Filed 6/17/26 P. v. Corona CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B349596
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA134005)
v.
JULIO IVAN CORONA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ramiro P. Cisneros and David C. Brougham,
Judges. Affirmed.
Halpern & Halpern, H. Russell Halpern for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. Wise,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________
Julio Ivan Corona appeals from a judgment entered after
he pled guilty to several charges related to a firearm and cocaine
that police officers discovered during a search of his car. At the
preliminary hearing, the magistrate denied Corona’s motion to
suppress evidence of the firearm and cocaine, along with his
admissions to the officers that the firearm was his and that he
possessed the cocaine for sale. Corona renewed his motion to
suppress before the trial court, which likewise denied the motion.
Corona contends that the magistrate and trial court erred by
denying the motion because the officers unlawfully detained him
in violation of the Fourth Amendment and failed to deliver
Miranda warnings before subjecting him to custodial
interrogation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.1
We find no error. Applying the law independently to the
magistrate’s factual findings, we conclude that Corona was not
detained—and the officers therefore need not have acted on
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity—when he consented to
the search through which the officers discovered the firearm.
Corona does not dispute that after the officers discovered the
firearm, they had reasonable suspicion justifying his detention at
that time. Thus, we conclude that the officers did not violate
Corona’s Fourth Amendment rights. We further conclude that
the officers did not violate his Miranda rights because he was not
in custody when the officers briefly questioned him about the
firearm and cocaine. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
1 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).
2
BACKGROUND
Corona moved to suppress evidence of a firearm and
cocaine found in his car, along with related incriminating
statements. At the preliminary hearing, the magistrate denied
the motion.
The Los Angeles County District Attorney charged Corona
with possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) while armed
with a loaded, operable firearm (count 1, Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11370.1, subd. (a)); carrying a concealed firearm within a
vehicle (count 2, Pen. Code, § 25400, subd. (a)(1)); and
transportation of a controlled substance (cocaine) for sale
(count 3, Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)).
Corona moved under Penal Code section 1538.5 to suppress
evidence of the firearm and cocaine, along with his statements to
police officers that the firearm was his and that he possessed the
cocaine for sale. The magistrate heard the motion at the
preliminary hearing.
West Covina Police Officer Jeffrey Honeycutt testified to
the following events on the date of the offenses: He and his
trainee, Officer Ortiz, patrolled an area of West Covina that was
known for a high level of gang activity, firearms, and narcotics.
He had received information from resources on the street that
people were dealing narcotics in the area. He noticed an occupied
car (Corona’s) parked in a non-designated parking area to the
rear of an open bar.
On Officer Honeycutt’s instructions, Officer Ortiz passed
Corona’s parked car, then reversed and parked to the car’s rear
right. The officers’ patrol vehicle did not block Corona’s car. The
patrol vehicle’s lights were off.
3
Officer Ortiz approached Corona’s car from the driver’s side
while Officer Honeycutt approached from the passenger’s side.
Corona and a passenger (Christian Ohlson) were inside. The
officers did not draw their weapons.
Officer Ortiz asked Corona and Ohlson what they were
doing. They said they were just talking. Officer Ortiz asked to
see their IDs. Corona showed his ID.
Officer Ortiz asked Corona and Ohlson to exit the car, and
they did. Officer Ortiz asked them for their consent to undergo
pat-down searches, and they consented. He conducted pat-down
searches and found no contraband.
Officer Ortiz asked Corona and Ohlson to sit on the ground,
and they did. He asked Corona for permission to search Corona’s
car, and Corona consented. After searching the car, Officer Ortiz
directed Officer Honeycutt’s attention to the area between the
driver’s seat and the center console, where Officer Honeycutt saw
a firearm.
Officer Ortiz retrieved the firearm (which was loaded) and
asked Corona what it was. Corona said that it was his gun. In
response to questions from Officer Honeycutt, Corona said that
he bought the firearm on the street one or two weeks earlier for
protection.
Officer Ortiz asked Corona if the car contained any other
illegal material, and Corona responded that a satchel behind the
driver’s seat contained cocaine. Officer Ortiz retrieved a bag
containing 12 grams of cocaine (along with a scale) from the
satchel and asked Corona why he had it. Corona responded that
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he sold it. Officer Ortiz arrested Corona and delivered Miranda
warnings, which the officers had not previously delivered.2
Corona testified that when Officer Ortiz first asked to see
his ID, the officer unsuccessfully attempted to drag Corona out of
his car while he had his seat belt on, after which Corona
unfastened his seatbelt, exited the car, and showed his ID. After
the officer searched him and had him sit on the ground, the
officer searched his car without asking for his consent. He told
the officers that he did not consent.
In contrast, Ohlson testified that the officers asked him and
Corona to exit the car and asked for Corona’s consent to search it.
He testified that Corona refused his consent, but that Officer
Ortiz nevertheless searched the car.
The magistrate denied Corona’s suppression motion and
held him to answer on all charges. The magistrate discredited
Corona’s testimony that he did not consent to the search of his
car, observing that his testimony was inconsistent with Ohlson’s
regarding whether the officers asked them to exit the car and
asked for permission to search it. Further observing that the
officers did not block Corona’s car or activate their patrol
vehicle’s lights, the magistrate found that the officers’ encounter
with Corona was consensual until they found the firearm and
2 Corona asserts that after his arrest, he was taken to a
sheriff’s station and interrogated by sheriff’s deputies. The
record contains no such evidence. Relatedly, Corona asserts that
a “Deputy Tennessen” questioned a “Defendant Higgins” about
who owned “closed bags” in a car. The record contains no
reference to those individuals or to bags in Corona’s car other
than the single bag of cocaine.
Corona also references a police report. The record does not
contain any police report.
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cocaine inside the car, at which point the consensual encounter
became a detention. The magistrate concluded that the detention
was supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
because the officers had discovered the firearm and cocaine. The
magistrate did not expressly address Corona’s Miranda claim but
impliedly found that no Miranda warnings were required because
Corona did not undergo custodial interrogation.
A. The trial court denied Corona’s renewed motion to
suppress. Corona pled guilty to all counts and was
placed on two years’ probation.
Before the trial court, Corona renewed his motion to
suppress, relying solely on the preliminary hearing transcript.
(See Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd. (i).) The trial court denied the
motion.
Corona pled guilty to all counts. The trial court suspended
imposition of sentence and placed appellant on formal probation
for two years with conditions.
Corona filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
A. Standards of review
“Where, as here, a suppression motion is made before a
magistrate in conjunction with a preliminary hearing and no new
evidence is presented in superior court, we are ‘concerned solely
with the findings of the [magistrate].’ ” (People v. Tacardon
(2022) 14 Cal.5th 235, 242 (Tacardon).) “We defer to the
magistrate’s express and implied findings of fact if supported by
substantial evidence.” (Ibid.) “We independently assess whether
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the challenged search or seizure violates the Fourth Amendment,
applying federal constitutional standards.” (Ibid.)
We apply a similar standard of review to the magistrate’s
implied rejection of Corona’s Miranda claim. “ ‘When reviewing a
trial court’s determination that a defendant did not undergo
custodial interrogation,’ an appellate court accepts the trial
court’s findings of historical fact if supported by substantial
evidence, but independently determines ‘whether, given those
circumstances,’ the interrogation [if any] was custodial.” (People
v. Kopatz (2015) 61 Cal.4th 62, 80.)
B. No Fourth Amendment violation occurred.
“Fourth Amendment jurisprudence draws [a] line between
mere consensual contact, which requires no justification, and a
detention, which requires articulation of a reasonable suspicion
that a crime may be afoot.” (Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp.
249-250.) “A detention occurs, not the moment a person knows
an officer would like to interact, but when a person would
reasonably believe he or she ‘ “ ‘was not free to leave’ ” or
“ ‘otherwise terminate the encounter,’ ” ’ and submits to the
officer’s show of authority.” (Id. at p. 250.) In determining
whether a detention occurred, “[r]elevant circumstances may
include: the presence of multiple officers, an officer’s display of a
weapon, the use of siren or overhead emergency lights, physically
touching the person, the use of a patrol car to block movement, or
the use of language or of a tone of voice indicating that
compliance with the officer’s request is compelled.” (Id. at pp.
241-242.) “ ‘The officer’s state of mind is not relevant . . . except
insofar as his overt actions would communicate that state of
mind.’ ” (Id. at p. 242.)
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“ ‘[T]he “free to walk away” test . . . must be read in
conjunction with the [United States Supreme] Court’s frequent
admonitions that “a seizure does not occur simply because a
police officer approaches an individual and asks a few
questions.” ’ ” (Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 252.)
“[I]ndividuals frequently have alternatives for asserting their
Fourth Amendment rights, such as refusing to answer the
officer’s questions or otherwise declining to act in the manner the
officer has requested. [Citation.] And while many law-abiding
citizens will choose to cooperate with the police ‘because [they]
know that their participation enhances their own safety and the
safety of those around them,’ that fact alone does not negate the
consensual nature of their response.” (Id. at p. 253.)
Here, Corona implies that the officers detained him when
they approached his parked car with the intent to investigate
potential criminal activity. We disagree. An officer’s subjective
intent is irrelevant to the distinction between a consensual
encounter and a detention. (See Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 242.) Further, “merely walking up to someone in a parked car
is not a detention.” (Id. at p. 241.) In approaching Corona’s
parked car, the officers did not block the car, activate their patrol
vehicle’s lights, or draw their weapons. (See id. at p. 247
[defendant was not detained when deputy parked behind
defendant’s car, shined spotlight on it, and approached on foot
but did not block the car, activate emergency lights or siren, or
draw weapon].)
Corona argues that the officers detained him when they
asked him to exit the car and conducted a pat-down search. He
does not dispute that he consented to the pat-down search and to
the subsequent search of his car. However, he argues that his
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consent to the latter search was invalid because it was the
product of his unlawful detention. Again, we disagree.
U.S. v. Drayton (2002) 536 U.S. 194 (Drayton) is
instructive. The California Supreme Court has described
Drayton’s relevant holding as follows: “[P]lain-clothes officers
boarded a Greyhound bus at a scheduled stop after securing the
driver’s permission to conduct a routine drug and weapons
interdiction effort. Officer Lang displayed his badge and spoke to
each passenger, positioning himself so that he did not block the
aisle. [Citation.] Drayton and his companion Brown were seated
together. The officer asked if they were traveling with luggage,
and the pair pointed to a bag in the overhead rack. [Citation.]
Lang asked, ‘ “Do you mind if I check [the bag]?” ’ and Brown
said, ‘ “Go ahead.” ’ [Citation.] The check revealed no
contraband. Brown then consented to a pat-down search of his
person, which resulted in the discovery of contraband. Brown
was arrested. [Citation.] Lang then asked Drayton, ‘ “Mind if I
check you?” ’ [Citation.] Drayton lifted his hands and a pat-down
revealed objects similar to drug packaging. . . . The court held
Drayton had not been detained before the pat-down revealed
what appeared to be drug packaging. [Citation.] It concluded
that ‘ample’ evidence pointed to a consensual encounter.”
(Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 252-253; see also id. at p. 253
[our state’s courts are bound by the United States Supreme
Court’s application of the free-to-leave standard for
distinguishing consensual encounters from detentions].)
In Drayton, the officers’ encounter with the defendant
remained consensual when the officers consensually searched the
bag that the defendant and his companion were traveling with,
conducted a consensual pat-down search of the companion,
9
arrested the companion after the latter search uncovered
contraband, and asked for the defendant’s consent to search his
person too. (Drayton, supra, 536 U.S. at pp. 197-199, 203-206.)
Based on Drayton, we similarly conclude that the officers’
encounter with Corona remained consensual when the officers
conducted consensual pat-down searches of Corona and his
companion (which uncovered no contraband and led to no arrest)
and asked for Corona’s consent to search his car.3
In other words, we conclude that Corona was not detained
when he consented to the search of his car. Thus, we reject his
argument that his consent was the product of an unlawful
detention. Corona does not argue that his consent was invalid for
any other reason.
Nor does Corona argue that the officers’ actions after they
searched the car and thereby discovered the firearm violated the
Fourth Amendment. He does not dispute that the discovery of
the firearm supported a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
and justified his detention at that time. (Cf. People v. Chamagua
(2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 925, 930 [“Once [defendant] admitted he
possessed illegal contraband, [the officer] had reasonable
suspicion to detain . . . him”].) We need not address whether
reasonable suspicion existed earlier.
In short, we conclude that the officers did not violate
Corona’s Fourth Amendment rights.
3 In passing, Corona mentions that the officers asked to see
his ID. That fact is immaterial in light of our foregoing analysis.
“[A]n individual’s voluntary cooperation with an officer’s request
for identification does not convert the request into a detention
. . . as long as the encounter is consensual under the totality of
the circumstances.” (People v. Leath (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 344,
353.)
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C. No Miranda violation occurred.
“Before they begin custodial interrogation of a suspect, the
police have an obligation to deliver Miranda warnings.” (People
v. Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 463, 491 (Caro).) Custody “refers to
circumstances ‘that are thought generally to present a serious
danger of coercion.’ ” (Ibid.) “Such a danger of coercion is usually
present where there has been a ‘ “ ‘formal arrest or restraint on
freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal
arrest.” ’ ” (Ibid.; see also People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th
1146, 1167 (Linton) [“Whether a person is in custody is an
objective test; the pertinent question being whether the person
was formally arrested or subject to a restraint on freedom of
movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest”].)
“The [initial] key question is whether, under all of the
objective circumstances, a reasonable person in the suspect’s
position would have felt free to terminate the interrogation.”
(Caro, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 491.) “But even if a person’s freedom
of movement has been curtailed, an ‘additional question’ arises:
‘whether the relevant environment presents the same inherently
coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at
issue in Miranda.’ ” (Ibid.; see also Howes v. Fields (2012) 565
U.S. 499, 509 [“Not all restraints on freedom of movement
amount to custody for purposes of Miranda. . . . ‘[T]he freedom-of-
movement test identifies only a necessary and not a sufficient
condition for Miranda custody’ ”].) “All objective circumstances of
the interrogation are relevant to this inquiry, including the site of
the interrogation, the length and form of questioning, and
whether the officers have conveyed to the subject that their
investigation has focused on him or her.” (Caro, at pp. 491-492.)
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Here, Corona misrepresents the record by asserting that
the officers questioned him about the firearm and cocaine while
he sat “in the backseat of a police vehicle.” In fact, he and Officer
Honeycutt both testified, without contradiction, that he sat on
the ground in the area where he parked his car, which was near
an open bar. Corona does not argue that the environment near
the bar “ ‘present[ed] the same inherently coercive pressures as
the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.’ ”
(Caro, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 491.)
Nor does Corona attempt to explain how the circumstances
demonstrated that—as he concedes a finding of custody
requires—a reasonable person in his position would have
perceived that his “freedom of action [wa]s curtailed to a ‘degree
associated with formal arrest.’ ” (Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468
U.S. 420, 440, italics added; see also Caro, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p.
491; Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1167.) Before Corona
answered the officers’ questions, the officers did not formally
arrest him, handcuff him, order him into a police vehicle, or
otherwise restrain his movement in a manner typically
associated with formal arrest.
We conclude that Corona was not in custody. Thus, even
assuming, arguendo, that the officers’ questioning constituted
interrogation, no Miranda violation occurred. (People v. Ochoa
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 401 [“ ‘Absent “custodial interrogation,”
Miranda simply does not come into play”]; see also ibid. [“We
conclude that defendant was not in custody, and therefore need
not and do not consider whether he was under interrogation”].)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
M. KIM, J.
We concur:
BENDIX, Acting P. J.
WEINGART, J.
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