Filed 9/3/26 P. v. Davis CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H053872
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. BB624073)
v.
MICHAEL PAUL DAVIS,
Defendant and Appellant.
In November 2006, defendant Michael Paul Davis committed an armed
robbery at a bowling alley and shot the bowling alley’s manager.
Davis pleaded guilty to attempted murder (Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, subd.
(a), 664; count 1) and second degree robbery (§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c); count 2).
He admitted personally discharging a firearm during the commission of each
offense (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) (firearm enhancements) and inflicting great
bodily injury during the commission of each offense (§ 12022.7, subd. (a))
(great bodily injury enhancements). Davis admitted he had two prior strike
convictions (§§ 667, subd. (b), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)) (strike priors) and two
prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)) (serious felony priors). He
1 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
also admitted he had served three prior prison terms within the meaning of
section 667.5, former subdivision (b) (prison priors). The trial court
sentenced Davis to an aggregate indeterminate prison term of 132 years to
life plus a consecutive determinate term of 22 years.
In May 2025, Davis filed a petition to recall and resentence pursuant to
section 1172.75 (section 1172.75 petition). The trial court recalled Davis’s
sentence and resentenced him. The court did not impose the now invalid
enhancements for the prison priors. In addition, on count 2, the court
dismissed the firearm enhancement and serious felony priors and stayed the
punishment on the great bodily injury enhancement. On count 1, the court
struck the punishment for the great bodily injury enhancement but declined
to dismiss the firearm enhancement and the serious felony priors. The court
denied Davis’s People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497
(Romero) motion to dismiss his strike priors. The court sentenced Davis to an
aggregate indeterminate prison term of 92 years to life plus a consecutive
determinate term of 10 years.
On appeal, Davis challenges the trial court’s decision not to dismiss the
firearm enhancement and the serious felony priors on count 1. He contends
the court abused its discretion by relying on a legally erroneous basis for its
decision. In the alternative, Davis argues his counsel provided ineffective
assistance.
For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment.
2
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
A. Facts
On the morning of November 18, 2006, Palo Alto police officers
responded to a report of an armed robbery with shots fired at Palo Alto Bowl.
A Palo Alto Bowl employee, V.K.,3 was present when Davis entered the
accounting office at the bowling alley. Davis robbed V.K. at gunpoint. As
Davis was leaving, H.K., the bowling alley manager, entered the office. Davis
ordered H.K. to move out of the way, H.K. took one step, and Davis shot H.K.
in the neck. Davis fled. Davis was then 25 years old.
On November 30, 2006, officers apprehended Davis after a 12-hour
stand-off. He denied committing the offenses and told officers he evaded
police because of a parole violation.4 Davis later admitted to committing the
robbery and shooting H.K.
B. Procedural Background
1. Charges, Plea, and Original Sentence
In 2007, the Santa Clara County District Attorney filed a first amended
felony complaint (complaint) charging Davis with attempted murder (§§ 187,
664; count 1), and second degree robbery (§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c); count 2).
As to both counts, the complaint alleged firearm enhancements (§ 12022.53,
subd. (d)) and great bodily injury enhancements (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).
The complaint also alleged Davis had been convicted of two strike
priors (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12) for residential burglary (§ 460, subd.
2 We take these facts from the probation reports prepared for Davis’s
original sentencing and his section 1172.75 resentencing.
3 We refer to the victims by their initials to protect their privacy
interests. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).)
4 Davis had absconded from parole supervision within two months of
his July 2006 release from state prison.
3
(a)) and criminal threats (§ 422) and had also been convicted of two serious
felony priors (§ 667, subd. (a)). The complaint further alleged that Davis had
incurred three prison priors (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
On March 9, 2007, Davis pleaded guilty to both counts and admitted all
allegations stated in the complaint. The trial court accepted Davis’s pleas
and admissions.
On May 10, 2007, the trial court sentenced Davis to an aggregate
prison sentence of 132 years to life, consecutive to 22 years. On count 1, the
court sentenced Davis to 68 years to life, consecutive to 11 years. On count 2,
the court sentenced him to 64 years to life, consecutive to 11 years, with the
sentence to run consecutively to the sentence on count 1.
2. Prior Criminal History
In 2001, Davis was, on separate occasions, convicted of (1) evading a
peace officer and multiple counts of auto theft and sentenced to two years in
prison; (2) possession of methamphetamine after he failed deferred entry of
judgment; and (3) first degree burglary (his first strike prior) and sentenced
to four years in prison. With respect to the first degree burglary, Davis
entered the residence of a man with whom he had been living and who had
sexually abused Davis and stole multiple items.
In 2004, Davis was placed on formal probation for domestic violence,
which resulted in a parole violation.
In 2005, approximately two weeks after Davis was released from
serving his parole violation, he was arrested for making criminal threats (his
second strike prior) and sentenced to 32 months in state prison, which
included a parole violation. Davis had physically assaulted his girlfriend,
leaving visible injuries to her face and arms, and had threatened to kill her if
4
she reported the assault to his parole officer. Davis was also convicted of one
count of misdemeanor domestic violence.
In July 2006, approximately four months before committing the current
offenses, Davis was released on parole. By approximately two months later,
he had absconded and was considered a parolee at large. The probation
officer reported that Davis’s parole violation included “mixed conduct:
absconding, failure to complete a domestic violence program[,] and
association with prohibited persons.”
Between 2000 and 2004, Davis also incurred misdemeanor convictions
for multiple counts of being under the influence of methamphetamine and
one count of criminal threats.
3. Conduct While Incarcerated
While incarcerated on the instant offenses, Davis completed various
courses pertaining to, inter alia, survivors of child sexual abuse, conflict
resolution, and anger management, as well as job-related training.
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) staff filed
reports praising Davis’s performance on job assignments.
In 2011 (also while in custody for the instant offenses), Davis was
convicted of attempted murder for stabbing a fellow inmate and sentenced to
27 years to life, consecutive to his sentence for the current offenses. Davis
and another inmate had repeatedly stabbed the victim in the neck and back
with manufactured weapons. Davis asserted he stabbed the victim because
the victim was a sex offender.
In 2012, Davis was again accused of attempted murder, by stabbing, of
a fellow inmate. Davis stabbed the victim in the neck by making continuous
slashing motions with a manufactured weapon. The charge was dismissed in
2016 because the victim would not cooperate with the prosecution.
5
Davis committed additional rules violations, including two that were
classified as serious (for fighting in 2019, and for possession of a cellular
phone in 2022).
In late April 2025, Davis was accused of coordinating the introduction
and distribution of controlled substances into the California Medical Facility
(where Davis was then housed) “on numerous occasions” and “had
‘circumvented institutional security on multiple occasions.’ ” The CDCR
reported that Davis “poses [a]n immediate threat to the safety and security”
of the facility and transferred him to segregated housing. The matter was
pending when Davis filed his petition for recall and resentencing.
4. Resentencing
On May 19, 2025, Davis filed a section 1172.75 petition. Davis
requested that the trial court grant his Romero motion and dismiss one of his
strike priors, strike the punishment for one of the two firearm enhancements
under section 12022.53, subdivision (d), impose a lesser gun enhancement,5
and impose a concurrent sentence on count 2. He also requested that the
court strike his serious felony priors.
Davis asserted he had experienced a traumatic childhood that involved
sexual abuse, physical abuse, drug abuse, and neglect. He argued both his
youth at the time of commission of the strike priors and the childhood trauma
he experienced were mitigating factors supporting dismissal of one of the
strike priors. Davis acknowledged his conviction for attempted murder of a
fellow inmate, his assault of a fellow inmate, and rules violations while
incarcerated, but he highlighted his completion of rehabilitation programs,
5 Davis suggested that the trial court impose a sentence under section
12022.53, subdivision (b) (carrying a term of 10 years) or section 12022.5,
subdivision (a) (carrying a term of 3, 4, or 10 years).
6
commendations for his work ethic and behavior on his job assignments, and
the support of his family and friends as mitigating factors.
Davis quoted section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(3) in setting out the
relevant postconviction factors the trial court should consider when
sentencing him, including “ ‘evidence that reflects whether age, time served,
and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk
for future violence.’ ” He also asserted “[t]he parole suitability hearing
process remains an extremely high hurdle for lifers,” with even “seemingly
strong candidates” being denied and the Governor and the parole board
having authority to review any decision to grant parole.
The district attorney’s resentencing brief requested that the trial court
strike the now legally invalid prison priors but otherwise impose the same
sentence.
On November 18, 2025, the trial court conducted a hearing, recalled
Davis’s sentence, and resentenced him. The trial court stated it had
“thoroughly reviewed all of the papers that ha[d] been filed in this case, all
the attachments.” The court accepted as true Davis’s assertions of childhood
trauma. Nevertheless, the court found that Davis’s record, “both before the
conviction in this case, as well as after, is replete with acts of significant
violence that cause[d] the court great concern about the safety of the public
where he would be released at this time.”
The trial court stated it had considered Davis’s efforts while
incarcerated as well as “the factors under the Williams case[6] and its
progeny.” The court denied Davis’s Romero motion, stating, “given the
conduct of [] Davis, not only in th[is] case, but also with his priors, and the
subsequent conduct that has occurred in prison, including the conviction for
6 People v. Williams (2018) 17 Cal.4th 148.
7
attempted murder that occurred while incarcerated, the court cannot, in good
conscience, find that [] Davis falls outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law.”
The trial court sentenced Davis to an aggregate sentence of 92 years to
life consecutive to 10 years, comprised of consecutive terms of 42 years to life
on count 1, 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd.
(d)) on count 1, 10 years for the two serious felony priors (§ 667, subd. (a)) on
to count 1, and 25 years to life on count 2. On count 1, the court struck the
punishment for the great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a))
under section 1385, subdivision (b). On count 2, the court imposed and
stayed the punishment on the great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7,
subd. (a)) under section 12022.53, subdivision (f), struck the punishment on
the firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) under section 1385,
subdivision (b)(1), and struck the two serious felony priors (§ 667, subd. (a))
under section 1385, subdivision (b)(1). Although the court did not expressly
address the prison priors during the hearing, the sentencing minute order
and the abstract of judgment state that they no longer apply by operation of
law.
Davis’s counsel did not object during the resentencing hearing to the
trial court’s findings or articulation of Davis’s sentence.
II. DISCUSSION
Davis contends the trial court abused its discretion in declining to
dismiss the firearm enhancement on count 1 and dismiss the serious felony
priors. Davis asserts the court committed legal error in failing “to consider
[the] danger to public safety on ‘the date on which the defendant would be
released under the revised sentence.’ ” (Quoting People v. Gonzalez (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 215, 229 (Gonzalez).) Davis asserts he was prejudiced by
this error because, given that under the revised sentence he would not be
8
eligible for parole before his 113th birthday, “the record does not clearly
indicate that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion if it had
understood the proper scope of its discretion.”7
A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
Section 1172.75, subdivision (a) provides for the recall and resentencing
of defendants with certain invalid sentencing enhancements. It states that
any sentence enhancement pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b) that
was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, is legally invalid (with an exception
not applicable here). (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) The statute further provides that
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75 “shall result in a lesser sentence
than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed
enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.” (Id., subd. (d)(1).)
When resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75, trial courts are
directed to “apply ‘the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and . . . any
other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion
so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of
sentencing.’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838,
849.)
Senate Bill 81, effective January 1, 2022, added subdivision (c) to
section 1385 (section 1385(c)) which affords trial courts added discretion to
strike sentence enhancements under certain circumstances. (See People v.
7 If this court were to find this claim forfeited, Davis alternatively
contends his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to argue that
the trial court was required to consider Davis’s request for resentencing
“using ‘ “a forward-looking inquiry” ’ ” into Davis’s dangerousness at the time
of release under the revised sentence. Because we consider the merits of
Davis’s argument, we do not reach his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
9
Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 242–243.) Section 1385(c)(1) provides,
“Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it
is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that
enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.” “In exercising its
discretion under [subdivision (c)], the court shall consider and afford great
weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the
mitigating circumstances in [the subparagraphs to subdivision (c)(2)] are
present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs
greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that
dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety. ‘Endanger
public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the
enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to
others.” (Id., subd. (c)(2); see also People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024,
1029; People v. Anderson (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 233, 239–240.)
We review for abuse of discretion the trial court’s decision not to strike
a sentence enhancement under section 1385. (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88
Cal.App.5th 287, 298 (Mendoza); Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 225.)
“The abuse of discretion standard is highly deferential. When, ‘ “as
here, a discretionary power is statutorily vested in the trial court, its exercise
of that discretion ‘must not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that
the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently
absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” ’ ”
(Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 298.) “It is not enough to show that
reasonable people might disagree about whether to strike one or more of [the
defendant’s] prior convictions.” (People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305,
310 (Myers).)
10
However, while deferential, the abuse of discretion standard “ ‘ “is not
empty.” [Citation.] “[I]t asks in substance whether the ruling in question
‘falls outside the bounds of reason’ under the applicable law and the relevant
facts.” ’ ” (People v. Uribe (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 836, 858.) “Thus, the trial
court abuses its discretion when it bases its decision ‘on impermissible factors
[citation] or on an incorrect legal standard.’ ” (Ibid.; Gonzalez, supra, 103
Cal.App.5th at p. 225.) “Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that
the trial court knew the law and followed it.” (People v. Ramirez (2021) 10
Cal.5th 983, 1042.)
B. Analysis
In contending the trial court abused its discretion, Davis focuses on the
trial court’s remark during the resentencing hearing that it had “ ‘great
concern about the safety of the public where [Davis] would be released at this
time.’ ” Relying on Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th 215, Davis asserts the
trial court erred because it did not conduct a “ ‘ “forward-looking” ’ ” inquiry
into whether reducing the enhancement and dismissing the serious felony
priors would endanger public safety.
In Gonzalez, the defendant argued the trial court committed error by
“focusing on whether [Gonzalez] ‘presently’ and ‘currently’ endangered public
safety rather than assessing whether, looking forward, public safety would be
endangered due to an earlier release from prison (i.e., in 50 years to life
rather than in 75 years to life) if the enhancement was dismissed.”
(Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 224.)
The Court of Appeal determined that “the trial court erred because it
considered only whether Gonzalez currently posed a danger to the public
when assessing if a dismissal of the firearm enhancement would ‘endanger
public safety.’ ” (Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 230, italics added.)
11
The trial court had “specifically explained, ‘I think presently [Gonzalez] does
represent a danger to society, and for that reason . . . I do think it is
appropriate for the [c]ourt to impose an additional 25 years to life for the gun
use enhancement.’ ” (Id. at p. 231.) Because the trial court in Gonzalez relied
on that single factor for its decision, and “gave no indication of how it would
rule if it did not limit its inquiry to Gonzalez’s current dangerousness” (ibid.,
italics added), the reviewing court concluded that the trial court’s error was
prejudicial. (Id. at p. 232.)
The trial court’s comments at the sentencing hearing do not
demonstrate that it interpreted section 1385(c) in the manner rejected by the
appellate court in Gonzalez. We agree with the Attorney General that, in
contrast to the facts of Gonzalez, the court considered Davis’s criminal,
parole, and incarceration history, as well as his current offenses.
Although Davis contends “a trial court’s failure to consider future
dangerousness abuses its discretion regardless of other facts and
circumstances considered” (citing Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 223;
People v. Williams (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1057, 1063), the trial court’s
remarks do not indicate that it expressly limited its analysis to Davis’s
current dangerousness or failed to consider Davis’s dangerousness at the
time of possible release. (Cf. Gonzalez, at p. 224.) Without such an
affirmative showing, Davis’s claim of error fails. (See People v. Brugman
(2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 637; Myers, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 310.)
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the trial court erred in its application of
section 1385(c).
Even if the trial court failed to properly consider Davis’s possible
dangerousness at the time of his eventual release if he were sentenced to a
lesser term, we would find any error harmless. The Gonzalez court stated, “it
12
is conceivable that, if the trial court holds a new sentencing hearing in which
it does not limit its inquiry to [the defendant]’s current dangerousness, it will
decide to exercise its discretion under section [1385(c)(2)] in a different
manner.” (Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 231.) On this record, we
decide there is no likelihood the court would have exercised its discretion
differently. We reject Davis’s assertion the trial court committed prejudicial
error under section 1385(c).
C. Errors in the Resentencing Minute Order and Abstract of Judgment
In reviewing the instant appellate record, we have identified errors in
the resentencing minute order and abstract of judgment not raised by either
Davis or the Attorney General. Specifically, the attachment to the November
18, 2025 minute order and the abstract of judgment (dated November 18,
2025) both state that the trial court struck the punishment for the great
bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) on count 2. In addition, the
minute order states that the court struck that punishment pursuant to
section 1385, subdivision (b). In fact, the transcript of the sentencing hearing
indicates that the court imposed and stayed the punishment on the great
bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) under section 12022.53,
subdivision (f).
In section No. 2 of the abstract of judgment, the trial court should have
entered an “S” in the fifth column for “time imposed or ‘S’ for stayed” for the
great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) on count 2. (Some
capitalization omitted.) In the attachment to the November 18, 2025 minute
order, the trial court should have entered “3 years pun stayed purs PC
12022.53(f)” in the sixth column for “yrs/styd/strkn” for the great bodily
injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) on count 2. (Some capitalization
omitted.)
13
We direct the trial court to correct the clerical errors in section No. 2 of
the abstract of judgment and in the attachment to the November 18, 2025
minute order. (See People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 89.)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to amend the
abstract of judgment to revise row 3, column five of section No. 2 to state “S”
and to amend the attachment to the November 18, 2025 minute order to
revise row five, column six to state “3 years pun stayed purs PC 12022.53(f).”
The trial court clerk is directed to forward a certified copy of the corrected
abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
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______________________________________
Danner, J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________________
Greenwood, P. J.
____________________________________
Adams, J.
H053872
People v. Davis