Filed 9/9/26 P. v. Delgadillo CA5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F089128
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 24CR-01111)
v.
ANSELMO JUNIOR DELGADILLO, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Merced County. Carol K.
Ash, Judge.
Laura Vavakin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Ivan P. Marrs, and Meghan
Cox, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Hill, P. J., Levy, J. and Franson, J.
A jury convicted defendant Anselmo Junior Delgadillo of inflicting corporal injury
upon and falsely imprisoning a former girlfriend and two counts of disobeying protective
orders. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by failing to give a unanimity
instruction for the infliction of corporal injury charge. Alternatively, he argues that the
trial court erred by failing to stay the sentence imposed for the false imprisonment
conviction. Finding no error, we affirm.
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On October 2, 2024, the Merced County District Attorney charged defendant in a
four-count information. The information alleged defendant willfully inflicted corporal
injury resulting in a traumatic condition on a person with whom he had been in a dating
relationship within seven years (Pen. Code,1 § 273.5, subd. (f)(1); count 1); unlawfully
violated the personal liberty of a person through violence, menace, fraud, and deceit
(false imprisonment) (§ 236; count 2); and disobeyed protective orders (§ 273.6,
subd. (a); counts 3 and 4). With respect to counts 1 and 2, the information alleged that
defendant had suffered two prior strike convictions within the meaning of the
“Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)) and that
six circumstances in aggravation applied.
Jury trial commenced on October 4, 2024. Prior to the jury rendering its verdict,
defendant waived his right to a jury trial on the prior strike allegations and the alleged
circumstances in aggravation. On October 8, 2024, the jury returned guilty verdicts on
each count.
On November 25, 2024, the trial court found true the two prior strike conviction
allegations and found true four of six circumstances in aggravation. The court then
sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 12 years eight months as follows: on
count 1, 10 years (the upper term of five years, doubled due to the prior strike
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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convictions); on count 2, a consecutive term of 16 months (one-third of the middle term
of eight months doubled due to the prior strike convictions); on counts 3 and 4, one year
each to run concurrently to the term on count 2; and for a separate violation of probation,
a consecutive term of 16 months (one-third of the middle term.2
FACTUAL SUMMARY3
A. Prosecution’s Case
1. March 23, 2024 Incident
On March 23, 2024, Daniela G. took her son to a barbershop in Los Banos. Upon
exiting, she witnessed a fight between defendant and Debbie T. and called 911 to report
it. Defendant was “holding” Debbie, who wanted to leave. While they were yelling,
Debbie tried to walk away, but defendant “push[ed]” and “h[e]ld her back.” Defendant
also pushed Debbie up against a fence. It appeared to Daniela that Debbie was trying to
break free and resist.
Defendant punched Debbie in the stomach more than once and placed his forearm
against her chest and neck. Debbie never struck defendant.
Officers William Marchese and James Marston of the Los Banos Police
Department were among the police officers who responded to Daniela’s 911 call. Upon
arriving, Marchese saw defendant standing in front of Debbie with both hands around her
2 In orally pronouncing the sentence, the trial court accurately stated the terms for
each count but misstated the total aggregate term as 13 years 8 months. The correct sum
of the sentences imposed was 12 years 8 months. On December 11, 2024, the court
issued a minute order purporting to “clarify” the sentence, but the order erroneously listed
the sentence for count 1 as 11 years 4 months and omitted any sentence for count 3, while
stating that the total sentence was 12 years 8 months. On that same day, the trial court
issued an abstract of judgment that correctly states the components of the sentence—
10 years on count 1, 16 months consecutive on count 2, and 16 months consecutive for
the probation violation—as well as the aggregate term of 12 years 8 months.
3 Because defendant does not challenge his convictions to counts 3 or 4, our factual
summary is limited to the evidence relevant to counts 1 and 2.
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head, his body pushed against hers, and her body against a wall. Once officers arrived on
scene, defendant looked towards their patrol cars and separated from Debbie.
Marston observed that Debbie had injuries, including redness on the sides of her
face as well as a scratch. He agreed that the redness could be characterized as abrasions
or “some type of trauma to her skin.”
When asked whether he saw any discoloration associated with the trauma, he
replied that he did and agreed that it could be characterized as bruising. Marston took
photographs of Debbie’s injuries, which were shown to the jury. Debbie did not want to
speak with Marston and was visibly upset.
Debbie testified that she had known defendant for seven years and that he was her
ex-boyfriend. They had lived together for a period of time but she had moved out
recently. Debbie said that she did not want to press charges against defendant and that he
did not do anything to her.
2. Prior Incidents of Domestic Violence Involving Defendant
The prosecution introduced evidence of prior incidents in which defendant
allegedly inflicted injuries on female victims. The first incident occurred on August 21,
2023, and involved defendant and a female victim other than Debbie. Los Banos Police
Officer Efren Fernandez was dispatched on a call for service regarding a disturbance
involving a male subject who had pushed a female and held her by the neck.
Upon arriving at the dispatch location, he did not locate anyone outside or inside
the home. He spoke with the woman involved in the incident and observed that she had
multiple red marks on her neck and blood on her left wrist. The woman identified
defendant as the person who assaulted her.
Fernandez also interviewed defendant, who admitted that he had made contact
with the woman that day. He said that they had argued over a laptop. He denied
attacking her and instead claimed that she had hit him causing a visible injury to his head,
which Fernandez observed.
4.
The second incident occurred on December 20, 2023, and again involved
defendant and Debbie. A female witness, Gemma S., testified that she observed a man
and woman engaged in a physical fight outside of her place of work in Los Banos. She
called law enforcement and recorded a portion of the incident on her cell phone, which
was shown to the jury.
Gemma described the woman trying to “go around” the man, while he followed
and screamed at her. The man pushed the woman towards a recreational vehicle that was
nearby, eventually grabbing the woman and throwing her inside of it. It appeared to
Gemma that the man was hitting the woman from his position outside of the vehicle.
Gemma later saw the woman running through the parking lot with the man
chasing her. When shown a picture of Debbie, Gemma said she “might have been” the
woman involved in the incident and said that the defendant looked like the man involved
in the incident.
Marchese was on duty and was dispatched in response to the December 20, 2023
incident. When he arrived, a witness approached him and explained that a woman had
just walked into the store with a bloody mouth. When Marchese made contact with the
woman, he observed that she had a “newer laceration” in the middle of her bottom lip.
He identified the woman as Debbie. He said that he also observed that her face “look[ed]
like it had almost swelling in certain areas.” He later made contact with defendant who
was the suspect in the case.
Marchese obtained a video recording of the December 20, 2023 incident taken by
Gemma. He later watched the video and reached the conclusion that the injury suffered
by Debbie was caused by the conduct seen on the video.
B. Defense Case
The defense presented testimony from Debbie and defendant. Debbie denied that
defendant slammed her head against metal bars, that he punched her, that he tried to
choke her, or that she was trying to get away from him that day. She said that the
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incident on March 23, 2024, was just a “little spat” and denied that the incident became
“physical” between defendant and herself. She said the reason her face “looked all
distorted in those pictures … was … [because] the sun was right in [her] face.”
1. Defendant’s Testimony
Defendant said that Debbie approached him on March 23, 2024. They started
arguing and she started yelling. He walked away from her. Debbie followed him and
pulled on his shirt. He “tugg[ed] away from her … to like get her off of [him].” He
became “a little aggravated.” He said that he turned around and pushed Debbie against a
wall and told her, “ ‘Dude, I’m going to go to jail if you don’t stop with this—with this
little situation that’s going on.’ ”
Defendant denied punching Debbie in the stomach, but he may have “held her
closer to [him] just like so she wouldn’t be able to hit [him] and then let her go.” He may
also have,
“[U]sed [his] forearm to like push her from like—cause she’s small
… there might have been a time where [he] was … pushing her back to like
block her from hitting [him], and that might have looked like [he] was
pushing her head up against the fence. But … this all happened in real
time. So [he] d[id]n’t really remember the situation like in detail like that.”
Defendant later denied pushing Debbie’s head against the metal bars, denied
punching or choking her, and denied scratching her face.
DISCUSSION
A. A Unanimity Instruction Was Not Required
1. Additional Background–Closing Arguments and Jury Instructions
In its closing argument, the prosecution argued that the jury had sufficient
evidence to return guilty verdicts on all counts. With respect to the infliction of corporal
injury charge, the prosecution argued that the second element—the injury inflicted by the
defendant resulting in a traumatic condition—was proven by the testimony of Daniela
who saw defendant punching Debbie in the stomach and using his forearm to pin her
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against a wall or fence by her chest and at times by her neck. The prosecution argued
that the evidence did not support a claim that defendant acted in self-defense because
there was nothing in the testimony of Daniela or Debbie that provided a basis for
defendant to use force to prevent physical danger to himself.
In her closing argument, defense counsel argued that the reason Debbie did not
want to “ ‘press charges’ ” against defendant for his conduct on March 23, 2024, was
because it “didn’t happen” and he did not cause the injuries depicted in the photographs
shown to the jury, and was therefore not guilty of assault or false imprisonment. Defense
counsel reminded the jury that Debbie testified that defendant did not choke, strangle,
punch her, or cause her injuries.
Defense counsel argued that the evidence before the jury supported alternative
causes for the injuries shown in the photographs, such as that the marks were caused by
acne, that Debbie scratched herself, and that some of the marks were “hickies.”
Defense counsel pointed to deficiencies in the accuracy and detail provided by
Daniela in her testimony. Defense counsel noted that Daniela was unable to describe
defendant’s physical characteristics from recollection. She argued that the evidence did
not prove that Debbie suffered a traumatic injury. Defense counsel noted that
“[e]verything was happening so quickly.”
Finally, defense counsel argued that the prosecution could not prove count 1
because defendant acted in self-defense to “defuse, de-escalate the situation … [and]
tr[ied] to block [Debbie] from hitting him, because that’s what he thought was reasonable
based on the situation.”
2. Applicable Law
“A jury verdict in a criminal case must be unanimous and the jury must also
unanimously agree that a defendant ‘is guilty of a specific crime.’ ” (People v. Hill
(2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 58, 68; People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132.) The
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requirement derives from our state constitution,4 which “expressly stat[es] that ‘in a civil
cause three-fourths of the jury may render a verdict’ and thereby implying that in a
criminal cause, only a unanimous jury may render a verdict.” (Russo, at p. 1132.)
When the trial evidence establishes multiple acts any one of which could
constitute a charged crime, either the (1) prosecution must select the particular act on
which the charge was based, or (2) court must instruct the jury that it has to unanimously
agree on the specific act underlying a guilty verdict. (People v. Jennings (2010) 50
Cal.4th 616, 679.) “This requirement of unanimity as to the criminal act ‘is intended to
eliminate the danger that the defendant will be convicted even though there is no single
offense which all the jurors agree the defendant committed.’ ” (People v. Russo, supra,
25 Cal.4th at p. 1132.)
There are exceptions to this rule, including the “continuous-course-of-conduct
exception” which “applies when (1) ‘the acts are so closely connected in time as to form
part of one transaction,’ (2) ‘the defendant tenders the same defense or defenses to each
act,’ and (3) ‘there is no reasonable basis for the jury to distinguish between them.’ ”
(People v. Lueth (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 189, 196; accord, People v. Williams (2013) 56
Cal.4th 630, 682.)
Whether a trial court should have given a unanimity instruction is a mixed
question of law and fact, which is primarily legal and is therefore not examined with
deference. (People v. Hernandez (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 559, 568.)
3. Analysis
Defendant argues that the lack of a unanimity instruction to the jury as to the
particular acts constituting the violation of section 273.5 was error and that it prejudiced
4 The federal constitution also requires a unanimous jury in criminal cases. (People
v. Hill, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at p. 70 [“the Sixth Amendment’s jury unanimity
requirement ‘applies to state and federal criminal trials equally,’ ” quoting Ramos v.
Louisiana (2020) 590 U.S. 83, 93.)
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him. Defendant further argues that the error affected his federal constitutional right to
due process and that “the appropriate standard for determining prejudice is the
Chapman[5] standard, which requires the People to show that the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Defendant argues that the prosecution did not elect a
specific act as the one on which it relied to prove his violation of section 273.5 and that
the “continuous-course-of-conduct exception” does not apply because each criminal act
was discrete and not part of a continuous assault. Defendant also argues that he did not
present a unified defense at trial but instead offered different defenses to the alleged uses
of force against Debbie, including that the prosecution did not prove traumatic condition,
and separately that he acted in self-defense. Defendant contends that reversal is required
when “a defendant offers separate defenses to different acts … because jurors have a
rational basis to distinguish among acts.”
The People argue that defendant’s acts of battery on Debbie were part of a
continuous course of conduct and that defendant asserted the same defenses to the
allegations against him—that he did not assault Debbie and that eyewitness testimony
was not credible. The People argue that even if the trial court erred by not giving a
unanimity instruction, the error was harmless because the jury would have convicted
defendant on any of the acts.
The issue is whether the evidence mandated the trial court to give a unanimity
instruction in light of the absence of an election by the prosecution to rely on one of
defendant’s acts—punching Debbie or pressing his forearm against Debbie’s chest—as
the one that inflicted the traumatic injury. Under applicable law, the answer turns on
whether defendant’s acts were discrete or part of a continuous course of conduct. If they
were discrete, a unanimity instruction was required. If they were part of a continuous
course of conduct, no such instruction was required.
5 Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.
9.
On this point, the evidence clearly establishes that defendant’s acts were part of a
continuous course of conduct. Daniela testified that as defendant and Debbie argued in
the parking lot, defendant pushed and held Debbie, preventing her from leaving.
Defendant later pushed her up against a fence, where he repeatedly punched her with
one arm and used the other to pin her against the fence, preventing her from breaking
free. As defendant testified, this incident happened “in real time,” or as his counsel
argued, “[e]verything was happening so quickly.” These were not discrete acts but ones
that proceeded from one another as part of a single transaction.
Defendant’s claim that he did not present the same defense to each act is
unconvincing. During her closing arguments, defense counsel argued that Debbie’s
testimony established that defendant did not punch, strangle, or press his forearm against
her, and that therefore he was not guilty of corporal injury or false imprisonment.
Defense counsel further argued that the pictures of Debbie did not reflect her having
suffered a traumatic injury and that Daniela was not a credible witness. These are not
separate legal defenses, but arguments for why the evidence supported Debbie’s
testimony rather than Daniela’s testimony. With respect to defendant’s use of force,
defense counsel argued that defendant used only that force that was necessary to try to
get Debbie to stop hitting him. Thus, to the extent that defendant asserted any formal
defense to count 1, it was self-defense and it was to each of the acts of force against
Debbie.
Finally, there was no reasonable basis for the jury to distinguish between
defendant’s acts. Daniela described in her testimony how defendant’s acts proceeded
from one to the next. There was no basis for the jury to conclude that one or more of the
acts Daniela described occurred, while others did not. To believe that any one of the acts
occurred was to believe that they all occurred. Put another way, either the jury believed
Daniela or they did not. Based on their verdict, the jury believed her. We find no error in
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the lack of a unanimity instruction. As a result, we do not reach the parties’ arguments
regarding whether any error was harmless.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err By Imposing Consecutive Sentences For
Counts 1 and 2
Defendant next argues that if a unanimity instruction was not required, then the
trial court should have stayed the sentence imposed for false imprisonment because the
same acts were used to convict him of both count 1 and count 2. The People disagree,
arguing that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s implied finding that defendant
had multiple criminal objectives which are punished separately by the sentences for
counts 1 and 2.
1. Applicable Law and Analysis
Section 654, subdivision (a) provides that:
“[a]n act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different
provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in
no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than
one provision. An acquittal or conviction and sentence under any one bars
a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other.”
“Section 654 precludes multiple punishments for a single act or indivisible course
of conduct.” (People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 294.) We apply a two-step test to
determine whether section 654 applies:
“We first consider if the different crimes were completed by a
‘single physical act.’ [Citation.] If so, the defendant may not be punished
more than once for that act. Only if we conclude that the case involves
more than a single act—i.e., a course of conduct—do we then consider
whether that course of conduct reflects a single ‘ “intent and objective” ’ or
multiple intents and objectives. [Citations.] At step one, courts examine
the facts of the case to determine whether multiple convictions are based
upon a single physical act. [Citation.] When those facts are undisputed …
the application of section 654 raises a question of law we review de novo.”
(People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311–312.)
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Where there were multiple acts that were part of a continuous course of conduct,
whether section 654 applies is a factual determination entrusted to the trial court, whose
findings, whether express or implied, will be upheld on appeal if supported by substantial
evidence. (People v. Hutchins (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1312.) “ ‘If, on the other
hand, defendant harbored “multiple criminal objectives,” which were independent of and
not merely incidental to each other, he may be punished for each statutory violation
committed in pursuit of each objective, “even though the violations shared common acts
or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct.” ’ ” (People v. Mejia (2017)
9 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1043, quoting People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335.)
“ ‘ “We must ‘view the evidence in a light most favorable to the respondent and presume
in support of the [sentencing] order the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably
deduce from the evidence.’ ” ’ ” (People v. DeVaughn (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1092,
1113.)
As explained above, the acts underlying defendant’s conviction on count 1 were
part of a continuous course of conduct, not a single physical act. Therefore, the
two crimes at issue were not completed by a “single physical act.” (People v. Corpening,
supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 312.) As such, we proceed to step two of the analysis described in
Corpening.
As defendant contends, the prosecution argued that defendant’s act of pinning
Debbie against the fence could be used to prove both the corporal injury and the false
imprisonment charges. The trial court did not address section 654 at sentencing and
made no express findings as a result. Therefore, we must determine whether substantial
evidence supports implied findings that defendant’s course of conduct included a single
or multiple criminal objectives.
Daniela’s testimony was that she heard and then saw defendant and Debbie
arguing in the parking lot. She first described defendant “holding” and “push[ing]”
Debbie. As the fight continued, defendant pushed Debbie against the fence, sometimes
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holding her there with his forearm against her neck. During this sequence of events,
defendant also punched Debbie in the stomach multiple times. Marchese testified to
seeing defendant standing in front of Debbie with both of his hands around her head and
his body pushed against hers, with her body against a wall.
From this evidence one of two conclusions could reasonably be drawn. First, that
defendant detained and falsely imprisoned Debbie to facilitate his battery of her. The
trial court could have found that defendant used his forearm to press Debbie against the
fence to facilitate his punches to her abdomen. On the other hand, the court could have
determined that the false imprisonment preceded defendant’s pushing Debbie against the
fence when Daniela described defendant pushing and holding Debbie while arguing with
her. Viewing the evidence from this perspective, the court could have concluded that the
purpose of the false imprisonment was to facilitate defendant’s continuation of the
argument rather than the infliction of corporal injury. Both conclusions were supported
by the eyewitness testimony of Daniella and Marchese. This testimony was substantial
evidence which could support either conclusion. (See People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th
1149, 1181 [“unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable,
testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction”].)
As the trial court did not apply section 654 to stay either the sentence for count 1
or count 2, we presume that it made the implied finding necessary to support that
sentencing decision, which was that defendant’s criminal objective for each crime was
distinct. (People v. DeVaughn, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1113.) As that implied
finding was supported by substantial evidence, we find no error in the court’s decision to
sentence defendant to consecutive sentences for counts 1 and 2.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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