Filed 9/30/26 P. v. Davis CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
THE PEOPLE, C101430
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 22FE017106)
v.
ERIC BRIAN DAVIS,
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury found defendant Eric Brian Davis guilty of voluntary manslaughter and
found true that defendant personally used a deadly weapon, a knife. The trial court
sentenced him to four years in prison. On appeal, defendant contends instructional errors
deprived him of a fair trial. We disagree and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In October 2022, defendant and C.H. were sitting together at the bar in a restaurant
when Daniel Padilla (the victim) sat next to them. Padilla was a stranger to both
defendant and C.H. After about 20 minutes of Padilla telling jokes and talking to
defendant, defendant stated he did not like to talk about politics, religion, or race.
Defendant walked away to talk to M.B., a server at the restaurant, and then
returned to the bar and continued his conversation with Padilla. C.H. was not paying
attention to the conversation between defendant and Padilla until she heard defendant say
again that he did not like to discuss politics, race, and religion. Defendant told Padilla,
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“[Y]ou don’t want to mess with me.” Padilla responded, “You don’t want to mess with
me.” Then they said, “[L]et’s take it outside.” C.H. did not see defendant with a
weapon. She knew he occasionally carried a knife but did not know if he had it with him.
C.H. told defendant, “[D]on’t do this,” but he shook her off. The men went outside.
C.H. did not follow them; she thought it was stupid they were going outside to have a
fistfight.
R.W., another server, followed the men to the hallway and watched them leave
through the back door. R.W. opened the back door and saw the two men beginning to
fight with knives. R.W. screamed at them to stop and closed the door to protect the
people inside. C.H. heard a scream and went to the back door. Before R.W. pulled the
door shut, C.H. saw defendant and Padilla in the parking lot displaying knives. 1
Defendant’s shirt was ripped, and blood was spraying out of his arm.
As he heard the fight ending, R.W. opened the door and saw Padilla sit in a chair
with defendant standing over him. R.W. heard someone say, “[I]t’s done,” or “I’m
done.” At the same time, R.W. heard defendant say, “[D]rop it, drop it,” and then a clank
of something hitting the ground. R.W. heard Padilla say “stop” and then saw defendant
stab Padilla in the stomach.
Padilla fell to the ground, and defendant stood off to the side. Padilla was
breathing but in and out of consciousness. Defendant was bleeding badly. C.H. wrapped
defendant’s arm in a towel to stop the bleeding. R.W. applied pressure to a wound on
defendant’s neck and saw that his wrist was wounded.
Defendant said, “I had to do it. He had the eye of the tiger.” Defendant also said
something about “mutual combat.” A chef at the restaurant heard defendant say Padilla
asked for it.
1 At trial, much of the evidence admitted consisted of surveillance videos that are
not in the record. This factual recitation is based on witness testimony.
2
Defendant told a police officer responding to the scene that Padilla was talking
about race, religion, and politics, things defendant did not want to talk about. Defendant
said Padilla pulled out a knife and slashed him three times. Defendant pulled a knife out
of his pocket and stabbed Padilla back.
Padilla sustained stab wounds to the left side of the upper chest near the armpit,
hitting his lung and heart; the abdomen right over the stomach; and the right upper arm.
He died at the scene from internal bleeding.
Defendant was charged with murder with an allegation that he personally used a
deadly weapon, a knife.
Defendant testified on his own behalf. He said he was sitting at the bar with C.H.
when Padilla started making critical comments about California Governor Gavin
Newsom. Although defendant told him “no politics in the bar,” Padilla continued to talk
about politics. Defendant tried without success to change the subject or talk with C.H. to
avoid talking to Padilla. Finally, defendant told Padilla he did not like to talk about
politics, race, or religion. Padilla became more irritated, asked defendant if he wanted to
go outside, and told defendant that he would not like what Padilla would do to him.
Defendant told Padilla not to threaten him.
Padilla asked defendant if he was “scared or something.” Defendant said he was
not and told Padilla to talk to someone else. Padilla called defendant a coward and asked
C.H. if she wanted to be with defendant. Padilla again asked defendant if he wanted to
go outside. C.H. commented that something was wrong with Padilla, that he was crazy.
Padilla told C.H. to keep her mouth shut or she would get the same thing that defendant
was going to get. At that point defendant stood up to walk outside. C.H. told defendant
not to go. Defendant said he was going to get this over with. Defendant thought they
were going to have a fistfight.
As they got to the hallway, Padilla twice told defendant that “a boy will fight and a
man will kill.” Padilla went out the door. Defendant considered locking the door from
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the inside but thought Padilla would run around to the front. Defendant then considered
locking the front door. Before defendant could do anything, the back door popped open,
and Padilla lunged into the hallway and slit defendant’s throat. Padilla attempted to pull
defendant out the door, but defendant pulled back and Padilla lunged at him again.
Defendant blocked Padilla’s knife, causing Padilla to stab him in the left hand.
Defendant then pulled his knife from his back pocket. When Padilla saw the knife, he let
go of defendant and went out the back door. Defendant followed.
Outside, Padilla moved around and defendant told him to drop the knife and walk
away. The two men again engaged with each other and Padilla stabbed defendant in the
arm and the wrist. Padilla then hit defendant’s left hand with his hand and cut defendant
in the throat. When defendant received the second cut to the throat, defendant thought
Padilla was trying to kill him. Defendant was losing a lot of blood and started to feel
lightheaded. Padilla said he was going to wait until defendant bled out to finish him.
Defendant testified he never saw Padilla drop his knife. Drifting in and out of
consciousness, defendant said, “I felt like I went to sleep, but was still awake, and I
moved forward, [Padilla] was still standing up, too, and at one point when I kind of woke
back up, he was right in front of me, and -- and I didn’t know what had happened. Alls
[sic] I know when I saw him in front of me, I had to do what I had to do, because at that
point I was thinking to myself at any point or moment he is going to kill me.”
On cross-examination, defendant confirmed a video recording showed Padilla
sitting down and his knife on the ground when defendant grabbed him around the neck
and stabbed him four times.
Chuck Rylant testified as an expert witness for the defense on use of force,
self‑defense, and associated psychological and physiological factors. Rylant testified
about the fight or flight response, which he said was triggered by fear. When the brain
senses potential danger, it automatically and unconsciously makes changes to the body to
prepare to deal with the threat. When experiencing fear in use of force scenarios, the
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brain is not making decisions during a calm and rational thought process. Depending on
the severity of threat, a person may not be able to use the rational part of the brain or use
only part of it.
Rylant also testified that vision under stress is different from vision in a calm state.
When a dangerous situation triggers a fight-or-flight response, peripheral vision shrinks
down to tunnel vision. Our brains automatically tune things out to focus on what is
important; this is selective attention. Under stress, we can have something in front of us
and not see it.
The defense also called multiple witnesses who testified to defendant’s reputation
for nonviolence and honesty.
The jury found defendant not guilty of first or second degree murder and guilty of
voluntary manslaughter, and found true that defendant personally used a deadly weapon.
The trial court sentenced defendant to the lower term of three years in prison for
voluntary manslaughter plus one year for the deadly weapon enhancement, for a total
term of four years.
Defendant appeals.
DISCUSSION
I
The Trial Court Correctly Instructed On Self-defense
Defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred in giving a pinpoint
instruction proposed by the prosecution on self-defense that informed the jury a person
may use deadly force in self-defense if such use of force is motivated only by fear of
death or great bodily injury, even though the person also feels anger or other emotions.
We conclude the instruction was a correct statement of the law and there was no error.
5
A
Background
At the close of evidence, the prosecutor offered two pinpoint instructions on
self‑defense; one based on People v. Trevino (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 874 (Trevino) and
another based on People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015 (Nguyen). The trial court
observed: “Obviously both sides are entitled to pinpoint instructions.” Defense counsel
objected to either instruction, arguing CALCRIM No. 505 was “sufficiently adequate for
the issues before the jury.” But if the court was inclined to give one of the instructions,
defense counsel requested the Trevino instruction. The prosecution requested the Nguyen
instruction.
The trial court ruled, “[I]n this case where the issue is, were these gentlemen
involved in a mutual fight, I think the [prosecution is] entitled to a pinpoint [instruction]
on this.” The court expressed its view that Nguyen is “a little bare bones,” “somewhat
misleading,” and “not a clear definition of the issue” the prosecution was seeking to have
the jury consider. The trial court concluded, “I think in fairness to both sides, Trevino is
a more complete statement of the law and I will give that instruction.” (Italics added.)
The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 505, the pattern instruction
on self-defense, which provides in relevant part: “The defendant is not guilty of murder
or manslaughter if he was justified in killing someone in self-defense or defense of
another. The defendant acted in lawful self-defense or defense of another if the
defendant reasonably believed that he or someone else was in imminent danger of being
killed or suffering great bodily injury; the defendant reasonably believed that the
immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend against that danger; and the
defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against that
danger. [¶] Belief in future harm is not sufficient, no matter how great or how likely the
harm is believed to be. The defendant must have believed there was imminent danger of
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death or great bodily injury to himself or someone else. Defendant’s belief must have
been reasonable and he must have acted only because of that belief.”
CALCRIM No. 505 concluded: “The [prosecution] ha[s] the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not justified. If the [prosecution] ha[s] not
met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of murder or manslaughter.”
The trial court then gave the pinpoint instruction labeled “505 A”: “A person may
justifiably use deadly force in self-defense as long as the use of deadly force is motivated
only by a reasonable fear and the belief that it is necessary to prevent his death or great
bodily injury. [¶] The party killing is not precluded from feeling anger or other
emotions, save and except fear. However, those other emotions cannot be causal factors
in his decision to use deadly force. If they are, the homicide cannot be justified on a
theory of self-defense. But if the only causation of the killing was the reasonable fear
that there was imminent danger of death or great bodily injury, then the use of deadly
force in self-defense is proper, regardless of what other emotions the party who kills may
have been feeling but not acting upon.” 2
B
There Was No Error
Defendant objected to a pinpoint instruction, arguing CALCRIM No. 505 was
sufficient. On appeal, defendant asserts that, if the issue was not properly preserved, he
2 The pinpoint instruction is a near verbatim quote from Trevino: “[T]he party
killing may justifiably use deadly force in self-defense as long as the use of such force is
motivated only by a reasonable fear and the belief that it is necessary to prevent his death
or great bodily injury. The party killing is not precluded from feeling anger or other
emotions save and except fear; however, those other emotions cannot be causal factors in
his decision to use deadly force. If they are, the homicide cannot be justified on a theory
of self-defense. But if the only causation of the killing was the reasonable fear that there
was imminent danger of death or great bodily injury, then the use of deadly force in
self‑defense is proper, regardless of what other emotions the party who kills may have
been feeling but not acting upon.” (Trevino, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 879.)
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was denied effective assistance of counsel. The People do not argue forfeiture, and, in
any event, defendant’s objection sufficiently preserved his challenge to the pinpoint
instruction as affecting his substantial rights. Accordingly, we review his claim of legal
error de novo. (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1210; People v. Guiuan (1998)
18 Cal.4th 558, 569.) In so doing, we ascertain the relevant law, determine the meaning
of the instructions, and determine whether the instructions correctly conveyed the law to
the jury. (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 525.) “The relevant inquiry here is
whether, ‘in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record, there is a
reasonable likelihood that the jury was misled to defendant’s prejudice.’ ” (People v.
Sattiewhite (2014) 59 Cal.4th 446, 475.)
California authority dating back more than a century establishes that self-defense
is available to only those who kill solely out of a reasonable fear of great bodily injury or
death. (See People v. Ye Park (1882) 62 Cal. 204, 207-208 [self-defense instruction
requiring acquittal if the defendant acted on the basis of reasonable fears was properly
refused because “ ‘the party killing must have acted under the influence of such fears
alone’ ”]; People v. Hecker (1895) 109 Cal. 451, 463 [conduct of person acting in
self‑defense “must not be in revenge” and must be “in good faith to the sole end of
winning his[, her, or their] safety and securing his[, her, or their] life”], superseded by
statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Hardin (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 625, 633-
634; People v. Vernon (1925) 71 Cal.App. 628, 629 [upholding modification to requested
instruction that limited self-defense to killing under the influence of fear “ ‘alone’ ”].)
In Trevino, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at pages 878 to 879, the appellate court rejected
the defendant’s argument that, when the circumstances of the case suggest mixed motives
for the killing, the jury should not be instructed that self-defense applies only when the
defendant is motivated by fear alone. The Trevino court clarified the law does not
preclude self-defense merely because “a person … feels anger or even hatred toward the
person killed,” as long as fear of imminent death or great bodily injury is the sole motive
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for using deadly force. (Id. at p. 879; see also People v. Shade (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d
711, 716 [rejecting the argument that the jury was not properly instructed when it was
told the killer must have acted out of fear alone for self-defense to apply].)
More recently, our Supreme Court drew this same distinction between actions and
emotions when it held defendants are not entitled to assert self-defense if they “did not
act on the basis of fear alone but also on a desire to kill [their] rival.” (Nguyen, supra,
61 Cal.4th at p. 1044.) In Nguyen, the defendant shot and killed a rival gang member
who, carrying a firearm, approached the car the defendant was driving. (Id. at p. 1043.)
The defendant asserted the evidence established self-defense as a matter of law. (Id. at
p. 1042.) The trial court instructed the jury with a prior version of the instruction
regarding justifiable homicide in self-defense. (Id. at p. 1043.) Our Supreme Court
quoted sections 197 and 198 and cited Trevino’s holding that “ ‘an instruction which
states that the party killing must act under the influence of such fears alone, is a correct
statement of the law.’ ” (Nguyen, at p. 1045, quoting Trevino, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at
p. 879.) The court recognized: “Trevino clarified that this rule does not ‘imply that a
person who feels anger or even hatred toward the person killed, may never justifiably use
deadly force in self-defense,’ ” only “ ‘that the party killing act out of fear alone.’ ”
(Nguyen, at p. 1045.) The court concluded that “it was for the jury to decide whether
[the] defendant acted out of fear alone when he shot and killed [the victim].” (Ibid.)
Defendant acknowledges the pinpoint instruction took language from Trevino and
does not contend this case misstated the law. Rather, he contends the instruction misused
the language of the case to “implicitly impose[] a requirement upon [defendant] to
demonstrate that his actions were free from impermissible motivations.” We are not
persuaded.
Both CALCRIM No. 505 and the pinpoint instruction use similar language.
CALCRIM No. 505 states that to justify deadly force the defendant “must have believed
there was imminent danger of death or great bodily injury to himself” “and he must have
9
acted only because of that belief.” The pinpoint instruction similarly states: “A person
may justifiably use deadly force in self-defense as long as the use of such force is
motivated only by a reasonable fear and belief that it is necessary to prevent his death or
great bodily injury.” The keyword is “only,” and it appears in both instructions.
Defendant contends that, by putting the word “only” in italics in the written
instructions given to the jury, the pinpoint instruction “implies a rule of exclusion.” In
fact, the pinpoint instruction expressly excludes from justifiable self-defense a killing not
motivated solely by fear of death or serious injury, as does CALCRIM No. 505. This is a
correct statement of the law. (§ 198 [“the party killing must have acted under the
influence of such fears alone”]; Nguyen, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1045.) Moreover,
defendant misses the point of the instruction and Trevino that, while fear of death or
injury must be the only motive for killing, experiencing other emotions at the time of the
killing does not disqualify a defendant from justifying the killing as self‑defense. In that
sense, the pinpoint instruction inures to the benefit of a defendant under circumstances
where emotions other than fear might be involved. Such circumstances were present in
this case where defendant and Padilla, seemingly motivated by anger, decided to fight
each other when a dispute that began as a conversation escalated. Indeed, the trial court
observed that both sides were entitled to a pinpoint instruction because the issue is “were
these gentlemen involved in a mutual fight.” In other words, defendant might have
decided to fight Padilla out of anger—for example, over his threats and comments to
C.H.—but killed only out of fear of death or great bodily injury. The pinpoint instruction
clarified, as did Trevino, that in such circumstances the killing would be justifiable
self‑defense. Here, CALCRIM No. 505 did not cover the issue, hence the basis for a
pinpoint instruction. (See People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 824 [pinpoint
instructions “ ‘relate particular facts to a legal issue in the case or “pinpoint” the crux of a
[party]’s case’ ”]; People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 362 [parties are entitled to
10
legally correct and factually warranted pinpoint instructions should they request such
additional instruction].)
Defendant maintains that the language of the pinpoint instruction requires him to
“prove a negative — he must persuade jurors that he possessed the appropriate
motivation and no other,” when it is the prosecution’s burden to prove the homicide was
not justifiable self-defense. Nothing in the instruction or Trevino, however, suggests that
the prosecution was relieved of its burden to prove the killing was not justified.
Significantly, the pinpoint instruction was given immediately after the trial court
instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 505: “The [prosecution] ha[s] the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not justified.” “ ‘ “In determining
whether error has been committed in giving or not giving jury instructions, we must
consider the instructions as a whole … [and] assume that jurors are intelligent persons
and capable of understanding and correlating all jury instructions [that] are given.” ’ ”
(People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1088; see also People v. Sattiewhite,
supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 475.)
Defendant further contends that use of the term “causal factors” in the pinpoint
instruction “framed the issue in terms of what [defendant] must accomplish to justify the
homicide.” The instruction—and the sentence in Trevino from which it was taken—do
not require defendant to prove anything. The instruction does not state that defendant
must show what did or did not cause him to use deadly force. The instruction clarifies
that a killer feeling emotions other than fear is not precluded from claiming justifiable
self-defense where fear alone motivated the use of deadly force.
Defendant also suggests that the term “causal factors” from Trevino is not “lay
terminology” and would confuse the jury in determining whether the killing was
justifiable self-defense. Defendant acknowledges, however, that the following, final
sentence, also taken from Trevino, which uses the term “only causation,” could lead to an
acquittal. Thus, defendant does not dispute that the jury could understand that a killing
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where fear of death or great bodily injury was the “only causation” is justifiable
self‑defense. That other emotions cannot be “causal factors” simply states the same
principle in a different way as “only causation,” and the references to “causal factors”
and “only causation” serve to reinforce the principle that only a killing motivated solely
by fear of death or great bodily injury is justifiable self-defense.
Finally, defendant contends the final sentence of the pinpoint instruction does not
“cure the problem” because it refers to a “proper” use of self-defense, which again
defendant argues implicitly requires him to show he meets the standard. Nothing in this
sentence or Trevino imposes an obligation on defendant to prove proper use of
self‑defense. Rather, it serves—as does the pinpoint instruction as a whole—to clarify
what constitutes self-defense justifying a killing where the killer experiences mixed
emotions. (Nguyen, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1044.)
The pinpoint instruction is a correct statement of the law. We reject defendant’s
argument that it improperly required him to prove justifiable self-defense. Thus, the
pinpoint instruction did not violate defendant’s rights to due process, a fair trial, or the
right to present a complete defense. (See People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 596
[“Because we find no instructional error, [the] defendant’s claim of federal constitutional
error must fail”].) Because there was no error, we need not address whether defendant
was prejudiced.
II
The Trial Court Correctly Instructed On Mutual Combat
Defendant first asserts that CALCRIM No. 3471 relieved the prosecution of the
burden of proof on self-defense, focusing on the “right to self-defense” language in the
instruction. Defendant argues this language required him to establish the three-part test
as to whether he had “a right to self-defense” in a mutual combat scenario. Anticipating
the People’s response, defendant contends CALCRIM No. 505 and other instructions
12
expressly assigning the burden of proof to the prosecution are not sufficient in the context
of mutual combat. We disagree.
A
Background
Immediately after ruling on the prosecution’s pinpoint instruction on self-defense,
the trial court stated that the prosecution was requesting CALCRIM No. 3471 on mutual
combat. The prosecutor argued that defendant would be asserting self‑defense,
CALCRIM No. 3471 is a limitation on the use of self-defense, and there was sufficient
evidence the incident involved mutual combat or that defendant was the initial aggressor.
Defense counsel objected, arguing the instruction shifted the burden from the prosecution
and implied that defendant must prove self-defense. Counsel further argued the
instruction did not apply, or was misleading, because the situation did not involve mutual
combat since Padilla yanked defendant outside and engaged him in a fight.
The trial court ruled there was substantial evidence that defendant and Padilla
were engaged in mutual combat, i.e., the jury heard evidence defendant and Padilla
indicated they were going to take their argument outside. The court further found
substantial evidence that defendant was the aggressor, because video showed the victim
with his knife closed and defendant’s knife open. Conversely, there was evidence Padilla
was the initial aggressor and he attacked so quickly that defendant had to respond with
deadly force. Accordingly, the court stated it would include the bracketed portion of
CALCRIM No. 3471 regarding circumstances where the defendant used nondeadly force
and the opponent responded with such sudden and deadly force that the defendant could
not withdraw.
The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 3471 as follows: “A
person who engages in mutual combat or who starts a fight has a right to self-defense
only if, one, he actually and in good faith tried to stop fighting; and two, he indicated by
word or by conduct to his opponent in a way that a reasonable person would understand
13
that he wanted to stop fighting and that he had stopped fighting; and three, he gave his
opponent a chance to stop fighting. If the defendant meets these requirements, he then
had a right to self-defense if the opponent continued to fight. However, if the defendant
used only non-deadly force and the opponent responded with such sudden and deadly
force that the defendant could not withdraw from the fight, then the defendant had the
right to defend himself with deadly force and was not required to try to stop fighting or
communicate the desire to stop to the opponent or give the opponent a chance to stop
fighting. [¶] A fight is mutual combat when it began or continued by mutual consent or
agreement. That agreement may be expressly stated or implied and must occur before the
claim to self-defense arose.”
B
There Was No Error
Viewing the instructions as a whole, as we must (People v. Sattiewhite, supra,
59 Cal.4th at p. 475), there is no reasonable likelihood the jury would have assigned
defendant the burden of proving he had a legal right to self-defense. As mentioned,
CALCRIM No. 505 instructed the jury that the prosecution bore the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable that the killing was not justified. In the context of self-defense in
mutual combat, this instruction required the prosecution to prove defendant did not have
a right of self-defense, i.e., that he did not meet the requirements of CALCRIM No. 3471
for self-defense. Also, in CALCRIM No. 571 regarding the lesser included offense of
voluntary manslaughter (imperfect self-defense), the jury was instructed: “The
[prosecution] ha[s] the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was not acting in imperfect self-defense” and “[i]f the [prosecution] ha[s] not met this
burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of murder.” From these instructions, the
jury would have understood the prosecution bore the burden of negating self-defense.
Defendant next identifies as problematic the language of the instruction that the
three requirements for self-defense in mutual combat need not apply where a defendant
14
uses nondeadly force and the opponent responds with such sudden and deadly force that
the defendant cannot withdraw from the fight. In that event, the defendant may defend
with deadly force without trying to stop fighting, communicating the desire to stop
fighting, or giving the opponent the opportunity to stop fighting. The trial court included
this bracketed language in the standard instruction because the jury could believe that
Padilla acted so quickly that defendant’s response had to be deadly force. Defendant
contends he could not avail himself of this part of the instruction because he never used
“non-deadly force”—which he deems a condition precedent to the use of deadly force
under the language of the instruction—but rather initially used no force and only used
deadly force after Padilla attacked.
Assuming defendant did not forfeit this claim, we do not interpret this portion of
CALCRIM No. 3471 as inapplicable because defendant agreed to a fistfight but had yet
to land a blow, when, as he testified, Padilla sprang through the door and slashed his
throat with a knife. The crux of the instruction is a defendant need not satisfy the
elements required to claim self-defense if he consents to mutual combat using nondeadly
force, and the opponent responds with deadly force in a sudden manner that gives the
defendant no opportunity to withdraw. Thus, a defendant who intends to use only
nondeadly force retains a self-defense right if the victim responds with deadly force.
(See People v. Conkling (1896) 111 Cal. 616, 626 [a person who contrives to start a
fistfight or provoke a nondeadly quarrel does not thereby forfeit his, her, or their right to
live]; People v. Vasquez (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1179-1180 [the defendant may
defend himself, herself, or themselves “even when the defendant set in motion the chain
of events that led the victim to attack the defendant”].) Certainly, the trial court
interpreted the bracketed language as applicable to the facts presented here when the
court determined to include this language in the instruction.
Additionally, the jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 3474 that the “right to
use force in self-defense … continues only as long as the danger exists or reasonably
15
appears to exist. When the attacker withdraws or no longer appears capable of inflicting
an injury, then the right to use force ends.” The jury heard testimony from defendant
admitting he decided to stab Padilla four times while he was sitting and holding onto one
of defendant’s arms with both hands. In convicting defendant of manslaughter, the jury
likely applied CALCRIM No. 3474 regardless of the scenarios covered by CALCRIM
No. 505, the 505 A instruction, or CALCRIM No. 3471. Defendant does not argue that
CALCRIM No. 3474 misstates the law or is incorrect in any way.
Accordingly, we reject defendant’s second claim of instructional error, conclude
that defendant’s constitutional rights were not violated, and need not ascertain whether he
was prejudiced. (People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 596.)
III
Cumulative Error
Lastly, defendant contends the cumulative effect of the instructions was
prejudicial. “Under the cumulative error doctrine, a series of trial errors that were
individually harmless may be prejudicial if in the aggregate the errors deprived the
defendant of a fair trial.” (People v. Page (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 1022, 1034.) Since
we found no instructional error, there are no errors whose cumulative effect could be
prejudicial. (Id. at pp. 1034-1035.)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/
ROBIE, J.
We concur:
/s/
HULL, Acting P. J.
/s/
MAURO, J.
17