Filed 8/19/26 P. v. Crowell CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B348155
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. XSONA045758)
v.
VICTOR ANTHONY CROWELL,
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT:
Victor Anthony Crowell appeals the trial court’s denial of his
Penal Code section 1172.61 petition for resentencing on the ground he
was ineligible for relief as a matter of law. We appointed counsel for
Crowell, who filed a brief raising no issues and requesting we apply
the review framework established by People v. Delgadillo (2022)
14 Cal.5th 216, 231–232 (Delgadillo). Accordingly, Crowell was
notified of his right to file a supplemental brief, which he duly filed.
(See ibid.) We are “required to evaluate the specific arguments
presented in that brief and to issue a written opinion,” but we need
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
not and do not conduct “an independent review of the entire record to
identify unraised issues.” (Id. at p. 232.)
We have considered Crowell’s supplemental brief and conclude
his arguments have no merit. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On July 15, 2000, Crowell was working as a security guard at a
motel in Long Beach where Cheng Kan Fei worked as a clerk.2 Fei had
previously accused Crowell of taking money from him, and Fei raised
the issue again upon Crowell’s arrival at work that day. Surveillance
video from Fei’s office showed Crowell wrestling Fei into a store room,
where Fei’s body was later found. Police determined Fei was
strangled.
Crowell later told police he struck Fei several times with his fist
and a clothes iron, and tried to strangle Fei with Fei’s own belt; when
that was unsuccessful, he strangled Fei with the iron’s electrical cord.
Crowell said he took money from an office drawer, broke a video
monitor in the office, took a videotape, and left the scene.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 5, 2001, Crowell pled guilty to first degree murder
(§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (a)). He also admitted he had previously
been convicted of a prior strike felony (§ 1170.12). Crowell was
sentenced to a term of 25 years to life, doubled for the prior strike, for
an aggregate sentence of 50 years to life.
On November 14, 2023, Crowell filed a section 1172.6 petition
for resentencing in propria persona and requested appointment of
counsel. The trial court appointed counsel to represent him, who
argued the trial court should issue an order to show cause and hold a
hearing to determine if Crowell was the actual killer or acted with an
2 We draw this factual summary from Crowell’s record of
conviction, including the preliminary hearing transcript. (See People
v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 564, 567.)
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intent to kill. (See § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) After our Supreme Court
decided Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th 549, the People argued Crowell was
ineligible for relief as a matter of law because the preliminary hearing
transcript showed he was the sole assailant and actual killer.
Crowell’s counsel then requested the court independently review the
record to determine his eligibility for relief. (See Delgadillo, supra,
14 Cal.5th at pp. 231–232.) At a hearing on July 30, 2025, the trial
court determined “the record of conviction unequivocally reflects
[Crowell] was the actual killer and is not entitled to relief.”
Crowell timely appealed. (See § 1237, subd. (b); Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.308(a).)
DISCUSSION
Section 1172.6, subdivision (a), allows those “convicted of felony
murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person
based solely on that person’s participation in a crime” to file a
resentencing petition in certain circumstances. (Ibid.) “[T]he
section 1172.6 petitioning ‘process begins with the filing of a petition
containing a declaration that all requirements for eligibility are met
([id.], subd. (b)(1)(A)), including that “[t]he petitioner could not
presently be convicted of murder . . . because of changes to . . .
Section 188 or 189.” ’ ” (People v. Antonelli (2025) 17 Cal.5th 719, 724
(Antonelli); see also § 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).)
The changes to sections 188 and 189 “altered the substantive
law of murder in two areas.” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433,
448.) “First, [they] narrowed the application of the felony-murder rule”
by limiting it to certain circumstances, including where “ ‘[t]he person
was the actual killer.’ ” (Ibid.; see also § 189, subd. (e).) Second, they
imposed a new requirement that “ ‘a principal in a crime shall act
with malice aforethought,’ ” which effectively eliminated aiding and
abetting liability for murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (Curiel, at p. 449; see also § 188, subd. (a)(3).)
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When a petitioner files a facially adequate section 1172.6
petition, the trial court “afford[s] the parties an opportunity to submit
briefing [and] ‘hold[s] a hearing to determine whether the petitioner
has made a prima facie case for relief.’ ” (Antonelli, supra, 17 Cal.5th
at p. 724.) If the court concludes the petitioner has made a prima facie
showing, it issues an order to show cause, but “ ‘[i]f the petition and
the record . . . establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible
for relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition.’ ” (Ibid.)
The trial court denied Crowell’s petition at the prima facie stage
on the ground the record conclusively established he was ineligible for
relief because he was the actual killer. Crowell pled guilty to first
degree murder, he told police he beat and strangled Fei, and the
record showed he acted alone.
Crowell’s supplemental brief does not explain how or why he,
Fei’s undisputed actual killer and sole assailant, “ ‘ “could not
presently be convicted of murder . . . because of changes to . . .
Section 188 or 189.” ’ ” (Antonelli, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 724; see also
§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) Instead, he argues Fei’s killing was
“accidental[].” Even if true, that does not render Crowell eligible for
resentencing because he remains “the actual killer.” (§ 189, subd. (e);
see also People v. Nguyen (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 1154, 1168
[resentencing relief “is only available when certain conditions
enumerated in [section 1172.6] apply”].) Crowell therefore has not
shown the trial court erred in denying his petition. (See Delgadillo,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 233 [relief is unavailable where “the record . . .
makes clear [the defendant] was the actual killer and the only
participant”].)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
_________________________________________________________________
LUI, P. J. RICHARDSON, J. GOORVITCH, J.
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