Filed 6/22/26 P. v. Cruz-Araujo CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G064614
v. (Super. Ct. No. 23HF0566)
NICOLAS DAVID CRUZ-ARAUJO, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Michael J. Cassidy, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Jennifer A. Gambale, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General,
Christopher P. Beesley and Britton B. Lacy, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Nicolas David Cruz-Araujo challenges his sex-crime
convictions, contending the trial court erred by admitting his un-Mirandized1
confession. The court concluded defendant’s interrogation was not custodial
and thus did not require Miranda warnings.
We conclude defendant confessed during a custodial
interrogation. Thus, the failure to advise him of his Miranda rights required
the court to suppress his confession. Because we cannot conclude the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we reverse.2
FACTS
I.
INITIAL ALLEGATIONS AND INVESTIGATION
In the summer of 2019, eight-year-old Victim 1 reported that
defendant, one of her counselors at a Christian day camp, touched her
inappropriately while they were seated together on the bus earlier that day.3
The next day, two detectives went to the church campus where
defendant worked to interview him. The detectives wore suits and carried
badges and firearms. The camp director provided them with a vacant office in
one of the church buildings. When defendant arrived at work, the director led
him into the office, where the detectives were waiting, then closed the door
1 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).
2 Defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s instruction under
CALCRIM No. 1191B is foreclosed by People v. Villatoro (2012) 54 Cal.4th
1152, 1164. We cannot “reconsider that decision,” despite defendant’s urging
that we do so.
3 For simplicity, and to shield the identities of the alleged victims,
we refer to them as Victims 1–4.
2
behind him and left. The detectives introduced themselves, displayed a
badge, and asked defendant to sit down.
The recorded interview began in a casual tone. Detectives
referred to defendant as “bro,” told him he was not under arrest, and
explained they just wanted to talk to him “super low key” to “clear the air and
figure out what’s going on.”
After obtaining defendant’s identifying information, the lead
detective turned to the incident Victim 1 had reported. He told defendant
that “somebody said something about an incident that happened yesterday”
and added, “[W]e know a lot of the answers to all this, but we want to hear it
from you . . . .” As defendant described the busses the camp used for
transportation, the detective interjected that the buses “have cameras on
them.”4
In response to questioning, defendant provided general
information about camp logistics and described sitting on the bus next to
Victim 1 on the way back from the prior day’s field trip. When asked if Victim
1 might have touched him inappropriately, defendant claimed she placed her
hand on his thigh at some point and he moved her hand away. The detective
sat next to him and directed him to reenact the incident. After the
reenactment, the detective reiterated, “Um, like I said, Nicolas, there’s
cameras on there. Okay? . . . . And I need you to be completely truthful.”
The detective told defendant he understood because defendant
was only 19 years old and “[i]t happens.” He then asked how often defendant
4 At the time, the detective did not know if there were in fact
cameras on the camp bus. Police did later retrieve video from the bus, but it
was not useful.
3
had put Victim 1’s hand in his pants. Defendant responded that it happened
only once.
As questioning continued, the detective repeatedly asserted that
defendant’s conduct had been captured on video. In response to additional
questioning, defendant admitted engaging in similar conduct with one other
camper, nine-year-old Victim 2. The detective claimed that incident had also
been recorded and said he saw Victim 2 trying to pull her hand away. The
detective added that Victim 2 was a “good looking girl.” Defendant admitted
that he placed Victim 2’s hand on his penis, under his underwear. He also
admitted he was aroused.
At one point during the interview, defendant asked, “Am I getting
arrested?” The detective responded that things were “not looking very good
for [him].” At the detectives’ urging, defendant then wrote apology letters to
both victims. About 40 minutes into the interview, the detective advised
defendant of his Miranda rights.
At the conclusion of the interrogation, the detectives arrested
defendant. A search of his phone and computer later uncovered photos of
young girls in provocative poses.
In the years following the initial report, two more victims
reported similar incidents of sexual abuse by defendant on the camp bus. The
prosecution charged defendant with several counts of committing a lewd act
on a child under 14.
II.
THE TRIAL
Before trial, defendant moved to suppress his un-Mirandized
statements to detectives. The trial court denied the motion, concluding
defendant was not in custody during the interview and thus Miranda
4
warnings were not required. The court noted the interrogation was “a very
pleasant conversation, as it starts out” and stated there was “no pressure put
on the defendant through the course of the interview.” Defendant’s recorded
confession was admitted at trial. The photos from defendant’s devices were
also admitted.
Victim 1 testified that defendant sat next to her on the bus while
returning from a field trip. During the ride, defendant grabbed her hand,
placed it on his private parts, and moved her hand in circles. She repeatedly
tried to pull her hand away but he held it there. He then placed her hand
under his shorts, and she could feel skin. She yanked her hand away
forcefully and he stopped.
During the incident, Victim 1 called her mother because she
wanted to tell her what was happening. But because defendant was sitting
next to her, she instead asked her mother when her mother would be picking
her up. At trial, Victim 1’s mother confirmed receiving this call.
Victim 1’s mother described Victim 1’s later disclosure. When the
mother picked her up from camp, Victim 1 said something inappropriate had
happened but she needed to wash her hands before discussing it. That
evening, the mother found Victim 1 crying. Victim 1 then reported that
defendant made her touch his private parts on the bus.
The following day, Victim 1 repeated the allegations during a
forensic interview and provided additional details. She became visibly upset
when she identified defendant in a photo.
Victim 2 testified that she did not recognize defendant and did
not recall anyone touching her inappropriately.
Victim 3 testified that in the summer of 2019, when she was
about eight years old, defendant touched her while they were seated next to
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each other on the bus on the way back from an excursion. Defendant took her
hand and made her touch his penis. He also touched her vagina with his
hand.
Victim 3’s mother testified that the allegations involving Victim 1
became a major story in the summer of 2019. When learning about them, she
asked Victim 3 if anything had happened to her at camp, but Victim 3 said
no. A year later, Victim 3 disclosed the incident to her mother after hearing
others discussing defendant. According to her mother, Victim 3 was visibly
distressed during the disclosure. Victim 3 later repeated her account in a
forensic interview.
Victim 4 testified about a similar incident that occurred in the
summer of 2019, when she was eight years old. Defendant sat next to her on
the bus on the way back from the pool. He placed his hand under her bathing
suit and touched her vagina. He later grabbed her wrist and put her hand on
his private part over his clothes. She pulled away, but he kept trying to do it.
She provided detailed testimony about the surrounding circumstances.
Victim 4 told her therapist about the incident in 2023.
Defendant testified on his own behalf and called multiple
character witnesses.5
In closing arguments, the prosecution repeatedly referenced
defendant’s confession. The prosecutor argued the confession foreclosed any
innocent explanation for defendant’s actions and established his sexual intent
when touching Victim 1. The prosecutor cited defendant’s willingness to write
apology letters as showing his consciousness of guilt. The prosecutor also
5 As we explain below, defendant’s testimony is irrelevant to the
assessment of prejudice from the erroneous introduction of his confession. We
therefore do not detail it.
6
highlighted defendant’s attempts during the earlier parts of the interrogation
to minimize his actions before eventually confessing. The prosecutor
reminded the jury that it could relisten to the recorded statement during
deliberations.
The trial court instructed the jury on CALCRIM No. 359 (Corpus
Delicti), explaining that the prosecution was required to present independent
evidence that a crime occurred, apart from defendant’s out-of-court
statements. The court also instructed on CALCRIM No. 1191B (Evidence of
Charged Sex Offense), which permitted the jury to consider the defendant’s
commission of one charged sex offense in deciding if he also committed other
charged sex offenses.
During deliberations, the jury asked if the corpus delicti doctrine
applied to defendant’s recorded confession. The court confirmed that it did.
The jury found defendant guilty on all charges as to Victims 1, 3, and 4. It
acquitted him of the charge concerning Victim 2. The court sentenced
defendant to 25 years to life in prison.
DISCUSSION
I.
DEFENDANT’S UN-MIRANDIZED STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED
We conclude the detectives subjected defendant to a custodial
interrogation. Their failure to advise him of his Miranda rights therefore
required the suppression of his confession.
Under Miranda, suspects questioned by law enforcement after
being taken into custody must first be informed that they have the right to
remain silent, that any statements they make may be used against them, and
that they have a right to the presence of an attorney. (People v. NavaAdame
(2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1, 16 (NavaAdame).) If police interrogate a suspect in
7
custody without providing these advisements, the suspect’s responses cannot
be admitted to establish their guilt. (Ibid.)
The duty to advise suspects of their Miranda rights applies only
if they are in custody. (NavaAdame, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 16.)
‘“[C]ustody is “a term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought
generally to present a serious danger of coercion.”’” (Ibid.) In deciding if a
person is in custody for Miranda purposes, the question is whether a
reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate
the interrogation and leave. (Ibid.) To answer this question, the court must
examine all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. (Ibid.)
Relevant considerations include (1) who initiated the contact;
(2) whether the person agreed to the interview; (3) whether the person was
questioned as a witness or suspect; (4) the interview’s location; (5) whether
police said the person was under arrest or in custody (6) conversely, whether
they said the person was free to leave at any time; (7) whether the person’s
movement was restrained; (7) the length of questioning; (8) the number of
officers; (9) the degree of police control over the interrogation; (10) whether
officers conveyed a belief in the person’s guilt and suggested they had
incriminating evidence; (11) whether the tone was aggressive or accusatory;
(12) whether police used interrogation tactics designed to pressure the
person; and (13) whether the person was arrested at the end of the
interrogation. (NavaAdame, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at pp. 16–17.)
“The prosecution has the burden of proving a defendant was not
in custody.” (In re Anthony L. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 438, 445.) We review the
trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence but independently
decide if the interrogation was custodial. (Ibid.)
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Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude defendant
was subjected to a custodial interrogation long before he received Miranda
advisements. The contact began with defendant’s employer—the camp
director—leading him to the awaiting detectives as soon as he arrived at
work. Nothing suggests defendant was asked if he was willing to speak to the
detectives and they never told him he was free to leave.
Although the interrogation occurred on the church campus,
rather than a police station, the circumstances suggested this vacant office
was not a familiar place for defendant, a camp counselor. (See United States
v. Carter (8th Cir. 1989) 884 F.2d 368, 371–372 [bank president’s office was
not familiar surroundings for bank employee].) Inside, defendant was met
with two detectives who, though wearing suits, presented a badge and were
carrying firearms. (See United States v. Fred (10th Cir. 2009) 322 Fed.Appx.
602, 607 [agents’ visible weapons and badges contributed to police-dominated
atmosphere].) And though the detectives initially minimized the seriousness
of this contact, they made clear that they were there because of allegations
against defendant himself, explaining they wanted to “clear the air and figure
out what’s going on.”
At this initial stage of the encounter, defendant was likely not yet
in custody. Although the office door was closed, he was not physically
restrained and was told he was not under arrest. And as the trial court noted,
the initial conversation was “pleasant.”
But that dynamic soon changed. (See NavaAdame, supra, 116
Cal.App.5th at pp. 18–19 [interrogation may begin as noncustodial but later
become custodial].) As the interrogation progressed, the detectives
increasingly conveyed that they already knew what had occurred and that
the interview’s purpose was to secure defendant’s admission rather than
9
determine if misconduct had happened at all. One detective told defendant
they already “kn[e]w” many of the answers to their questions. When
defendant mentioned the camp buses, the lead detective advised him that the
buses had cameras. This became a recurring theme in the interrogation.
Whenever defendant offered innocuous explanations or minimized his
conduct, detectives referenced cameras or expressly told defendant there was
video of his actions—for instance, after defendant demonstrated how Victim 1
had supposedly touched him.
In addition to confronting defendant with invented incriminating
evidence, the detectives used other, more subtle interrogation tactics by
expressing sympathy for his conduct and suggesting he write apology letters.
Together, these tactics amounted to what one court called “a classic two-
pronged interrogation.” (People v. Saldana (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 432, 460
(Saldana).) On one hand, the detectives asserted conclusive evidence of guilt,
leaving defendant no plausible alternative but to confess. On the other, they
minimized defendant’s moral blame and expressed (purported)
understanding—at one point saying Victim 2 was a “good looking girl”—in a
way designed to make confessing easier. This approach tended to create a
“police-dominated atmosphere.” (Ibid.) Under these circumstances, we cannot
agree with the trial court’s conclusion that detectives exerted “no pressure”
on defendant.
Finally, although the detectives initially told defendant he was
not under arrest, when he asked later in the interrogation if he was “getting
arrested,” the detective suggested he would be, saying that things were “not
looking good for [him].” While the un-Mirandized portion of the interrogation
lasted only about 40 minutes, a reasonable person would not have felt free to
10
terminate the encounter given the detectives’ increasingly accusatory posture
and intensifying control over the interrogation.
The circumstances here are at least as suggestive of custodial
interrogation as those in NavaAdame, where we recently concluded the
failure to provide Miranda warnings required suppression of the defendant’s
statements. (NavaAdame, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 5.) As here, officers
there employed “multiple types of well-known interrogation techniques
designed to elicit confessions,” asserted knowledge of the suspect’s guilt while
minimizing moral blame, and encouraged him to provide the victim closure.
(Id. at pp. 18–19.) But unlike defendant here, the suspect in NavaAdame
initiated the contact with police himself and was told he was free to leave.
(Id. at p. 10.) Yet we still concluded the latter portion of the interrogation was
custodial. (Id. at p. 19.)
We are unpersuaded by the Attorney General’s citation to People
v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 386. Unlike here, the defendant there agreed to
come to the station; he was assured he was there only to provide a statement
and was free to leave; and investigators did not claim to have evidence of his
guilt until after they arrested him. (Id. at pp. 402–403.)
We do not suggest the tactics the detectives used in interrogating
defendant were improper. They may even be considered “good police work.”
(Saldana, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 460.) But good police work often
requires Miranda warnings. They were required here; and defendant’s
statements should therefore have been suppressed.
II.
THE ERROR WAS NOT HARMLESS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT
We cannot conclude the erroneous admission of defendant’s
confession was harmless. “A confession held inadmissible by reason of having
11
been obtained in violation of the prophylactic Miranda requirements is
subject to a harmless-error standard of review specified in Chapman v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.” (NavaAdame, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at
p. 21 (cleaned up).) Under that standard, we ask “whether it appears beyond
a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the
verdict obtained.” (Ibid. (cleaned up).) “To say that an error did not
contribute to the verdict is to find that error unimportant in relation to
everything else the jury considered on the issue in question.” (Id. at pp. 21–22
(cleaned up).)
The erroneous admission of defendant’s confession cannot be
regarded as unimportant. “A confession is like no other evidence. Indeed, ‘the
defendant’s own confession is probably the most probative and damaging
evidence that can be admitted against him.’” (Arizona v. Fulminante (1991)
499 U.S. 279, 296.) “[C]onfessions often operate as a kind of evidentiary
bombshell which shatters the defense” and are thus “much more likely to be
prejudicial.” (People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 86 (cleaned up).)
Here, the prosecution significantly relied on defendant’s
confession during closing argument. Among other things, the prosecutor used
defendant’s statements to establish his conduct and intent, demonstrate
consciousness of guilt, and refute innocent explanations for his actions. The
prosecutor reminded jurors they could replay the recorded interview during
deliberations.
We agree with the Attorney General that the remaining evidence
against defendant was robust. Victim 1 provided compelling testimony that
was consistent with both her forensic interview and her contemporaneous
report of the incident. Her account was further supported by evidence of her
emotional state when making the initial report and by corroboration that she
12
called her mother during the incident. Photos from defendant’s devices
independently confirmed the inference that defendant had a sexual interest
in young girls. And the testimony of Victims 3 and 4 strengthened Victim 1’s
account by suggesting both a disposition to commit sexual offenses against
children and a distinctive M.O.—sitting next to young girls on the camp bus
and forcing their hands to his penis.
At the same time, the prosecution’s case depended heavily on
credibility determinations and was not free from arguable weaknesses. No
physical evidence or other independent corroboration established the core
allegations involving any of the victims. Victims 3 and 4 disclosed their
allegations only after details of Victim 1’s accusations had become public—
Victim 3 after one year and Victim 4 after several. And Victim 3 initially
denied any incident to her mother.
Under these circumstances, we cannot say beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant’s confession did not contribute to the verdict. The
confession substantially strengthened the prosecutions’ effort to persuade the
jury that Victim 1’s account was truthful. And once the jury credited
Victim 1’s allegations, the testimony of Victims 3 and 4 also became more
persuasive in establishing defendant’s guilt on the remaining charges.
The Attorney General wrongly contends the jury’s acquittal on
the charge concerning Victim 2—who was included in defendant’s
confession—shows that the jury “did not put credence” in the confession. This
contention neglects to account for the corpus delicti rule, which required
independent evidence that the crime occurred. The jury could have fully
credited defendant’s confession—even as to Victim 2—yet concluded the
evidence was legally insufficient. The trial court instructed the jury on corpus
13
delicti and confirmed, in response to the jury’s question, that the rule applied
to defendant’s confession.
We decline the Attorney General’s invitation to consider
defendant’s testimony at trial in assessing harmlessness. When an illegally
obtained confession is erroneously admitted, the defendant’s testimony will
not render the error harmless unless it is shown beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant did not take the stand “‘in an attempt to mitigate the
explosive impact of a confession which had left his case in ruin.’” (People v.
Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 131, 151.) The Attorney General makes no such
showing here.
Because the erroneous admission of defendant’s un-Mirandized
confession was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the judgment must
be reversed.
14
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded. The
People shall have 60 days from issuance of the remittitur to decide whether
to retry defendant for the charges concerning Victims 1, 3, and 4.
SCOTT, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
GOODING, J.
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