P. v. Dean CA1/4

Filed 9/28/26 P. v. Dean CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A172552
v.
LAMONT ALEXANDER DEAN, (Mendocino County
Super. Ct. Nos.
Defendant and Appellant.
SCUKCRCR2020365561,
SCUKCRCR2020371031)

Lamont Alexander Dean was convicted of assault with
intent to commit rape (Pen. Code,1 § 220, subd. (a)(1)) and a
separate offense of bringing drugs into a jail (§ 4573.6, subd. (a)).
He admitted one prior strike allegation. (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i),
1170.12).) The trial court sentenced him to 13 years in prison
and imposed various fines and fees. On Dean’s first appeal, we
reversed and remanded for resentencing due to an intervening
change in the sentencing law. (People v. Dean (June 29, 2022,
A162706) [nonpub. opn.].) On remand, the trial court sentenced
Dean to a total of nine years in prison and imposed various fines
and fees. On the second appeal, we reversed and remanded

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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because the trial court failed to give Dean the proper admonitions
when it accepted his admission of the strike allegation. (People v.
Dean (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 391, 393 (Dean II).) We also
instructed the trial court to recalculate Dean’s custody credits
and reconsider the imposition of fines in light of Dean’s
indigency. (Ibid.) On remand, the trial court again imposed a
sentence of nine years in prison and stayed or suspended all fines
and fees.
Dean appeals for a third time, arguing the trial court erred
by failing to consider mitigating developments since the second
sentencing. He also argues the abstract of judgment must be
corrected to reflect the stay of all fines. We agree that the
abstract of judgment must be corrected but find no abuse of
discretion in the trial court’s sentence. We will therefore affirm
the judgment and order the correction of the abstract of
judgment.
BACKGROUND
In our opinion in Dean’s second appeal, we agreed with him
that his pre-trial admission of the prior strike allegation was
flawed because the trial court failed to properly admonish him
regarding his privilege against self-incrimination, the right to
confront his accusers, and the precise increase in the prison term
that might be imposed because of the admission. We therefore
set aside that admission and remanded for further proceedings.
We also instructed the trial court to recalculate his custody
credits and allow the parties to address Dean’s ability to pay
certain fines and fees.

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In April 2024, at the first hearing following issuance of the
remittitur, the sentencing judge presided and announced that
“[b]y agreement of the parties,” the court was continuing the case
for about two months “for resentencing.” The court also referred
the matter to the probation department to recalculate Dean’s
actual credits.2 The second hearing was before a different judge
than the sentencing judge, so the court continued the matter for
about three weeks. At the third hearing, the sentencing judge
again presided and continued the matter for three weeks so that
Dean could appear by video “for judgment and sentencing.”
Dean’s counsel predicted that Dean would want to hold a
Marsden3 hearing, but the trial court said it thought that issue
was “off the table” because the court was “ultimately going to be
striking the strike.”
In August, the trial court began the hearing by saying the
matter was “on for resentencing.” The trial court said the
remittitur directed the trial court “to strike a previously imposed
strike” and the only thing to be addressed was “whether or not
the court should sentence Mr. Dean to the term recommended in
the credit memo based on the Court of Appeal’s direction to strike
the strike.” Dean’s counsel said he could no longer represent
Dean because he believed Dean had accused him of providing
ineffective assistance in connection with Dean’s earlier admission
of the strike. The trial court reluctantly agreed to appoint

2 All subsequent events occurred in 2024 unless otherwise

stated.
3 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.

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alternative counsel, telling Dean, “I’m sorry, Mr. Dean, I’m going
to have to find other counsel for you.” The court relieved Dean’s
counsel and continued the hearing for three weeks.
Dean’s new counsel was not available at the next hearing
date, and Dean had not been transported to the video room. The
trial court continued the matter again until early October. At the
October hearing, the court said that the direction after the prior
appeal was to set aside Dean’s admission of the strike, which the
court intended to do. The court mentioned having discussed the
issues in chambers and that it appeared Dean would be entitled
to a jury trial on the strike allegation after the court set aside his
admission of it. The People affirmed that they were asking the
court to set a jury trial on the strike allegation. Dean’s counsel
said, “I didn’t anticipate that the People would want to prove the
prior strike, but they do.” Dean’s counsel asked the court not to
transport Dean to the courthouse until the very last moment
because Dean had significantly compromised health conditions
from a couple of strokes. The trial court noted that Dean could
waive his right to jury trial on the allegation, but the court said it
was not suggesting he do so.
At a pretrial hearing in November, the trial court began by
stating its understanding that Dean was in hospital care in the
Department of Corrections and, if he were transported to the
courthouse, would need to be housed in a medical facility that the
jail did not have the capacity to provide. Dean’s counsel affirmed
that this was correct and said that Dean was willing to waive his
jury trial because of the importance of keeping his medical care.

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The People announced that they intended to amend the strike
allegation to change the date and specific Penal Code section
alleged for Dean’s prior conviction for assault with a firearm.
At the date set in December for motions in limine, with
Dean appearing by video, the People filed the amended
information. Dean then admitted the strike allegation as
amended. The court continued the matter for about two and a
half weeks for sentencing.
At the sentencing hearing later in December, Dean’s
counsel argued that the trial court’s sentencing needed to take
into account Dean’s current circumstances, not just his position
at the time of the original sentencing. He said that Dean was 54
years old, in a hospital facility, with medical issues and declining
health requiring daily professional care with durable medical
equipment. He asserted that Dean was partially disabled and at
high risk for medical crisis intervention. Dean’s counsel also told
the court that Dean had participated in all of the rehabilitative
programs that were available at the Department of Corrections.
Dean’s counsel further argued that Dean had admitted the prior
strike at an early stage of the process, “sort of.” Emphasizing
that recent amendments to the Penal Code made clear the
Legislature’s desire to reduce prison populations and maximize
rehabilitation and restorative justice, Dean’s counsel asked the
court to impose the lower term of two years on the primary count
of assault with intent to commit rape, doubled because of the
strike, and a concurrent one year on the separate charge of
bringing drugs into the jail, for a total of four years. As to fines

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and fees, Dean’s counsel told the court that Dean had zero income
due to his incarceration and lacked employment before his
incarceration.
The People asked the court to impose the middle term of
four years on the principal charge as recommended by the
probation department, doubled for the prior strike, and run the
additional one-year term consecutively for a total of nine years.
The prosecutor argued that the circumstances in aggravation
related to Dean’s numerous prior felony and misdemeanor
convictions, prior prison terms, and violations of parole and
probation outweighed any of the mitigating factors Dean’s
counsel had suggested. The People also said the court could
consider the vulnerability of the victim, who was in an
unresponsive state due to drug use at the time of the offense.
The trial court said that the probation department’s
recommendation was appropriate for the reasons the People
mentioned, which the court had cited at the prior sentencing.
The court specifically said it considered Dean’s counsel’s
arguments about Dean’s physical health. But the court explained
that “in evaluating all the factors that go to the appropriate
term,” it was satisfied that the middle term was appropriate on
the assault with intent to commit rape conviction. The court
imposed a total sentence of nine years based on doubling that
middle term and adding one year for the charge relating to
bringing drugs into the jail. It stayed all restitution fines, court
security fees, and criminal conviction assessments, and
suspended the $300 parole revocation fee. Before concluding the

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hearing, the trial court asked Dean’s counsel if he wanted to put
anything on the record. Dean’s counsel said, “No, thank you.”
DISCUSSION
I. Sentencing Discretion
Dean contends the trial court erred by imposing the middle
term on the assault with intent to commit rape count without
considering mitigating developments since the prior sentencing,
including certain procedural developments after the remand from
his second appeal. Dean admits the trial court recognized his
health issues but faults the court for not crediting him for his
rehabilitative efforts and achievements despite those health
challenges. He charges the trial court with failing to consider his
cooperation in admitting the prior strike despite the injustice of
his former attorney’s breach of loyalty and the People’s
abandonment of their agreement not to retry the strike
allegation. He also accuses the trial court of forgetting the
Legislature’s policy favoring rehabilitation and the reduction of
prison populations.
Dean forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in the
trial court. “ ‘A party in a criminal case may not, on appeal, raise
“claims involving the trial court’s failure to properly make or
articulate its discretionary sentencing choices” if the party did
not object to the sentence at trial,’ ” unless the sentence is legally
unauthorized. (People v. Sperling (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1094,
1100.) This rule applies here because Dean did not object on the
bases he now raises when the trial court gave him an opportunity
after announcing his sentence. Had he done so, the trial court

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could have obviated his claims of error by addressing the facts
that Dean now contends it ignored.
Dean resists this conclusion by pointing out that his
counsel raised his health issues, participation in rehabilitation
programs, cooperation, and the Legislature’s policy preferences in
argument before the trial court announced his sentence. He then
claims it would have been futile to object after the trial court
announced its sentence, citing the statement in People v. Craig
(2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1165, 1176 that “[f]ailing to object to an
erroneous ruling after the court has rejected your argument is
not forfeiture.” But Dean cannot have it both ways. If Dean
raised his arguments about mitigating circumstances and the
trial court rejected them, then it did not fail to address them as
Dean now argues. If the trial court did not address any
mitigating circumstances because Dean did not raise them, then
he forfeited the argument that it failed to do so.
In any event, even if we exercise our discretion to consider
Dean’s argument on the merits as he requests in the alternative,
the argument fails. “We review discretionary sentencing
decisions for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Knowles (2024)
105 Cal.App.5th 757, 764.) “We presume that the trial court
acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives. [Citation.] The
burden is on the party challenging the sentencing decision to
show that the court abused its discretion. [Citation.] We may
not presume error from a silent record. [Citation.] ‘Unless the
record affirmatively demonstrates otherwise, the trial court is
deemed to have considered all the relevant sentencing factors set

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forth in the rules.’ ” (Id. at p. 765; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.409 [relevant sentencing factors “will be deemed to have been
considered unless the record affirmatively reflects otherwise”].)
The presumption that the trial court considered all
relevant sentencing factors defeats Dean’s contentions. The trial
court itself remarked that it imposed its sentence after
“evaluating all the factors that go to the appropriate term.” As
Dean’s counsel stated in the trial court, the trial court could see
via video that Dean was in a hospital facility. Dean’s counsel told
the court that Dean had participated in rehabilitation programs
in prison. Dean cites nothing in the record to overcome the
presumption that the trial court considered the significance of the
latter fact in light of the former. Dean’s counsel told the court of
the Legislature’s policy preferences for rehabilitation and
reduction of prison populations. Dean cites nothing to suggest
the trial court was somehow unaware of those considerations
when it announced its sentence moments later. Likewise, the
trial court accepted Dean’s admission of the strike, so it must
have been aware of the extent of Dean’s cooperation and whether
that cooperation came early or late in the development of the
case.
We further reject Dean’s assertion that the People
originally agreed not to retry the strike allegation and later
changed course after a change in the deputy district attorney
handling the case. The strongest evidence supporting Dean’s
contention is the trial court’s statement at the first post-remand
hearing that “[b]y agreement of the parties” the court would

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continue the matter “for resentencing” at a future date after the
probation department had calculated Dean’s actual credits. This
statement is ambiguous at best. The trial court did not explain
whether the parties had agreed that the People would not retry
the strike or simply agreed that the probation department needed
to recalculate credits. Any support this statement lends Dean’s
position disappears in light of the trial court’s repeated remarks
at subsequent hearings that our remittitur required it to strike
the strike allegation. Those remarks reveal that the trial court,
at least initially, believed it was obligated to strike the strike
allegation, which is quite different from the People choosing not
to retry it. The trial court was mistaken, as it later realized,
since our opinion said only that Dean’s admission of the strike
allegation was set aside, not that the trial court was required to
strike the strike. The other evidence supporting Dean’s position
is the statement by Dean’s new counsel, in his initial appearance,
that he had not anticipated that the People would want to prove
the prior strike. But Dean’s counsel did not explain the basis for
his expectation or accuse the People of changing their position.
Considering that Dean’s counsel had just joined the case, he had
no apparent basis from which to conclude that the People had
changed their approach.
Even if we leave aside this factual issue and assume the
People changed their position, it would not affect the outcome
here. Dean never suggests, much less proves, that the People
were legally precluded from changing their position. Nor does he
cite any authority for his implicit position that the People’s

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change of position or delay in choosing to retry the strike
allegation is a mitigating circumstance supporting a lower
sentence. Finally, assuming further that the change of position is
a mitigating circumstance, we would have to presume that the
trial court considered it, like any other mitigating circumstances.
II. Abstract of Judgment
Dean points out that the trial court struck or stayed all
fines at the sentencing hearing, including the restitution fines
under section 1202.4 in both cases. But the abstract of judgment
lists $300 fines under section 1202.4 in each case. As the People
concede, the trial court’s oral pronouncement controls, so the
abstract of judgment must be corrected. (People v. Whalum
(2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 1, 15.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The trial court clerk shall
prepare an amended abstract of judgment to reflect that the $300
section 1202.4 restitution fines imposed in both case no.
SCUKCRCR2020365561 and case no. SCUKCRCR2020371031
are stayed. The trial court clerk shall transmit a copy of the
amended abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation.
BROWN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:

GOLDMAN, J.
GORDON, J. People v. Dean (A172552)


Judge of the Superior Court of San Francisco County,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

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