Filed 6/26/26 P. v. Dodson CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B343202
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA091265)
v.
DEAN PATRICK DODSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Daniel B. Feldstern, Judge. Affirmed.
Kathleen Becket, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General,
Stephanie C. Brenan and Stefanie Yee, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Dean Patrick Dodson appeals after a jury convicted him of
eight felonies: two counts of criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422, subd. (a)),1
two counts of vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a)), one count of assault with a deadly
weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), one count of assault by means of force likely to
produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)), and two counts of stalking
(§ 646.9, subd. (a)).)
On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his pretrial
mental health diversion motion and the sufficiency of the evidence underlying
one of his vandalism convictions. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the
judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Trial Evidence
The victims of defendant’s crimes were his sister Vicki and her
husband Charles.2 Vicki was 72 years old in 2018. Vicki and Charles lived in
a gated senior community.
1. Counts 1-4: Criminal Threats and Vandalism
One day in April 2018, Vicki “heard a commotion” outside. She looked
outside and saw defendant near the back of her car. He was yelling
something about the car. Four or five minutes later, defendant began
pounding on the door with his metal cane. Defendant yelled, “I am going to
kill you.”
Following this incident, there was damage to the front door (dents and
scrapes), which cost $950 to repair. The next day, Vicki noticed damage to
her car (scratches and a hole), which cost $1,446.08 to repair, although the
insurance deductible was only $250.
2. Counts 5 & 6: Assaults
One day in June 2018, defendant again came to the home. Defendant
barged inside, yelling and screaming. He pushed Vicki and hit her. Charles
intervened, and defendant hit Charles with the metal cane at least five times.
Vicki tried to pull defendant away from Charles, and defendant pushed her.
1 Unspecified section references are to the Penal Code.
2 We refer to the victims by first name to protect their privacy. (See Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).)
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As a result of the assault, Charles suffered a bloody nose and injuries to
his arm and leg. Vicki suffered a black eye and a cut to her arm, which bled
“profusely.” Both were treated in the hospital.
3. Counts 7-9: Stalking and Threat to Vicki’s Daughter
For four years following the June 2018 incident, defendant
communicated threats to Vicki, mainly by phone and on an almost daily
basis. Defendant also sent Vicki a message containing a threat to kill Vicki’s
daughter and her family. Vicki forwarded the message to her daughter.
4. Defendant’s Testimony
Defendant admitted that during the April 2018 incident, he used his
metal cane to pound on the front door. He denied threatening to kill Vicki
and Charles, although he admitted he had sent messages containing such
threats. Defendant also denied damaging Vicki’s car.
Regarding the June 2018 incident, defendant asserted that the physical
altercation began when Charles put him in a headlock. Vicki was injured
because she fell during the scuffle. Defendant used his cane only to make
Charles let go.
Defendant did not recall sending Vicki messages containing threats to
kill Vicki’s daughter and her family.
B. Mental Health Diversion Motion
After his preliminary hearing and arraignment on the information,
defendant filed a motion for pretrial mental health diversion pursuant to
sections 1001.35 and 1001.36. The motion was supported by a psychological
assessment. Also included as attachments were the sheriff’s incident reports,
copies of some of the messages defendant had sent to Vicki, a document
indicating that defendant had enrolled in substance abuse treatment at the
jail, and a pre-conviction probation report.
The probation report reflected that defendant’s criminal history dated
back to 2000. His convictions included DUI’s, felony evading, fighting in
public, felony elder abuse, and felony criminal threats. Defendant’s 2008
felony criminal threats conviction was based on messages he left for the
victim, related to “family issues,” in which he threatened to kill her by
cutting her throat.
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According to the assessment, defendant suffered from alcohol use
disorder and “Unspecified Schizophrenia Spectrum/Other Psychotic
Disorder.” Defendant, who was age 64 and incarcerated, reported having
four psychiatric hospitalizations since he was age 42. He took daily
medications to treat his psychiatric symptoms. He had been an alcoholic
since age 20 and had taken various medications to address withdrawal
symptoms.
The assessment noted “areas of psychological concern,” including
“thought distortions” and a tendency toward aggression. He was assessed as
posing “a moderate risk of future violence.” On the positive side, defendant
showed “a clear understanding of his mental health challenges and [was]
actively engaged in seeking treatment.”
The assessment further explained that a combination of alcohol use
disorder and schizophrenia “can significantly increase the risk of criminal
behavior due to the complex interaction between impaired judgment, altered
perception, and diminished impulse control. . . . When both disorders are
present, they can amplify each other’s effects.”
The assessment included the evaluator’s opinions as to the suitability
factors set forth in section 1001.36, subdivision (c). The assessment indicated
that defendant’s symptoms “could respond to mental health treatment”
(italics added). (See § 1001.36, subd. (c)(1) [“In the opinion of a qualified
mental health expert, the defendant’s symptoms of the mental disorder
causing, contributing to, or motivating the criminal behavior would respond
to mental health treatment.”], italics added.)
As to the question of whether defendant would “pose an unreasonable
risk of danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in the
community” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4)), the evaluator offered the following:
“[Defendant] is assessed as a moderate risk of violence due to several
contributing factors. Firstly, his ongoing alcohol addiction impairs his
judgment, heightens impulsivity, and may trigger aggressive behavior.
Moreover, his poor impulse control is a risk factor. Individuals with poor
impulse control often struggle to manage their emotions and reactions, which
can result in sudden outbursts and difficulties in handling conflicts
effectively.” The evaluator concluded that “Comprehensive treatment aimed
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at stabilizing his mental health and addressing his substance abuse is critical
to mitigate the potential for violence.”
Finally, as to the issue of whether “the recommended inpatient or
outpatient program of mental health treatment will meet the specialized
mental health treatment needs of the defendant” (§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(1)(A)),
the assessment recommended that defendant participate in cognitive
behavioral therapy, relapse prevention therapy, Alcoholics Anonymous, peer-
support groups, long-term care and monitoring, and medication management
with a psychiatrist.
C. Pretrial Proceedings
At the first pretrial conference/trial setting hearing following the filing
of his mental health diversion motion, defendant requested a continuance.
No mention of the mental health diversion motion appears in the minutes of
that hearing.
At the continued pretrial conference/trial setting hearing, defendant
was a “miss-out” and his trial counsel again requested a continuance. The
minutes reflect that defendant’s mental health diversion motion was taken
off calendar by trial counsel “due to Defendant’s Florida hold.”
Nothing in the record indicates that defendant’s mental health
diversion motion was ever formally placed back on calendar. At the next
hearing, a pretrial conference/trial setting held on November 5, 2024, the
motion was heard and denied, off the record.
A jury trial commenced on December 9, 2024.
D. Verdicts and Sentencing
The jury found defendant guilty of counts 1-8 but deadlocked on count
9, the threat to kill Vicki’s daughter. The trial court declared a mistrial on
that count, and the prosecution later dismissed it.
Defendant waived his right to a jury trial on the aggravating factor
that he had served a prior prison term, and on allegations that he had a prior
strike conviction and a prior serious felony conviction; he subsequently
admitted each of those allegations.
At sentencing, the trial court imposed an aggregate prison term of 13
years, four months. During the sentencing hearing, trial counsel referred to
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the mental health diversion motion, stating that the trial court had found
defendant “eligible but not suitable due to danger grounds.”
II. DISCUSSION
A. Denial of Mental Health Diversion Motion
Defendant contends the trial court’s off-the-record denial of his mental
health diversion motion was an abuse of discretion. He asserts that the
evidence submitted in support of the motion supported a grant of mental
health diversion and that the record fails to demonstrate that the trial court
properly considered the relevant considerations. He seeks a conditional
reversal for reconsideration of his motion.
Respondent contends defendant failed to preserve this claim for
appellate review, because he did not provide an adequate record, and that
this court must presume the trial court’s order is correct. We do not find
waiver, but we agree that “[a]n order is presumed correct; all intendments
are indulged in to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and
error must be affirmatively shown. [Citation.]” (Corenevsky v. Superior
Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 307, 321.)
On this record, including trial counsel’s recollection that mental health
diversion was denied because the trial court found defendant “not suitable
due to danger grounds,” defendant fails to establish an abuse of discretion.
(See People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 448-449 [abuse of discretion
occurs when trial court “makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by
applying the wrong legal standard . . . or bases its decision on express or
implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence”].)
The trial court could reasonably have found that defendant was not
suitable for mental health diversion because he would “pose an unreasonable
risk of danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in the
community.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).) Section 1170.18, subdivision (c)
specifies that “‘unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ means an
unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a new violent felony within
the meaning of” section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv) (a “super strike”), which
includes homicide and attempted homicide offenses. In determining
defendant’s likelihood of committing such a crime, the trial court was entitled
to “consider the opinions of the district attorney, the defense, or a qualified
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mental health expert, and may consider the defendant’s treatment plan, the
defendant’s violence and criminal history, the current charged offense, and
any other factors that the court deems appropriate.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).)
Defendant’s psychological assessment supported a finding that there
was an unreasonable risk that he would commit a super strike if he is treated
in the community. The assessment emphasized that defendant’s combination
of alcohol use disorder and schizophrenia raised his potential for violence.
Although defendant had undergone several stints of psychiatric treatment, it
had not been effective, and thus the trial court could find that defendant was
not likely to follow through with the recommended mental health treatment.
(See People v. Superior Court (Taylor) (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 1153, 1168-
1169 [defendant’s “history of departing facilities without completing
treatment and the temporary effects of his current medication indicate he
would pose an unreasonable risk if granted diversion to a voluntary mental
health program”].) The trial court could further find that defendant was
unlikely to follow through with treatment for his alcohol use disorder, given
the length of time he had been using alcohol and the fact that prior alcohol-
related arrests had not motivated defendant to address his addiction. (See
People v. Pacheco (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 207, 214 (Pacheco) [defendant’s prior
drug-related arrests and long history of drug use made “his resolve to stop
using the drug . . . dubious” and supported a finding of unreasonable risk].)
Significantly, defendant’s mental health diversion motion did not contain a
specific “treatment plan” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4)) but merely treatment
recommendations.
The fact that defendant has no prior convictions for violent felonies is
not determinative. In Pacheco, the defendant’s criminal history included
mostly misdemeanor drug offenses, and his current offense was arson of
forest land. (Pacheco, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 209, 211.) Nevertheless,
the Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s finding of an unreasonable risk
that the defendant would commit an “arson murder.” (Id. at p. 214.) In this
case, defendant’s criminal history included alcohol-related offenses as well as
prior elder abuse and threats to kill. Given that history, the facts underlying
the current charges, and the potential for future violence articulated in the
psychological assessment, the trial court could find an unreasonable risk that
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defendant would commit a homicide offense if he was granted mental health
diversion.
Defendant notes that other appellate courts have held that a trial
court’s reasons for denying mental health diversion should be made on the
record. However, those cases involved denials based on the trial court’s
“‘residual’ discretion” to deny mental health diversion despite finding the
defendant eligible and suitable. (Flareau v. Superior Court (2026) 118
Cal.App.5th 681, 684 (Flareau); Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98
Cal.App.5th 882, 893 (Sarmiento) [“Where the court chooses to exercise this
residual discretion to deny diversion, its statement of reasons should reflect
consideration of the underlying purposes of the statute and explain why
diversion would not meet those goals.”].) Here, the record indicates the trial
court’s denial was based on its finding that defendant was not suitable for
mental health diversion. Moreover, neither Flareau nor Sarmiento reversed
on the basis that the trial courts failed to place their reasons on the record.
In his reply brief, defendant asserts that the trial court’s failure to
place its ruling on the record was, in itself, reversible error. “This claim is
forfeited. ‘Obvious reasons of fairness militate against consideration of an
issue raised initially in the reply brief … .’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1218.) This claim also is not supported by
any of defendant’s cited authority. Defendant cites to the California
Constitution’s statement that the courts of this state are “courts of record”
(Cal. Const., art. VI, § 1) and to the definition of “court of record” contained in
various secondary sources such as Black’s Law Dictionary. He also cites to
Code of Civil Procedure section 269, subdivision (a)(2), which requires a court
reporter to “take down . . . rulings of the court” in a felony case “on the order
of the court or at the request of the prosecution, the defendant, or the
attorney for the defendant.” None of these authorities stands for the
proposition that a trial court’s failure to place a ruling on the record amounts
to reversible error. Moreover, under the specific circumstances of this case,
where the motion for mental health diversion was not on calendar, and where
the record is sufficient for us to review the trial court’s reasons for denying
that motion, reversal is not warranted.
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B. Sufficiency of the Evidence – Vandalism to Car
Defendant contends there is no substantial evidence to support his
conviction of vandalizing Vicki’s car.3 Defendant points out that no one saw
him damage the car, and he argues that the circumstantial evidence was
insufficient. Defendant relies primarily on the circumstantial evidence rule,
which requires that the jury “be convinced that the only reasonable
conclusion supported by the circumstantial evidence is that the defendant is
guilty.” (CALCRIM No. 224.)
“To determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, an
appellate court reviews the entire record in the light most favorable to the
prosecution to determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value, from which a rational trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.]” (People v. Silva
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 368.)
“The standard of appellate review is the same when the evidence of
guilt is primarily circumstantial. ‘Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit
a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two
interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence
[citations], it is the jury, not the appellate court which must be convinced of
the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. “‘If the circumstances
reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing
court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a
contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.’”’ [Citations.]”
(People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 668.)
In challenging the car vandalism conviction, Defendant asserts that it
was speculative for the jury to conclude he was guilty. He argues that since
he was banging on the front door five minutes after being seen by Vicki’s car,
there was insufficient time for him to have vandalized the car. He further
argues that the front door damage (dents) was different from the car damage
(scratches), and he notes that the damage was not discovered until the next
3 Vandalism to the car was charged as count 4, and the jury’s verdict also
denoted it as count 4. On appeal, the parties incorrectly identify this
conviction as count 6.
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day. Finally, he points to his own trial testimony denying that he vandalized
the car.
The circumstantial evidence here strongly linked defendant to the car
vandalism and thus justified the jury’s verdict. Defendant was not merely
seen in proximity to the car; Vicki heard a “commotion” just before seeing
defendant and heard defendant yelling about the car. Given the proximity of
the car to the residence, a reasonable jury could find that five minutes was
enough time for defendant to cause the car damage and then cause the front
door damage, or that defendant had already caused the car damage before
Vicki saw him. Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the evidence showed that
he was agitated when he was seen near the car, making it a reasonable
inference that he damaged both the car and front door during the same
episode. Finally, a reasonable jury could find that defendant’s metal cane
was used to damage both the car and the front door, given the photographic
evidence.4 The jury was not required to speculate that someone else may
have caused the car damage, particularly since the vandalism occurred in a
gated senior community.
In his reply brief, defendant relies on In re Leanna W. (2004) 120
Cal.App.4th 735, but that case involved vandalism that occurred during a
party, so there were many different people who could have damaged the
property. In this case, there was no evidence that, around the time of the
vandalism, anyone else other than defendant was near Vicki’s car, in
possession of an object that could have caused the damage, with any motive
to damage the car.
4 Photographs of the car’s location and the damage to the front door and
car were admitted at trial and are included in the record.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
COGLIATI, J.*
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
TAMZARIAN, J.
* Judge of the Santa Cruz Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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