Filed 8/11/26 P. v. Davis CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B349154
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA142388)
v.
AHMAD DARON DAVIS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Laura Walton, Judge. Dismissed.
Ahmad Daron Davis, in pro. per. and A. William Bartz, Jr.,
under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
Ahmad Daron Davis appeals from the superior court’s order
denying his motion to strike his five-year prior serious felony
enhancement under Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a)(1).1
We appointed counsel to represent Davis on appeal. After
reviewing the record counsel for Davis filed a brief pursuant to
People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 that did not identify
any arguable issues. After independently reviewing the record
and the contentions in Davis’s supplemental brief, we have not
identified any either. We dismiss the appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 12, 2016 Davis, who was on parole and wearing an
ankle tracking device, entered a cellphone store, pointed a gun at
the store employee, and demanded she follow him to the back of
the store. Once in the back of the store, Davis filled his bag with
44 cellphones. Davis fled from the store, but officers were able to
track him through his ankle tracker.
The People charged Davis with kidnapping to commit
robbery (§ 209, subd. (b)(1)), second degree robbery (§ 212.5,
subd. (c)); and kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)). The People alleged
that Davis was armed with a firearm while committing a felony,
within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (a)(1), and that
he had a prior conviction for a felony that was a serious or violent
felony, within the meaning of the three strikes law (§§ 667,
subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12), and a serious felony, within the meaning
of section 667, subdivision (a)(1).
1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
In December 2016 Davis pleaded no contest to kidnapping
and admitted the allegations. Pursuant to the plea agreement
the trial court dismissed the charges of kidnapping to commit
robbery and robbery and sentenced Davis on his kidnapping
conviction to a prison term of 22 years, consisting of the upper
term of eight years, doubled under the three strikes law, plus one
year for the firearm enhancement and five years for the prior
serious felony conviction.
In August 2025 Davis filed a one-page motion asking the
superior court to strike his five-year serious felony enhancement
pursuant to Senate Bill No. 1393, Assembly Bill No. 2483, and
sections 667, subd. (a)(1), 1171, and 1172.1. Davis argued that
the “enhancement serves no rehabilitative or deterrent purpose,”
that he “has demonstrated post-conviction rehabilitation and
poses no significant threat to public safety,” and that striking the
enhancement “will further the interest of justice and equity
relating to the Racial Justice Act.”
The superior court denied the motion. The court stated
that it had “read and consider[ed] [Davis’s] Motion to strike [the]
prior serious felony enhancement,” that it was declining to
exercise its discretion to strike the five-year enhancement under
section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and that Davis “failed to
demonstrate that he is rehabilitated.” Davis timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
As stated, we appointed counsel to represent Davis in this
appeal. After reviewing the record, counsel stated that he could
not identify any arguable issues and that “[t]his court should
determine appealability of appellant’s motion.” On April 13, 2026
3
counsel advised Davis that he was filing a brief stating he was
unable to find any arguable issues and that Davis could
personally submit a supplemental brief. Counsel also stated in
his declaration he sent Davis “the transcripts of the record on the
current appeal and a copy of this brief.”
On June 2, 2026 we received a six-page supplemental brief
from Davis asking us to “determine appealability of appellant’s
motion.” Davis also argues for the first time that “another
defendant was the one with a firearm” and that the “record also
shows that a ‘gang allegation’ was the reason for the [prior
serious felony] enhancement,” which he challenges under
section 1109, subdivision (a)(2).2 Davis further argues that
imposing the one-year firearm enhancement may violate the
Racial Justice Act and that the County of Los Angeles should
provide him with relevant statistical data so that he can pursue
such a claim. Finally, Davis argues that his appellate counsel
failed to provide him with the entire record or ““augment the
record”” on appeal to address the firearm and gang enhancement
issues raised by Davis in his supplemental brief.
Davis’s citations to Assembly Bill No. 2483 and
sections 1171 and 1172.1 do not support his argument.
“Assembly Bill [No.] 2483 enacted section 1171, which sets forth
various procedures under subdivision (c) that apply to all
postconviction proceedings to modify a sentence or conviction
under ameliorative statutes, including section 1172.1.” (People v.
2 Section 1109, subdivision (a)(2), states that, “[i]f the
defendant is found guilty of the underlying offense and there is
an allegation of an enhancement under subdivision (b) or (d) of
section 186.22, there shall be further proceedings to the trier of
fact on the question of the truth of the enhancement.”
4
Brinson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1047.) However,
section 1172.1 does not entitle defendants “to petition the court
for relief” and a petition under that section “is best viewed as
merely inviting the court to consider whether it wishes to
exercise its discretion under section 1172.1.” (People v. Roy
(2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 991, 998-999.) The superior court’s order
declining to exercise its discretion to strike Davis’s prior serious
felony enhancement is not appealable. (See Brinson, at p. 1045;
People v. Faustinos (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 687, 697.) Though
the superior court stated that it was denying the motion and that
Davis had failed to show he had been rehabilitated, the court did
not take the kinds of actions courts have held constituted
reaching the merits of a petition for resentencing, such as
obtaining or reviewing documents regarding the defendant’s
rehabilitation (e.g., classes and programs completed, letters of
support, lack of rules violations in prison)3 or holding a contested
hearing on the motion. (Cf. People v. Craig (2026)
117 Cal.App.5th 1165, 1173-1174; People v. Olea (2025)
115 Cal.App.5th 889, 901.)
As for Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats.
2018, ch. 1013, §§ 1, 2), effective January 1, 2019, that statute
grants trial courts discretion to strike five-year serious felony
enhancements under section 1385, subdivision (a), “in
furtherance of justice.” (People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th
393, 397.) Section 1385, however, applies only to cases not final
as of its effective date of January 1, 2022. (See § 1385,
subd. (c)(7); People v. Alexander (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 341, 344.)
3 Davis did not submit any evidence of in support of his
motion.
5
Because Davis’s case was final when he filed his motion, and
there is no independent right to resentencing on the five-year
enhancement, the superior court did not have jurisdiction to
modify his sentence. (See People v. Hernandez (2019)
34 Cal.App.5th 323, 326 [“once a judgment is rendered, except for
limited statutory exceptions [citations], the sentencing court is
without jurisdiction to vacate or modify the sentence, except
pursuant to the provisions of section 1170, subdivision (d)”].)
“‘And “[i]f the trial court does not have jurisdiction to rule on a
motion to vacate or modify a sentence, an order denying such a
motion is nonappealable, and any appeal from such an order
must be dismissed.”’” (People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th
375, 381; see People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629, 634.)
To the extent Davis in his supplemental brief challenges
the gang enhancement imposed in his prior conviction, that issue
is beyond the scope of Davis’s petition, the superior court’s order,
and Davis’s notice of appeal. (See In re J.M. (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 745, 755, fn. 3 [“the scope of our review is
limited to the notice of appeal and order appealed from”];
Faunce v. Cate (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 166, 170 [“[w]e have no
jurisdiction over an order not mentioned in the notice of
appeal”].)4 Counsel for Davis could not have rendered ineffective
assistance in failing to provide a sufficient record to review that
issue in this appeal. (See People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692,
4 Even if we had jurisdiction to decide these issues, any
challenge to the gang enhancement imposed in Davis’s prior case
is untimely. (See People v. Burgos (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1, 8
[“inference of retroactivity does not extend to section 1109”].)
Davis’s assertion he did not use a firearm during the kidnapping
is not supported by any evidence and conflicts with his admission
he did use a firearm.
6
732; see also People Kelly (1997) 40 Cal.4th 106, 122, fn. 4 [“an
appellate court should not find ineffective assistance of counsel
unless all facts relevant to that claim have been developed in the
record”].)
Finally, Davis states he wants “‘statistical data’ from the
County” so that he may pursue a claim under the Racial Justice
Act. Davis may file an appropriate motion for discovery under
the Racial Justice Act in the superior court. (§ 745, subd. (d);
People v. Serrano (2023) 106 Cal.App.5th 276.)
Neither Davis nor his appellate counsel has identified a
cognizable legal issue. Our independent review has not identified
one either. (See People v. Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
pp. 231-232; see also People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 118-
119; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441-442.)
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
SEGAL, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
STONE, J.
7