Filed 9/24/26 P. v. Edwards CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E085403
v. (Super.Ct.No. FSB14718)
ANTHONY A. EDWARDS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Ronald M.
Christianson, Judge. Affirmed.
Jennifer A. Gambale, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Christopher
P. Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
Defendant Anthony A. Edwards (defendant) appeals from the trial court’s denial of
his Penal Code1 section 1172.6 resentencing petition after an evidentiary hearing. The
trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of first degree
murder as a direct perpetrator who killed victim David Mortensen during the commission
of a robbery, a direct aider and abettor with the intent to kill, and alternatively, a major
participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. Defendant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence under all three murder theories that support the trial court’s
conclusion that he was barred from resentencing relief. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Evidence at Trial2
Richard Moore owned Magnum Range, which was a gun range and gun store in
San Bernardino. David Mortensen worked there as the manager. On the evening of May
26, 1997, Moore closed and cleaned the business including washing the glass counter
tops with warm soapy water, followed by a “nonsmear polish.” Mortensen opened the
business the next morning, May 27, 1997, around 9:00 a.m.
Just before 9:00 a.m., a witness drove past the range on his way to work and saw
two Black persons standing in the doorway of the business. The first person was a Black
male, who was over 6 feet tall, with a thin build weighing 200 pounds, and short, cropped
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise indicated.
2 We have taken judicial notice of the record on appeal from defendant’s direct
appeal, People v. Edwards (December 17, 1999, E022771), pursuant to defendant’s
request.
2
hair. Defendant matched this description. The second person was considerably shorter
and heavier in build.
At approximately 9:30 a.m., a customer arrived at the business finding the internal
security cage door open and the business in disarray. After seeking help from the
business next door, they located Mortensen, deceased, in a pool of blood.
Mortensen had been shot four times causing 12 wounds. He suffered wounds to
the arm, neck, ear, and head. The shot that entered Mortensen’s left arm, traveled
downward through the muscles of the chest wall and hip bone, and settled in the left
buttock. An intact bullet was recovered from his buttock. After the shot to the arm,
Mortensen would have been able to move. The shot to the back of the head caused brain
death and an inability to make purposeful movement. The shot to the left ear was at close
range, landing in his spine and totally paralyzing him. The shots that entered through the
arm and neck were inflicted before the shots to the head and ear incapacitated Mortensen
and caused his death. Only bullet fragments were recovered from the fatal shots.
Sixteen guns, one rifle, three thousand rounds of ammunition, a cash register, and
Mortensen’s wallet were missing. One of the stolen guns was a Beretta, 9mm
semiautomatic.
Based on the register roll from May 27, 1997, the first transaction of the day
occurred at 9:04 a.m. and included one gun rental, ammunition for a 9mm or .38 caliber,
two range fees, and two large training targets. There was a second transaction for a gun
rental with large caliber ammunition. Any person that visits the range and is going into
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the firing area must sign the guest register/sign-in sheet and an insurance liability release.
Both the sign-in register and packet of release agreements for May 27, 1997, were
missing. Defendant’s name appeared on a release agreement that was dated May 22,
1997, but given the sequence of the forms whoever filled out the release either did not
know the date or predated it.
Three days after the shooting, Pomona Police Department stopped defendant for a
traffic violation and arrested him for an outstanding warrant. Officers located a loaded
9mm under the driver’s seat. It was later determined that the gun’s serial number
matched a gun stolen from the range.
Ballistic evidence proved this 9mm fired the bullet that was recovered from the
victim’s buttock. The bullet fragments recovered from the victim were too small to be
compared. Ballistic evidence could not prove whether the other three bullets were fired
from the same gun or a different gun.
Forensic evidence linked defendant to the crime scene. Defendant’s palm prints
and fingerprints were found on the paper shooting targets, glass counter tops, and exit
door. Two types of shoes walked through the victim’s blood at the crime scene; one pair
had a Vibram sole and the other had a dot pattern sole. Officers seized a pair of boots
with Vibram soles from defendant’s bedroom closet. Defendant later admitted he was
wearing boots at the time.
Mortensen also had several black, curly hairs in his hand at the time of his death.
Defendant admitted the victim pulled out some of his hair.
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On May 30, 1997, homicide investigators from San Bernardino Police Department
learned that prints from the scene belonged to defendant. Defendant’s Chula Vista
residence was searched, he was taken into custody and agreed to talk to police.
Defendant denied being in San Bernardino in the last three years. Defendant reported
that he took his son to see a movie as an alibi, but it was determined that the movie that
has not yet been released. At the time he reported being with his son, he was under
arrest. Defendant also denied having shot a gun in a long time.
After being confronted with physical evidence placing him at the scene, defendant
reported going to the range two weeks prior, on May 13, 1997, to look for a gun to
purchase. Defendant described the business owner, who was not present on the date of
the murder, and briefly described the business. The detective testified this was significant
because it established that defendant had been to the business, and it was implied that
defendant had “cased” the business.
During the interview, defendant was confronted with the information that the
owner had cleaned the counter tops the night before the murder so his prints could not
have been from two weeks ago. Defendant replied, “[y]ou sure that he wiped that thing
down good?”
The detective then confronted defendant with other evidence found at the scene
including his hair and shoeprints. Defendant then admitted to being at the range on May
27. He denied any involvement in the killing but stated he was at the shooting range with
someone he identified only as “Nino.” Defendant claimed he had gone to use the firing
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range, he turned around and saw Nino and Mortensen were fighting so he put his gun
down and went to break it up, but then Nino shot Mortensen causing blood to splat out of
his face. After being shot, Mortensen fell towards defendant and grabbed his hair. Nino
shot Mortensen three or four more times when he was on the ground and then forced
defendant to help commit the robbery.
Defendant described Nino3 as a 38 or 39-year-old black male, who was 6 feet 2
inches tall, muscular and close to 290 pounds. Defendant’s description conflicted with
the witness’s testimony. Defendant also identified a residence and car that purportedly
belonged to Nino. Further investigation revealed the home and car belonged to an older
Hispanic woman, who did not know anyone named Nino.
The People filed a felony complaint charging defendant with Mortensen’s murder
(§187, subd. (a)) and with the special allegation that he personally used a firearm in the
commission of the murder (§ 122022.5, subd. (a)). The People filed an amended felony
complaint adding a charge of second degree robbery (§ 211). Defendant was held to
answer on both charges and the special allegation.
The People filed an information in superior court charging defendant with murder
and robbery and alleging that defendant had personally used a firearm in the commission
of the murder. The People amended the information to include a special circumstance
allegation that the murder was committed during a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). At
3 Officers located a person named Larry Dean Bailey aka Lorenzo Bailey who
went by the nickname Nino. There were no fingerprints or evidence putting Larry Bailey
at the scene.
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defendant’s request, after the evidence had closed, the court instructed on an additional
charge, that defendant was an accessory after the fact to the robbery and murder.
B. Jury Verdict, Sentencing, and Appeal
The jury found defendant guilty of all charged offenses. Defendant was convicted
of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), a separate count of robbery (§ 211), and being
an accessory (§ 32). The jury found true that defendant personally used a firearm in the
commission of the murder (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). The jury also found true the special
circumstance allegation that he committed the murder during the commission of a
robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). He was sentenced to a term of life without possibility of
parole plus a consecutive determinate term of 9 years.
On direct appeal, this court affirmed the convictions based, in part, on a finding
that defendant was the actual killer, but adjusted the sentence. (People v. Edwards
(December 17, 1999, E022771 [nonpub. opn.].) The Supreme Court denied review.
(People v. Edwards (March 29, 2000, S085349).)
C. Defendant’s First Petition for Resentencing
On March 15, 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under the former
section 1170.95. On July 1, 2020, the trial court summarily denied the petition finding it
was “abundantly clear from the evidence presented at trial that the petitioner could today
be convicted of murder as the actual killer.”
Defendant appealed, alleging the trial court erred by summarily denying his
petition. On May 17, 2021, this court affirmed the trial court’s order denying his petition
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for resentencing. (People v. Edwards (May 17, 2021, E075312 [nonpub. opn.]).) The
Supreme Court denied review “without prejudice to any relief to which petitioner might
be entitled after this court decides People v. Lewis, S260598.” (People v. Edwards (July
21, 2021, S268947).)
D. Defendant’s Second Petition for Resentencing
On August 9, 2023, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under section
1172.6. On February 28, 2024, the trial court issued a written ruling finding that a prima
facie case had been set forth in defendant’s petition and set an order to show cause
hearing. Counsel stipulated that the court could review the written trial transcript in
advance of the order to show cause hearing. At the hearing, neither side called witnesses
and counsel argued based on the trial record, including the written transcript of
defendant’s statement to law enforcement. After hearing argument, the trial court took
the matter under submission.
On December 31, 2024, in a written order, the trial court found beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of first degree murder under three
currently valid theories: first degree murder during the commission of a robbery as an
actual killer; aiding and abetting in the murder during the commission of a robbery with
the intent to kill; and alternatively, first degree murder as a major participant in the
robbery acting with reckless indifference to human life. Defendant timely appealed.
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DISCUSSION
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s
finding that he was the actual killer, a direct aider and abettor with the intent to kill, and a
major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. Sufficient evidence
supporting any one of these murder theories would suffice to bar defendant from section
1172.6 relief. As we find that substantial evidence supports defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt as a major participant in the robbery who acted with reckless disregard
for human life, we do not address the sufficiency of the evidence of the remaining
alternate theories.
A. Section 1172.6
Under section 1172.6, subdivision (a), an individual convicted of murder under the
felony-murder rule, natural and probable consequences doctrine, or other theory under
which malice is imputed based on the person’s participation in a crime, may petition the
sentencing court to vacate the conviction and to be resentenced on any remaining counts
if the individual could presently not be convicted of murder because of changes to
sections 188 and 189. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
If the defendant has made “a prima facie case for relief and the superior court
issues an order to show cause, the matter proceeds to an evidentiary hearing at which it is
the prosecution’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner is
ineligible for resentencing.” (People v. Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 951; § 1172.6,
subd. (d)(3).) “[T]he trial court’s role in a section 1172.6 proceeding is to act as an
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independent fact finder . . . .” (People v. Guiffreda (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 112, 123
(Guiffreda).) It is the trial court’s role to “determine, in the first instance, whether the
petitioner committed murder under the law as amended . . . .” (Ibid.)
B. Standard of Review
After an evidentiary hearing, “a trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6 petition is
reviewed for substantial evidence.” (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988.)
“Under this standard, we review the record ‘ “ ‘in the light most favorable to the
judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence
which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid., citing People v.
Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 277.) “Our job on review is different from the trial
judge’s job in deciding the petition. While the trial judge must review all the relevant
evidence, evaluate and resolve contradictions, and make determinations as to credibility,
all under the reasonable doubt standard, our job is to determine whether there is any
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support a rational fact finder’s
findings beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276,
298.)
“ ‘Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable
inferences drawn from that evidence.’ ” (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57.) “That
the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not
warrant reversal of the judgment.” (People v. Lopez (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 1171, 1185.)
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“We will not reverse unless there is no hypothesis upon which sufficient substantial
evidence exists to support the trial court’s decision.” (Guiffreda, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th
at p. 125.) “ ‘The same standard applies when the conviction rests primarily on
circumstantial evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘An appellate court must accept logical inferences
that the [trier of fact] might have drawn from the circumstantial evidence.’ ” (Ibid.)
C. Factual and Credibility Findings by the Trial Court
The trial court made several factual findings. A witness description as well as the
physical evidence, including fingerprints, palmprints, shoe prints, and hair, placed
defendant at the scene of the murder. Three days after the murder, defendant was found
with a 9mm that was stolen from the range. A ballistics test revealed that the 9mm found
in defendant’s possession fired the bullet located in Mortensen’s buttock during his
autopsy. Due to the angle and trajectory of that bullet, “it must have been fired before
either of the shots that incapacitated Mortensen.” The blood evidence further
demonstrated that Mortensen was initially shot in the shooting range area and then moved
several feet before the fatal shots were fired. The trial court also found that a search of
the business indicated signs of a struggle with “items strewn about the floor” and victim’s
“personal items were found scattered about 20 feet from his body.” Further, the court
determined that the waiver form had been misdated and was filled out on May 27th.
The trial court’s ruling also included factual findings about the veracity of
defendant’s statement to police regarding the events leading up to and on the date of the
murder. Defendant specifically denied that he had been to San Bernardino in years,
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attempted to use a movie date with his son as an alibi but the movie had not yet been
released, and denied he had recently used a gun. The trial court found that defendant
continued to deny his presence at the scene and any knowledge of the murder until
confronted with physical evidence including his fingerprints, hair, and shoe prints.
The physical evidence including ballistics, pathology, and blood spatter
interpretation, constitutes substantial evidence to support the trial court’s factual findings.
These factual findings support the trial court’s conclusion that the events could not have
occurred as defendant described and that “defendant’s story attempting to minimize his
involvement and allege he was somehow coerced by Nino to participate in the offense is
refuted by the physical evidence at the scene, his possession of the 9mm Baretta that fired
the bullet recovered during the autopsy and his assertion that after the crimes were
committed they partied together using PCP.”
Based on the totality of the evidence, the trial court could reasonably infer that
defendant entered the range with an unlawful purpose. It is reasonable to infer that
defendant “cased” the business in advance and then attempted to conceal his presence at
the range by misdating the waiver form and by making untruthful statements to police
regarding his whereabouts and actions leading up to and on the date of the murder.
Ultimately, the evidence supports the trial court’s logical conclusion that during the
commission of a robbery, defendant struggled with Mortensen, who pulled defendant’s
hair, and then defendant shot Mortensen, causing him to leave a blood trail throughout
the business before the fatal shots caused his death.
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D. Major Participant with Reckless Indifference
The totality of the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that defendant would
still be liable for the murder of Mortenson as a major participant in the robbery who acted
with reckless indifference to human life. (§ 189, subds. (a), (e)(3).) This is defined as
“every person, not the actual killer, who, with reckless indifference to human life and as a
major participant, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists
in the commission of a [robbery] which results in the death of some person . . . .”
(§ 190.2, subds. (a)(17), (d).) The California Supreme Court provided guidance on the
meaning of major participant in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and
reckless indifference to human life in People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark).
1. Major Participant
The Court in Banks set forth the relevant factors in determining whether a
defendant was a major participant in a crime including defendant’s role in planning the
criminal enterprise that led to one or more deaths; defendant’s role in supplying or using
lethal weapons; defendant’s awareness of particular dangers posed by the nature of the
crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other participants; whether the
defendant was present at the scene of the killing, in a position to facilitate or prevent the
actual murder, or played a particular role in the death; and what did defendant do after
lethal force was used. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.) “No one of these
considerations is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily sufficient.” (Ibid.) To
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decide whether an accomplice is a major participant, the fact finder must consider the
totality of the circumstances. (Id. at p. 802.)
As set forth above, defendant played a significant role in the events that led to
Mortenson’s death as a major participant in the robbery. The evidence suggests that
defendant participated in planning the robbery that led to the murder of Mortenson. Only
after being confronted with physical evidence, defendant admitted to having visited the
range two weeks before the murder to purchase a gun, a strong inference that defendant
was “casing” the range.
It is also undisputed that defendant was present at the range with someone he
identified as “Nino.” Although defendant claims “Nino” — whose description was
markedly different from that of an eyewitness — was fighting with Mortensen, the
evidence is clear that defendant was involved in a struggle with Mortenson who pulled
defendant’s hair prior to the shots to the ear and head incapacitating him. While
defendant claims he was trying to prevent a fight between Mortenson and Nino, he
eventually admitted stealing ammunition from the range, albeit he was forced to do so by
Nino. Defendant verified that he rented a “nine . . . compact like small gun,” and a
loaded 9mm gun stolen from the range was later found under the driver’s seat of
defendant’s vehicle during a traffic stop. A bullet recovered from Mortenson’s buttock
was fired from the 9mm. The bullet entered Mortensen’s left arm, traveled downward
through the chest wall muscles and hip bone, and settled in the left buttock. The shot to
the arm occurred before the fatal shots that incapacitated him. This evidence points to
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defendant having fired at least one shot that caused severe internal injuries prior to the
fatal shots to the ear and head.
Defendant claims that after Mortenson was shot multiple times, he pleaded with
Nino to take Mortensen to the hospital. But when Nino refused, defendant assisted with
the robbery, got in the car with Nino, and they went to get “high” together. Sixteen guns,
one rifle, three thousand rounds of ammunition, a cash register, and Mortensen’s wallet
were missing. In totality, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
defendant was a major participant in the robbery.
2. Reckless Indifference to Human Life
According to Clark, reckless indifference to human life “encompasses a
willingness to kill (or to assist another in killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even if the
defendant does not specifically desire that death as the outcome of his actions.” (Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 617.) The court set forth pertinent “case-specific factors that [it]
and other state appellate courts have considered in upholding a determination of reckless
indifference to human life . . . .” (Id. at p. 618.) Some of these factors are similar to
those considered for a major participant analysis including defendant’s use or awareness
of the presence of a weapon, physical presence at the crime scene and opportunity to
restrain the killer or aid victims, knowledge of any threat the killer might represent, and
efforts to minimize the risk of violence, and duration of the crime. (Id. at pp. 618-623.)
No one factor is necessary and no one factor is necessarily sufficient. (Id. at p. 618.)
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“ ‘Reckless indifference to human life has a subjective and an objective element.
[Citation.] As to the subjective element, “[t]he defendant must be aware of and willingly
involved in the violent manner in which the particular offense is committed,” and he or
she must consciously disregard “the significant risk of death his or her actions create.”
[Citations.] As to the objective element, “ ‘[t]he risk [of death] must be of such a nature
and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the
circumstances known to him [or her], its disregard involves a gross deviation from the
standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.’ ”
[Citation.] “Awareness of no more than the foreseeable risk of death inherent in any
[violent felony] is insufficient” to establish reckless indifference to human life; “only
knowingly creating a ‘grave risk of death’ ” satisfies the statutory requirement.
[Citation.] Notably, “the fact a participant [or planner of] an armed robbery could
anticipate lethal force might be used” is not sufficient to establish reckless indifference to
human life.’ ” (People v. Keel (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 546, 557-558, citing In re Scoggins
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677.) Nor would using a gun while committing a robbery, standing
alone, be sufficient. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 617.)
Considering the factors set forth in Clark, targeting a gun shop and shooting range
for a robbery and using guns and ammunition belonging to the range presented a
convenient circumstance and an inherent risk of violence. Defendant was certainly
aware, since “casing” the range, that there were a variety of firearms that could easily be
rented and utilized for the robbery. Although we do not have information regarding
16
whether defendant was aware of Nino’s capacity to kill, both defendant and Nino were
armed with rental guns.
Critically, as discussed above, evidence supports that defendant fired a 9mm
during the course of the robbery. Defendant shot Mortensen at least once through the arm
causing internal injuries as the bullet traveled downward into Mortensen’s body before
the fatal shots.
The duration of the crime was arguably prolonged. We know that defendant and
Nino arrived at the range just before 9:00 a.m. and a customer arrived at 9:30 a.m. The
30 minutes was a period of time long enough to complete the waiver form to rent two
guns, buy ammunition, set up the targets, and practice shooting in the firing range — all
preparatory work before the actual robbery and murder — which escalated to a struggle
leading to Mortensen’s death, and the task of transporting multiple firearms, thousands of
rounds of ammunition, a cash register, and Mortensen’s wallet into a vehicle.
Defendant claims he intervened when he saw Mortensen and Nino physically
fighting before Nino shot Mortensen multiple times. Defendant also claims he pleaded
with Nino to seek help, but Nino refused, and defendant assessed any help would have
been futile. Yet even after Mortensen was mortally wounded, defendant proceeded to
help Nino in the robbery and then they drove away to get “high” together. There was no
evidence that defendant ultimately called for help or reported the incident.
There is significant overlap between being a major participant and having reckless
indifference to human life, “ ‘for the greater the defendant’s participation in the felony
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murder, the more likely that he acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 615, citing Tison v. Ariz. (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 153.) On balance,
defendant’s significant and considerable participation in the robbery and the shooting
exhibited his recklessness and indifference to human life.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that defendant was guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of first degree murder as a major participant with reckless
indifference to human life. Defendant was not entitled to relief under section 1172.6 and
the trial court properly denied his resentencing petition.
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
LEE
J.
We concur:
MCKINSTER
Acting P. J.
RAPHAEL
J.
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