Filed 7/1/26 P. v. Eddington CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D086724
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. CR130216)
v.
LEONARD E. EDDINGTON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
David J. Danielsen, Judge. Affirmed in part, dismissed in part.
Daniel J. Kessler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Leonard E. Eddington appeals the trial court’s order denying his
petition for resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1170.91, subdivision (b).
He also appeals the trial court’s refusal to take action on his resentencing
request under section 1172.1. His appointed appellate counsel filed a brief in
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
which he raised no claims of error and invited us to review the record
independently for error. (See People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende);
Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders).) Eddington accepted the
opportunity to file his own brief, which we address below. We affirm the trial
court’s order denying his resentencing petition and dismiss his appeal of the
trial court’s refusal to act on his resentencing request.
BACKGROUND2
In October 1992, a jury found Eddington guilty of murder in violation of
section 187, subdivision (a), with a special circumstances finding that he
committed the murder for financial gain within the meaning of section 190.2,
subdivision (a)(1). The jury also found that, in committing the murder, he
personally used a deadly weapon within the meaning of section 12022,
subdivision (b). The trial court sentenced him to serve life in prison without
the possibility of parole, plus one year.
In May 2025, Eddington filed a petition requesting recall of his
sentence and resentencing pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 600 and
section 1172.1. He filed the same section 1172.1 resentencing request again
later that month.
In June 2025, Eddington filed a petition for resentencing “based on
health conditions due to military service time listed in Penal Code Section
1170.91(b).” (Capitalization omitted.)
Later that month, the trial court denied Eddington’s section 1170.91,
subdivision (b) resentencing petition, finding that he was statutorily
ineligible for resentencing under section 1170.91 “in light of the nature of his
2 The facts of the underlying offense are not relevant to any potential
issues on this appeal. Accordingly, we will omit the traditional statement of
facts.
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conviction.” The court also issued a written notice to Eddington that stated:
“The court is in receipt of and has reviewed your request for recall and
resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.1. This is to notify you that
the court will not take any action on your request.”
In July 2025, Eddington filed a timely notice of appeal. In December
2025, Eddington filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking
resentencing relief under sections 1172.1 and 1170.91.
DISCUSSION
As we have noted, appellate counsel has filed a Wende brief and asks
the court to review the record for error. To assist the court in its review of
the record, and in compliance with Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738
(Anders), counsel identified the following possible issues that were considered
in evaluating the potential merits of this appeal:
1) Whether the trial court erred by denying Eddington’s section
1170.91, subdivision (b) resentencing petition; and
2) Whether the trial court erred by refusing to take any action on
Eddington’s section 1172.1 resentencing request.
Neither issue identified by counsel has arguable merit. As to the first,
and as set out in our order denying Eddington’s writ petition,3 a current or
former member of the military who has been convicted of a felony may
petition for resentencing alleging they suffer from a mental health condition
related to their military service, and that condition “was not considered as a
factor in mitigation at the time of sentencing.” (§ 1170.91, subd. (b).)
However, certain violent felony convictions, often called “super strikes,”
3 We take judicial notice of the order denying Eddington’s habeas
petition in case No. D087325. (See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
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render a defendant ineligible for relief. (§ 1170.91, subd. (c).) Murder is
included as a super strike. (§ 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv); People. v.
Jefferson (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 235, 242.) Because Eddington was convicted
of murder, he is categorically ineligible for relief under section 1170.91.
Regarding the second issue, the trial court’s refusal to take any action
on Eddington’s section 1172.1 resentencing request is not appealable. (People
v. Brinson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1040 [“a trial court’s decision not to act on
a defendant’s section 1172.1 request for recall and resentencing does not
affect his or her substantial rights and is therefore not appealable under
section 1237, subdivision (b).”]; People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985,
999 [“a trial court’s order declining a defendant’s request for recall and
resentencing is not appealable”].)
Eddington raises these same two issues in his supplemental brief. He
also argues there is a “statutory conflict between sections 1171 and 1172.1”
that “would allow self-initiation if filed pursuant to section 1171.” We
disagree. “[A] defendant who requests recall and resentencing under section
1172.1—even after section 1171 became effective—does not have a
substantial right at stake, and the trial court’s decision on that request is not
appealable.” (Brinson, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1049.)
Eddington also relies on People v. Frederickson (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th
910, but that case is inapposite as it involved harmonization of section 1172.1
with a statute that is not at issue here. (Id. at p. 915 [rejecting “the district
attorney’s claim that section 1172.1 . . . effectuates an improper amendment
of section 1385.1”].) On the record before us, the claims Eddington makes in
his supplemental brief do not raise any arguable issues for reversal on
appeal.
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We have reviewed the entire record as required by Wende and Anders.
We have not discovered any arguable issues for reversal on appeal.
Competent counsel has represented Eddington on this appeal.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s June 2025 order denying Eddington’s section 1170.91,
subdivision (b) resentencing petition is affirmed. Eddington’s appeal of the
trial court’s refusal to act on his resentencing request under section 1172.1 is
dismissed.
KELETY, J.
WE CONCUR:
DO, Acting P. J.
BUCHANAN, J.
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