd. (h).) And, as the majority itself recognizes,
remand for resentencing due to a direct appeal pending when
Senate Bill 620 took effect would necessarily trigger full
resentencing in virtually all cases. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 17
[“This situation is wholly distinct from [those] where
ameliorative legislation became effective while the direct appeal
was still pending” to which the full resentencing rule would
apply].)
The only reason Esquivias did not receive a
straightforward remand, and full resentencing, was due to the
rare and idiosyncratic timing of his case. The effective date of
Senate Bill 620 happened to straddle the narrow window
between our denial of his direct appeal and the expiration of
time to seek certiorari. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 24.) It is unlikely
the Legislature would have anticipated this case’s unusual
procedural posture. Thus, the Legislature’s failure to include an
express reference to full resentencing says little if anything
about its intent under these circumstances. That Esquivias’s
case is in the class of cases which the majority acknowledges
normally triggers full resentencing suggests that the
Legislature would expect full resentencing to apply here, even if
it did not explicitly reference it.
Nor does the Legislature’s express call for full
resentencing in sections 1172.1, 1172.7, and 1172.75 provide
any evidence that the Legislature did not wish the default rule
to be full resentencing after habeas relief, partial or otherwise.
Habeas corpus relief has been a constant fixture in our cases for
the many decades since Estrada was decided. We repeatedly
have affirmed that the appropriate procedure for habeas corpus
remedies involving failure of the trial court to exercise its
25
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Evans, J., dissenting
sentencing discretion is for the petitioner to be “treated as
though before the court at the time of pronouncement of
judgment and . . . be entitled to all the normal procedures and
rights available at that time.” (Cortez, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 88;
Belmontes, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 348, fn. 8; see Romero, supra,
13 Cal.4th at 530, fn. 13; see also Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 170 [applying new ameliorative law at resentencing].)8
Nothing in recent legislative enactments can or should cast
doubt on the Legislature’s intent in construing the habeas
statute, a statute passed long before recent criminal
resentencing reforms specifying full resentencing.9
8
The majority correctly notes that all of these cases dealt
with claims that were themselves fully retroactive and the
question of whether defendants received the benefits of these
decisions did not hinge on the application of Estrada. (Maj. opn.,
ante, at pp. 29–30, fn. 12.) But the authority of the habeas
corpus court to resolve downstream Estrada questions that flow
from a grant of discretionary sentencing relief has nothing to do
with whether the underlying claim that resulted in relief
happened to involve Estrada. Most claims resulting in habeas
corpus relief have nothing to do with Estrada. The question
posed by Esquivias is whether, when a petitioner has obtained
partial relief through a habeas corpus petition, ameliorative law
applies at resentencing with respect to other aspects of the
sentence. Cortez, Belmontes, and Romero all dictate that when
defendants obtain such discretionary resentencing relief they
should be treated as though sentenced for the first time and be
afforded all rights and procedures available at a sentencing
hearing. (Cortez, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 88.) That includes
application of current law.
9
Even were these statutes relevant for the negative
implication cited by the majority, they are only weakly so.
“ ‘[A]n expression of legislative intent in a later enactment is not
binding upon a court in its construction of an earlier enacted
26
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Evans, J., dissenting
The majority’s claim that the Legislature “knows how” to
dictate full resentencing if it so chooses is particularly
unavailing given that we rejected very similar arguments in
Padilla. In Padilla, the Attorney General cited Senate Bill 620’s
provision that “the new discretion courts have to dismiss
[firearm] enhancements ‘applies to any resentencing that may
occur pursuant to any other law.’ ” (Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th
at p. 169.) In the Attorney General’s view, this phrasing was a
sign that “the Legislature does not generally intend
ameliorative laws to apply when a defendant’s sentence has
been vacated.” (Ibid.) We found this argument — that the
“Legislature knows how to provide for full resentencing” (maj.
opn., ante, at p. 27) — unpersuasive. We reasoned that the
“Legislature was entitled to take a belt-and-suspenders
approach to ensuring that the firearm enhancement reform it
passed would apply broadly.” (Padilla, at p. 169, italics added.)
Rather than serving as contrary evidence, sections 1172.7
and 1172.75 help explain why full application of current
ameliorative laws is warranted at resentencing proceedings.
Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 483)
gave rise to these statutes in their current, retroactive form. In
passing Senate Bill 483, the Legislature expressly identified
that the two sentencing enhancements it retroactively
invalidated had often been applied in a racially discriminatory
manner. The Legislature explained that the elimination of the
prior prison term enhancement and the three-year term for
prior conviction of certain drug crimes in sections 1172.7 and
statute, [although] it is a factor that may be considered.’ ”
(Pacific Lumber Co. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2006)
37 Cal.4th 921, 940.)
27
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Evans, J., dissenting
1172.75 was necessary “in order to ensure equal justice and
address systemic racial bias in sentencing.” (Stats. 2021, ch.
728, § 1.) The Assembly Committee on Public Safety’s analysis
of Senate Bill 483 emphasized the bill author’s statement “ ‘that
long prison and jail sentences have no positive impact on public
safety, but are demonstrably injurious to families and
communities — particularly Black, Latino, and Native
Americans in the United States and in California.’ ” (Assem.
Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) as amended July 7, 2021, p. 3.) In other words, the
Legislature, in dictating full resentencing under current law,
was acutely aware that the sentencing practices of the past had
been applied unevenly to different racial and ethnic groups.
Legislative intent to address and remedy laws which have
been disparately applied on racial and ethnic lines has direct
salience to this case. Here, the trial court’s allegedly “equitable”
refusal to apply current law involved Assembly Bill 333, a law
addressing sentencing enhancements flagged by the Legislature
as potentially racially discriminatory. Refusal to allow full
resentencing to address this enhancement is inconsistent with
the Legislature’s concerted efforts to unwind enhancements that
may have been discriminatorily applied.
Our Estrada jurisprudence has long recognized that
ameliorative laws should “apply as broadly as is constitutionally
permissible.” (People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 677.)
Esquivias was sentenced to significant enhancements under
laws whose discriminatory flaws have been identified by the
Legislature and reformed. (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 2, subds. (a),
(d)(4), (10).) This should be a compelling justification to afford
broad, rather than narrow, application of Estrada in this case.
28
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVIAS
Evans, J., dissenting
(See People v. Burgos (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1, 33–42 (dis. opn. of
Evans, J.) (Burgos).)
I share Justice Groban’s recent observation that the
architecture of our Estrada doctrine rests on presumptions and
“less than perfect analytical tools to determine what we believe
[the Legislature] meant.” (Burgos, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 32
(conc. opn. of Groban, J.).) I also concur with the view that “the
Legislature can take a more preferable course and plainly state”
its intended outcome. (Ibid.) I encourage the Legislature to
clarify whether it wishes courts to conduct full resentencing,
applying current law, after a grant of habeas, or indeed in
resentencing generally.
By granting habeas corpus relief and modifying
Esquivias’s sentence by striking his firearm enhancements
under Senate Bill 620, the trial court rendered Esquivias’s case
nonfinal and subject to application of all intervening
ameliorative laws, including Assembly Bill 333. Accordingly, I
would reverse the Court of Appeal and remand for resentencing
at which the trial court would apply current law, including
Assembly Bill 333. I therefore respectfully dissent.
EVANS, J.
I Concur:
LIU, J.
29
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who
argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion People v. Esquivias
__________________________________________________________
Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted (published) XX 103 Cal.App.5th 969
Review Granted (unpublished)
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S286371
Date Filed: August 17, 2026
__________________________________________________________
Court: Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: Daniel B. Feldstern
__________________________________________________________
Counsel:
Lenore De Vita, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, and
Stephen M. Vasil, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for
Defendant and Appellant.
The Law Office of B.C. McComas and Brian C. McComas for the
California Public Defender’s Association and the California Attorneys
for Criminal Justice as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Charles C.
Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Susan Sullivan Pithey,
Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Johnsen, Steven D. Matthews,
Idan Ivri and Amanda V. Lopez, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for
publication with opinion):
Stephen M. Vasil
Attorney at Law
PMB 133
1026 West El Norte Parkway
Escondido, CA 92026
(619) 221-5933
Amanda V. Lopez
Deputy Attorney General
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702
Los Angeles, CA 90013
(213) 269-6118