Filed 6/18/26 P. v. Doby CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B339607
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA081778)
v.
RANDY DOBY,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Laura L. Laesecke, Judge. Affirmed.
Laini Millar Melnick, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Jonathan M.
Krauss, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and
Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Randy Doby appeals the superior court’s denial of his Penal
Code section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage without
issuing an order to show cause.1 Doby argues the superior court
erred because certain jury instructions at his trial allowed him to
be convicted of murder and attempted murder on a theory of
imputed malice. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Conviction and Sentence
In 2009, Doby and codefendant Trindel Wingate were
charged with the murder of James Franklin (§ 187, subd. (a)) and
the attempted murder of D’ancee Carter (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664).
The information alleged the attempted murder of Carter was
committed willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation (§ 664,
subd. (a)). The information also alleged various firearm
(§ 12022.53) and gang (§ 186.22) enhancements.
Doby and Wingate were tried together. At trial, the jury
heard evidence that Franklin and Carter were shot after Doby
and Wingate passed by them on the street.2 The prosecution did
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 We provide factual context from the prior appellate opinion
affirming Doby’s convictions on direct appeal. (See People v.
Doby (Mar. 27, 2013, B233832) [nonpub. opn.].) “These facts are
‘for background purposes and to provide context for the parties’
2
not introduce any direct evidence regarding who shot Franklin
and Carter. The People’s theory at trial was that Wingate and
Doby both acted as principals to the offenses, regardless of the
identity of the shooter or shooters.
The jury was instructed on willful and premeditated first
degree murder. The jury was also instructed that second degree
murder is “the unlawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought when the perpetrator intended unlawfully to kill a
human being but the evidence is insufficient to prove deliberation
and premeditation.” Additionally, on the murder charge the jury
was instructed with CALJIC No. 3.00:
Persons who are involved in committing or
attempting to commit a crime are referred to as
principals in that crime. Each principal, regardless
of the extent or manner of participation is equally
guilty. Principals include:
1. Those who directly and actively commit or attempt
to commit the act constituting the crime, or
2. Those who aid and abet the commission or
attempted commission of the crime.
When the crime charged is either murder or
attempted murder, the aider and abettor’s guilt is
determined by the combined acts of all the
participants as well as that person[’]s own mental
state. If the aider and abettor’s mental state is more
culpable than that of the actual perpetrator, that
arguments.’ [Citation.] We do not rely on these facts to review
the trial court’s determination for [Doby’s] prima facie showing.”
(People v. Rushing (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1025, 1028, fn. 2.)
3
person’s guilt may be greater than that of the actual
perpetrator. Similarly, the aider and abettor’s guilt
may be less than the perpetrator’s, if the aider and
abettor has a less culpable mental state.
The jury also received CALJIC No. 3.01 on aiding and
abetting:
A person aids and abets the commission or attempted
commission of a crime when he:
(1) With knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the
perpetrator, and
(2) With the intent or purpose of committing or
encouraging or facilitating the commission of the
crime, and
(3) By act or advice, aids, promotes, encourages or
instigates the commission of the crime. . .
The jury was also instructed with CALJIC No. 8.66 on
attempted murder: “1. A direct but ineffectual act was done by
one person towards killing another human being; and 2. The
person committing the act harbored express malice aforethought,
namely, a specific intent to kill unlawfully another human being.”
As relevant to the attempted murder charge, the jury received
CALJIC No. 8.66.1 on the “kill zone” theory:
A person who primarily intends to kill one person,
may also concurrently intend to kill other persons
within a particular zone of risk. This zone of risk is
termed the “kill zone.” The intent is concurrent when
4
the nature and scope of the attack, while directed at a
primary victim, are such that it is reasonable to infer
the perpetrator intended to kill the primary victim by
killing everyone in that victim’s vicinity.
The jury found Doby guilty of second degree murder and
attempted murder, but it found the attempted murder was not
willful, deliberate, and premeditated. The jury further found the
firearm and gang enhancement allegations to be true. Doby was
sentenced to a total prison term of 74 years to life, consisting of
15 years to life for second degree murder, plus nine years for
attempted murder, and two terms of 25 years to life on the
firearm enhancements.
On direct appeal, this court reversed Doby’s firearm and
gang enhancements due to insufficient evidence and otherwise
affirmed the judgment. (People v. Doby (Mar. 27, 2013, B233832)
[nonpub. opn.].) Doby was resentenced to 15 years to life for
second degree murder, plus nine years for attempted murder.
B. Section 1172.6 Resentencing Petition
In 2023, Doby filed a petition in propria persona for
resentencing under then-section 1170.95, now renumbered
section 1172.6. Doby alleged he was convicted of first or second
degree murder and he could not now be convicted because of
changes to the Penal Code made by Senate Bill No. 1437.
The People opposed Doby’s petition, arguing the jury was
not instructed on the felony murder rule or the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, thus Doby “could only be
convicted as the actual perpetrator or a direct aider and abettor.”
5
Doby filed a reply through appointed counsel. Doby argued
that “the prosecution fails to recognize that Senate Bill 775 []
broadened the scope of Penal Code section 1172.6 petitions to
include murder and attempted murder convictions based on ‘. . .
[any] other theory under which malice is imputed to a person
based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.’ ” (Italics
and emphasis omitted.) Doby cited People v. Langi (2022)
73 Cal.App.5th 972 (Langi) which concluded that the “standard
aiding-and-abetting instruction,” CALJIC No. 3.01, was
“inadequate as applied to the crime of second degree murder
because it did not clarify that an accomplice must personally
harbor th[e] mental state of implied malice.” (Langi, at p. 983.)
Doby argued that, as in Langi, CALJIC No. 3.01 “permitted the
jury to impute malice to [him] based solely on his participation in
a crime . . . and should have been tailored to explain that to be
guilty as a direct aider and abettor of murder and attempted
murder, an accomplice must have acted with malice.”
Doby further argued that the jury instruction on the “kill
zone” theory, CALJIC No. 8.66.1, was now erroneous under
People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591. This error, Doby
asserted, “failed to require that the jury find that Mr. Doby had
the specific intent to kill the victim” as required for attempted
murder, and it “allowed [the] jury to impute the express malice
required for attempted murder based on his presence and
participation in the crime.”
The superior court held a prima facie review hearing in
July 2024. The court stated it was denying Doby’s petition
because his second degree murder conviction “was not [on] a
natural and probable consequence theory and it was not [on] a
felony murder theory.” The court further denied the petition as
6
to the attempted murder conviction, concluding attempted
murder was eligible for section 1172.6 relief only “under the
natural and probable consequences” and not an “other theory
under which malice is imputed.”
Doby timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
In 2018, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)
“amended section 188 to provide that, except in cases of felony
murder, ‘in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime
shall act with malice aforethought.’ [Citation.] This change ‘bars
a conviction for first or second degree murder under a natural
and probable consequences theory.’ ” (People v. Reyes (2023)
14 Cal.5th 981, 986.) Senate Bill No. 1437 further amended the
felony murder rule (section 189) to impose murder liability only
on actual killers, those who aid or abet the actual killer with the
intent to kill, and major participants in the underlying felony
who act with reckless indifference to human life. (See People v.
Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708 (Strong).)
Senate Bill No. 1437 also created former section 1170.95,
now section 1172.6, to provide “a special procedural mechanism
for those convicted under the former law to seek retroactive relief
under the law as amended.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708,
fn. 2.) “[T]he section 1172.6 petitioning ‘process begins with the
filing of a petition containing a declaration that all requirements
for eligibility are met ([§ 1172.6], subd. (b)(1)(A)), including that
“[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or
attempted murder because of changes to . . . Section 188
7
or 189. . . .” ’ [Citations.] Upon receiving a complying petition,
and after affording the parties an opportunity to submit briefing,
‘the court shall hold a hearing to determine whether the
petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. . . .’ (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c).).” (People v. Antonelli (2025) 17 Cal.5th 719, 724
(Antonelli).)
To assess whether the petitioner has made a prima facie
showing, the court may consult the record of conviction to
“inform” its prima facie inquiry. (People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 971-972 (Lewis).) Whether a petitioner is eligible
for relief “ ‘will turn on an examination of both the governing law
at the time of trial and the record of conviction, including the jury
instructions.’ ” (Antonelli, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 731 [jury
instructions are “critical” for “assessing section 1172.6 petitions
from individuals convicted following jury trials”].)
Further, the court should “ ‘ “take[] petitioner’s factual
allegations as true and make[] a preliminary assessment
regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his
or her factual allegations were proved. . . .” ’ ‘[A] court should not
reject the petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility grounds
without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.’ [Citation.]
‘However, if the record, including the court’s own documents,
“contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the petition,”
then “the court is justified in making a credibility determination
adverse to the petitioner.” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)
“In reviewing any part of the record of conviction” at the prima
facie stage, “a trial court should not engage in ‘factfinding
involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ”
(Id. at p. 972.) “[T]he prima facie inquiry . . . is limited” and “the
‘prima facie bar was intentionally and correctly set very low.’ ”
8
(Id. at pp. 971-972.) “If the petition and record in the case
establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief,
the trial court may dismiss the petition. [Citations.] If, instead,
the defendant has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to
relief, ‘the court shall issue an order to show cause.’ ” (Strong,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.)
In 2021, Senate Bill No. 775 expanded the availability of
section 1172.6 resentencing relief beyond those convicted of first
or second degree murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or felony murder rule. (See Antonelli,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 721.) Section 1172.6 as amended now
makes eligible for resentencing defendants convicted of murder
under a “theory under which malice is imputed to a person based
solely on that person’s participation in a crime, attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or
manslaughter.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
“We independently review the trial court’s determination
that the petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing for
relief.” (People v. Pickett (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 982, 989; accord,
People v. Gaillard (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1206, 1211.) “[W]e
review the trial court’s ruling, ‘not the court’s reasoning and, if
the ruling was correct on any ground, we affirm.’ ” (People v.
Camacho (2022) 14 Cal.5th 77, 123.)
We interpret section 1172.6 de novo. (Garcia v. Superior
Court (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1005, 1015; accord, People v. Curiel
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 461.) “ ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘As in any case involving
statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to
determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s
purpose. [Citation.] We begin by examining the statute’s words,
giving them a plain and commonsense meaning.’ ” ’ ” [Citation.]
9
“ ‘[W]e look to “the entire substance of the statute . . . in order to
determine the scope and purpose of the provision . . . . [Citation.]”
[Citation.] That is, we construe the words in question “ ‘in
context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the
statute.’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (Curiel, at p. 461.)
B. The Superior Court Did Not Err by Denying Doby’s Petition
at the Prima Facie Stage
1. The Jury Instructions on Second Degree Murder Did
Not Create a Possibility of Conviction on an Imputed
Malice Theory
Relying on Langi, Doby first argues that the jury
instructions on aiding and abetting allowed the jury to convict
him of second degree murder on a theory of imputed malice. As
stated, Langi concluded a section 1172.6 petitioner established a
prima facie showing because the standard aiding and abetting
instruction in CALJIC 3.01 may have permitted a jury to convict
him of second degree murder on a theory of imputed malice.3
3 The People contend that Langi was “wrongly decided and
should not be followed,” citing People v. Berry-Vierwinden (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 921, People v. Flores (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1164,
and People v. Burns (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 862, which held that
section 1172.6 petitioners may not assert “ ‘a routine claim of
instructional error’ that ‘could have been asserted on appeal from
the judgment of conviction.’ ” (Berry-Vierwinden, at p. 936.)
In People v. Lopez (2026) 19 Cal.5th 639 at page 658
(Lopez), our Supreme Court “disapprove[d] the Burns-
Flores/Berry-Vierwinden line of cases” and held that “ ‘[t]he mere
fact that a petitioner could have raised an analogous . . . claim of
instructional error at trial or in his original appeal does not
10
(Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at pp. 983-984; see also People v.
Maldonado (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1257, 1265-1266 (Maldonado)
[concluding an aiding and abetting instruction substantively “
‘identical’ ” to that in Langi may have allowed the jury to convict
a section 1172.6 petitioner of implied malice lying-in-wait murder
on an imputed malice theory].) Doby contends that “[n]othing in
the standard aiding and abetting instruction given to the jury
here stated that as an aider and abettor, [Doby] must have acted
with the same mental state as the perpetrator.” Doby argues
that “the ‘equally guilty’ language of CALJIC 3.00 further
obscured the distinction” between guilt as a direct perpetrator
and guilt as an aider and abettor. (See Langi, at p. 981, fn. 8
[noting CALJIC No. 3.00 “ ‘equally guilty’ ” instruction].)
Langi, however, does not support Doby. First, Doby’s jury
received an amended version of CALJIC No. 3.00 regarding
principals to a crime. This instruction, while describing
principals to a crime as “equally guilty,” clarified that “[w]hen the
crime charged is either murder or attempted murder, the aider
and abettor’s guilt is determined by the combined acts of all the
participants as well as that person[’]s own mental state.” In
Langi, by contrast, the jury received the unamended CALJIC
No. 3.00, meaning that “nothing in the standard aiding-and-
abetting instruction given . . . state[d] that the accomplice himself
must have acted” with the required mental state. (Langi, supra,
73 Cal.App.5th at p. 983 & fn. 13.)
render him categorically ineligible for relief under
section 1172.6.’ ” (Ibid.) We requested and received
supplemental briefing regarding Lopez’s impact, if any, on Doby’s
appeal. (See Gov. Code, § 68081.)
11
To be sure, the jury in Langi received the same aiding and
abetting instruction (CALJIC No. 3.01) that Doby’s jury received.
Specifically, the jury was instructed that an aider and abettor
must act with “knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the
perpetrator” and with “the intent or purpose of committing or
encouraging or facilitating the commission of the crime.” (Langi,
supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 981.)
But in Langi, the jury was also instructed on second degree
implied malice murder: “a killing is a second degree murder if
‘1. The killing resulted from an intentional act, [] 2. The natural
consequences of the act are dangerous to human life, and []
3. The act was deliberately performed with knowledge of the
danger to, and with conscious disregard for, human life. [] When
the killing is the direct result of such an act, it is not necessary to
prove that the defendant intended that the act would result in
the death of a human being.’ ” (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at
p. 981.) The Court of Appeal agreed with the petitioner that
“under the instructions that were given, the jury was entitled to
conclude that, to be guilty as an aider and abettor of second
degree murder, [Langi] need only have intended to encourage the
perpetrator’s intentional act—in this case, punching [the
victim]—whether or not [Langi] intended to aid or encourage [the
victim’s] killing, and whether or not he personally knew of and
disregarded the risk of such a killing. [¶] The instructions
should have explained that, to be guilty as a direct aider and
abettor of second degree murder, an accomplice must have acted
with the mental state of implied malice.” (Id. at p. 983; see also
Maldonado, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1266 [following Langi
and concluding that if the jury “found the perpetrator’s purpose
was only to injure or intimidate the victim in a surprise attack,”
12
the jury may have convicted petitioner of aiding and abetting
lying in wait first degree murder by finding petitioner intended to
encourage this intentional act, not the actual killing].)
By contrast, Doby’s jury was not instructed on second
degree implied malice murder. Rather, the only definition of
second degree murder the jury considered at Doby’s trial was
based on express malice, which required the People to prove that
“the perpetrator intended unlawfully to kill a human being.”
Langi’s reasoning only applies where “the second degree murder
instruction specifie[s] that the direct perpetrator of that crime
need not act with the unlawful intent of causing death,” but
instead with implied malice. (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at
p. 982; see id. at pp. 982-983 [CALJIC No. 3.01 is “inadequate”
where “it d[oes] not clarify that an accomplice must personally
harbor [a] mental state of implied malice”]; see Maldonado,
supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1267 [adopting Langi’s reasoning
because “first degree lying-in-wait murder can be based on a
theory that the perpetrator acted with implied malice rather than
an intent to kill”].)
In Doby’s case, where the direct perpetrator’s liability for
second degree murder was premised on intent to kill, not implied
malice, CALJIC No. 3.01 correctly instructed the jury that an
aider and abettor to the crimes must share the perpetrator’s
“unlawful purpose,” i.e., his intent to kill. (See People v. McCoy
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1122-1123 [holding that where the jury
found an aider and abettor “knew of [the perpetrator’s] unlawful
purpose and intended to commit, encourage, or facilitate that
purpose” and “[t]he only unlawful purpose charged [at trial] was
an unlawful killing,” “one cannot knowingly and intentionally
help another commit an unlawful killing without acting with
13
malice”].) Indeed, direct aiding and abetting liability for murder
remains a valid theory after Senate Bill Nos. 1437 and 775
“ ‘because a direct aider and abettor to murder must possess
malice aforethought.’ ” (People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th
1244, 1252; accord, People v. Estrada (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941,
945.)
Because Doby was convicted either as a direct perpetrator
of, or as a direct aider and abettor to, an express malice murder,
Doby does not demonstrate a possibility that the jury convicted
him of second degree murder on a theory of imputed malice. (See
People v. Warner (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 416, 430 [affirming
denial of section 1172.6 petition because “we are ‘confident the
jury necessarily found the [mental state and acts] required for
direct aiding and abetting murder’ ”]; People v. Lee (2023)
95 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1191 [“in Langi . . . , the concern centered
on the fact that the direct perpetrator of an implied malice
murder . . . need not harbor an intent to kill” but “[t]hat concern
is not present” under jury instructions which require the direct
perpetrator to have “ ‘express malice aforethought, namely, a
specific intent to kill’ ”].)
2. The Jury Instructions on Attempted Murder Did Not
Create a Possibility of Conviction on an Imputed
Malice Theory
Doby also argues that CALJIC No. 8.66 on attempted
murder and CALJIC No. 8.66.1 on the “kill zone” theory allowed
the jury to convict him of attempted murder on an imputed
malice theory.
The People contend that Doby is ineligible for relief on this
conviction because the jury was not instructed on the natural and
14
probable consequences doctrine. The People argue section 1172.6
expressly limits relief to petitioners convicted of “attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine”
and does not extend to attempted murder convictions under other
theories of imputed malice.
Doby argues the People offer a “literal reading” of section
1172.6, but he further argues this creates “an ‘absurd result’
which is at odds with legislative intent and the entire statutory
scheme.” Doby contends “there is no logical basis” for applying
Senate Bill No. 1437’s amendments to section 188 only to murder
and not to attempted murder because criminal attempt is closely
related to a completed crime, and because of the “ ‘ “absurd and
unfair situation where people are eligible for resentencing if the
victim died, but are ineligible if the victim did not die.” ’ ”
Every Court of Appeal to consider the issue has concluded
that section 1172.6 “applies by its terms only to attempted
murders based on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine.” (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548;
accord, People v. Anaya (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 615, 619 (Anaya);
People v. Muhammad (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 268, 276; People v.
Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451, 457; People v. Lovejoy
(2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 860, 865 (Lovejoy).) This is because the
plain text of section 1172.6 expressly lists the bases for a
resentencing petition. Petitioners convicted of felony murder or
murder may file a petition for resentencing if they were convicted
“under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other
theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on
that person’s participation in a crime.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) By
contrast, a person convicted of attempted murder may only file a
petition if convicted “under the natural and probable
15
consequences doctrine.” (Ibid.) “Under governing principles of
statutory construction, ‘the expression of one thing in a statute
ordinarily implies the exclusion of other things.’ ” (People v.
Guzman (2005) 35 Cal.4th 577, 588.) By its terms, section
1172.6, subdivision (a), limits resentencing relief to defendants
convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.
Doby argues that “a literal reading of the statute without
reference to the legislative history of SB 1437 and SB 775, and
the entire statutory scheme regarding the imputation of malice
leads to a result the Legislature could not have intended.” But
the “ ‘usual and ordinary’ ” meaning of the “ ‘statutory language
is generally the most reliable indicator of [legislative] intent.’ ”
(People v. Ruiz (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1100, 1105.) “If the plain
language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, our inquiry
ends, and we need not embark on judicial construction.
[Citations.] If the statutory language contains no ambiguity, the
Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said, and the
plain meaning of the statute governs.” (People v. Johnson (2002)
28 Cal.4th 240, 244.)
Doby relies on People v. Luu (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1051
(Luu), review granted July 16, 2025, S291235, which concluded
that section 1172.6 relief extends to attempted manslaughter
even though “attempted manslaughter is not explicitly stated in
the statute, [and] the completed crime of manslaughter is
explicitly stated in the statute.” (Id. at p. 1065.) Luu held that
excluding attempted manslaughter from resentencing eligibility
created an absurd result because it conflicted with “the intent of
the Legislature in revising section 1172.6 . . . to include
defendants convicted of attempted crimes obtained under the
16
natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (Id. at p. 1066.)
Citing Luu, Doby argues that the Legislature intended to
provide relief for those convicted of attempted murder on any
theory of imputed malice because the amendments to section 188
(providing that “ ‘[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based
solely on his or her participation in a crime’ ”) apply to both
murder and attempted murder. Doby further argues that “the
Legislature generally intends remedial legislation to apply to
attempted crimes, even when the Legislature only mentions the
completed crimes within the statute.” But here, unlike
attempted manslaughter, the Legislature expressly accounted for
attempted murder, and it specifically limited relief to those
convictions based on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine.
In sum, we agree with the cases holding that the plain
statutory text only permits a petitioner convicted of attempted
murder to petition for resentencing based on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. Because the jury in Doby’s case
was not instructed on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, we conclude Doby is not eligible for resentencing relief
based on his attempted murder conviction. (See Lovejoy, supra,
101 Cal.App.5th at p. 865 [section 1172.6 petition is “properly
denied as to [an] attempted murder conviction only if the record
affirmatively demonstrates the jury did not rely on the natural
and probable consequences doctrine”]; Anaya, supra,
117 Cal.App.5th at p. 621 [affirming denial of petition where
petitioner was convicted of attempted murder “not based on the
17
natural and probable consequences doctrine”].)4
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
FEUER, J.
STONE, J.
4 Because we reject Doby’s interpretation of section 1172.6,
we need not reach Doby’s remaining arguments as to his
attempted murder conviction.
18