Filed 6/30/26 P. v. Dixon CA1/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A169449
v.
ROBERT JOE DIXON, JR., (Solano County
Super. Ct. No. FCR277399)
Defendant and Appellant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
In January 2012, Robert Joe Dixon, Jr. was convicted of
assault with a firearm on Samuel King (Pen. Code,2 § 245,
subd. (a)(2)) (count 1); first-degree murder of Kevin Domino
(§ 187, subd. (a)) (count 2); premeditated attempted murder of
Kristopher Battle and Jamal Williams (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664)
(counts 3 and 4, respectively); shooting at an inhabited dwelling
(§ 246) (count 5); and various firearm enhancements. Dixon was
sentenced to prison for a determinate term of 24 years, four
months, on counts 1 and 5, and an indeterminate consecutive
1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion pursuant to
the California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1.
2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
term of 110 years to life, plus four life terms with possibility of
parole, on the remaining three counts. (People v. Dixon
(A140051, Oct. 3, 2017) [nonpub. opn.].)
As relevant here, as part of his determinative sentence, the
trial court imposed and stayed a prior prison term enhancement
under section 667.5, subdivision (b). In October 2022, the court
appointed counsel for Dixon after receiving notice from then
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation that he
is eligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75,
subdivision (a), which declares that “[a]ny sentence enhancement
that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to
subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any enhancement
imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense . . . is
legally invalid.”3 After considering briefing submitted by the
parties, the court denied Dixon’s request for resentencing on the
ground that he was not entitled to relief because the
enhancement had been stayed.
The question before us is whether a defendant is eligible for
resentencing under section 1172.75 when punishment for the
enhancement was imposed but stayed by the original sentencing
court. Although the Attorney General initially argued that a
defendant is not entitled to resentencing when the enhancement
is stayed, in a letter submitted after briefing was complete, the
Attorney General withdrew the argument and conceded that in
3 The trial court’s order references section 1171.1 which
was renumbered, without substantive change, as section 1172.75
effective June 30, 2022. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12.) We will refer
to section 1172.75 in this opinion.
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light of the California Supreme Court’s decision in People v.
Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, Dixon is eligible for
resentencing.
In People v. Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at page 1068, the
court held that “section 1172.75(a) applies to enhancements that
were imposed as part of the defendant’s original judgment,
regardless of whether the enhancement was stayed or executed.
If the enhancement is no longer authorized under the current
version of section 667.5(b), section 1172.75(a) renders the
enhancement invalid. And the retroactive invalidation of the
previously imposed enhancements in turn mandates resentencing
under section 1172.75, according to the procedures set forth
therein.” Accordingly, we reverse the order denying resentencing
and remand for resentencing under section 1172.75,
subdivision (d).
We decline Dixon’s invitation to instruct the trial court how
to exercise its discretion on remand. In addition to a claimed
error in the “kill zone” instruction, Dixon argues that the
sentencing court should consider: (1) that at the time of the
offenses he was a youthful adult with difficulties early in life;
(2) imposing the lower term on count 5; (3) striking
enhancements under section 1385; and (4) whether there should
be a proceeding under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 to
develop evidence for a future youth offender parole hearing. As
the Attorney General argues, apart from the claimed
instructional error that we resolve by separate opinion
adjudicating Dixon’s petition for habeas corpus, Dixon has not
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developed any argument that these additional issues are grounds
for reversal, all of which may be considered by the trial court on
remand. Dixon identifies no basis for us to opine on them here.
DISPOSITION
The order denying resentencing is reversed. The matter is
remanded to the trial court with directions to recall Dixon’s
sentence and resentence him under section 1172.75,
subdivision (d).
GOLDMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
BROWN, P. J.
MOORMAN, J. *
*Judge of the Mendocino Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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