Filed 7/22/26 P. v. Esparza CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G064511
v. (Super. Ct. No. 17CF1483)
JAVIER DAVID ESPARZA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Robert A. Knox, Judge. Affirmed.
Jared G. Coleman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant
Attorney General, Stephanie H. Chow, Seth M. Friedman, and Joseph C.
Anagnos, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
Defendant Javier David Esparza pleaded guilty to attempted
murder and later filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code
section 1172.6.1 The matter proceeded to an evidentiary hearing where the
court found it true beyond a reasonable doubt that Esparza remained guilty
under current law.
On appeal, Esparza contends the court’s ruling is not supported
by substantial evidence. The evidence the court relied on was Esparza’s
statement in connection with his guilty plea that he “tried to kill” the victim,
together with evidence that there was only one shooter involved in the
attempted murder. There was also evidence that the shooting was gang
related, Esparza was a member of the relevant gang, the firearm used in the
shooting was found near him, and he had been found armed with a firearm
on multiple occasions. The principal thrust of Esparza’s argument is that his
plea form cannot be considered substantial evidence. We disagree and affirm
the judgment.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 28, 2017, pursuant to a plea agreement, Esparza
pleaded guilty to attempted murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 3). He also
admitted committing this offense for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in
association with a criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote,
further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang members (§ 186.22, subd.
(b)(1)). His maximum prison exposure for these crimes was 19 years; his
stipulated sentence was five years, eight months in prison. The court
sentenced him pursuant to the stipulation.
1 All statutory refences are to the Penal Code unless stated
otherwise.
2
On September 20, 2022, Esparza filed a petition for resentencing
under former section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6). On June 21, 2024,
following an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d), the
trial court denied the petition. Esparza appealed.
FACTS
The evidence admitted at the evidentiary hearing consisted of
defendant’s plea, portions of the preliminary hearing transcript (excluding
inadmissible hearsay), a transcript of gang expert testimony involving
Esparza in another case, and stipulations.
On the morning of September 24, 2010, a witness parked her car
when she saw a lone gunman fire several rounds from a handgun at a vehicle
traveling at a high rate of speed. She observed bullet holes in the vehicle as it
passed her. The victim was a member of the Orange County Criminals street
gang. Defendant was a member of the Orange Varrio Cypress criminal street
gang, which was a rival of the Orange County Criminals street gang.
On October 5, 2010, at 8:30 a.m., an employee of a Senior Center
located at 2215 W. McFadden found a handgun in the driveway of the Senior
Center. The employee gave this gun to his supervisor, who then provided the
handgun to the police at 1:00 p.m. On October 5, 2010, at 9:00 a.m., Mr.
Esparza attended a funeral at a church across McFadden from the Senior
Center. After Esparza left the church in a vehicle, police conducted a car stop
at 2115 W. McFadden. During the car stop, Esparza was found in possession
of a different firearm. Six months earlier, he had been found in possession of
yet another firearm. A forensic scientist later compared the casings recovered
from the shooting scene to casings retrieved from test-firing the handgun
found by the Senior Center employee. The forensic scientist opined that the
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casings retrieved from the test-firing and the casings recovered from the
shooting scene came from the same firearm.
In pleading guilty to attempted murder in connection with the
shooting, Esparza offered the following factual basis: “I offer the following
facts as the basis for my guilty plea: In Orange County, California, on
September 24, 2010, I unlawfully tried to kill John Doe, a rival gang member,
and I did so for the benefit of Orange Varrio Cypress, a criminal street gang,
intending to further and assist in criminal conduct by members of that gang.”
He initialed that paragraph, and in the next paragraph, he signed a
statement under penalty of perjury that everything in the form was true and
correct.
DISCUSSION
The gist of the prosecution’s case at the evidentiary hearing was
that Esparza confessed that he “tried to kill” the victim, and the evidence
showed there was only one shooter. The reasonable inference is that Esparza
was the shooter. There was circumstantial evidence consistent with that
conclusion, such as that he was in a rival gang, that he had been found armed
with firearms, and that the gun used in the shooting was recovered near
Esparza’s location on October 5. 2010. Esparza contends this did not amount
to substantial evidence of his guilt.
In reviewing the court’s findings from an evidentiary hearing
pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d), our standard of review is
substantial evidence. (People v. Player (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 931, 963.) ‘“We
presume every fact in support of the judgment the trier of fact could have
reasonably deduced from the evidence. [Citation.] If the circumstances
reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, reversal of the judgment is not
warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be
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reconciled with a contrary finding.’” (People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306,
331.)
“A guilty plea is a judicial admission. It ‘amounts to an admission
of every element of the crime and is the equivalent of a conviction.’” (People v.
Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451, 458; see also People v. Allison (2020)
55 Cal.App.5th 449, 458 fn.7, disapproved on other grounds in
People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 718 fn.3 [“the admission of an
enhancement is equivalent to and has the same effect as a jury finding on the
enhancement.”].) “Appellant cannot use a section 1172.6 resentencing
hearing to relitigate facts already determined, whether by plea, admission, or
verdict.” (Rodriguez at p. 458.) “In light of appellant's admission by plea of an
intent to kill, the sole issue at the evidentiary hearing was whether he acted
alone.” (Id. at p. 459.)
Here, the evidence permitted a reasonable inference that Esparza
acted as the sole shooter. The eyewitness to the shooting testified there was
only one shooter. And Esparza admitted that he “tried to kill” the victim.
When combined with the fact that Esparza was a member of a rival gang,
was consistently armed, and was close in time and location to where the gun
used in the shooting was recovered, the totality of the circumstances justified
the inference the trial court drew. (See People v. Grant (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th
323, 330 [“ ‘Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and any
reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence.’ ”].)
In contending that the court should not have relied on the factual
basis in his plea form, Esparza relies on People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36
(French). In French the defendant had pleaded no contest to several counts of
lewd and lascivious conduct with a child. (Id. at p. 40.) As a factual basis, the
prosecutor gave a recitation in open court, and defense counsel simply agreed
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that the prosecution had evidence to support the prosecutor’s factual
recitation. (Id. at p. 42.) But at no point did either defendant or his counsel
admit to the truth of that recitation. (Id. at p. 51.) In a subsequent
proceeding, the prosecution sought to impose an upper term sentence in the
absence of a jury finding on aggravating circumstances by arguing that
defendant had admitted to the aggravating circumstance in the factual
recitation. Our high court disagreed. “A defendant is not required to
personally admit the truth of the factual basis of the plea, which may be
established by defense counsel's stipulation to a particular document, such as
a police report or a preliminary hearing transcript.” (Id. at pp. 50-51.)
“[D]efense counsel's stipulation to the factual basis cannot reasonably be
construed as an admission by the defendant sufficient to satisfy the Sixth
Amendment . . . .” (Id. at p. 51.)
The present case is readily distinguishable. Here, defendant
expressly admitted the truth of the factual basis under penalty of perjury.
Moreover, the trial court did not treat the factual basis as a binding
admission, but instead simply as evidence of a statement made by Esparza to
be weighed along with the other evidence in the case. The court did not err in
doing so.
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DISPOSITION
The court’s denial of Esparza’s petition for resentencing is
affirmed.
SANCHEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, P. J.
SCHWARM, J.*
*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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