Filed 7/20/26 P. v. Eckman CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B344321
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA079538)
v.
TOMMY CURTIS ECKMAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Jacqueline Lewis, Judge. Affirmed.
Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
This is an appeal from the postconviction denial of
appellant Tommy Curtis Eckman’s petition for full resentencing
under Penal Code section 1172.75.2 We affirm because Eckman
fails to show the trial court erred in not striking his prior strike
1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion because it
“raise[s] no substantial issues of law or fact . . . .” (Cal. Stds. Jud.
Admin., § 8.1.)
2 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
Generally summarized, effective on January 1, 2025,
section 1172.75, eliminates one-year prior prison enhancements
except as to a prior conviction for a “sexually violence offense.”
(Id., subd. (a).) Upon a full resentencing with the benefit of
“changes in law that reduce sentences,” the court must apply “a
lesser sentence than the one originally imposed” unless the court
finds that “imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public
safety.” (Id., subd. (d)(1) & (d)(2).) Resentencing “shall not result
in a longer sentence than the one originally imposed.” (Id.,
subd. (d)(1).) The court “may consider postconviction factors,
including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of
rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that
reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical
condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future
violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have
changed since the original sentencing so that continued
incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.” (Id.,
subd. (d)(3).) “Unless the court originally imposed the upper
term, the court may not impose a sentence exceeding the middle
term unless there are circumstances in aggravation that justify
the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle
term, and those facts have been stipulated to by the defendant, or
have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the
jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (Id., subd. (d)(4).)
2
convictions and otherwise asserts challenges not cognizable upon
review of a postconviction order under People v. Delgadillo (2022)
14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo) or challenges we rejected in his direct
appeal.3
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND4
We summarize only those procedural events pertinent to
our disposition of this appeal.
1. Eckman’s conviction and the trial court’s rejection of
Eckman’s sentencing motions
A jury convicted Eckman of annoying children, in violation
of section 647.6, subdivision (c)(2) (count 1); evading an officer, in
violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.2, subdivision (a) (count 2);
assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer, in violation of
Penal Code section 245, subdivision (c) (count 3); and resisting an
executive officer, in violation of section 69 (count 4).
In an amended information, the People alleged Eckman
suffered (1) four prior serious or volent felony convictions
pursuant to section 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d) and
section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) in the same 1985 case
No. A533100; (2) one prior conviction alleged as to each count
3 See footnote 4, post.
4 In reciting the procedural history, we rely in part on our
unpublished opinion in case No. B204655 in which we affirmed
the original judgment but directed the trial court to reduce one
count to a misdemeanor. (See People v. Eckman (May 11, 2009,
B204655) [nonpub. opn.] [2009 WL 1277733, at pp. *1, *12]
(Eckman). We, sua sponte, take judicial notice of our prior
opinion. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
3
pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b) (in case No. KA030241);
and (3) one serious prior felony conviction as to count 3 pursuant
to section 667, subdivision (a)(1). (Eckman, supra, B204655
[2009 WL 1277733, at pp. *6–*7].)5
The court rejected Eckman’s Benson6 motion to strike
“connected ‘strike’ priors,” on the theory the strike convictions
resulted from “the defendant’s commission of a single course of
events.” The court also denied Eckman’s Romero7 motion and
rejected Eckman’s opposition to consecutive sentencing, which
asserted, inter alia, that the court could avoid mandatory
5 These strikes were Eckman’s April 1985 convictions for
one count of forcible oral copulation, in violation of former
section 288a, subdivision (c), and three counts of forcible sodomy,
in violation of section 286, subdivision (c). The victim of these
crimes was his then wife. The prior prison felony conviction
alleged as to each count pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b)
was a 1997 conviction for violating Health and Safety Code
section 11350. (See Eckman, supra, B204655 [2009 WL 1277733,
at pp. *6–*7, *9].)
We note our prior opinion states Eckman was convicted of
violating section 288, subdivisions “(a), (c).” To the extent the
latter quotation can be interpreted to be a violation of both
subdivisions (a) and (c) that would be an incorrect interpretation.
Section 288 defines lewd and lascivious conduct, and former
section 288a (now section 287) defines oral copulation. The
amended information in the record alleges a prior conviction of
violating “PC 288a(c).” We thus assume for purposes of this
appeal that Eckman was found guilty of violating former
section 288a, subdivision (c).
6 People v. Benson (1998) 18 Cal.4th 24.
7People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497
(Romero).
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consecutive sentencing under the “Three Strikes” law8 if it struck
one of the strikes because counts 2, 3, and 4 arose out of the same
operative facts.
Prior to trial, as to count 1, Eckman stipulated to a prior
felony conviction of forcible oral copulation in violation of
section 288a, subdivision (c). Eckman waived jury on the other
allegations of prior convictions and the court found them true.
2. The trial court’s sentence and our opinion on
Eckman’s direct appeal
The trial court sentenced Eckman to an aggregate state
prison term of 81 years to life in state prison, consisting of a term
of 31 years to life on count 3 (a term of 25 years to life, along with
a five-year enhancement under § 667, subd. (a)(1) and a one-year
enhancement under § 667.5, subd. (b)); a consecutive term of
25 years to life on count 1; and a consecutive term of 25 years to
life on count 2. The court stayed the sentence on count 4
pursuant to section 654.
In 2009, with one exception, we affirmed the judgment. In
doing so, we held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Eckman’s Romero motion given his “significant recidivist
criminal history, including multiple convictions and violations of
parole,” and that he committed the offenses that were the subject
of the appeal within about three weeks from his last release on
8 “[S]ection 667, subdivisions (b) through (i), is the
codification of the Three Strikes law’s legislative version (Stats.
1994, ch. 12, § 1). . . . [S]ection1170.12 is the codification of its
initiative version (Prop. 184, § 1, as approved by voters, Gen.
Elec. (Nov. 8, 1994)). The two are ‘nearly identical.’ ([Romero],
supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 504.)” (People v. Williams (1998)
17 Cal.4th 148, 152, fn. 1.)
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parole. The court also held the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Eckman’s Benson motion. We also
concluded “consecutive sentenc[ing]” was “mandatory.”
We, however, found insubstantial evidence to support
Eckman’s felony conviction on count 1 because there was no
evidence to support that the victim of the prior conviction under
section 288a, subdivision (c) was a minor under 16 years of age,
which would have made his violation of section 647.6,
subdivision (c)(2), a felony as opposed to a misdemeanor. We
remanded the matter to the trial court to resentence Eckman on
count 1 as a misdemeanor in violation of section 647.6,
subdivision (a). On remand, Eckman received a one-year county
jail sentence on count 1 to run concurrently with count 3.9
3. Eckman’s resentencing petition pursuant to
section 1172.75 and the trial court’s new sentence
eliminating only the prior prison and five-year
enhancements
On August 17, 2023, the superior court issued an order
“authoriz[ing] resentencing” under sections 1172.7 and 1172.75
and appointed Eckman counsel. Eckman requested his sentence
be recalled, and that he receive a full resentencing hearing,
including the benefit of all new laws pursuant to 1172.75.
Eckman requested his sentence be reduced to a determinate
sentence of 9 years 16 months to be achieved by (1) eliminating
the one-year prior prison enhancement, (2) eliminating his five-
year enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a) in case
9 On February 4, 2016, Eckman petitioned for resentencing
under Proposition 47. The trial court denied the petition finding
him ineligible for relief.
6
No. A533100, (3) striking prior strikes under Romero and leaving
only one strike thus making him a second striker, (4) awarding a
one-year consecutive sentence for violation of section 647.6,
subdivision (a), a misdemeanor (count 1), (5) setting count 3 as
the base count and imposing a midterm of four years doubled to
eight years, (6) imposing one-third the midterm of two years on
count two doubled to 16 months, and (7) changing his sentence on
count 4 to one third the midterm of two years doubled to
16 months but staying that sentence under section 654.
To support his recommended sentence, Eckman reiterated
the arguments in favor of concurrent sentencing and striking his
prior strike convictions that he made at his original sentencing.
Eckman also argued pursuant to section 1172.75, subdivision
(d)(1) that he was entitled to a lesser sentence because he was not
a danger to public safety. Because of his then age, 66, his
disability, and his performance in prison evidencing his
rehabilitation, he did not “pose a risk” to public safety. He
claimed his past crimes were “drug induced,” his rules violation
in prison caused no injuries, and he had been sober for 10 years.
He also cited the self-help courses he took in prison and when
released, he would take NA and AA classes and work with a
sponsor. Eckman attached to his memorandum, inter alia, a
sentencing memorandum from the then District Attorney, a rules
violation report, certificates of completion of self-help courses,
and police reports.
With the exception on one prior prison enhancement, the
People opposed striking any enhancement or strike given
Eckman’s prior violent criminal history and the nature of his
crimes in the current case: “This is a defendant with a violent
criminal past, who terrifyingly followed a brother and sister
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around a park, while the defendant was naked, with an arm
under a towel. When police responded, he refused to get out of
his car, and instead tried to escape. When that didn’t work, he
resisted arrest by kicking one of the officers and attacking
another with a . . . makeshift weapon.” The People attached
several exhibits to their opposition including, inter alia, minute
orders, probation and police reports, our prior opinion, and a list
of his in-custody rules violations.
On January 30, 2025, the trial court held a full
resentencing hearing and struck the one-year prior prison and
five-year section 667, subdivision (a) enhancement but found it
was not in the interest of justice “to strike anything further.” The
court observed Eckman had made the same arguments he made
in the “original trial” and that were addressed in his direct
appeal when the appellate court refused to strike any of the
strikes. The resentencing court further observed Eckman was
49 years old when he chased children around a part “in a state of
undress.” The court noted Eckman’s lack of a crime-free record
and that he has done “very, very little” to address his drug and
sex abuse issues to indicate that “anything has changed since the
time he was convicted.” The court then resentenced Eckman to,
among other things, a total of 50 years to life on counts 2 and 3.
Eckman filed a timely appeal.
4. Appellate proceedings regarding Eckman’s
resentencing petition
On March 20, 2026, appellant’s appointed counsel filed a
brief in which she raised no issues and requested this court
independently review the record pursuant to People v. Wende
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. On March 23, 2026 and citing Wende, the
court sent Eckman notice that he may file a supplemental brief
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stating “any grounds for an appeal, or contentions, or arguments
which appellant wishe[d] this court to consider.” Eckman did not
file a supplemental brief.
The citation to Wende in the court’s March 23, 2026 notice
was incorrect. Generally, when an appellant appeals from the
denial of postconviction relief and appointed appellate counsel
files a brief raising no issues, an appellate court does not review
the record independently to determine whether there are any
arguable issues on appeal. (See Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
pp. 224–226.) Rather, we “evaluate the specific arguments
presented in” the appellant’s supplemental brief or letter, if
appellant files one. (See id. at p. 232.) Because Eckman was not
informed that Delgadillo’s procedures govern this appeal, the
court gave Eckman another opportunity to submit a
supplemental brief stating any grounds, contentions, or
arguments relevant to his postconviction appeal. We further
informed Eckman that if he did not file a supplemental brief, the
court may dismiss the appeal as abandoned. (See id. at pp. 231–
232.) On June 12, 2026, Eckman filed a supplemental brief.
DISCUSSION
In his supplemental brief, Bell makes the following
arguments:
1. In violation of his constitutional rights, he was not
brought to trial within 60 days, requested dismissal of his case,
and was not represented at the hearing on that request because
his counsel was in a jury trial;
2. The detectives read him his Miranda rights only
after the detectives interviewed him;
3. His counsel did not do “a complete investigation of all
the evidence of [his] constitutional rights”;
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4. Because his strike convictions predate enactment of
the Three Strikes law, the trial court should have stricken his
strikes, and not just the one-year prior prison and five-year
enhancements;
5. The reduction of count 1 to a misdemeanor reflects an
inadequate investigation of the prior conviction in “A533100” and
a proper investigation would have produced “a different
sentence”;
6. He is entitled to a different appellate counsel given
his current counsel filed a brief citing no issues and did “not even
get a strike remove[d],” and that his current counsel may be
biased as a women and maybe as a mother;
7. The bamboo stick involved in count 3 was not a
deadly weapon;
8. His recitation of the facts show he should not have
suffered the convictions in his current case; and
9. His prison record shows he has taken many “self
help” classes and he is 68 years old and disabled in both arms.
A Delgadillo appeal from a postconviction resentencing
order is not an occasion to revisit issues that this court already
decided against Eckman in his appeal from the original
judgment. As set forth in our Procedural Background, many of
his above arguments ask us to do just that. Attacks on counsel’s
handling of the original trial, the adequacy of Miranda warnings,
whether his speedy trial rights were violated, and other issues
that could have been raised in the direct appeal, as well as
attacks on the jury’s evaluation of the evidence, are also not
cognizable upon review under Delgadillo. Eckman’s contention
that his strikes predating enactment of the Three Strikes law are
not eligible strikes under that law is not supported by case
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authority. (See, e.g., People v. Hamilton (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th
1615.)
We review a trial court’s refusal to strike or dismiss a prior
strike conviction under the deferential abuse of discretion
standard of review. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367,
373.) “We presume that the trial court acted to achieve
legitimate sentencing objectives. [Citation.] The burden is on the
party challenging the sentencing decision to show that the court
abused its discretion.” (People v. Knowles (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th
757, 765.) We conclude Eckman has failed to demonstrate the
trial court abused its discretion in not striking Eckman’s strike
convictions.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
WEINGART, J.
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