Filed 10/19/26 P. v. Delaittre CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B346131
(Super. Ct. No. 23F00024)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (San Luis Obispo County)
v.
SHAWN ANTHONY
DELAITTRE,
Defendant and Appellant.
Shawn Anthony Delaittre attacked a police officer,
inflicting physical injuries and mental trauma that forced her to
medically retire. After he pleaded no contest, the court placed
him on probation and ordered restitution of $373,933.85,
including for the officer’s lost future wages, medical expenses,
and home security system.
Delaittre challenges several of the restitution awards as
excessive and lacking evidentiary support. He also contends his
trial counsel was ineffective and he was denied due process of
law. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1
Police Officer E.L.2 responded to a report of theft of a
laptop and cell phone from a hotel room at the Seacrest
Oceanfront Hotel (the hotel). Delaittre had stayed overnight in a
hotel room without consent, and was running around the hotel,
smearing feces on furniture and other objects. E.L. recognized
Delaittre as a suspect in other shoplifting incidents. When she
tried to detain him, he resisted, choked her, pulled out her hair,
and pinned her against a wall. Delaittre had feces on his face
and hand, which transferred to E.L. when he scratched her face.
He grabbed her taser out of her hand. Several people assisted in
subduing Delaittre.
Delaittre pleaded no contest to first degree burglary of the
hotel room (Pen. Code,3 §§ 459, 460, subd. (a)), battery inflicting
injury on a peace officer (§ 243, subd. (c)(2)), and deterring a
peace officer with removal of a weapon (taser) from her person or
immediate presence (§ 148, subd. (b)). Pursuant to a negotiated
disposition, the court dismissed the remaining counts: resisting
an executive officer by force or violence (§ 69, subd. (a)),
vandalism of the hotel causing damage of $400 or more (§ 594,
subd. (b)(1)), grand theft of a wallet and cash of a hotel employee,
S.A. (§ 487, subd. (a)), grand theft of merchandise from the
Madonna Inn boutique (§ 487, subd. (a)), depositing an offensive
substance (feces) at the hotel (§ 375, subd. (a)), prowling at the
1 Because Delaittre pleaded no contest, we base the factual
summary on the preliminary hearing transcript.
2 We refer to the victims by their initials to protect their
privacy. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).)
3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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hotel (§ 647, subd. (h)), and unlawfully occupying a hotel room
(§ 602, subd. (m)). Delaittre agreed the court could consider the
dismissed counts at sentencing. (People v. Harvey (1979) 25
Cal.3d 754, 758.) The trial court placed Delaittre on two years’
felony probation with terms including 364 days in county jail.
Restitution hearings were held after sentencing. E.L.
testified the incident caused traumatic brain injury to her left
temporal lobe, injury to four discs in her neck, a knee injury, and
psychological harm. Delaittre had rammed E.L.’s head and face
into a stucco wall, resulting in facial injuries including injuries to
her nose that interfered with breathing. As a result of the
crimes, she also suffered from migraine headaches, seizures,
night terrors, panic attacks, and memory issues. She had
experienced posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in the past but
was in remission and functioning fully for years. This incident
brought her out of remission, causing PTSD symptoms to an
extent she had never experienced before.
Although E.L. had planned to work as a police officer for
another seven years, she was forced to accept a medical
retirement based on the injuries Delaittre inflicted. The trial
court ordered that Delaittre pay E.L. $346,967.88 in restitution
for future lost wages. The court calculated the amount as the
difference between her monthly pay as a police officer, minus her
monthly medical retirement benefits, multiplied by the 84
months (seven years) she had planned to remain employed as a
police officer. Although E.L. had hoped to be promoted to higher-
paying jobs as a corporal and sergeant, the court found this
speculative and did not include it in its calculations. The court
also declined to adjust for future cost of living increases and
inflation based on insufficient information, “and keeping in mind
the concept of the time value of money even if the court does not
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have competing values presented by the defense (People v.
Pangan (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 574 [Pangan]).”
The court also ordered $2,524.92 in restitution to E.L. for
past medical expenses, including $369.16 for registration at a
PTSD conference, and $1,537 for jet plasma treatment and
products to address scarring of her face. The court denied some
other claimed medical expenses that were not shown to be
medically necessary for the injuries incurred. The court ordered
$433.15 for home security expenses, representing the balance
E.L. paid after the $1,000 paid by the California Victim
Compensation Board (CVCB). Because E.L.’s medical retirement
did not provide the same medical coverage she received while
employed, the court ordered restitution of $20,419.74 for
increased health, vision, and dental insurance premiums for E.L.
and her dependents.
The court ordered additional restitution that is not
challenged on appeal: reimbursement to the CVCB for the $1,000
it paid E.L. for the security system, $1,670.76 to the hotel for
stolen and damaged property, and $917.40 to S.A. for his stolen
wallet and cash.
DISCUSSION
Right to restitution
“It is the unequivocal intention of the People of the State of
California that all persons who suffer losses as a result of
criminal activity shall have the right to seek and secure
restitution from the persons convicted of the crimes causing the
losses they suffer.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(A).)
“[I]n every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a
result of the defendant’s conduct, the court shall require that the
defendant make restitution to the victim or victims . . . based on
the amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other
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showing to the court. . . . The court shall order full restitution.”
(§ 1202.4, subd. (f).) Because probation was granted here, section
1203.1, subdivisions (a)(3), (b), and (j) provide broader discretion
to order restitution, “ ‘even when the loss was not necessarily
caused by the criminal conduct underlying the conviction.’ ”
(People v. Martinez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1093, 1101.)
A prima facie case for restitution must first be made by the
People based on a victim’s testimony or other statement of the
amount of their economic loss. (People v. Millard (2009) 175
Cal.App.4th 7, 26 (Millard).) “[T]he burden [then] shifts to the
defendant to demonstrate that the amount of the loss is other
than that claimed by the victim.” (Ibid.) “ ‘[T]he standard of
proof at a restitution hearing is by a preponderance of the
evidence.’ ” (Ibid.)
“The court ‘ “may use any rational method of fixing the
amount of restitution as long as it is reasonably calculated to
make the victim whole.” ’ ” (People v. Plains All American
Pipeline, L.P. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 872, 898–899 (Plains
Pipeline).) The trial court must “make a clear statement of the
calculation method used and how that method justifies the
amount ordered.” (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644,
663–664 (Giordano).)
“ ‘We review a victim restitution award for abuse of
discretion. [Citation.] “[W]here the specific issue is whether the
court’s factual findings support restitution, we review those
findings for substantial evidence.” ’ ” (Plains Pipeline, supra, 101
Cal.App.5th at pp. 885–886.)
Lost wages
The court may order restitution for lost wages, including
future wages. (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(D); Giordano, supra, 42
Cal.4th at p. 658.) Delaittre challenges the restitution award for
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lost future wages on the bases that there was insufficient
evidence E.L. was unable to work, the seven-year period was
excessive, and the court failed to calculate the time value of
money. He also contends trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance by not investigating or presenting evidence to mitigate
the loss. We are not persuaded.
1. Inability to work
Delaittre contends restitution for lost wages must be set
aside because the evidence was insufficient to establish that E.L.
was unable to work in any capacity. We disagree.
E.L. had a traumatic brain injury, neck and knee injuries,
and suffered from migraines, seizures, memory issues, and
PTSD. In the workers’ compensation process, physicians
determined she was not cleared to return to work and was
medically retired. She was designated as “unable to fulfill the
role of a police officer due to [her] injuries.” The disability
retirement was documented in letters from the CalPERS
retirement system. E.L. testified she did not have a job and “at
this point in [her life]” she was “unable to work.” E.L.
volunteered one hour a week assisting handicapped children ride
horses by walking beside them. However, she had been unable to
volunteer for at least four months because she was unwell. E.L.’s
inability to work was thus established by substantial evidence.
(Plains Pipeline, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 886.)
Restitution for lost wages was not precluded by the
possibility E.L. might obtain some sort of employment. In
Millard, the court affirmed a restitution award of $750,000 for
lost future wages where the victim testified he would be unable to
return to his work at a construction company, and he could not
return to his previous employment as a computer installer
because his training was outdated. He testified, “ ‘I’m sure I’ll be
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doing something,’ ” but the trial court believed that hope was
“ ‘conjectural at best.’ ” (Millard, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at
p. 29.) The appellate court stated, “The People were not required
to present vocational rehabilitation expert testimony,” and
concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
the restitution for future lost earnings. (Id. at p. 30.) We reach
the same conclusion here.
Delaittre contends E.L.’s injuries were less severe than
those in Millard. But because “ ‘ “the circumstances reasonably
justify the [trial court’s] findings,” the judgment may not be
overturned when the circumstances might also reasonably
support a contrary finding.’ ” (Millard, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at
p. 26.)
Delaittre also contends there was insufficient evidence
regarding the criteria for medical retirement. The criteria are
established by statute: an employee is “incapacitated for the
performance of duty” if they have a “disability of permanent or
extended duration, which is expected to last at least 12
consecutive months or will result in death.” (Gov. Code,
§§ 21150, subd. (a), 20026; see Lowry v. Port San Luis Harbor
Dist. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 56, 63.) No contrary evidence was
presented here.
2. Period of employment
Delaittre contends restitution should have been limited to
five years’ earnings because that was the time period used in
Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th at page 663, and People v. Harvest
(2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 641, 653, disapproved on other grounds in
People v. Pittman (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1252, 1260. Giordano
stated at page 663 that although “the trial court’s calculation was
imprecise,” the restitution order was not an abuse of discretion.
Harvest upheld restitution for five years of past child support
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payments to the murder victim’s ex-wife. (Harvest, at p. 653.)
Our Supreme Court in Giordano criticized the five-year period in
Harvest as “arbitrary” because it was “based on the period
between an unspecified triggering event and the date that the
restitution order was entered.” (Giordano, at p. 666, fn. 8.) In
contrast here, the trial court logically based the period of seven
years on E.L.’s expected retirement date.
There is no rule limiting future wages to five years. In
Millard, the restitution award for lost wages was based on a
period of 15 years (age 52 at the time of the crime with an
expected retirement age of 65 or 67). (Millard, supra, 175
Cal.App.4th at p. 29.) The trial court here also based restitution
on the victim’s expected retirement age and exercised its “broad
discretion to choose a method for calculating the amount of
restitution . . . that is rationally designed to determine the
surviving victim’s economic loss.” (Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th at
pp. 663–664.)
3. Time value of money
Delaittre contends the trial court erred by failing to
discount the restitution awards for lost wages and health
insurance by the present value (time value) of money. “ ‘Since
the present award is to compensate for [wages] which would only
have been received in the future . . . discounting to present value
recognizes the economic advantage of receiving a present lump
sum which may be used or invested as speculatively or
conservatively as the recipient chooses.’ ” (Pangan, supra, 213
Cal.App.4th at p. 582.) In awarding restitution, a trial court errs
“in not accounting for the fact possession of money now, as
distinct from the future, is worth something.” (Ibid.; see People v.
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Sinay (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1, 7 [upholding 4.2 percent present
value discount for lost wages restitution].)
The prosecution submitted tables and calculations showing
the effect of inflation on what E.L.’s salary would have been,
offset by cost-of-living adjustments for medical retirement pay.
Delaittre requested the court “use a rational formula to discount
for the time value of money,” but did not provide any formula,
figures, or other information on how to do so.
Calculations for the time value of money “cannot be pulled
out of thin air.” (People v. Arce (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 924, 931.)
Arce “disagree[d] with the notion [in Pangan] that a trial court
has a duty to sua sponte apply a time-value reduction even when
there is no evidence or stipulation to establish a discount rate or
measure. Pangan itself recognized the need for evidence when it
stated that on remand, ‘[o]bviously, the trial court will have to
take evidence on the issue of the appropriate discount rate and
calculations.’ ” (Arce, at p. 931, fn. 9, quoting Pangan, supra, 213
Cal.App.4th at p. 586.) No such evidence was presented here.
The trial court here acknowledged the responsibility to
consider the time value of money pursuant to Pangan. But in the
absence of specific information about either the time value of
money or the expected cost of living increases for E.L.’s wages,
the court declined to adjust restitution for either of those factors.
Because these factors would have opposite effects, the court
essentially allowed them to cancel each other out. The court thus
“employ[ed] a method that is rationally designed to determine the
surviving victim’s economic loss” that “produc[ed] a nonarbitrary
result.” (Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 663–665.) No abuse
of discretion has been shown.
4. Ineffective assistance of counsel
Delaittre contends his attorney provided ineffective
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assistance by failing to adequately investigate or present
evidence that E.L. could mitigate her losses by working at
another job. The record does not support this contention.
In written points and authorities, Delaittre contended E.L.
failed to show she had no ability to work in some capacity.
Counsel cross-examined E.L. as to whether she was able to work
and she testified she was not.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant
must show that (1) “counsel’s performance was deficient,” and (2)
“prejudice,” meaning “there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466
U.S. 668, 687, 694.) Delaittre fails to establish either prong.
Deficient performance has not been shown because the
record is silent as to what investigation counsel did or did not
undertake. (See People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926,
1005; People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 569.) And
prejudice is not established based on mere speculation as to what
some undisclosed evidence would have shown. (People v.
Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1127, 1153–1154.) Delaittre has not
shown his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.
Wellness conference
E.L. paid $369.16 to attend a First Responder Mental
Health and Wellness Conference. She testified it addressed
PTSD and would provide insight, discuss available treatments,
help her adapt to trauma from the crime, and provide resources
and options. E.L. was unable to attend the conference because
she contracted COVID. The fees were not refundable.
The court must order restitution “sufficient to fully
reimburse the victim . . . for every determined economic loss
incurred as the result of the defendant’s criminal conduct,
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including, but not limited to . . . [¶] . . . [¶] [m]ental health
counseling expenses.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(C), italics added.)
Because the court granted probation, it had broader authority to
order restitution for expenses “ ‘reasonably related to the crime of
which the defendant was convicted.’ ” (People v. Carbajal (1995)
10 Cal.4th 1114, 1123; People v. Rugamas (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th
518, 521–522.) E.L.’s expenditure for the conference was
reasonably related to the psychological injuries inflicted by
Delaittre’s crimes. E.L. incurred the expense even though her
illness prevented her from attending. The court properly ordered
restitution for the cost of the conference.
Security system
E.L. testified she installed a security system because the
way she was beaten by Delaittre made her feel unsafe in her
home. The CVCB reimbursed E.L. $1,000, which is the
maximum benefit it provides for residential security. Delaittre
contends the trial court erred in awarding E.L. $433.15 for her
costs over the $1,000. He is mistaken.
“ ‘[W]here a victim incurs the economic loss of installing a
security system as a direct result of a defendant’s conduct, the
trial court may include that amount in a victim restitution award
regardless of the crime of conviction.’ ” (People v. Brooks (2018)
23 Cal.App.5th 932, 946.) The court properly ordered Delaittre to
reimburse the CVCB for the $1,000 it provided E.L. to install the
system. (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(4)(A).) The court also properly
awarded restitution to E.L. for the remaining cost of the system.
The record does not support Delaittre’s contention that the
CVCB determined $1,000 was the reasonable cost of the system.
Instead, CVCB stated it was “[t]he maximum benefit for
residential security.” E.L. itemized the expenses for cameras,
other equipment, and installation. Delaittre presented no
11
evidence to show these amounts were unreasonable or that the
restitution award was “ ‘arbitrary or capricious.’ ” (People v.
Shelly (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 181, 199.)
One component of the restitution for the home security
system was $220 E.L. paid a handyman in cash to install the
cameras. Delaittre contends that restitution for this expense was
improper because she did not have a receipt. This contention is
meritless because E.L.’s sworn testimony that she made the
payment was a valid form of proof and was unrefuted. (People v.
Shelly, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 199; see § 1202.4, subd. (f).)
Jet plasma spa treatment and products
Delaittre challenges the $1,537 restitution award for jet
plasma treatment and products because they were not prescribed
by a doctor. We again disagree.
The scratches in E.L.’s face became infected from
Delaittre’s feces and left scarring. E.L. testified the jet plasma
treatment was a cosmetic procedure that stimulated cell growth,
reduced scarring and inflammation, and “helped quite a bit.”
Delaittre offered no evidence to the contrary. Restitution is not
limited to treatment prescribed by a medical doctor. (See People
v. Keichler (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1042 [affirming
restitution for “traditional Hmong healing ceremonies and herbal
medicines”].) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding restitution for this treatment.
Restitution to Madonna Inn
The probation order filed August 14, 2024, erroneously
stated that at sentencing, restitution was ordered in specified
amounts pursuant to stipulation to the hotel, S.A., and the
Madonna Inn. Delaittre correctly notes there was no stipulation
regarding restitution. Accordingly, on April 22, 2025, the court
modified the probation order nunc pro tunc to delete these
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purported stipulated restitution amounts. After the restitution
hearings, the trial court issued a written restitution order that,
inter alia, denied restitution to the Madonna Inn because the
merchandise had been returned and there was no showing it
could not be resold. No further order is required.
Due process
Delaittre recasts all his claims as violations of his federal
right to due process. (Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343,
346.) Hicks found a due process violation where a jury
instruction unconstitutionally limited the jury’s ability to impose
a lesser sentence. (Id. at pp. 344–346.) But “a ‘mere error of
state law’ is not a denial of due process.” (Engle v. Isaac (1982)
456 U.S. 107, 121, fn. 21 [erroneous jury instruction shifting
burden of proof on self-defense]; People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th
394, 432 [erroneous penalty phase jury instruction].) No error of
state law or of due process has been shown here.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
CODY, P. J. YEGAN, J.
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Crystal T. Seiler, Judge
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo
______________________________
Sally Patrone, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Michael C. Keller and John Yang, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.