Filed 10/16/26 P. v. Curry CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B344980
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 24CJCF04817)
TYRONE CURRY,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Ray G. Jurado, Judge. Affirmed.
Paul Stubb Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, David A. Wildman, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Police officers detained Tyrone Curry from a recreational
vehicle (RV) that was parked on a public street and connected by
jumper cables to a car that matched the description of a car
involved in a shooting the previous week. One of the shooting
victims identified Curry as the shooter. Based in part on the
victim’s identification, officers formally arrested Curry and
obtained a warrant to search the RV, which officers had towed to
an impound lot to hold for evidence. When they searched Curry’s
RV, the officers found three guns.
Before trial Curry moved to suppress the victim’s
identification of him and evidence of the guns recovered from the
RV. The trial court denied his motion, and a jury convicted Curry
on three counts of possessing a firearm as a felon (Pen. Code,
§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)).1
Curry argues the officers violated his rights under the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution when,
without a warrant, they detained him and towed his RV to an
impound lot. We conclude the officers did not violate the Fourth
Amendment because the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement applied. Therefore, the officers only needed
probable cause to enter the RV, and Curry does not challenge the
trial court’s finding the officers had probable cause to detain him.
We also conclude that, even if the officers violated the Fourth
Amendment by securing the RV while detectives sought a
warrant, the officers pursued the warrant, and the magistrate
issued it, based on information independent of the impoundment.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Thus, the independent warrant search cured any taint.
Therefore, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Police Arrest Curry for Shooting at Two Men and
Search His RV
On July 23, 2024 police officers responded to a report of an
assault with a deadly weapon. One of the officers spoke with the
victims, Humberto Valiente and Jose Munoz. Valiente said he
and Munoz were walking down the street when a “light blue or
light gray” two-door car pulled up beside them. The driver told
Valiente and Munoz to “get the fuck out of here,” “pointed a gray
revolver” at them, and fired the gun. The victims described the
driver as a thin, bald, Black male, 55 to 60 years old, wearing a
white T-shirt.
Another officer canvassed the area for potential video
evidence. He obtained screenshots of the car from a neighbor’s
home surveillance video (which captured the shooting) and gave
them to another officer to make flyers asking officers in the
division to “attempt to identify” the suspect or his car. The flyers
included one of the screenshots, as well as the date, time, and
location of the shooting; a description of the shooter; the make,
model, and color (gray) of the car; and the fact the suspect had
followed the victims, yelled at them, and fired a silver revolver.
A week after the shooting, Officer James Stea was on patrol
a block and a half from the scene of the shooting. Officer Stea
and his partner were looking for a car like the one pictured in the
flyer or somebody who matched the description of the shooter.
Officer Stea testified that the gray car in the picture was a “very
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unique car” the officers did not often see in their division. That
day, however, the officers saw the gray car. Officer Stea noticed
something unique about the car: It had special-order rims with a
black outline that matched the rims pictured in the crime flyer.
The engine of the gray car was running, and there were
jumper cables connecting the car to an RV.2 The RV was parked
on the street, and Officer Stea could see that the RV had wheels,
an engine, and a steering wheel and that “it was a mobile RV.”
Officer Stea observed the RV appeared independently drivable or
towable by the gray car. When the officers drove past the RV,
they saw a man, whose appearance matched the flyer’s
description of the shooter, lying down inside.
Officer Stea and his partner stopped, walked to the RV, and
asked the person (later identified as Curry) to step outside.
Curry refused. The officers became concerned for their safety
because Curry was a suspect in a shooting and was “in a position
of advantage” in the RV, elevated above the officers with a
superior view of them. The officers were concerned that Curry
could have a gun in the RV and that, if Curry wanted to shoot
them, “he would have a better chance” to shoot from the RV.
The officers spent several minutes trying to persuade Curry
to come out of the RV, but he refused. After additional officers
arrived, one officer remained outside the RV talking to Curry,
while two others went into the RV through the unlocked door to
detain him. The officers handcuffed Curry, brought him out of
the RV, and performed a protective sweep to make sure there
were “no weapons in plain view” or other people in the RV who
might pose a risk to the officers. The officers did not see any
2 The officers assumed the jumper cables were “transferring
power” between the RV and the car.
4
weapons or other people in the RV. Valiente later identified
Curry in a six-pack photographic line up as the man who chased
him with a silver revolver and shot at him twice.
While Officer Stea took Curry to the station, several
officers remained with the RV to impound it and “hold it for
evidence while the detectives developed a search warrant.”
Though the “normal procedure” was to conduct an inventory
search when impounding a vehicle, officers generally prefer to
have a search warrant for RVs because RVs are so big. The
officers obtained a warrant to search Curry’s RV the day after his
arrest. When they did, they found a backpack containing three
handguns and Curry’s identification. Two of the guns were black
semiautomatic handguns, and the other was a silver revolver
matching the description of the gun used in the shooting.
B. The People Charge Curry with Multiple Crimes, and
the Trial Court Denies Curry’s Motion To Suppress
The People charged Curry with one count of assault with a
firearm, in violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(2); three
counts of possessing a firearm as a felon, in violation of
section 29800, subdivision (a)(1)3; and one count of willfully
discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner, in violation
of section 246.3, subdivision (a).
Curry moved to suppress the victim’s photographic
identification and evidence of the guns recovered from the RV.
Curry’s motion to suppress focused on the initial warrantless
entry into his RV and the “illegal towing” of the RV before
executing the search warrant.
3 The parties stipulated Curry “was previously convicted of a
felony.”
5
The trial court heard testimony from the officers who
investigated the shooting, detained Curry, and searched the RV.
After the officers testified, counsel for Curry argued that Curry’s
detention was unreasonably long, that the officers did not have
probable cause to arrest him when they removed him from the
RV, and that the circumstances did not justify a protective sweep
of the RV after the officers had detained him.
The trial court denied Curry’s motion to suppress. The
court found the officers had probable cause to arrest Curry when
they first encountered him in the RV because he matched the
description of the shooter, he was parked near the scene of the
shooting, and the unique aspects of the car involved in the
shooting matched those of the car connected to the RV. The court
also found that the protective sweep of the RV “was justified by
exigent circumstances” and that the subsequent search warrant
“was supported by facts amounting to probable cause to search
the RV.”
C. The Jury Convicts Curry on Some of the Counts, and
the Trial Court Sentences Him
The jury acquitted Curry on the count for assault with a
firearm, convicted him on the three counts of possessing a
firearm as a felon, and was unable to reach a verdict on the count
for willfully discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner.
The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Curry on
two years of formal probation. Curry timely appealed.
6
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
A defendant may move to suppress evidence on the ground
a “search or seizure without a warrant was unreasonable.”
(§ 1538.5, subd. (a)(1)(A).) “‘“A warrantless search is presumed to
be unreasonable, and the prosecution bears the burden of
demonstrating a legal justification for the search. [Citation.]
‘The standard of appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on a
motion to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial
court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by
substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so
found, the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,
we exercise our independent judgment.’”’” (People v. Johnson
(2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1026, 1031-1032.) “‘In California, issues
relating to the suppression of evidence derived from
governmental searches and seizures are reviewed under federal
constitutional standards.’” (People v. Macabeo (2016) 1 Cal.5th
1206, 1212; see Johnson, at p. 1032 [“The question whether
relevant evidence obtained by assertedly unlawful means—that
is, in violation of the Fourth Amendment—must be excluded is
determined by deciding whether its suppression is mandated by
the federal Constitution.”].)
B. The Officers Did Not Violate the Fourth Amendment
When They Entered the RV Because They Had
Probable Cause To Arrest Curry
The trial court found the officers had probable cause to
arrest Curry when they entered the RV, a finding Curry does not
challenge. Even so, he argues, the officers violated the Fourth
7
Amendment because the RV was his home, they did not have a
warrant for his arrest, and there were no exigent circumstances
justifying the entry.
“[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the
entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that
threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.”
(Payton v. New York (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 590; see People v.
Bennett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 373, 384.) Cars, however, are different.
Under the automobile exception, officers can seize and search an
automobile without a warrant, so long as they have probable
cause. (Carroll v. United States (1925) 267 U.S. 132, 155-156;
accord, California v. Carney (1985) 471 U.S. 386, 390, 394-395
(Carney); see Sellers v. Superior Court (2026) 19 Cal.5th 75, 89
[“‘Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement,
an officer may search a vehicle if the officer has probable cause to
believe that evidence of a crime will be found inside.’”].) An RV
or motor home has a “hybrid character,” placing it “at the
crossroads between the privacy interests that generally forbid
warrantless invasions of the home” and “the law enforcement
interests that support” warrantless invasions of automobiles
based on probable cause. (Carney, at p. 395 (dis. opn. of
Stevens, J.); see United States v. Hill (10th Cir. 1988) 855 F.2d
664, 668.) “Though a motor home has the characteristics of both
a home and a motor vehicle, it is the latter characteristics that
govern in applying the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement.” (United States v. Albers (9th Cir. 1998) 136 F.3d
670, 673.) Courts consider several factors in determining
whether an RV retains its character as a vehicle for purposes of
the Fourth Amendment, including whether the RV is “readily
mobile by the turn of an ignition key”; whether the RV is being
8
“use[d] as a licensed motor vehicle,” which is “subject to a range
of police regulation inapplicable to a fixed dwelling”; and whether
“the vehicle was so situated that an objective observer would
conclude that it was being used not as a residence, but as a
vehicle.” (Carney, at p. 393; accord, Albers, at p. 673; see People
v. Black (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 506, 509-510 [“the mobility of the
motorhome placed the warrantless search within the scope of the
vehicle exception to the search warrant requirement”].)
Here, even if Curry’s RV “possessed some, if not many of
the attributes of a home,” it was “equally clear” it fell “within the
scope” of the automobile exception. (Carney, supra, 471 U.S. at
p. 393.) Curry’s RV was parked on the side of the road, “had
wheels and an engine,” and was “a mobile RV,” all of which
indicated it retained its vehicular character and “could readily
have been moved beyond the reach of the police.” (Ibid.) Though
Curry’s RV was stationary at the time, it remained independently
mobile (for example, it was not elevated on blocks), it was not
connected to utilities,4 and it had “convenient access to a public
road.” (Carney, at p. 394, fn. 3; see United States v. Albers, supra,
136 F.3d at p. 673 & fn. 3 [houseboat that, like a vehicle, was
subject to government regulation and that moved on “open waters
on a large lake” was like an automobile under Carney, while a
“houseboat not independently mobile or one that is permanently
moored would present a different case”]; United States v.
4 Connection by jumper cables to another readily mobile
vehicle is “hardly the kind of ‘pipe and drain’ connection that
would render the motor home more permanent and less mobile as
was contemplated by the Court in Carney.” (United States v.
Hamilton (9th Cir. 1986) 792 F.2d 837, 843; see ibid. [automobile
exception applied to a motor home connected to power with an
extension cord that went into a residence].)
9
Hamilton (9th Cir. 1986) 792 F.2d 837, 843 [search of a motor
home fell within the automobile exception, where the “mobility of
the motor home [was] amply demonstrated by the fact that it was
moved the night before the search,” the “motor home was licensed
with the State of California,” and it had “easy access to a public
road” because “it was located in a residential driveway”].)
Curry’s RV was parked on the side of a public roadway, rather
than a place “regularly used for residential purposes.” (Carney,
at pp. 392-393; see id. at p. 388 [automobile exception applied to
a motor home in a parking lot]; United States v. Markham
(6th Cir. 1988) 844 F.2d 366, 369 [automobile exception applied
to the search of a motor home where it “was on wheels,” had state
license plates, was “parked in a driveway connected to a public
street,” and “there were no utility lines connected to the motor
home”].)
Curry points to other factors that suggest he was using the
RV as a residence, not a vehicle.5 But residency is not
dispositive. As the Supreme Court in Carney recognized, “many
vehicles used for transportation can be and are being used not
only for transportation but for shelter.” (Carney, supra, 471 U.S.
at p. 393.) The primary questions are whether the vehicle was
“readily mobile” and “subject to a range of police regulation
5 As Curry recognizes, many of these facts—such as the
presence of the groceries, bedding, a television, and other
belongings inside the RV—were not visible from outside the RV.
Unobservable facts would not negate an objective observer’s
conclusion the RV retained its vehicular character at the time the
officers went into the RV to detain Curry. (See People v. Celis
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 673 [objective probable cause inquiry
focuses on “facts known to the arresting officer”]; see also
Devenpeck v. Alford (2004) 543 U.S. 146, 152-155.)
10
inapplicable to a fixed dwelling”—the two justifications for the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement. (Ibid.; see
People v. Hochstraser (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 883, 904 [“the twin
justifications which make the automobile exception applicable to
a vehicle ‘come into play’ whenever a car is capable of being used
as a car, i.e., for transportation”]; People v. Superior Court
(Overland) (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1114, 1119, fn. 2 [motor home
in Carney was subject to the automobile exception, even though it
was capable of functioning as a home, “because the motor home
remained mobile and its operation in a public place reduced the
owner’s expectation of privacy”]; Hasseh El Bey v. Dominguez
(N.D. Tex. 2020) 540 F.Supp.3d 653, 662, fn. 24 [“motorhomes
may be searched without a warrant—even though they are
residences and enjoy a greater expectation of privacy than do
automobiles—because they are mobile”].) The Supreme Court in
Carney declined “to distinguish between ‘worthy’ and ‘unworthy’
vehicles”—if the vehicle is apparently mobile and “on the public
road[ ],” as Curry’s was, the automobile exception applies,
regardless of whether the vehicle is a motor home or “an ordinary
sedan.” (Carney, at pp. 393-394; see id. at p. 393 [application of
the automobile exception does not depend “upon the size of the
vehicle and the quality of its appointments”].)
Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s implicit
findings Curry’s RV was readily mobile, on a public road, and
subject to regulation as a vehicle. Therefore, under Carney, the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement applied, and
Curry’s arrest in his RV “based solely on probable cause was
valid.” (United States v. Hill, supra, 855 F.2d 664, 668; see ibid.
[where houseboat “could have been searched without a warrant,
11
the rule of Payton[ v. New York, supra, 445 U.S. 573] requiring a
warrant for an arrest in a suspect’s home is inapplicable”].)6
C. Impounding the RV Did Not Taint the Evidence the
Officers Obtained Pursuant to the Warrant
After officers removed Curry from the RV, they impounded
it to “hold” it for evidence, which conduct Curry contends violated
the Fourth Amendment. The officers, however, waited until they
obtained a warrant before they searched the RV, and Curry does
not challenge the validity of the warrant. Even if the decision to
impound the RV was an unlawful seizure, the impound did not
taint the subsequent search pursuant to the warrant.
Even where officers violate the Fourth Amendment,
evidence is not the fruit of an illegal search or seizure if officers
discovered it pursuant to a “valid warrant” that was “wholly
unrelated” to the violation. (Segura v. United States (1984)
468 U.S 796, 814.) A later search conducted pursuant to a valid
6 People v. Trevino (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 120, cited by Curry,
is distinguishable. The court in that case considered whether an
RV was an “inhabited dwelling house” for purposes of section 460,
subdivision (a), which defines first degree burglary. (Id. at
pp. 123-124.) Whether the automobile exception applies is
governed by federal constitutional standards, not state law.
(People v. Macabeo, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1212.) For the same
reason, the so-called knock-and-notice cases Curry cites do not
support his argument; federal law does not authorize suppression
as a remedy for such violations. (See Hudson v. Michigan (2006)
547 U.S. 586, 593-594 [Fourth Amendment does not require
suppression when officers violate knock-and-announce
requirements]; People v. Byers (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 856, 868-869
[after Hudson “the remedy for a knock-notice violation does not
include suppression of evidence”].)
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warrant is “genuinely independent” of a constitutional violation,
so long as the violation did not impact either the officers’
“decision to seek the warrant” or the magistrate’s “decision to
issue the warrant.” (Murray v. United States (1988) 487 U.S.
533, 542.)
People v. Bennett, supra, 17 Cal.4th 373, is instructive.
There, an officer asked a hotel manager to secure the defendant’s
hotel room, which officers later searched after obtaining a
warrant. (Id. at pp. 380-381.) The Supreme Court, citing Segura,
held that, even if the request amounted to an unconstitutional
seizure, a warrant that did not rely on the initial seizure “was
sufficient to dissipate the taint of any illegality.” (Id. at p. 391.)
More recent cases have reaffirmed that, so long as the decision
and application to obtain the warrant were independent of the
initial alleged violation, a valid warrant dissipates any taint and
precludes suppression as a remedy. (See People v. Vasquez (2026)
121 Cal.App.5th 1340, 1359-1360; United States v. Saelee
(9th Cir. 2022) 51 F.4th 327, 335, 338-339; see also People v.
Tousant (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 804, 818 [warrant search provides
an independent source even if the warrant application contained
illegally obtained information, so long as the declaration would
have established probable cause without the tainted information
and investigators would have sought the warrant even without
the illegal conduct].)
As the People point out, the officers who impounded
Curry’s RV did not search it when they impounded it, but
“awaited the signing of a search warrant” that “could have been
obtained without impoundment of the vehicle.”7 Curry does not
7 Curry argues the People cannot rely on inevitable
discovery—which is an extrapolation of the independent-source
13
argue otherwise; he merely asserts that obtaining a warrant
“cannot cure a constitutional violation which occurred prior to the
application for the warrant.”8 But as discussed, obtaining a
warrant can cure a constitutional violation, so long as the People
satisfy the two requirements of Murray, which the People did
here. Because the officers did not inventory the RV or otherwise
obtain any information as a result of the impoundment,
impounding the RV did not produce any information that could
have impacted the officers’ decision to obtain a warrant or the
judicial officer’s decision to issue it. And because impounding the
RV had no bearing on the decision to seek the warrant, and none
of the information in the affidavit was derived from the
impoundment, the independent-source doctrine would apply even
if there were something constitutionally improper about
impounding the RV.
doctrine (Murray v. United States, supra, 487 U.S. at p. 539)—
because the People failed to “raise the issue and present
evidence” in the trial court. But they did. The People defended
the warrant in the trial court, officers testified about the
circumstances surrounding their decision to impound the RV, and
the warrant affidavit is in the record. The People did not “fail[ ]
to make a record to establish” the “evidence would have been
obtained even without the [alleged] illegality.” (In re Rudy F.
(2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1136.)
8 Curry relies on People v. Shuey (1975) 13 Cal.3d 835.
However, to the extent Shuey “holds that a subsequent search
warrant may never ‘disinfect’ a previous illegal entry or search,
that view has been rejected by the” United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Segura v. United States, supra, 468 U.S. 796.
(People v. Bennett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 389, fn. 5.)
14
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
SEGAL, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
FEUER, J.
15