Filed 6/18/26 P. v. Dunbar CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
THE PEOPLE, C102300
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 24FE003334)
v.
CHRISTOPHER JAMES DUNBAR,
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury convicted defendant Christopher James Dunbar of grand theft and
possession of methamphetamine, fentanyl, and paraphernalia. The trial court found
true a prior strike conviction allegation and sentenced defendant to an aggregate six years
in prison.
Defendant now contends the trial court should have relieved his defense counsel
based on an irreconcilable conflict of interest. The parties treat the claim as one of
ineffective assistance of counsel. We conclude that even if a conflict of interest existed,
defendant has not demonstrated deficient performance or prejudice. Accordingly, we
will affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
After jury selection commenced, but outside the presence of the jury panel, the
following exchange occurred:
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“[Defense counsel]: … I don’t know what it’s called when the attorney makes the
Marsden[1] motion, but the thing about what we do is -- and I appreciate your listening to
me, Your Honor -- is that we have difficult clients. And you have to make some leeway
for that, but my tolerance for any type of disrespectful language or abuse is zero.
[¶] … [¶]
“THE COURT: I think I see what’s going on. [Defense counsel], you’re in a
position where you do not feel you can represent your client because of a breakdown in
the relationship?
“[Defense counsel]: Correct, and it’s not the first time. I let it pass a couple times.
I figure – and you know, I have been doing this for a dozen years, and it comes with the
territory. But if it happens again, and again, and again --
“THE COURT: Yeah.
“[Defense counsel]: -- I have to say that I, myself, draw a line where that is not
okay.
“THE COURT: Okay. So the question then for me at this point is then -- wow.
Does the Court then now appoint an attorney off the panel, in essence, declare a mistrial
here because of the breakdown of the attorney-client relationship and put the matter back
in home court for ID of appointed counsel and start the process over?
“Let’s take a break. Let’s look -- I have never faced this issue before. I haven’t
seen this issue.”
After a recess, the following exchange took place:
“THE COURT: On record. Record will reflect counsel and Defendant are present
outside the presence of the panel.
1 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden).
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“And [defense counsel], I’d like to explore this a little bit farther, but I want to
make sure to stay completely out of the attorney-client communication privilege.
“So this sort of started sort of an indication that Mr. Dunbar wanted a Marsden
motion. And then it seems to me that it’s really not a Marsden motion, but a conflict of
interest for your office, correct, for you, in other words, your representation of Mr.
Dunbar? [¶] … [¶] [W]hat is the conflict such that, [defense counsel], you no longer feel
you can represent Mr. Dunbar?
“[Defense counsel]: So Your Honor, Mr. Dunbar and I have had these type of
conversations a few times before where -- and this is on the phone, where his
dissatisfaction with his situation, he has to emotionally download that onto me. This is
not a novel situation for a public defender as you can imagine. We deal with mentally
and emotionally unstable people all the time, but it happens again, and again, and again,
and I’m letting it slide.
“But today he comes to court, and he -- he has this paper that he wants to file.
And of course I’m telling him not to do it, right, because for obvious reasons, that any
type of communication, I like to know what it is about. And I also know that the point is
moot. And he begins to insult me. It’s not good, your doing helping me [sic], so on and
so forth. Just insulting me, being emotionally abusive.
“And you know, I have been doing this for over a decade. Sometimes, public
defenders, they get stabbed. Some of them get punched. Some of them get spat on, and I
think that there’s a level of this type of behavior where I can say, you know what, I don’t
think it’s fair. I don’t think that it’s fair to ask me to work in those -- you know, that type
of condition. And I don’t think I can, nor do I feel safe with this type of behavior next to
me.”
The trial court said, “I think … you’re declaring a conflict … between you and
your client such that you do not feel comfortable [¶] … [¶] [a]nd cannot adequately
represent him at this point?” Defense counsel responded, “Correct.” Defense counsel
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also said that because of defendant’s issues, “I will be spending the majority of my time
just dealing with this, both emotionally and intellectually. In fact, it impacted how I was
doing my voir dire, how I’m thinking about this case strategically. [¶] The bulk of my
energy then is spent managing his emotions, and I don’t think that’s helpful to him at all.”
The court said to defense counsel, “Really what I’m trying to nail down is whether or not
you think the caliber of your service is being substantially diluted at this point given the
nature of your relationship with the Defendant.” Defense counsel responded, “I do.”
The trial court said, “The record would reflect, or at least in my mind the record
reflects that probably there is a conflict of interest now. And then the next step is what to
do with that conflict of interest. [¶] I think it would be unwise to proceed and force your
attorney-client relationship to continue.”
The trial court said it would conduct further research, and it asked counsel for both
sides to consult with their supervisors regarding next steps. Following a recess, defense
counsel appeared in court with a supervising attorney from the public defender’s office.
The trial court asked defense counsel, “this morning when we were discussing your
ability to continue representation and the possible conflict, are you satisfied now that if
you’re kept in the case, you can continue to represent your client effectively?” Defense
counsel said, “Yes.”
Defendant then made a motion pursuant to Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118. After
considering defendant’s concerns and defense counsel’s responses to those concerns, the
trial court denied the motion, explaining that defense counsel had properly represented
defendant.
The jury found defendant guilty of grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a)),2
misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)),
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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misdemeanor possession of fentanyl (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)), and
misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364). The jury found
defendant not guilty of unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle, buying and receiving a
stolen vehicle, and a separate count of misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia.
Following a bench trial, the trial court found true a prior strike conviction
allegation and aggravating circumstances. It sentenced defendant to four years (the
middle term, doubled for the prior strike) for grand theft, a consecutive one year for
possession of methamphetamine, a consecutive one year for possession of fentanyl,
and a concurrent 180 days for possession of paraphernalia.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court should have relieved his defense counsel based
on an irreconcilable conflict of interest. The parties treat the claim as one of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
“ ‘A criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to the assistance of counsel by the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 15 of the
California Constitution. This constitutional right includes the correlative right to
representation free from any conflict of interest that undermines counsel’s loyalty to his
or her client.’ ” (People v. Rices (2017) 4 Cal.5th 49, 65 (Rices).) “ ‘Conflicts of interest
may arise in various factual settings. Broadly, they “embrace all situations in which an
attorney’s loyalty to, or efforts on behalf of, a client are threatened by his responsibilities
to another client or a third person or by his own interests.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] [¶]
Although ‘most conflicts of interest seen in criminal litigation arise out of a lawyer’s dual
representation of co-defendants, the constitutional principle is not narrowly confined to
instances of that type.’ [Citation.] Thus, a conflict may exist ‘whenever counsel is so
situated that the caliber of his services may be substantially diluted.’ ” (People v. Hardy
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 135-136.)
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“ ‘For both state and federal purposes, a claim of conflicted representation is one
variety of claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance. Hence, to obtain reversal of
a criminal verdict, the defendant must demonstrate that (1) counsel labored under an
actual conflict of interest that adversely affected counsel’s performance, and (2) absent
counsel’s deficiencies arising from the conflict, it is reasonably probable the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” (Rices, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 65.)
To establish deficient performance, a “defendant must show that the conflict
(a) existed and (b) had some palpable, real effect on the trial, i.e., the ‘ “actual conflict
of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” ’ ” (People v. Almanza (2015)
233 Cal.App.4th 990, 1001-1002 (Almanza).) “ ‘In determining whether a defendant has
demonstrated the existence of an actual conflict of interest satisfying the first prong of the
analysis [, i.e., deficient performance], we consider whether “the record shows that
counsel ‘pulled his punches,’ i.e., failed to represent defendant as vigorously as he might
have had there been no conflict.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1002.) A reviewing court “ ‘must bear in
mind … that when “ ‘a conflict of interest causes an attorney not to do something, the
record may not reflect such an omission. We must therefore examine the record to
determine (i) whether arguments or actions omitted would likely have been made by
counsel who did not have a conflict of interest, and (ii) whether there may have been a
tactical reason (other than the asserted conflict of interest) that might have caused any
such omission.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.)
As to whether a conflict of interest existed, defendant focuses on defense
counsel’s initial comments to the trial court. Shortly thereafter, however, defense counsel
assured the trial court that he could effectively represent defendant. Defendant argues the
change in position occurred because defense counsel was pressured by his supervisor to
continue representation. It is true that the supervising attorney appeared in the
courtroom, but there is no other evidence defense counsel was pressured into saying that
he could effectively represent defendant.
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Nevertheless, even if a conflict of interest existed, defendant has not demonstrated
deficient performance or prejudice. As to the former, defendant contends that deficient
performance is established by a showing that defense counsel labored under an actual
conflict of interest, as opposed to a theoretical one. As we have explained, however, to
prevail defendant must demonstrate not only that the conflict “existed” but also that it
“had some palpable, real effect on the trial, i.e., the ‘ “actual conflict of interest adversely
affected his lawyer’s performance.” ’ ” (Almanza, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1001-
1002; see also id. at pp. 1002-1003 [the defendant met his burden by showing that
defense counsel failed to call a relevant witness due to the conflict of interest]; People v.
Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 310 [the defendant did not show any adverse
effect on counsel’s performance due to an assumed conflict].) Defendant does not show
how the asserted conflict resulted in deficient performance by his trial counsel, and thus
his claim fails. (Cf. People v. O’Malley (2016) 62 Cal.4th 944, 1002 [“Defendant relies
on defense counsel’s statements during the in camera hearings expressing doubt about his
own ability to continue with the case, but he identifies no instance in which the alleged
conflict actually affected counsel’s performance. … Accordingly, we reject defendant’s
claim.”].)
Regarding prejudice, defendant asserts that because an actual conflict of interest
existed, prejudice is presumed. Defendant is incorrect. The California Supreme Court
has explained that a presumption of prejudice applies only to claims involving conflicts
arising from multiple concurrent representation. (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th
390, 428-429.) “Strickland [v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668] provides the
appropriate analytic framework for assessing prejudice arising from attorney conflicts of
interest outside the context of multiple concurrent representation.” (Doolin, at p. 428; see
Almanza, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 1007.) Under Strickland, a “defendant must show
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.” (Strickland, at p. 694.) Defendant
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contends that, even if not presumed, prejudice is established because defense counsel
initially stated that the conflict affected his representation. Such an assertion falls far
short of showing a reasonable probability that the outcome of defendant’s trial would
have been different but for the purported conflict causing unspecified errors.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/S/
MAURO, Acting P. J.
We concur:
/S/
RENNER, J.
/S/
FEINBERG, J.
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