Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

P. v. Cowan CA4/1

Filed 10/26/26 P. v. Cowan CA4/1
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 10/26/26 P. v. Cowan CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D084049

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Case No. SCD291715)

RICHARD COWAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Peter C. Deddeh, Judge. Affirmed.
Valerie G. Wass, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General,
A. Natasha Cortina and Christine Levingston Bergman, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Richard Cowan of the first degree murder of
Mario Bullard, attempted murder and assault with a semi-automatic firearm
of Joseph M. and Michael H., and assault with a semi-automatic firearm of
Lonnie H. Cowan contends on appeal that there is insufficient evidence to
support his two attempted murder convictions because the prosecution failed
to prove he had the intent to kill. He further contends that the trial court

erred by: denying his request for a Kelly1 hearing on the prosecution’s
firearm and toolmark comparison evidence; allowing the prosecution’s
firearm and toolmark comparison expert to testify that the cartridge casings
recovered from three of the four crime scenes matched Cowan’s firearm; and
inadequately responding to the jury’s request for a definition of “intent to
kill.” Cowan argues that these errors were prejudicial and require reversal of
his remaining convictions as well.
We conclude there was substantial evidence from which a reasonable
jury could find Cowan had the intent to kill victims Joseph M. and
Michael H. We also conclude the trial court did not err in admitting the
People’s expert witness testimony or in responding to the jury’s question, and
we therefore affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2022, Cowan was charged with one count of murder (Pen. Code,2
§ 187, subd. (a); count 1), three counts of attempted murder (§§ 187, subd. (a),
664; counts 2, 4, and 6), and assault with a semi-automatic firearm (§ 245,
subd. (b); counts 3, 5, and 7). The information further alleged that Cowan
intentionally and personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury
or death to a non-accomplice (§ 12022.53, subd. (d); counts 1 and 4),
intentionally and personally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c);
counts 2 and 6), personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a); counts 3, 5,
and 7), and personally inflicted great bodily injury upon a non-accomplice

1 People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24.
2
(§ 12022.7, subd. (a); count 5). Cowan pleaded not guilty and denied the
special allegations.
Near the end of the prosecution’s case in chief, the prosecutor filed an
amended information, which included all of the allegations in the original
information and further alleged various aggravating factors. Cowan again
pleaded not guilty and denied the special allegations and aggravating factors.
A. The Prosecution’s Case
1. Background Information
Cowan lived in an apartment in the Stadium Arms apartment complex
located at 4525 Twain Avenue in the Grantville neighborhood of San Diego,
where he had moved in 2011. The complex, which was not gated, consisted of
nine buildings arranged around a courtyard, with a main entrance on Twain
Avenue. Cowan owned two Jeeps and a motorcycle, and he was often
concerned about the safety of his vehicles. Cowan had one assigned parking
space, and he had to park his other vehicles on the street. Cowan expressed
frustration on multiple occasions with vehicles being stolen or vandalized at
the apartment complex, and he felt that the manager needed to be more
vigilant. At some point, Cowan began walking around his neighborhood late
at night, apparently monitoring the area for possible criminal activity.
Stadium Arms apartment complex property manager Maricela F.
testified that management sometimes reviewed after-hours surveillance
footage. On that footage, she sometimes saw Cowan in the early morning
hours, between midnight and 5:00 a.m., walking around various parts of the
property. He was always alone, and she did not see other residents doing the
same. Maricela never saw Cowan carrying a firearm or threatening anyone.

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3
In October 2016, a detective from the San Diego Police Department
(SDPD) took a report from Cowan regarding a vehicle break-in. Cowan
stated that his Jeep Cherokee had been broken into overnight while parked
outside the Stein Education Center near 4500 Twain Avenue, and his Bose
speaker was stolen.
On January 17, 2017, Cowan purchased a .40 caliber Springfield
Armory firearm, Model XD-40 (Springfield XD-40).
On January 28, Cowan called the SDPD and reported that on the night
of January 16 or early morning of January 17, someone had tampered with
the ignition of his motorcycle and cut its wires. The same day of his police
report, Cowan texted someone about picking up his “glock 40”; he later texted
about wanting to go shooting.
In June 2017, Cowan called the SDPD and reported that his motorcycle
had been stolen. He had parked his motorcycle in front of 4608 Twain
Avenue the night before and discovered it missing that morning. That same
month, there was a series of messages between Cowan and another man
where Cowan discussed patrolling the neighborhood but stated that on the
night that he “slept on [his] duties,” his motorcycle was stolen. In several of
the messages, Cowan referred to seeing “essays”—slang for Hispanic males—
acting suspiciously in the neighborhood. In one message, Cowan said, “They
gone get theres [sic]. If I have to be the one to serve it to them, then so be it.”
In January 2020, an SDPD detective followed up on Cowan’s report to
the police regarding another stolen motorcycle. Cowan stated that he had
parked his motorcycle on the street at 4500 Twain Avenue earlier that day
and realized it was missing later that evening.
On April 12, 2020, shortly after midnight, Jacob C. was driving down
Mission Gorge Road after stopping to pick up fast food. While driving, he

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noticed a dark SUV repeatedly following and mimicking his movements,
sometimes with its headlights flashing on and off. Jacob attempted several
evasive turns, including turning left four times, but the SUV was still
following him. Jacob became concerned and called 911. He stayed on the line
with the dispatcher, reporting his location as the SUV continued to follow
him, until police officers eventually intervened and conducted a traffic stop of
the SUV.
The SUV turned out to be a black Jeep Grand Cherokee driven by
Cowan. Cowan denied following Jacob and said he was going to a nearby
Vons. The police officer who pulled Cowan over noted that there were other
grocery stores, including other Vons locations, closer to Cowan’s apartment.
Between May 2020 and September 2021, Cowan sent more messages
about going to shooting ranges. There were also videos of Cowan at a
shooting range, some of which he posted on Facebook, and messages about
getting an assault rifle. In June 2020, Cowan also sent and received
Facebook messages about his motorcycle being stolen.
From August 2019 to August 2021, Cowan called 911 thirteen times
and the SDPD non-emergency number 41 times. In several of these calls,
Cowan was calling to report what he believed were individuals casing
vehicles or acting suspiciously. A few times when Cowan called 911, he told
the dispatcher he was following vehicles he thought were engaging in
suspicious activities in his neighborhood.
2. May 21, 2019 Shooting
In the early morning of May 21, 2019, Richard J., who lived in an
apartment on Vandever Avenue, heard what sounded like two people arguing
outside his apartment. He did not recognize either voice. He heard one male
voice say “No, no, no,” followed by multiple gunshots in rapid succession.

5
Richard J. looked out his window and saw someone lying in the street. When
he took his dog outside shortly afterward, he approached the figure and found
a man who was wheezing but unresponsive. Richard J. did not see anyone
else in the area.
Jason C., who lived at the same complex as Richard J., was awake in
his apartment when he heard a man screaming frantically, “Oh no. Please,”
followed by cursing and then the word, “Don’t.” Jason heard only one voice
and did not recognize it. The voice was abruptly cut off by a gunshot,
followed by a pause and then another gunshot. Jason dove to the floor and
called 911 within seconds. He told the dispatcher he heard about five
gunshots and a man screaming, although at trial he recalled hearing only two
shots. Jason did not go outside and never saw the shooter or victim.
Valeria R., who also lived at the complex, was studying with her sister
when she heard gunfire through their open living room window. She heard
two gunshots, a man saying “Please, no,” and then a third shot. Valeria
heard only one voice. She called 911 within two minutes. She and her sister
were too afraid to look outside.
At around 2:50 a.m., SDPD officers arrived at the scene and found
victim Mario Bullard lying face down with blood visible near his head and no
pulse. Mario was wearing gloves, and no personal property was located
nearby. He had suffered two gunshot wounds to his lower back, a gunshot
wound to the left side of his neck, and a gunshot wound through his abdomen
area. The cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds, and the manner of
death was homicide.
An SDPD crime scene specialist collected four cartridge casings, a
bullet fragment, a car adapter, and a Virginia Slims cigarette butt from the
crime scene. Each casing had a headstamp that read “S&B 40SW,” which

6
meant they were .40 caliber Smith and Wesson cartridge casings. An SDPD
criminalist in the Firearms Identification Unit compared the cartridge
casings to each other and concluded that all four casings were fired from the
same firearm. The most common brands of firearm that could have fired
these casings were FN Browning, Springfield, or Taurus.
3. April 28, 2020 Incident and Shootings
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on April 28, 2020, a man named Richard
called the SDPD to report Hispanic males casing vehicles near the Stadium
Arms apartment complex where Cowan lived. The caller stated that his Jeep
had broken down and was blocking the driveway into the apartment complex.
When police officers arrived, Cowan, who was wearing all black clothing and
a headlamp, ran toward them. He shouted, “They went this way, they went
this way,” while pointing northeast toward Decena Drive, and added, “I’m
chasing them.” Cowan identified himself as the Jeep’s owner, explained that
his Jeep had broken down in the driveway, and said there were three men
casing vehicles. He then got into his Jeep and drove off toward the hill on
Twain Avenue. The officers searched the area but did not find any suspects.
At around 4:30 a.m. that same morning, SDPD officers responded to a
report of shots fired at the 4500 block of Twain Avenue. Eric H., who lived at
one of the Stadium Arms apartment complex buildings on Twain Avenue, had
been woken up by a gunshot. He looked out his bedroom window and saw a
man crossing Twain Avenue. The man was wearing a dark hoodie and
possibly a backpack, as well as a headlamp, which was illuminated. The man
stopped in the street with his right arm extended, holding what appeared to
be a gun with a light on it. Eric heard the man yell, “Get down, get down,”
and “Get away from the car.” Eric then heard another gunshot followed by
the man shouting, “Not in my neighborhood.” The man then walked east on

7
Twain Avenue. Eric did not hear other voices or see anyone else. He called
911 within a minute of the second shot, at 4:27 a.m. Eric could not identify
the man’s race or describe his hair color. He knew Cowan from living in the
same complex.
Domingo L., who also lived at the Stadium Arms apartment complex,
was getting ready for work at around 4:30 a.m. when he heard a male voice
yelling, followed by two gunshots. Afterward, he heard running footsteps
that stopped outside his window, then two male voices, with one saying he
had been shot in the leg. The sound of running footsteps then went down the
sidewalk toward Mission Gorge.
Heather M., who lived across the street from the Stadium Arms
apartment complex, heard a loud bang at around 4:30 a.m. From her
window, she saw a man in a dark hoodie standing in the middle of the street
on Twain Avenue with his arm outstretched. He yelled, “Don’t touch that
car” several times. Heather saw two other people running west on Twain
Avenue—one in the street and one on the sidewalk. After a second bang and
a flash, she saw the man in the street walk east on Twain Avenue, then
return a minute or two later and enter a complex across the street.
Garrett H., who lived at the same complex as Heather, was woken up
at around 4:30 a.m. by a loud noise. He looked outside and saw two shadowy
figures moving quickly west on Twain Avenue. He heard one of the men
shout, “Don’t get into that car” in a deep, angry voice. He believed the
individual shouting had a long-barrel firearm that might be a revolver.
Shortly after the shouting, he heard a gunshot.
When SDPD officers responded to the scene, two of them were the same
officers who responded to Cowan’s earlier report of men casing vehicles. They
recognized the same black Jeep they had seen earlier, now parked on the

8
street. A bullet fragment and two spent .40 caliber cartridge casings were
found at the scene. One of the cartridge casings was found next to Cowan’s
Jeep.
At around 6:10 a.m. the same morning, Cowan called 911 and reported
that someone shot at him while he was driving on the southbound 805
freeway. Cowan said that as he was driving next to the slow lane, a vehicle
pulled up on his left side and a passenger sitting in the front pulled out a
silver handgun and fired three shots at him. Cowan described the car to
officers and gave them its license plate number. There was a bullet hole in
the driver’s door of Cowan’s Jeep, and when he opened the door, a bullet
fragment fell out.
Cowan also told the responding officers about the incident earlier that
night when he saw three suspicious individuals at his apartment complex as
he was moving his Jeep from the street into the complex parking lot. Cowan
referenced his earlier 911 call and said that the officers who arrived at his
complex were unable to locate any subjects. Cowan surmised that the
freeway shooting occurred in retaliation for his 911 call. He took the officers
to the location on the freeway where he believed that the shots were fired,
but no cartridge casings were located.
Based on Cowan’s description of the vehicle on the freeway and the
license plate, investigators located the car that had been following Cowan.
After learning the vehicle was stolen, officers arrested the two occupants.
Lonnie H. was one of the occupants, and he had a bandage around his left
ankle. Photos taken on Lonnie’s phone the morning of the shooting showed a
piercing wound on a leg consistent with Lonnie’s wrapped ankle, a tattoo like
the one he had, and a pair of pants with a hole above the ankle. Cell phone
location records showed that Lonnie had been in the area of Cowan’s

9
apartment around the time of the 4:30 a.m. shooting and that he returned to
the area just before 6:00 a.m. The cell phone was on Interstate 805 heading
southbound around the same time Cowan’s vehicle was shot at.
Surveillance video from April 28, 2020, captured part of the encounter
between Lonnie and his shooter at the Stadium Arms apartment complex.
Lonnie says, “You going to point that shit at me homie?” and asks the other
man if he has a problem with him. The other man tells Lonnie, “Better head
that way,” and then repeatedly yells “Don’t go to that car!” Lonnie asks
“What the fuck are you doin—[?]” There is a “loud bang” and the shooter
continues to yell, “Don’t go to that car! You better hussle [sic]! You better
hussle [sic]! Don’t go to that car!”
A criminalist compared the two cartridge casings found at the scene of
the April 2020 Stadium Arms apartment complex shooting and determined
that they were fired from the same firearm. The criminalist listed potential
gun manufactures the casings could have been fired from, and the list
included Springfield. Lonnie’s DNA was found on the recovered bullet
fragment.
4. June 20, 2020 Shooting
At around 4:00 a.m. on June 20, 2020, John C. was woken up at his
apartment on Decena Drive by what sounded like wrestling. He looked out
his window and saw two people grasping each other below the shoulders for
less than a minute. He heard a deep, masculine voice say, “Get out of here.
Stay away.” While John was dialing 911, he heard a gunshot and saw the
person shot immediately fall to the ground, get back up, bounce on one leg
two or three times, then fall back on the ground. The shooter extended his
arm as if to shoot again but instead turned and walked quickly south. The
injured individual was crying out for help and sounded like a younger male.

10
John told an SDPD officer who responded to the crime scene that the
shooter was of average build, between five feet eight inches and five feet
eleven inches tall, weighed 180 pounds, had a distinctly African American

voice, and was wearing a dark hoodie sweatshirt and dark-colored pants.3
Evan H., who also lived on Decena Drive, was woken up by a gunshot
and yelling at approximately 4:00 a.m. He looked out his window and saw
someone of average build, wearing a dark hoodie and long pants, running
south. He estimated the person’s height to be between five feet eight inches
and five feet ten inches tall. As this person ran, Evan heard someone else
yell, “Help me.” Evan called 911.
When SDPD officers responded to a report of a shooting in the 6100
block of Decena Drive, they found a tall, young white man, later identified as
17-year-old Joseph M., slumped over on a path next to some bushes, yelling,
with a woman nearby on the phone. One of the officer’s body-worn cameras
footage was played for the jury. Joseph had blood on his face, a wound on the
back of his head, and a gunshot wound to his left thigh; his femur appeared
to be broken or shattered.
A video taken from an officer’s body-worn camera at the scene while
officers were rendering aid to Joseph was played for the jury. Although
Joseph was clearly in pain, he was alert and coherent. Joseph said he had
been taking a walk when a man he had never seen before approached while
pointing a gun with a laser pointer at him and said, “Don’t move. Get on the
ground,” and “I got it cocked and loaded.” The man was wearing green pants
and a black jacket with the hood up. Joseph dropped his phone and got on
the ground. After Joseph got on the ground, the man pistol-whipped him in
the back of head and then shot him once in the thigh. Joseph saw stars after

3 Cowan is a Black man and is five feet eight inches tall.
11
he was pistol-whipped and was not sure whether he lost consciousness. The
shooter stole Joseph’s cell phone and fled towards the Stadium Arms
apartment complex.
Joseph described his assailant as an African American man,
approximately six feet five inches tall, weighing 230 pounds, and wearing a
dark jacket and green pants. He repeatedly stated that the man was “big.”
Medics arrived and took Joseph to the hospital. At the scene, officers
collected a .40-caliber cartridge casing and bullet fragment from the dirt near
where Joseph was. Joseph’s DNA was on the bullet fragment.
5. June 25, 2021 Shooting
On June 25, 2021, between 3:00 and 4:00 a.m., Michael H. was on
Decena Drive siphoning gas into a can from a nearby car after the van he had
been given ran out of fuel. As Michael was standing on the passenger side of
the van siphoning gas, a man in black pants and a black hoodie, whom
Michael had never seen before, approached him. He was wearing a miner’s-
style headlamp, which he shone on Michael as he yelled, “Get on the ground.”
Michael responded, “No. Fuck you,” and threw the hose from the gas can at
the man.
The man fired a shot at Michael from about 22 feet away, and the
bullet passed within a couple of feet of Michael. Michael ran to the open
driver’s door of the van, got in, and put the already running van in reverse.
As he was backing up, the shooter, who was on the passenger side of the van,
shot out the van’s front passenger side tire. He then raised his arms to
shoulder height and fired a third shot, which struck the passenger-side panel
of the van. Michael sped away northbound on Decena Drive. He did not
contact police, testifying that he was “not a cop-caller.” He said he had his

12
own encounters with law enforcement and had previously been convicted of a
crime of moral turpitude.
Two days after the shooting, SDPD officers were searching for Michael
as a suspect in a domestic violence case and ultimately took him into custody
on outstanding warrants. After advising Michael of his rights, the officers
asked him about the bullet hole they had observed in his van. The officers
initially doubted the truth of Michael’s story about the shooting incident, but
they were later able to confirm much of it. Michael described the firearm as a
black, semi-automatic gun. He described the shooter as a Black male, 30 to
40 years old, about five feet eleven inches tall, and weighing 180 pounds. He
said he would recognize the shooter if he saw him again.
At the preliminary hearing, Michael identified Cowan as the shooter.
He testified that he saw the shooter for five to ten seconds before the
headlamp was activated and that it was long enough to recognize him. At
trial, Michael again identified Cowan as the shooter.
Officers were unable to locate any cartridge casings or surveillance
video from the incident.
6. Investigation and Search of Cowan’s Jeeps and Apartment
While investigating the June 2020 shooting, SDPD Detective Nicole
Mondello realized it had similarities to the April 2020 shooting. Detective
Mondello showed a photograph of Cowan to the officers who had responded to
the April shooting, and one of them identified Cowan as the reporting party
the officers had spoken to just before the shooting, who had been wearing
dark clothing and a headlamp. The other officer said he was 80 percent
certain that Cowan was the person they had spoken to in the early morning
hours on April 28, 2020.

13
Another detective who was investigating the June 2021 shooting
searched for other shootings in that area, going back to January 2018. He
found that the April 2020 and June 2020 shootings had occurred in the
immediate vicinity of the June 2021 shooting—the April 2020 shooting was
approximately 350 feet away, and the June 2020 shooting occurred at the
same location as the one he was investigating.
A search of the phone number used to make the 911 call on April 28,
2020, revealed that the same number had been used to make at least 11 other
911 calls, and in two of those calls, Cowan had provided his last name.
In September 2021, SDPD officers executed a search warrant on
Cowan’s Jeeps and his apartment. They found a loaded Springfield XD-40
gun under the driver’s seat of one of his Jeeps. The ammunition all had the
headstamp “WIN 40 S&W.” The officers also found a backpack containing a
headlamp and two cell phones inside of the Jeep. They also found a baseball
bat, binoculars, a black zip-up jacket, black cargo pants, and a canister of
mace.
Inside Cowan’s apartment, officers found a Palmetto Armory PA-15
assault rifle, which had a scope, laser attachment, and a loaded magazine.
They also found a light attachment for a handgun. Officers also recovered
two firearm magazines—one for the rifle as well as a Springfield Armory
magazine for a .40 caliber firearm. The Springfield Armory magazine was
loaded with 10 cartridges that all had the headstamp “S&W” on them.
Officers also found another headlamp, several boxes of ammunition, a
machete in a sheath, and a black hooded sweatshirt in Cowan’s apartment.
7. Cell Phone Location Evidence
Call detail records showed that Cowan’s cell phone regularly pinged off
the cell phone tower near his apartment on Twain Avenue. There were 205

14
occasions when Cowan’s cell phone was not connected to the network for at
least 10 minutes, with almost half of the connection gaps occurring between
the hours of 11:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m. The connection gaps often occurred
after Cowan had called 911 or the SDPD non-emergency line. The reasons
for the connection gaps could have been because the phone was in airplane
mode or turned off. The fastest way to terminate a cellular connection is to
put the phone in airplane mode, and then it cannot be tracked if moving.
On May 21, 2019, the day Mario Bullard was killed, Cowan’s phone
connected to the cell phone site near his apartment between midnight and
2:53 a.m. At 2:53 a.m. there was a connection gap that lasted about two
minutes. The cell phone then moved in a large, clockwise circle through
surrounding neighborhoods before returning to Cowan’s neighborhood at
4:08 a.m.
On April 28, 2020, around the time of the shooting of Lonnie H.,
Cowan’s cell phone remained in his neighborhood until 4:32 a.m., when a
connection gap began that lasted for one hour and 22 minutes. At 5:55 a.m.
the phone reconnected and was seemingly traveling south towards National
City. Cowan called 911 from near the intersection of Interstate 805 and
State Route 54. This movement was consistent with Cowan’s 911 call
reporting that someone was shooting at him in his vehicle that morning.
On June 20, 2020, the day Joseph M. was shot, Cowan’s cell phone was
connected to the cell phone tower in his neighborhood between midnight and
6:00 a.m.
On June 25, 2021, the day Michael H. was shot at, Cowan’s cell phone
connected with cell phone towers in his neighborhood between midnight and
5:42 a.m. The phone then began to move north into the Kearny Mesa area.

15
8. Firearm and Toolmark Comparison Evidence
SDPD forensic firearm and toolmark examiner Katherine Todd
testified as an expert on behalf of the prosecution. She is a member of the
Association of Firearm and Toolmark Examiners (AFTE), the premier
firearm and toolmark examiner professional organization for practitioners in
the field, and she described what she does as a trained firearm and toolmark
examiner. Todd explained that each firearm has specific surface contours
unique to that firearm, and when ammunition comes into contact with those
surfaces, it transfers those details onto the cartridge casing or bullet. When
she compares the features, or characteristics, imprinted on the ammunition
to each other or to test-fires from a specific gun, she can potentially pattern-
match those characteristics to determine whether a particular gun fired that
ammunition. She explained that with a cartridge casing, the class
characteristics specific to it would be the caliber, shape of the firing pin, and
general category of the breech face impression, which could be lines, circles,
or lines that intersect in a crosshatch pattern. Every time Todd conducts a
comparison analysis, a second examiner then independently conducts their
own comparison analysis, and if the conclusions match, they consider that a
verified answer.
When an examiner performs a comparison analysis, five different
conclusions can be reached: (1) identification, which means two bullets were
fired by the same gun; (2) exclusion, which means two different guns were
used to fire two different bullets; and (3) inconclusive, which is broken down
into three categories: (a) there is some agreement, “leaning towards an
identification, but there is not enough information there to render a definitive
conclusion”; (b) the results leaned “towards an exclusion, but you don’t have
enough information or can’t rule out certain variables in order to say

16
conclusively they were excluded”; and (c) “right down the middle that there is
not enough information to work with so it is not pushing you in one direction
or another.” Todd said that an inconclusive was an acceptable conclusion
because there were many different variables that had to be accounted for
when making a comparison, including the type of ammunition used.
Todd explained that when performing firearms and toolmark
comparisons, the characteristics examiners look at are objective—they belong
to the bullet or cartridge case—but the interpretation or how much weight
the characteristics are given during the analysis or evaluation is subjective.
This is true whenever an individual is interpreting data and also applies to
other fields, such as DNA or fingerprint analysis: “All science if it asks for an
individual to interpret data would be considered subjective.”
Todd acknowledged there is criticism of the firearm and toolmark
comparison field. In 2016, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and
Technology (PCAST) established types of studies they thought were best
designed to establish foundational validity. PCAST did a review of the
research involving firearms and toolmarks comparison, and of the eight
studies that they took into consideration, they determined that only one met
their criteria. PCAST concluded that to meet foundational validity, there had
to be at least one more appropriately designed study to show that the results
were repeatable. Todd explained that since PCAST’s 2016 report, several
other studies had been designed in the manner PCAST advised, with a recent
review finding false positive error rates ranging from 0.11 to 1.5 percent.
For her work on this case, Todd examined expended cartridge casings
from the May 2019, April 2020, and June 2020 shootings. Todd compared the
two casings from the April 2020 shooting to the casing from the June 2020
shooting under a microscope and determined that the same firearm was

17
responsible for firing all three of the cartridge cases. Todd then looked at the
four casings found at the May 2019 crime scene and compared one of them to
the casing from the June 2020 shooting, concluding that the two had been
fired from the same firearm. She then compared the four cartridge cases
from the May 2019 shooting to each other and determined they were all fired
from the same firearm. Todd thus opined that the casings from all three of
these shooting incidents were fired from the same firearm.
In September 2021, Todd received and examined the Springfield XD-40
found in Cowan’s Jeep. After Todd confirmed Cowan’s gun was operable, she
test-fired six rounds—three rounds using ammunition similar to the
cartridge casing recovered from the June 20, 2020, shooting and three rounds
using ammunition similar to the casings recovered from the May 21, 2019,
shooting. She then compared the unique marks on the test-fired casings with
those on the evidence casings. Todd concluded that Cowan’s Springfield XD-
40 was the gun that fired the casings recovered from the shooting scenes on
May 21, 2019, April 28, 2020, and June 20, 2020. A second examiner, who
did not know the results of Todd’s analysis, independently reached the same
conclusion.
Todd also compared the test-fired bullets from Cowan’s Springfield XD-
40 to the bullet fragments that were recovered from all four shootings, but
the results were all inconclusive. Todd explained that the results were
inconclusive because, due to the level of damage and distortion to the bullet
fragments, she did not have enough information to either conclusively
identify or exclude the fragments as being fired from Cowan’s gun.

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B. The Defense
1. May 20, 2019 Mario Bullard Homicide
Janet A. lived in an apartment on Vandever Avenue and testified about
the May 21, 2019 shooting. That morning at around 2:30 or 3:00 a.m., she
heard gunshots and looked out the window. She saw someone leaving the
area and described the person as a man who was about five feet six inches or
five feet seven inches in height, white, wearing black pants, black shoes, a
black sweatshirt with a white marking on the front, and a hood over his head
and carrying a black backpack.
Officers who responded to the crime scene conducted a curbside lineup,
and Janet identified the person she thought she saw leaving the scene of the
shooting. The person she identified was a woman who looked like a “tomboy.”
At trial, Janet testified that she had never seen Cowan before and that he
was not the individual she saw that night after the gunshots.
2. Expert Testimony on Scientific Methodology Relating to Firearm and
Toolmark Comparison Evidence
David Faigman, the chancellor and dean of the University of California
College of Law, San Francisco, and a professor in the Department of
Psychiatry at the School of Medicine at the University of California,
San Francisco, testified for the defense as an expert in scientific methodology.
He served as a senior advisor to PCAST on its report evaluating the
foundational validity of several forensic fields, including firearm and
toolmark comparison. Faigman acknowledged that he was not a firearm and
toolmark examiner, but he was familiar with the job of a firearm and
toolmark examiner, AFTE, and the theory and methodology of firearm and
toolmark examinations.

19
Faigman explained that there is no specific protocol for conducting a
firearm comparison. Instead, the field relies on a “theory” from AFTE based
on the concept of “sufficient agreement” to declare a match. “Sufficient
agreement” is a subjective view, and unlike in DNA analysis, firearm
identification opinions are not accompanied by any known probabilities or
statistical weight.
In 2016, PCAST concluded that the field of firearm and toolmark
comparison lacked foundational validity because there was little
understanding of its error rates or the standards for declaring a match. It
found that most pre-2016 studies were set-to-set comparisons, which it
deemed worthless for establishing validity because their closed-set design
made the task artificially easy and did not allow for the calculation of a
meaningful error rate. PCAST called for more black-box studies, in which
examiners are tested on samples for which the “ground truth” (whether they
match or not) is known to researchers.
Faigman stated that a central issue in the black-box study that had
been conducted was the handling of inconclusive results. While an
inconclusive finding is a reasonable outcome in casework, it cannot be a
correct answer in a controlled study where the true answer is known. The
researchers in the firearm and toolmark comparison studies improperly
treated inconclusive results as correct answers in their calculations, resulting
in a reported error rate of around one percent. Faigman opined that if the
high number of inconclusive findings in these studies were correctly counted
as errors, the error rate for firearm comparison would be substantially
higher. Citing one study in particular, he stated that properly accounting for
inconclusive results would raise the error rate to as high as 54 percent for
bullets and 44 percent for cartridge cases.

20
Faigman opined that firearm and toolmark comparison using class
characteristics seems to be fairly accurate, but the research does not support
the ability to identify a cartridge casing or bullet as being fired from a specific
firearm.
C. Jury Question and Response
During deliberations, the jury sent a note to the court that said, “Please
expand upon the definition of ‘intent to kill’.” Defense counsel noted that she
had discussed with the prosecutor that they both thought CALCRIM No. 600

included the definition of intent to kill.4 Defense counsel further stated that
she thought she and the prosecutor could agree to an expansion of the
definition. The court stated: “I don’t think it is appropriate to expand
definitions, frankly. . . . I am happy to have you guys talk to each other and
propose something. But to me, it’s in the jury instruction, and so just refer

4 It did not. The written instruction on attempted murder given to the
jury was as follows: “To prove that the defendant is guilty of attempted
murder, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant took at least one
direct but ineffective step toward killing another person; [¶] AND [¶] 2. The
defendant intended to kill that person. [¶] A direct step requires more than
merely planning or preparing to commit murder or obtaining or arranging for
something needed to commit murder. A direct step is one that goes beyond
planning or preparation and shows that a person is putting his or her plan
into action. A direct step indicates a definite and unambiguous intent to kill.
It is a direct movement toward the commission of the crime after
preparations are made. It is an immediate step that puts the plan in motion
so that the plan would have been completed if some circumstance outside the
plan had not interrupted the attempt. [¶] A person who attempts to commit
murder is guilty of attempted murder even if, after taking a direct step
toward killing, he or she abandons further efforts to complete the crime, or
his or her attempt fails or is interrupted by someone or something beyond his
or her control. On the other hand, if a person freely and voluntarily
abandons his or her plans before taking a direct step toward committing the
murder, then that person is not guilty of attempted murder.” (CALRCIM
No. 600, italics added.)
21
them back to the jury instruction.” Defense counsel agreed. The prosecutor
was also hesitant to give the jury anything more because the definition of
intent to kill was in CALCRIM No. 600 as well as in the charge of homicide,
but she could see the reason for the jury’s request. She thus requested that
the court’s response to the jury question also refer them to CALCRIM
No. 200, which provides: “Some words or phrases have legal meanings. If
they are not defined, then you use their ordinary, everyday meaning.”
The trial court asked the prosecutor and defense counsel to discuss a
response, which they did. Both attorneys and the trial court agreed to the
following response, which was then given to the jury: “Please refer to Calcrim
520 and 521 and 600. Please also refer to Calcrim 200, ‘Some words or
phrases used during this trial have legal meanings that are different from
their meanings in everyday use. These words and phrases will be specifically
defined in these instructions. Please be sure to follow the definitions that I
gave you. Words and phrases not specifically defined in these instructions
are to be applied using their ordinary, everyday meanings.’ ”
D. Jury Verdict and Sentencing
After deliberating for four days, the jury found Cowan guilty of first
degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), two counts of attempted murder
(§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)), and three counts of assault with a semi-automatic
firearm (§ 245, subd. (b)). The jury found true the allegations that Cowan
intentionally and personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury
or death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), intentionally and personally discharged a
firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)), personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd.
(a)), and personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The
jury also found true the aggravating factors that Cowan had engaged in

22
violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society and that the victim
in counts four and five (Joseph M.) was particularly vulnerable.
The trial court sentenced Cowan to 14 years plus 75 years to life in
prison.
DISCUSSION
A. Substantial Evidence Supports Cowan’s Attempted Murder Convictions
Cowan’s first contention on appeal is that there was insufficient
evidence of his intent to kill to convict him of the attempted murder charges
in counts 4 and 6. Our review of a claim of insufficiency of evidence is
limited. We review the entire record in the light most favorable to the
judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that which
is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of
fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v.
Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 59–60.) We presume every fact in support of
the judgment that can reasonably be deduced from the evidence. (People v.
Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 890 (Covarrubias).) If the circumstances
reasonably justify the jury’s findings, reversal is not warranted simply
because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
contrary finding. (Ibid.)
Attempted murder requires two elements: (1) the specific intent to kill;
and (2) a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing.
(Covarrubias, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 890.) Intent to kill is shown if the
defendant either desires the victim’s death or knows to a substantial
certainty that death will occur. (Ibid.; People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733,
739 (Smith).) Direct evidence of a defendant’s intent rarely exists; rather, the
factfinder will generally infer intent from the circumstances of the crime and
the defendant’s actions. (People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 602; see

23
also Smith, at p. 741.) The question of a defendant’s intent is a factual one.
(People v. Lashley (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 938, 945–946 (Lashley).)
1. Count 4 – Attempted Murder of Joseph M.
Cowan contends there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s
finding that Cowan intended to kill Joseph M. during the June 2020 shooting,
and his attempted murder conviction on count 4 must therefore be reversed.
The People presented evidence at trial showing that Cowan
encountered 17-year-old Joseph while Cowan was patrolling his
neighborhood in the middle of the night armed with his gun. Joseph had
been checking car door handles to see if they were unlocked so he could get
into them to steal property. Cowan approached Joseph, pointed a gun with a
laser at his chest, and ordered him to get on the ground. He told Joseph that
his gun was “cocked and loaded” and ordered him not to move. After Joseph
got on the ground, Cowan pistol-whipped him in the head and then shot him
once in the thigh at close range. Cowan then took Joseph’s phone and walked
off towards his apartment complex.
Cowan argues that this evidence falls short of establishing intent to
kill, mainly because if he had “intended to kill Joseph, he could have easily
discharged the firearm into Joseph’s head or a vital area of his body.”
Instead, he fired a single shot into Joseph’s thigh and then “voluntarily
desisted from further firing,” thus demonstrating that he did not act with
intent to kill Joseph.
Our Supreme Court recently analyzed a similar set of circumstances—
where the victim was also “shot in her leg from a close range”—and reached
the opposite conclusion. (People v. Chhuon (2026) 19 Cal.5th 1018, 1065
(Chhuon).) One of the defendants in Chhuon argued that there was
insufficient evidence to prove that either he or his codefendant had intended

24
to kill the victim. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court disagreed, explaining that the
act of shooting a gun at a victim at close range in a manner that could have
inflicted a fatal wound had the shot been on target is sufficient to support an
inference of an intent to kill. (Ibid.; see also Covarrubias, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
p. 892.) That the shooter fired only once and then abandoned his efforts does
not compel the conclusion that he lacked the intent to kill in the first
instance. (Chhuon, at p. 1065; see also People v. Houston (2012)
54 Cal.4th 1186, 1218 (Houston); Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 741.)
Moreover, while it is possible the shooter intended only to wound or disable
the victim, the reviewing court must “ ‘presume in support of the verdict the
existence of every fact that can be reasonably inferred from the evidence.’ ”
(Chhuon, at p. 1066, quoting Houston, at p. 1217.)
The Supreme Court’s analysis applies here and compels the conclusion
that sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding of intent to kill. Cowan
pistol-whipped Joseph M. and then shot him in the leg at close range.
Responding officers had to apply a tourniquet to the gunshot wound, which
went through Joseph’s thigh and had large amounts of blood coming from it,
while Joseph was crying and yelling out in pain. That Cowan only shot once
and the bullet struck Joseph in the leg, rather than a vital organ, does not
compel the conclusion that there was insufficient evidence of Cowan’s intent
to kill. (Chhuon, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 1065; Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at
p. 741.) Moreover, Cowan then took Joseph’s phone and left him on the
ground bleeding, unable to call for help—another fact from which the jury
could reasonably infer Cowan’s intent. (Cf. People v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44
Cal.4th 174, 202 [evidence of defendant’s actions after inflicting wounds,
including actively preventing victim’s mother from calling 911, supported
inference of intent to kill].)

25
As another appellate court recently explained: “One reasonable
inference that could be drawn from that evidence . . . is that [the defendant]
shot [the victim] with the intent to injure or to frighten and not the intent to
kill. However, another reasonable inference that could be drawn from that
evidence is that [the defendant] intended to shoot to kill [the victim] but had
poor aim.” (People v. Cardenas (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 102, 120 (Cardenas)
[concluding there was sufficient evidence of intent to kill where defendant
shot victims in the ankles and feet].) The relevant question when it comes to
review of a sufficiency of evidence claim is not whether the appellate court
believes that the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt; instead, the relevant question is whether “any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1055; Chhuon, supra, 19
Cal.5th at p. 1066.) Viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to
the judgment, the answer here is yes. We therefore conclude that sufficient
evidence supports the jury’s finding that Cowan intended to kill Joseph.
2. Count 6 – Attempted Murder of Michael H.
Cowan similarly contends his conviction for the attempted murder of
Michael H. must be reversed because there was insufficient evidence to
support the jury’s finding that Cowan intended to kill, rather than merely
frighten, Michael.
Michael testified at trial that Cowan approached him as he was
siphoning gas for his van from another car. Cowan yelled at Michael to get
on the ground, and Michael responded by saying, “ ‘No. Fuck you.’ ” He then
threw the hose from the gas can at Cowan and took off running. As Michael
ran to the driver’s side of the van to escape, Cowan shot at him. Michael
estimated that Cowan was about 22 feet from him when he fired the first

26
bullet, which Michael described hearing as it passed within a couple of feet of
him. Michael got in the already running van and reversed quickly out of his
parking spot, and Cowan fired another two rounds—one hit the van’s front
passenger tire and the other hit the passenger side of the van. Cowan was
close enough to Michael that Michael was able to observe that the gun was
black and looked like a 9-millimeter semi-automatic firearm.
Cowan asserts that these facts are insufficient to find that he intended
to kill Michael, arguing that the first shot was consistent with a mere
“warning shot” or attempt to scare Michael because he was engaged in
criminal activity, and the second and third shots at the van are consistent
with an effort to prevent Michael’s escape. But just because the bullets did
not hit Michael does not preclude a finding of intent to kill. That Cowan fired
multiple shots towards Michael, and one passed within a few feet of him, is
sufficient to support the jury’s finding of an intent to kill, regardless of where
the bullets ultimately landed. (Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 742 [the fact
“that the bullet misses its mark or fails to prove lethal” is not dispositive
when it comes to an attempted murder charge—the very act of shooting a gun
such that could have inflicted a fatal injury had the bullet been on target is
sufficient to support an inference of intent to kill]; Lashley, supra, 1
Cal.App.4th at p. 945 [“Nor does the fact that the victim may have escaped
death because of the shooter’s poor marksmanship necessarily establish a
less culpable state of mind.”].) The jurors may also have asked themselves, to
what end was Cowan trying to prevent Michael’s escape? They could have
reasonably inferred that Cowan shot Michael’s tire out to incapacitate his
van, thus making it easier to aim at and kill him.
Cowan’s argument, in short, is that “[a] single shot fired in the
direction of a fleeing individual, who had been engaged in criminal activity, is

27
consistent with a warning shot or an attempt to frighten, and not necessarily
with an intent to kill.” (Italics added.) We agree this is a reasonable
inference that could be drawn from the evidence. As above, “[h]owever,
another reasonable inference that could be drawn from that evidence is that
[Cowan] intended to shoot to kill [Michael] but had poor aim.” (Cardenas,
supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 120.) It is the jury, not the reviewing court, that
must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt. (Chhuon, supra, 19 Cal.5th at
p. 1066.) Viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, we conclude that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding
that Cowan intended to kill Michael.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Cowan’s Request for a Kelly
Hearing on the Prosecution’s Firearm and Toolmark Comparison Evidence
Cowan next argues that the trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing
under Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d 24, which requires a party seeking to admit
expert evidence based on a new scientific technique to “establish that: (1) the
reliability of the new technique has gained general acceptance in the relevant
scientific community, (2) the expert testifying to that effect is qualified to give
an opinion on the subject, and (3) the correct scientific procedures were used.”
(People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 445, citing Kelly, at p. 30.) Cowan
contends that the court was required to hold a Kelly hearing to evaluate the
prosecution’s ballistics comparison evidence. We are not persuaded.
1. Procedural Background
Before trial, the prosecution filed a motion to admit certain firearm and
toolmark comparison evidence. Specifically, the prosecutor sought to admit
the testimony of criminalist Katherine Todd regarding her comparison of the
cartridge casings and bullets found at the four crime scenes to Cowan’s
firearm. Relying mainly on People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401 (Cowan),

28
the prosecution argued that firearm and toolmark comparison evidence is not
subject to a Kelly hearing because (1) it is not a new scientific technique, and
(2) it is the type of evidence a layperson can see for themselves.
Cowan filed a competing pretrial motion to exclude Todd’s firearm and
toolmark comparison testimony or, alternatively, request a Kelly hearing.
Cowan argued that the subjective method of firearm and toolmark
comparison—specifically the assertion that a specific firearm can be
identified as the source of a cartridge casing—is no longer generally accepted
by the relevant scientific community. In support, Cowan cited three
reports—two from the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), issued in 2008
(NAS Ballistics Imaging Report) and 2009 (NAS Report: Strengthening
Forensic Science A Path Forward), and one from the President’s Council of
Advisors on Science and Technology, issued in 2016. The two NAS reports
concluded that “the validity of the fundamental assumptions of uniqueness
and reproducibility of firearms-related toolmarks ha[d] not yet been
demonstrated” (2008 NAS Ballistics Imaging Report) and that firearms
comparison analysis had a “fairly limited” scientific knowledge base and
lacked a “precisely specified, and scientifically justified, series of steps that
lead to results with well-characterized confidence limits” (2009 NAS Report:
Strengthening Forensic Science A Path Forward). The PCAST report
concluded that the firearms comparison field “falls short of the scientific
criteria for foundational validity.”
The trial court denied Cowan’s motion and request for a Kelly hearing.
It determined that the hearing was not required, stating: “[T]his science has
been out there for a long, long time, and it’s been challenged and been
allowed in. . . . But to me it’s question of weight, not admissibility.” The
court concluded that the firearm and ballistics comparison evidence was

29
relevant and admissible, stating that if the defense expert wanted to “testify
to the contrary or testify about things that he’s discovered through his work
and studies,” then the court could have an evidentiary hearing to determine
the parameters of his testimony. Again, though, the court noted that
“ballistics is a well-established science . . . for generations and . . . it’s been
challenged and still ruled admissible.”
At trial, Todd testified regarding her analysis of the firearm evidence in
the case and her conclusion that the cartridge casings recovered from the
shootings charged in counts 1 through 5 were fired from Cowan’s firearm.
Defense expert Faigman testified about studies that raised concerns about
firearm and toolmark comparison analysis, opining that although the
research seems to indicate an ability to be fairly accurate in determining the
type of firearm that fired a casing based on class characteristics, it does not
support the ability to identify a casing or bullet as coming from a specific
firearm.
2. Analysis
We agree with the People that the trial court did not err in denying
Cowan’s request for a Kelly hearing, as Supreme Court precedent forecloses
the argument Cowan makes here. (Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 470.) In
Cowan, the defendant also moved to exclude testimony from the prosecution’s
expert regarding firearm and toolmark comparison evidence, as well as the
expert’s conclusion that the bullets recovered from the murder victim’s body
had been fired from a specific firearm. (Id. at pp. 468–469.) Unlike here,
however, the defendant in Cowan argued that the method the expert had
used to compare the firearm to the bullets recovered from the victim’s body—
which combined tool mark comparison technique with ballistics comparison
technique after creating a cast of the firearm’s interior using a silicone rubber

30
compound and then comparing the markings on the cast with the recovered
bullets— was a “new technique, the reliability of which should have been
proved under the Kelly standards.” (Id. at p. 471.) The Supreme Court
nevertheless disagreed that a Kelly hearing was required. (Ibid.)
The court explained that “Kelly applies only to that limited class of
expert testimony which is based, in whole or in part, on a technique, process,
or theory which is new to science and, even more so, the law.” (Cowan, supra,
50 Cal.4th at p. 470 [cleaned up].) Moreover, to be subject to Kelly, the
technique at issue must be “ ‘so foreign to everyday experience as to be
unusually difficult for laypersons to evaluate.’ ” (Ibid., quoting People v.
Venegas (1998) 18 Cal.4th 47, 81 [contrasting DNA evidence, which requires
validation under Kelly, with “ ‘fingerprint, shoe track, bite mark, or ballistic
comparisons, which jurors essentially can see for themselves’ ”].) This is
because “the Kelly rule ‘is intended to prevent lay jurors from being unduly
influenced by procedures which seem scientific and infallible, but which
actually are not.’ ” (Cowan, at p. 470, quoting People v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th
494, 524; see also People v. Stayner (2026) 19 Cal.5th 395, 487 (Stayner)
[“ ‘Kelly was designed to insulate the jury from expert testimony premised on
methods that “carry [a] misleading aura of scientific infallibility.” ’ ”].)
Applying these principles to the ballistics comparison evidence at issue
in Cowan, the Supreme Court concluded that “the difference between static
tool mark comparison and dynamic ballistics comparison was not a matter so
beyond common understanding that lay jurors could not give it proper weight
in evaluating [the expert]’s opinion.” (Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 471.)
Further, the defendant had the opportunity to raise the issue on cross-
examination or present his own expert to contest the prosecution’s expert’s
findings before the jury. The court thus concluded there was no error. (Ibid.)

31
Here, Cowan does not argue that the firearm and toolmark analysis
conducted by Todd was new to science or the law. Rather, citing People v.
Leahy (1994) 8 Cal.4th 587, 606 (Leahy), he contends that the Supreme Court
“has explicitly rejected the notion that a technique is immune from scrutiny
simply because it has been used in courtrooms for decades.” Cowan argues
that the trial court was required to hold a Kelly hearing because he presented
new evidence—the three reports—reflecting “a sea change in the scientific
community’s view of toolmark analysis.”
We disagree. First, Leahy does not stand for the proposition for which
Cowan cites it. The Supreme Court stated in Leahy that, “[t]o hold that a
scientific technique could become immune from Kelly scrutiny merely by
reason of long-standing and persistent use by law enforcement outside the
laboratory or the courtroom, seems unjustified.” (Leahy, supra, 8 Cal.4th at
p. 606 [emphasis original].) Here, the scientific technique Cowan challenges
is not one that only has long-standing and persistent use by law enforcement
outside the courtroom—it has long-standing and persistent use inside the
courtroom. In any event, the Supreme Court has repeatedly found that the
Kelly rule does not apply to firearm and toolmark comparison evidence.
Indeed, the Supreme Court explicitly stated earlier this year that “ballistics
and tool mark comparisons [are] not subject to Kelly.” (Stayner, supra, 19
Cal.5th at p. 487, citing Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 470.)
We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that
Todd’s testimony was not subject to the Kelly rule.
C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Declining to Limit Todd’s
Expert Testimony
Cowan further argues that even if the Kelly rule does not apply to the
firearm and toolmark comparison technique Todd used in this case, the trial

32
court still erred by failing to limit Todd’s testimony and exclude her opinion
that the cartridge casings found at the scene of three of the shootings were
fired from Cowan’s firearm. According to Cowan, the trial court failed to
perform its gatekeeping responsibility under Evidence Code sections 801 and
802 when it allowed Todd’s testimony. Again, we disagree.
Evidence Code sections 801, subdivision (b), and 802 mandate that the
trial court act as a gatekeeper to exclude proposed “expert opinion testimony
that is (1) based on matter of a type on which an expert may not reasonably
rely, (2) based on reasons unsupported by the material on which the expert
relies, or (3) speculative.” (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern
California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 771–772 (Sargon); see also Evid. Code,
§§ 801, 802.) The trial court should “determine whether the matter relied on
can provide a reasonable basis for the opinion or whether that opinion is
based on a leap of logic or conjecture. The court does not resolve scientific
controversies. Rather, it conducts a ‘circumscribed inquiry’ to ‘determine
whether, as a matter of logic, the studies and other information cited by
experts adequately support the conclusion that the expert’s general theory or
technique is valid.’ ” (Sargon, at p. 772.) In short, the trial court’s
gatekeeping goal is “simply to exclude ‘clearly invalid and unreliable’ expert
opinion.” (Ibid.)
We review the trial court’s decision to admit expert testimony for abuse
of discretion. (Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 773; People v. McWhorter
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 362.) A trial court abuses its discretion when its
ruling “ is ‘so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree
with it.’ ” (Sargon, at p. 773, quoting People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th
367, 377.)

33
Cowan relies on Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th 747 and People v. Azcona
(2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 504 (Azcona) to support his assertion that the trial
court failed in its gatekeeper role and should have limited Todd’s testimony.
He first contends that Todd’s opinion that the cartridge casings were fired
from his gun constituted unreliable speculation in violation of Sargon
because it was based on a finding of “sufficient agreement” among the tool
marks she examined, a method Cowan claims is circular and subjective. (See
Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 770 [the matter an expert relies on “ ‘must
provide a reasonable basis for the particular opinion offered, and [] an expert
opinion based on speculation or conjecture is inadmissible’ ”].)
Todd’s opinions were not based on speculation or conjecture. They were
supported by “matter (including [her] special knowledge, skill, experience,
training, and education) perceived by or personally known to” her. (Evid.
Code, § 801, subd. (b).) Todd testified that she based her opinions on her own
personal training and continued education, certification, and experience, the
studies and testing she participated in, “[a]s well as the institutional
knowledge that has been accrued in the discipline throughout the field.” She
explained that her conclusion that the cartridge casings recovered from three
of the four shootings were fired from the same gun—Cowan’s Springfield XD-
40—was based on her analysis of the gun, test-fired bullets and casings, and
the seven recovered casings. She described the extensive process used to
analyze the casings, explaining how she used a comparison microscope to
identify unique characteristics on the casings, and thus determined there was
sufficient agreement such that she could conclude the casings were fired from
the same gun.
Todd acknowledged that her interpretation of the data was subjective,
but she clarified the objective aspect of the methodology: “The features that

34
we are looking at are objective. They belong to object, the bullet, the
cartridge case. [¶] . . . [¶] So if you can document what you are seeing, then
it belongs to the object. The fact that we have all of these pictures that
document the lines and curves and the different defects, those features are
objective. They belong to the object. So I am not just saying there is a bunch
of stuff there, without being able to show what I am looking at.” Further,
Todd presented to the jury photographs of the casings she compared, pointing
out the areas of agreement she relied upon in forming her opinion. There
was no “ ‘analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.’ ”
(Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 771.)
Azcona does not help Cowan either. The Azcona case involved a series
of shootings and related crimes committed over a one-month period. (Azcona,
supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at pp. 508–509.) The gun used was never located, but
cartridge casings were recovered from the scenes of two different shootings.
(Id. at pp. 518–519 (conc. opn. of Greenwood, P.J.).) The prosecution’s
firearms expert opined that the two cartridge casings were fired from the

same gun.5 (Azcona, at p. 510.) When asked about the degree of scientific
certainty in the expert’s determination that the two cartridge casings came
from the same gun during a pretrial hearing, the expert stated: “ ‘It would be
in the billions to be wrong on this. . . . It is so certain that I don’t think

5 The fact that there was no gun recovered from which bullets could be
test fired and compared to the cartridge casings recovered from the crime
scenes further distinguishes the method used in Azcona, supra, 58
Cal.App.5th at p. 510 [visually comparing markings on two casings with each
other], from the method used and approved in Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at
pp. 469–470 [comparing markings on a cast made from the inside of the
barrel of a recovered gun with two bullets recovered from the victim’s body],
and the method Todd used here [comparing markings on casings recovered
from three of the shootings with each other and with six test-fired casings
from Cowan’s gun].
35
there’s any reasonable chance that its wrong.’ ” (Id. at p. 519 (conc. opn. of
Greenwood, P.J.).) At trial, the expert testified that the two cartridge casings
came from the same gun “ ‘to the practical exclusion of all other guns.’ ”
(Azcona, at p. 514.) Because the expert’s opinion was presented as a scientific
certainty, the Court of Appeal thus concluded that it was a “leap too far from
what the underlying method allowed” and the trial court had abused its
discretion by failing to limit the expert’s opinion. (Ibid.)
We disagree with Cowan that this is “precisely what occurred here.” To
the contrary, Todd repeatedly stated that her evaluations and opinions were
subjective. She also conceded it was possible that another examiner might
choose different characteristics of the cartridge casings to examine and
conclude that a different gun had fired the casings—though this would be
“highly unexpected,” particularly since another examiner verified Todd’s
conclusion.
Unlike the expert in Azcona, Todd did not portray her opinion as
objective truth. She did not testify that the cartridge casings were fired from
the same gun to any degree of scientific certainty, nor did she testify that
Cowan’s gun fired the casings “ ‘to the practical exclusion of all other guns’ ”
or reach any other “purportedly infallible conclusion.” (Azcona, supra, 58
Cal.App.5th at p. 514.) Also unlike the expert in Azcona, Todd acknowledged
criticism of the firearm and toolmark comparison field and, importantly,
explained how many of those criticisms have since been addressed, including
through multiple studies that have been performed since the 2016 PCAST
report was issued. Todd explained that PCAST “kind of handed over the
evaluations of the feature-based discipline to NIST [the National Institute of
Standards and Technology] and asked them to do an annual report for each of
the disciplines [including toolmark comparison] until they reached

36
foundational validity.” Discussing recent error rates for firearm and
toolmark examiners when it came to false positives (i.e., an examiner
concluding that a cartridge casing came from a particular firearm when it did
not), Todd testified that “NIST came out with -- they reviewed 22 studies
recently, and at the last AFTE seminar, they came out with their preliminary
results. Of those 22 studies, there was a range of false positive between 0.11
and 1.5 percent.”
Cowan was then permitted to, and did, present his own expert witness
to testify regarding the reliability of Todd’s interpretation of the data.
Ultimately, the jury was presented with the parties’ competing views about
the validity of firearm and toolmark comparison evidence, and it was the
jury’s job to evaluate that evidence and its subjective nature. (See Cowan,
supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 471.) The court’s “gatekeeping role does not involve
choosing between competing expert opinions” or resolving scientific
controversies. (Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 772.)
We therefore conclude the trial court satisfied its gatekeeping duty and
did not err in admitting Todd’s firearm and toolmark comparison testimony.
D. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Responding to the Jury Question
Finally, Cowan contends the trial court violated his constitutional
rights when it responded to the jury’s question requesting an expansion of
the definition of “intent to kill” by referring the jury back to CALCRIM
Nos. 520, 521, and 600, as well as 200. He asserts that the court’s response
to the jury question constitutes reversible error as to counts 1, 4, and 6.
Cowan argues that because the court collectively referred the jury to these
instructions, the jury may have erroneously believed that attempted murder
and first degree murder could be based on a finding of implied malice, and
that first degree murder could be based on an intent to kill lawfully. In

37
addition, Cowan asserts that if this claim is forfeited, then he was denied his
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel when his counsel agreed
with the response given by the trial court.
As an initial matter, we agree with the People that Cowan forfeited his
claim of instructional error. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
where a defendant contends the trial court should have provided additional
or different instructions in response to the jury’s inquiry, “his counsel’s
acquiescence in the trial court’s response forfeits the claim of error on
appeal.” (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 877 (Rogers); see also People
v. Castaneda (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1292, 1352 (Castaneda) [defendant forfeited
argument on appeal regarding trial court’s purported instructional error “by
agreeing with the trial court concerning the appropriate response to the jury’s
question”].) This is precisely what happened here. The parties discussed a
proposed response to the jury note with the trial court, the court conferred
with counsel, and everyone agreed with the response given. We thus
conclude that defense counsel’s acquiescence forfeits the claim of error on
appeal. (Castaneda, at p. 1352; Rogers, at p. 877.)
We nevertheless consider the merits of Cowan’s claim, because he
argues in the alternative that his attorney provided ineffective assistance of
counsel in acquiescing to the trial court’s response to the jury question. As
we will explain, we conclude the court did not err in its response to the jury’s
question. We therefore do not reach Cowan’s alternative ineffective
assistance of counsel argument. (See People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 61,
fn. 22 (Cain) [“Because we find no error on the merits we need not
decide . . . whether nonopposition constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel.”]; People v. Mena (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 702, 708, fn. 7 [“Because we
conclude that the trial court’s instruction was not erroneous, and there is no

38
reasonable likelihood the jury was misled, we do not discuss the ineffective
assistance claim.”].)
Section 1138 governs the issue of jury questions that arise during
deliberations. It provides in pertinent part: “After the jury have retired for
deliberation, . . . if they desire to be informed on any point of law arising in
the case, they must require the officer to conduct them into court. Upon
being brought into court, the information required must be given in the
presence of, or after notice to, the prosecuting attorney, and the defendant or
his counsel, or after they have been called.” (§ 1138.) Section 1138 thus
imposes on the trial court a “duty to help the jury understand the legal
principles it is asked to apply.” (People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 97
(Beardslee).) But “[t]his does not mean the court must always elaborate on
the standard instructions.” (Ibid.) If the original instructions are “full and
complete,” the court has the discretion to determine what, if any, additional
explanations are appropriate to satisfy the jury’s request for information.
(Ibid.) We review the court’s decision whether to provide further explanation
to the jury for abuse of discretion. (People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983,
1032.)
Cowan argues the court here erred in responding to the jury’s request
because it failed to expand on or clarify the meaning of “intent to kill” and
thus “did not specifically respond to the source of the jury’s confusion.” We
disagree.
First, the Supreme Court has found that the term “intent to kill” is
“readily understandable.” (Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 37, fn. 13.) “Intent
to kill” is thus not a legal term of art with a technical meaning apart from the
common, everyday usage of the words. Cowan does not point us to any legal
authority suggesting otherwise.

39
Second, the trial court had the discretion to determine that the original
instructions as given were complete and decide against further defining the
term. (Beardslee, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 97; People v. Lua (2017) 10
Cal.App.5th 1004, 1017 (Lua).) Rather than expand upon the definition of
“intent to kill,” the court referred the jury back to CALCRIM Nos. 520, 521,
and 600—which Cowan does not dispute contain correct statements of law
regarding the elements of first and second degree murder as well as
attempted murder. The court further emphasized that any “[w]ords and
phrases not specifically defined in these instructions are to be applied using
their ordinary, everyday meanings.” (CALCRIM No. 200.) This, too, was a
correct statement of the applicable law and adequately advised the jury to
apply the ordinary meaning of the phrase “intent to kill.” (See Cain, supra,
10 Cal.4th at p. 37, fn. 13.)
We cannot say this is a situation where the court “figuratively thr[e]w
up its hands.” (See Beardslee, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 97.) The court instead
considered the jury’s question, conferred with counsel, and determined that
“the best way to aid the jury [wa]s by directing the jury to reread the
applicable jury instructions that ‘are themselves full and complete.’ ” (Lua,
supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1017.) The court was not required to define the
word “kill” for the jury or explain the ordinary meaning of the phrase “intent
to kill.” We therefore conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in
responding to the jury’s question.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

KELETY, J.

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