Filed 10/29/26 P. v. Eldridge CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B339989
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA027826)
v.
PRIDE ELDRIDGE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Laura L. Laesecke, Judge. Affirmed.
Wayne C. Tobin, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Pride Eldridge (defendant)
appeals from the trial court’s summary denial of his petition for
recall and resentencing pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1). He contends the court violated his due process
rights by denying the petition before appointing counsel. He also
asserts a violation of his right to equal protection of the laws. We
affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Conviction and sentencing2
In 1997, defendant was convicted of first degree murder
(§ 187; count 1), second degree burglary (§ 459; count 4), and
three counts of second degree robbery (§ 211; counts 2, 3, & 5).
As to each count, the jury found true the allegation that a
principal was armed with a firearm. (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1).)
Robbery-murder and burglary-murder special circumstances
alleged as to count 1 were found true by the jury. At sentencing,
the special circumstances were determined to be inapplicable
because defendant was under 16 years old at the time of the
offense. (People v. Eldridge (Jan. 12, 1999, B113801) [nonpub.
opn.].)
Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 31 years
to life.
II. Petition for recall and resentencing
Using a preprinted form, on July 1, 2024, defendant filed a
petition for recall and resentencing pursuant to section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1) and People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608
1 All further undesignated references are to the Penal Code.
2 Because the facts of the underlying offense are not relevant
to the current appeal, we do not include them here.
2
(Heard). In it, he asserted he was 15 years old at the time of his
offense, sentenced to 31 years to life, and has been incarcerated
for at least 15 years. He checked boxes indicating (1) he “was
convicted of felony murder or aiding and abetting murder,” (2) he
does “not have a [prior] juvenile adjudication for assault or other
felony crime(s) with a significant potential for harm to victims,”
and (3) he has participated in rehabilitative activities. He did not
check the box indicating he “committed the offense with at least
one adult codefendant.” Finally, he declared his offense did not
involve torture and he has “remorse and ha[s] worked towards
rehabilitation.” He also indicated he was indigent and requested
an attorney to represent him.
On July 15, 2024, without appointing counsel, the court
denied the petition because defendant was not sentenced to life
without the possibility of parole (LWOP) as required by section
1170, subdivision (d)(1) and further concluded, “[g]iven
[defendant’s] age, 31 years-to-life is not a de facto life sentence.”
Defendant timely filed his notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable law
A. Standard of review
We apply de novo review where, as here, the appeal turns
on questions of law and the application of law to undisputed
facts. (People v. Ashford University, LLC (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th
485, 518.)
B. Section 1170, subdivision (d), section 3051, and the
split of authority
Under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A), when a
defendant who was under 18 years old at the time of his offense
and was sentenced to LWOP has been incarcerated for more than
3
15 years, he “may submit” a petition for recall and resentencing
to the sentencing court. (Italics added.) Once a defendant
reaches this threshold and accepts the invitation to file such a
petition, the defendant “shall file” a statement indicating he was
under 18 at the time of his offense, sentenced to LWOP, and must
also include a statement regarding his “remorse and work
towards rehabilitation,” as well as a statement that one of four
circumstances listed in section 1170, subdivision (d)(2)(A)
through (D) is true.
After the petition is filed, the People have 60 days to file
any reply. (§ 1170, subd. (d)(4).) Then, if “the court finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that one or more of the statements
specified in subparagraphs (A) to (D), inclusive, of paragraph (2)
is true, the court shall recall the sentence … and hold a hearing
to resentence the defendant … .” (§ 1170, subd. (d)(5).)
The statute does not contain a provision for the
appointment of counsel.
Despite the plain language of section 1170, subdivision (d),
which limits relief to juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP, the
Heard court held that denying the opportunity to petition for
section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) relief to juvenile offenders
sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP violates the
constitutional guarantee to equal protection of the laws. (Heard,
supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at pp. 612, 626–634; accord, People v.
Cabrera (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 650, 653; People v. Bagsby (2024)
106 Cal.App.5th 1040 [reaffirming Heard]; People v. Sorto (2024)
104 Cal.App.5th 435, 454 (Sorto) [following Heard and concluding
there was no rational basis to treat differently “explicit LWOP
offenders and functionally equivalent LWOP offenders”].)
4
Heard and the line of cases that has developed since opine,
“[A] sentence is the functional equivalent of LWOP if it includes a
‘term of years with a parole eligibility date that falls outside the
juvenile offender’s natural life expectancy’” regardless of a
meaningful opportunity for release at an earlier date pursuant to
section 3051, youth offender parole. (Sorto, supra, 104
Cal.App.5th at p. 443.) Thus, because the plain language of
section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) cannot be interpreted to include
juvenile offenders not sentenced to LWOP, these cases have
found the equal protection clause compels the conclusion that
juvenile offenders sentenced to the functional equivalent of
LWOP must be entitled to relief under the statute.
These cases have also found the plain language of the
statute compels the conclusion that, although People v. Franklin
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin) and section 3051 have cured the
juvenile’s otherwise lengthy sentence so that it currently no
longer operates as the functional equivalent of LWOP, this “‘does
not change the fact that the sentence was a [functionally
equivalent] life without parole sentence at the time it was
imposed.’” (Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 447; see also
Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 629 [appellate court reversed
the trial court on equal protection grounds, reasoning that
§ 1170, subd. (d)(1) “‘uses the phrase “was sentenced” and refers
to the past’” and “[a]t the time Heard was sentenced, section 3051
had not yet been enacted, and he was required to serve his
determinate term plus the full minimum period of confinement of
each of his life sentences before becoming parole eligible”].) In
undertaking an equal protection analysis, these courts were
“unable to identify a rational basis for making juveniles
sentenced to an explicitly designated life without parole term, but
5
not juveniles sentenced to the functional equivalent of life
without parole, eligible to petition for resentencing under section
1170, subdivision (d)(1).” (Heard, supra, at p. 633.)
Recently, other Courts of Appeal have parted ways with
Heard and its rationale. These cases have found, in effect, there
are no longer de facto LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders
because section 3051 provides a meaningful opportunity for
release during the 25th year of incarceration. (See People v. Lara
(2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 484, review granted Dec. 30, 2025,
S294095; People v. Isayev (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1117, review
granted Nov. 12, 2025, S292860 (Isayev); People v. Baldwin
(2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 978; People v. Thompson (2025) 112
Cal.App.5th 1058, review granted Sept. 24, 2025, S292540; People
v. Ortega (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1252, review granted Sept. 17,
2025, S292070; People v. Munoz (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 499,
review granted3 June 25, 2025, S290828.) In short, these courts
have found “[f]irst, under the plain language of [section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1)], [the defendants] [were] not sentenced to life in
prison without the possibility of parole. (See § 1170 (d)(1)(A).)
And second, [defendants’] equal protection claim[s are] moot
because under clear and binding precedent [they] [were] not
sentenced to a prison term that currently violates the
Constitution (i.e., a sentence that is the functional equivalent of
3 In granting review, the court ordered briefing on the
following issue: “Is a juvenile homicide offender sentenced to 50
years to life in prison entitled to recall and resentencing under
Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) on the ground that
the sentence is the functional equivalent of life imprisonment
without parole?” (People v. Munoz (June 25, 2025, S290828).)
6
life in prison without the possibility of parole).” (People v. Ortega,
supra, at p. 1265, underscoring added.)
C. Equal protection challenges
In People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 850–851
(Hardin), the California Supreme Court “clarified the governing
analytical framework” for claims under the equal protection
clause and found “when plaintiffs challenge laws drawing
distinctions between identifiable groups or classes of persons, on
the basis that the distinctions drawn are inconsistent with equal
protection, … [t]he only pertinent inquiry is whether the
challenged difference in treatment is adequately justified under
the applicable standard of review. The burden is on the party
challenging the law to show that it is not.”
“Rational basis review ‘sets a high bar’ for litigants
challenging legislative enactments. [Citation.] … ‘Coupled with
a rebuttable presumption that legislation is constitutional,
[rational basis review] helps ensure that democratically enacted
laws are not invalidated merely based on a court’s cursory
conclusion that a statute’s tradeoffs seem unwise or unfair.’
[Citation.] [¶] Under this deferential standard, we presume that
a given statutory classification is valid ‘until the challenger
shows that no rational basis for the unequal treatment is
reasonably conceivable.’” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 852;
see also People v. Williams (2024) 17 Cal.5th 99, 127 [reaffirming
Hardin, “Because these ‘legislative policy choices’ are not
‘irrational,’ they are not ‘impermissible as a matter of equal
protection’”].) “‘If a plausible basis exists for the disparity, courts
may not second-guess its “‘wisdom, fairness, or logic.’”’” (Hardin,
at p. 852.)
7
This same deferential standard governs regardless of
whether defendant’s claim is understood as a facial challenge to
section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)’s LWOP-only classification, or a
narrower as-applied challenge limited to the particular subgroup
and circumstances defendant has identified. (See Hardin, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 839 [rational basis review applied “either on its
face or as applied”].)
II. Analysis
A. Section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) does not violate equal
protection
Defendant asserts section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) violates
equal protection “as applied” to defendants like him. Specifically,
individuals sentenced to neither LWOP nor its functional
equivalent will not have the “opportunity to have [their] case
remanded to juvenile court” pursuant to Proposition 57 (Public
Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016) (as approved by voters,
Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016)) (Proposition 57). He argues this result
is especially prejudicial where, because he was 15 years old at the
time of his offense, he would otherwise also be able to benefit
from Senate Bill No. 1391 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
1391) and Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision
(a)(1).4 We find no equal protection violation.
4 We note defendant contends his “criminal conduct was less
egregious than juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP or its
functional equivalent.” We disagree. Defendant was convicted of
murder with two special circumstances found true by the jury.
Though he was ineligible for such treatment at age 15, it cannot
be said that his conduct was “less egregious” than other juvenile
offenders.
8
To address defendant’s claim, we must first explain it: (1)
People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 170, and People v. Montes
(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 35, 45, have held that Proposition 57
applies retroactively to cases reopened upon recall of sentence; (2)
Proposition 57 combined with Senate Bill 1391 and Welfare and
Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (a)(1) prohibit the
transfer to criminal court the cases of defendants who committed
their offense while under 16 years old; (3) a defendant who
committed their offense while they were under 16 years old and
has had their sentence recalled under section 1170, subdivision
(d), would have their case returned to juvenile court with no
chance of being returned to criminal court; and (4) because, after
15 years of incarceration, that defendant is too old to be placed in
a juvenile detention facility, they would become immediately
eligible for release.
1. Section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) applies
only to defendants sentenced to LWOP
As noted, under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A), a
juvenile offender sentenced to LWOP may petition the court for
recall and resentencing. Thus, on its face, section 1170,
subdivision (d), limits relief to juvenile offenders sentenced to
LWOP. For the reasons expressed post, we respectfully disagree
with the Heard line of cases and find section 1170, subdivision
(d)(1)’s plain language does not violate equal protection.
The Heard line of cases rests on flawed equal protection
analysis. Rather than place the burden on the defendant to
“‘“negat[e] every conceivable basis”’” that might support the
statutory disparity between explicit LWOP and other lengthy
juvenile sentences (Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60
9
Cal.4th 871, 881), it appears Heard and Sorto placed the burden
on the Attorney General and, seemingly, even on the courts.
In Sorto, the panel discussed each of the potential “rational
bas[es]” for the Legislature’s actions in restricting section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1) to explicit LWOP sentences, and, while
negating each potential basis the court repeated some version of,
“[t]he Attorney General suggests no reason—nor can we conceive
of any on our own.” (Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 451.) In
Heard, the panel concluded, “We can conceive of no legitimate
reason for making juvenile offenders sentenced to explicit life
without parole terms eligible to seek resentencing but not
juvenile offenders sentenced to the equivalent of a life without
parole sentence,” and “[t]he People’s sole justification for the
differential treatment is that the Legislature ‘could have
reasonably concluded that the punishment of [life without parole]
imposed on those under age 18 could be excessive and this was an
appropriate means of reform by allowing for reconsideration of
such a sentence.’” (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 632, italics
added.) The Heard and Sorto opinions do not discuss the reasons,
if any, offered by defendants as to why the distinction between
the two categories was not rational. Thus, the burden was not
properly placed on the “party challenging the law.” (Hardin,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 850–851.)
Furthermore, the Heard line of cases adopts a
classification—functional equivalent of LWOP—originally
created to aid in Eighth Amendment analysis. The Hardin court
noted, in an effort to address Eighth Amendment concerns, “[t]he
Legislature enacted section 3051 to bring California juvenile
sentencing law into line with Graham [v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S.
48], Miller [v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460], and [People v.]
10
Caballero [(2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 268].” (Hardin, supra, 15
Cal.5th at p. 845.) The court observed, “section 3051 provided for
youth offender parole hearings at which the Board of Parole
Hearings must provide ‘a meaningful opportunity’ for release
(§ 3051, subd. (e)) … .” (Ibid.; see also Franklin, supra, 63
Cal.4th at p. 268 [held § 3051 remedied any 8th Amend. defects
in sentencing of juvenile offenders].) Use of the “functional
equivalent” label to evaluate section 1170, subdivision (d)(1),
when the plain language is clear, is error; especially, where
defendants sentenced as juveniles are “now serving a life
sentence that includes a meaningful opportunity for release” and
are “not serving an LWOP sentence or its functional equivalent.”
(Franklin, supra, at pp. 279–280.)
2. Because defendant was not sentenced to
LWOP, he is not eligible for relief under
section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)
Defendant was sentenced to 31 years to life—not LWOP.
Because we have found section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) applies
only to de jure LWOP sentences, defendant is not eligible for
relief under this section. Moreover, because a sentence of 31
years to life has not been defined by any court as the functional
equivalent of LWOP, even under the precedent of Heard,
defendant is not eligible. Thus, under either line of authority,
defendant is outside the class of offenders eligible for relief under
section 1170, subdivision (d)(1).
Because defendant’s equal protection claim, as described
ante, does not depend on his eligibility under either line of
authority, we address it now.
11
3. Rational bases support the Legislature’s
classification, both generally and as
applied to defendant’s subgroup
The legislative history of Senate Bill No. 9 (2011–2012 Reg.
Sess.), which led to enactment of section 1170, now-subdivision
(d)(1), demonstrates the Legislature intended to proceed
incrementally with respect to addressing the larger problem of
excessive punishment for juveniles. (People v. Thompson, supra,
112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1076, review granted.) Senate Bill No. 9
“was described as a ‘“modest and narrowly focused piece of
legislation.”’” (Thompson, at p. 1077.) Specifically, in response to
the potential for petitions for writ of habeas corpus alleging “8th
amendment grounds of cruel and unusual punishment,” the
Legislature hoped to “simplif[y] the process for a small group of
specified inmates,” and “offer a less expensive alternative” to filing
a habeas corpus petition. (Sen. Appropriations Com. Fiscal
Summary of Sen. Bill No. 9 (2011–2012 Reg. Sess.) as introduced
May 23, 2011, pp. 3, 2, italics added; see id. at p. 1 [“This bill
authorizes the 293 [juvenile offenders] serving LWOP” sentences
to petition under the provision].)
Despite the sweeping and automatic changes created by
section 3051, “[t]he Legislature did not envision that the original
sentences of eligible youth offenders would be vacated and that
new sentences would be imposed to reflect parole eligibility”;
instead, the “inmate remains bound by [their original] sentence.”
(Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 278.) However, Eighth
Amendment challenges are “moot” because both de jure LWOP
and de facto LWOP defendants are now serving reformed
sentences under section 3051. (Isayev, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1130, review granted.) These similarities notwithstanding,
12
LWOP offenders are still positioned differently from functional
LWOP offenders because, as discussed, “section 3051 d[oes] not
alter the defendant’s original sentence,” and they remain
sentenced to LWOP. (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 629.)
This difference is a rational basis for treating these two
groups separately. Though it is not our burden to find rational
bases for the Legislature’s actions, we propose a few. First,
applying section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) to only explicit LWOP
sentences creates a bright line that does not require judicial
determination of a petitioner’s eligibility. Requiring the statute
to include functional LWOP has already resulted in litigation
over basic threshold eligibility that could not have been
anticipated by the Legislature. By limiting the statute to the
estimated 293 inmates sentenced to LWOP as juveniles, the
Legislature was able to predict and measure the fiscal impact of
the legislation. Instead, since Heard, litigation over basic
eligibility requires trial courts to hold hearings to determine
whether each petitioner’s sentence is the functional equivalent of
LWOP. Limiting eligibility to the explicit LWOP designation as
clearly provided in the statute avoids this threshold litigation
entirely.
Second, opening the statute to those sentenced to the
functional equivalent of LWOP requires an unknown number of
full resentencing hearings. Upon receipt of a properly pled
petition—and a hearing over basic eligibility—section 1170,
subdivision (d)(5) requires the court to recall the sentence and
hold a hearing where the petitioner will be sentenced anew. As
evidenced by the amount of litigation since the Heard ruling,
reading section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) to allow all juveniles
sentenced to lengthy sentences to proceed with a resentencing
13
petition creates an enormous strain on scarce and thinly spread
judicial resources. This too results in a vastly different impact
than originally contemplated.
Third, section 3051 comprehensively addressed the Eighth
Amendment concerns that arise when juveniles are sentenced to
terms that do not allow them a meaningful opportunity for
release in their lifetime, and it did so without any need for
inmates to petition or courts to conduct hearings. Section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1) was enacted to address specific concerns
surrounding sentencing children to LWOP. Despite the
newfound eligibility for section 3051 parole hearings, section
1170, subdivision (d)(1) remains important for explicit LWOP
inmates because it allows them to escape the formal LWOP
designation—a classification the Legislature has determined is
inappropriate for juveniles. Because juveniles remain formally
sentenced to LWOP, they remain formally classified as having
received one of society’s most serious penalties, carrying unique
legal and social consequences not experienced by those originally
sentenced to the functional equivalent. These three rationales
support the statute’s explicit LWOP classification generally and
as-applied to defendant.
Moreover, the downstream benefit identified by
defendant—that a 14- or 15-year-old sentenced to LWOP or,
through Heard, its functional equivalent may receive a dismissal
in juvenile court after recall of sentence—is an unintended
consequence of the interplay between independent statutory
provisions (section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) and Welfare and
Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (a)(1)), voter initiative
(Proposition 57), and case law (see People v. Padilla, supra, 13
Cal.5th 152 and People v. Montes, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th 35).
14
That these provisions and cases interact to provide a more
significant benefit to a narrow class of defendants is not an
intentional legislative benefit being conferred in an unequal
manner. Equal protection does not require the Legislature to
anticipate and uniformly replicate every ancillary consequence of
the law. “‘[A] legislature need not run the risk of losing an entire
remedial scheme simply because it failed, through inadvertence
or otherwise, to cover every evil that might conceivably have been
attacked.’” (Kasler v. Lockyer (2000) 23 Cal.4th 472, 488, quoting
McDonald v. Board of Election (1969) 394 U.S. 802, 809.)
4. Defendant has not met his burden
Other than to assert, “no rational basis for denying this
enormous benefit to juvenile offenders in [defendant’s] class,”
defendant has failed to negate every rational basis for the
Legislature’s perceived unequal treatment. In fact, he does not
negate any potential rational bases for the Legislature’s actions
and instead posits the perceived “disparate treatment does not
and cannot have a rational basis.” Thus defendant has not met
his burden to overcome the presumption that the statute, as
applied to him, is constitutional.
In short, it is not appropriate to read the statute to mean
something more than the plain language and legislative history
provide. Nor is it our place to conjure up rational bases for the
Legislature’s actions. So long as “‘a plausible basis exists for the
disparity,’” it is not for us to “‘second-guess its “‘wisdom, fairness,
or logic.’”’” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 852.) “‘“‘Only by
faithful adherence to this guiding principle of judicial review of
legislation is it possible to preserve to the legislative branch its
rightful independence and its ability to function.’”’” (Johnson v.
Department of Justice, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 889.)
15
B. The court did not err in summarily denying
defendant’s petition without appointing counsel
Defendant asserts the court was not permitted to
summarily deny his petition without appointing counsel or
conducting a hearing. He argues the process provided for in
section 1170, subdivision (d) affects his substantial rights and the
evidence he needed to support his claim that his sentence is the
functional equivalent of LWOP could “only be met by legal
counsel appointed by the court.” We disagree.
Defendant does not have a statutory right to counsel.
Section 1170, subdivision (d) has no explicit provision for the
appointment of counsel. In the event the Legislature wanted to
provide for the appointment of counsel at a specific stage of
section 1170, subdivision (d) proceedings, it knows how to do so.
(See §§ 1172.1, subd. (b)(1) [Legislature added a counsel provision
when the court receives a resentencing recommendation], 1172.6,
subd. (b)(3) [counsel appointed upon request and filing of a
facially valid petition].) The Legislature chose not to do so here.
Defendant does not have a constitutional right to counsel.
The Sixth Amendment and due process do not mandate a right to
counsel in these postconviction proceedings. “‘[I]t is beyond
dispute that “[t]he Sixth Amendment safeguards to an accused
who faces incarceration the right to counsel at all critical stages
of the criminal process”’ up to and including sentencing.” (People
v. Frazier (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 858, 864, quoting Marshall v.
Rodgers (2013) 569 U.S. 58, 62.) No court has found state
postconviction proceedings to be a “critical stage” triggering a
constitutional right to counsel. (See People v. Rosemond (2025)
108 Cal.App.5th 667, 673 [in § 1172.1 proceedings, court held
“defendant does not have a constitutional right to counsel
16
because this is a state postconviction proceeding”]; Frazier, supra,
at p. 865 [no constitutional right to counsel after resentencing
recommendation filed by the Secretary of the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)5].) Once a
sentence has been recalled, the “resentencing hearing [that
follows] is [a] critical stage at which defendant enjoys both 6th
Amend[ment] and due process right to counsel.” (Frazier, supra,
at p. 866; see also People v. Pillsbury (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 776,
798, fn 14; People v. Rouse (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 292, 299–300
[due process right to counsel during § 1170.18 proceedings arose
after the “‘defendant passed the eligibility stage’”].)
As discussed, defendant did not meet the minimum
pleading requirements listed in section 1170, subdivision
(d)(1)(A). He was not sentenced to LWOP or, for the sake of
argument, its functional equivalent. Instead, defendant was
sentenced to 31 years to life and began receiving parole hearings
pursuant to section 3051 in 2021.6 Thus, where defendant did
not meet the threshold requirements listed in section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1)(A), he did not have a right to counsel.
5 Of course, as noted ante, the Legislature saw fit to amend
section 1172.1 to provide for the appointment of counsel upon
filing of a CDCR-initiated resentencing recommendation. (See §
1172.1, subd. (b)(1).)
6 See CDCR’s California Incarcerated Records and
Information Search for inmate Pride Eldrige
(http://ciris.mt.cdcr.ca.gov/details?cdcrNumber= K72457 [as of
Oct. 29, 2026], archived at <https://perma.cc/5ZZG-SLG9>.)
17
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s section 1170, subdivision
(d)(1) petition is affirmed.
CHAVEZ, J.
I concur:
LUI, P. J.
18
People v. Eldridge
B339989
RICHARDSON, J., Concurring.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion affirming the trial
court’s denial of Eldrige’s petition for recall and resentencing
under Penal Code1 section 1170, subdivision (d)(1). I would,
however, affirm on the ground that a sentence of 31 years to life
is not the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of
parole (LWOP), and thus, under any theory, Eldridge is not
entitled to the benefits of that legislation. (People v. Baldwin
(2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 978, 1006 (Baldwin) [44 years to life is
not functional equivalent of LWOP]; People v. Olmos (2025)
109 Cal.App.5th 580, 583 [33 years to life is not functional
equivalent of LWOP].) I therefore do not join that portion of the
majority opinion disagreeing with People v. Heard (2022)
83 Cal.App.5th 608, which held that sentences constituting the
functional equivalent of LWOP are subject to the provisions of
section 1170, subdivision (d)(1). As I believe it is unnecessary to
the resolution of Eldridge’s appeal, I express no view as to Heard
and its progeny.
I also agree with the majority that there is no equal
protection violation, but I would draw the comparison between
defendants sentenced to LWOP or its functional equivalent on
the one hand, and those with lesser sentences, such as Eldridge,
on the other. I thus do not join that portion of the opinion
discussing an equal protection distinction between those
1 Undesignated references are to the Penal Code.
sentenced to an explicit LWOP sentence, and those sentenced to
any other sentence (including a functional equivalent of LWOP).
Equal protection does not require the Legislature to remedy
every ill uniformly. The Legislature may “proceed incrementally,
so long as it proceeds rationally, in ‘walking [the] tightrope’ of the
political process.” (People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 866,
quoting Kasler v. Lockyer (2000) 23 Cal.4th 472, 487.) The
Legislature passed section 1170 in response to Graham v. Florida
(2010) 560 U.S. 48 and concerns regarding sentences of LWOP to
juveniles, rather than lengthy juvenile sentences generally.
(Baldwin, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1002-1004.) It is rational
for the Legislature to have chosen, by its new law, to focus on the
relatively limited number of defendants who were subject to the
state’s “harshest punishments guaranteeing death in prison.” (Id.
at p. 1004.)
Other than as stated above, I concur in the rest of the
majority opinion, including its conclusion that Eldridge was not
denied his due process rights by the trial court’s failure to
appoint counsel.
RICHARDSON, J.
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