Filed 9/29/26 P. v. Dalton CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Yuba)
THE PEOPLE, C104136
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. Nos. CRF25-
v. 00732, CRCS25-00007)
ANDREW CHARLES DALTON III,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Andrew Charles Dalton III pleaded no contest to criminal threats and
was sentenced to four years in state prison. His appointed appellate counsel asks this
court to conduct an independent review of the record under People v. Wende (1979)
25 Cal.3d 436. Dalton filed a supplemental brief arguing that his plea was involuntary,
that he was improperly denied mental health diversion, that he provided evidence of his
innocence and has accumulated additional exonerating evidence since, and that he
received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Having considered these contentions and
examined the record as required by Wende, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
In January 2025, in case No. CRCS25-00007, a petition for revocation of
postrelease community supervision (PRCS) alleged that Dalton attempted to deter and
resist an officer in violation of Penal Code section 69, was intoxicated in a public place in
violation of section 647, subdivision (f), failed to successfully complete a required
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rehabilitation program, and failed to report to the probation department as directed.1
Dalton admitted the violations. The trial court reinstated PRCS and sentenced him to
180 days in county jail with 28 days of custody credit (14 actual days and 14 conduct
days).
On April 2, 2025, in case No. CRCS25-00007, a petition for revocation of PRCS
alleged that Dalton made criminal threats in violation of section 422 and failed to report
to probation within 48 hours of his release from jail. On April 3, 2025, in case
No. CRF25-00732, the People filed a criminal complaint charging Dalton with making
criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a)). The complaint alleged that he had a prior strike
conviction in 2018 for carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a)). It also alleged seven aggravating
factors under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421.
On April 10, 2025, in case No. CRCS25-00007, Dalton admitted the PRCS
violations. At the same hearing, in case No. CRF25-00732, Dalton pleaded no contest to
the criminal threats charge and admitted the prior strike in exchange for a stipulated
prison sentence of four years. The prosecutor stated the factual basis for the plea as
follows: “[O]n March 27th, 2025, in the County of Yuba, [Dalton] was calling the victim
at 6:40 a.m. when she arrived at work. She answered the phone, recognized [Dalton]’s
voice. She told him she did not want to be with him anymore and did not speak with
him. And [Dalton] responded, [t]hat, [‘]no, bitch. I’m going to come to your work and
kill you. Then I’m going to go to your house and shoot it up.[’] ”
On May 7, 2025, in case No. CRCS25-00007, the trial court terminated PRCS and
sentenced Dalton to 77 days in county jail, concurrent with the sentence in case
No. CRF25-00732, and awarded him 77 days of custody credit (39 actual days and
38 conduct days). At the same hearing, the court denied Dalton’s motion to withdraw his
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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no contest plea in case No. CRF25-00732. The court then sentenced him to the middle
term of two years, doubled to four years for the prior strike. It awarded him 77 days of
custody credit (39 actual days and 38 conduct days) and imposed mandatory minimum
fines and assessments.
On June 30, 2025, the trial court issued a minute order construing a handwritten
letter from Dalton as a timely notice of appeal in case Nos. CRF25-00732 and CRCS25-
00007. We granted Dalton’s application to seek a belated certificate of probable cause,
which the trial court granted.
DISCUSSION
Appointed counsel filed an opening brief that sets forth the background of the case
and requests that this court review the record and determine whether there are any
arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.) Dalton was advised
by counsel of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days from the date the
opening brief was filed. Dalton filed a supplemental brief raising several issues.
First, Dalton contends that he did not voluntarily plead no contest to the charges in
case No. CRF25-00732, sign the plea agreement, or admit the allegations. He maintains
that he told defense counsel he was “high” on the day he signed the plea agreement, and
he also had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, which counsel and the trial court failed to
take into consideration. Dalton, however, points us to nothing in the record supporting
these contentions. Moreover, during the plea colloquy, Dalton confirmed in response to
the trial court’s questions that he had not recently consumed controlled substances or
alcohol and was not taking any medication that interfered with his ability to understand
the plea proceeding. He also initialed a statement on the written plea agreement
representing: “I am not taking any medication that affects my ability to understand this
form and the consequences of my plea, have not recently consumed any alcohol or drugs,
and am not suffering from any medical condition … .”
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In addition, when Dalton sought to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing, defense
counsel stated as grounds for the request that “essentially, he feels that he entered his plea
too quickly and that he has since changed his mind.” The trial court observed that
“buyer’s remorse is not legal grounds for withdrawing his plea.” Dalton did not disagree,
telling the court, “I just didn’t feel right taking it, but I guess I should have thought about
it. It was just kind of quick.” He further explained, “Just felt like I was forced to take the
deal under the circumstances with priors used as a threat.” When the court followed up
saying, “you did take the deal,” “nobody forced you to,” and it was “buyer’s remorse,”
Dalton responded “Yeah” to each statement. On this record, we see no abuse of
discretion in the trial court’s refusal to allow Dalton to withdraw his plea. (See People v.
Huricks (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1208 [“ ‘[a] plea may not be withdrawn simply
because the defendant has changed his [or her] mind’ ”]; ibid. [standard of review].)
Next, Dalton claims that he was improperly denied mental health diversion. There
is, however, no indication in the record that Dalton asked the trial court to consider
granting him mental health diversion before he pleaded no contest. (See § 1001.36
[authorizing trial courts to grant mental health diversion to qualified defendants];
People v. Braden (2023) 14 Cal.5th 791, 799 [diversion “request must be made before
attachment of jeopardy at trial or the entry of a guilty or no contest plea, whichever
occurs first”].) His current appellate claim is therefore forfeited. (See People v. Oneal
(2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 581, 592, fn. 6.)
Dalton additionally contends that he is innocent of the charges. He directs us to
nothing in the record to support this contention. And in any event, after a plea of guilty
or no contest, as here, “issues going to the determination of guilt or innocence are not
cognizable on appeal; review is instead limited to issues going to the jurisdiction of the
court or the legality of the proceedings, including the constitutional validity of the plea.”
(People v. Hoffard (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1170, 1178.)
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Finally, Dalton asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing
that his trial attorney did not take his mental illness into consideration or respond
appropriately when he notified her that he was “high” on the day he signed the plea
agreement. He argues that he made the trial court aware of these issues when he moved
to withdraw his plea. The reporter’s transcript, however, shows that Dalton sought to
withdraw his plea on the ground that he had been hasty in agreeing to it and had since
changed his mind. Moreover, as Dalton’s claim of ineffective assistance appears to be
premised on matters outside the record, it is more appropriately addressed by a petition
for writ of habeas corpus and not by direct appeal. (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997)
15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267.)
In addition to considering the claims in Dalton’s supplemental brief, we have
reviewed the entire record and find no arguable error.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/
FEINBERG, J.
We concur:
/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.
/s/
MAURO, J.
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