Filed 8/3/26 P. v. Dawson CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G064914
v. (Super. Ct. No. 23NF1021)
RICARDO LAROY DAWSON, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Terri K. Flynn-Peister, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded with directions.
Johanna Pirko, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General,
Collette C. Cavalier and Tami Falkenstein Hennick, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
* * *
Appellant Ricardo Dawson was convicted of three charges,
including two counts of conspiracy. On appeal, he contends that he can only
be convicted of one conspiracy count because the two conspiracy convictions
arose from a single agreement. The Attorney General concedes that Dawson
could only be convicted of a single count of conspiracy under these
circumstances. We agree and reverse Dawson’s conviction on count 3.
FACTS1
A. Factual Background
Early on the morning of July 5, 2022, C.B. was in the kitchen of
her condominium in Anaheim when she heard an unfamiliar noise coming
from near her front door. C.B. walked down a set of stairs toward the front
door where she saw what looked like an explosive device. The device, which
appeared similar to a red stick of dynamite, was burning. She ran toward the
device because she was worried it would blow up and burn her home down.
The device blew up as C.B. reached for it, and the condominium filled with
smoke. After C.B.’s husband called 911, she was transported to the hospital
with severe burns to her hands and feet, as well as lacerations to her bicep,
1 Dawson’s reply brief explains that he does not “challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence in support of counts 2 and 3.” (Italics in reply brief.)
Because the sufficiency of the evidence underlying Dawson’s convictions for
conspiracy as to counts 2 and 3 is not in dispute and based on the narrow
issue on appeal, we provide a brief summary of the facts.
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which required stitches. She was unable to walk without a walker for almost
two months; she also suffered slight hearing loss in her right ear.
C.B. suspected her former boss, K.D., may have been involved
because C.B. had successfully sued K.D. the year before for wage and hour
violations. C.B. had not had any contact with K.D. since she left the company
in July 2021, and all litigation and contact with K.D. had been handled by
C.B.’s attorney.
Surveillance video from the front of C.B.’s home showed Dawson
at the time of the bombing. During a search of Dawson’s bedroom, police
found a pair of shoes, a brown coat, and a blue backpack which matched what
Dawson was wearing on the surveillance video. Police also found homemade
explosive devices consistent with the explosive device recovered at C.B.’s
home, as well as multiple firearms.
A witness saw a Mercedes leaving the crime scene following the
explosion, and investigators observed a similar Mercedes parked in front of
Dawson’s home. Using geofence data from Google, investigators learned that
Dawson was in the area around C.B.’s home on July 4, 2022.
On the morning of September 22, 2022, as C.B. was getting out of
her car in front of her condo, she noticed a gray Chrysler van slowly drive
past her. The van then reversed and stopped about six to eight feet away
from her. C.B. noticed a gun barrel resting in the corner of an open window of
the van. She felt a “big thud” on the side of her body and ran in front of her
car to hide. C.B. noticed she was covered in blood and called 911 to report she
had been shot; she was treated in the hospital for a gunshot wound.
Police later determined that Dawson had rented the van on
September 18, 2022, and returned it on September 26, 2022. The van was
driving near C.B.’s condo the day before the shooting, and cell phone tower
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data showed Dawson’s phone was near C.B.’s home the morning she was
shot.
I.E., testifying pursuant to a use immunity agreement, stated
that she and Dawson had been dating for a few years at the time of the
attacks on C.B. On July 5, 2022, Dawson picked up I.E. from her daughter’s
house in a black Mercedes. They drove about 30 minutes to what Dawson
claimed was a friend’s house. Around 3:00 a.m., they parked in front of C.B.’s
condo and smoked methamphetamine. Dawson later instructed I.E. to get in
the driver’s seat, drop him off in front of the condos, park the Mercedes at the
corner, and wait for him. Approximately 20 minutes later, Dawson got back
in the car and said, “Let’s go.” When I.E. asked Dawson where he had gone,
Dawson replied that “he just went to go scare someone.”
I.E. testified she met J.A. through Dawson. J.A. and Dawson
were roommates in 2022 before the bombing. J.A. and Dawson texted each
other frequently, including the day of the bombing.
Phone records showed that J.A. also had phone communications
with C.B.’s former boss K.D. on July 3, 2022 and on September 10, 2022.
Investigators also discovered that K.D. paid J.A. $800 in 2022. An
investigator testified that police believed K.D. and J.A. worked together to
harm C.B. but had been unable to prove their theory.
B. Procedural History
Dawson was charged with explosion causing mayhem and great
bodily injury (Pen. Code,2 § 18755, subd. (b); count 1), conspiracy to discharge
a firearm from a motor vehicle (§§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 26100, subd. (c); count 2),
and conspiracy to commit assault with a firearm (§§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 245,
2 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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subd. (a)(2); count 3). It was also alleged that Dawson had a prior serious
felony conviction and a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (d)
& (e)(1), 1170.12, subds. (b), (c)(1)).
A jury convicted Dawson of all three counts. The trial court found
true that Dawson had suffered a prior serious felony and a prior strike
conviction. The court sentenced Dawson to a total term of 29 years to life,
comprised of 19 years to life on count 1 and a consecutive term of 10 years to
life on count 2. The court imposed and stayed sentence on count 3.
DISCUSSION
Dawson argues there was insufficient evidence to support his
convictions of conspiracy in counts 2 and 3 because both convictions arose
from a single agreement and the single criminal objective of shooting C.B.
The Attorney General concedes that Dawson may only be convicted of a
single count of conspiracy based on a single agreement. We concur and
reverse Dawson’s conviction on count 3.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Where a defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to
support a conviction, we “‘“review the whole record in the light most favorable
to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—
such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.”’” (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1251.) “We
presume ‘“in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier
could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” [Citation.] This standard applies
whether direct or circumstantial evidence is involved.’” (Ibid.)
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II.
DAWSON CANNOT BE CONVICTED OF TWO COUNTS OF CONSPIRACY
ARISING FROM THE SAME AGREEMENT
A. Factual Background
As noted, Dawson was convicted in count 2 of conspiracy to
commit the crime of discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle and in
count 3 of conspiracy to commit the crime of assault with a firearm. The
prosecution alleged the same three overt acts in support of both conspiracy
counts: (1) Dawson “rented a Chrysler Pacifica van with license plates
8YLA730 on September 18, 2022”; (2) “an unknown co-conspirator drove that
van to the victim’s house address on September 22, 2022”; and (3) “an
unknown co-conspirator fired their firearm from the passenger’s side window
of the van which struck the victim causing her injury.”
During closing argument, the prosecutor repeatedly stated that
counts 2 and 3 were based on a single agreement to commit a single shooting:
“You have your [c]ount 2 and [c]ount 3, conspiracy to commit
those different crimes, conspiracy to commit shooting a firearm from a motor
vehicle at a person, and then . . . conspiracy to commit assault with a firearm.
I’m not going to spend a lot of time on those because, again, we have that
video. She was shot by a shotgun, and you heard her testimony, you saw the
BBs, the wounds in her side. . . . [¶] These are not two separate random
incidents that occurred with the same victim at the same location . . . .”
“So to prove the conspiracies, [c]ounts 2 and . . . 3, was there an
intent to agree, and did they defend and agree to commit a discharge of a
firearm, and did he also agree for the [c]ount 3, assault with a firearm. So did
he intend to agree and is there an agreement?”
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“These crimes are committed together, same reason, same
purpose, to hurt [C.B.], to scare [C.B.] for what she’s done, whether it’s to sue
Ms. Daniels or just living. [¶] . . . But this was an agreement between
multiple individuals to commit these acts on September 22nd because we
know there were multiple people involved in that shooting. There’s a driver
and shooter.”
Furthermore, during closing argument, the prosecutor relied on
the same three overt acts as alleged in the information to argue that there
was a single agreement between Dawson and an unknown co-conspirator to
shoot C.B. The prosecutor never argued there were separate agreements to
shoot C.B. or that there were separate shootings.
At sentencing, the trial court stated, “I seem to get the
impression . . . that [the parties] concede that [c]ounts 2 and . . . 3 [may not
both be imposed under section] 654 as they address the September 22nd
shooting.” Based on this consensus, the court stayed Dawson’s conviction on
count 3.
B. Legal Standard
“It is well settled that the essence of the crime of conspiracy is
the agreement, and thus it is the number of the agreements (not the number
of the victims or number of statutes violated) that determine the number of
the conspiracies.” (People v. Meneses (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1648, 1669
(Meneses); People v. Lopez (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1551, 1557 [‘“One agreement
gives rise to only a single offense, despite any multiplicity of objects”’].) “The
gist of the crime of conspiracy . . . is the agreement or confederation of the
conspirators to commit one or more unlawful acts . . . .” (Braverman v. United
States (1942) 317 U.S. 49, 53.) “‘The conspiracy is the crime, and that is one,
however diverse its objects.’” (Id. at p. 54.)
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C. Analysis
Here, according to the allegations of the information, the
evidence presented at trial, and the prosecutor’s closing argument, there was
a single agreement to commit one shooting of C.B. on September 22, 2022.
Therefore, Dawson could only be convicted of a single count of conspiracy.
That the single shooting may have violated two separate criminal statutes is
immaterial. (See, e.g., People v. Patrick (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 952, 965
[noting that “a single agreement to commit acts which, if completed, would
constitute more than one substantive crime, is but a single conspiracy”];
Meneses, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1669 [“Whether the object of a single
agreement is to commit one or many crimes, it is in either case that
agreement which constitutes the conspiracy which the statute punishes”].)
The fact the trial court stayed punishment on count 3 pursuant to
section 654 does not render the error harmless because there can only be one
conspiracy conviction for a single agreement under the above authorities. “If
the felony is conspiracy to commit two or more felonies which have different
punishments and the commission of those felonies constitute but one offense
of conspiracy, the penalty shall be that prescribed for the felony which has
the greater maximum term.” (§ 182, subd. (a).) Here, because the maximum
punishment for count 2 is seven years (§ 26100, subd. (c)) and the maximum
punishment for count 3 is four years (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)), count 3, having the
lesser maximum term, must be reversed.
DISPOSITION
Dawson’s conviction on count 3 is reversed. The judgment is
otherwise affirmed. On remand, the trial court is directed to prepare an
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amended abstract of judgment to dismiss count 3 and to forward a certified
copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
SCHWARM, J.*
WE CONCUR:
DELANEY, ACTING P. J.
SERVINO, J.
*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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