Filed 11/9/26 P. v. Corona-Aguirre CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H053859
(Monterey County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 25CR002829)
v.
NEFTALI CORONA-AGUIRRE,
Defendant and Appellant.
After Neftali Corona-Aguirre pleaded no contest to operating a chop shop, the trial
court awarded $47,902.41 in restitution to the owner of a car that Corona-Aguirre and his
codefendants disassembled. Corona-Aguirre contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in using repair cost rather than replacement cost, which Corona-Aguirre
contends was at most slightly more than $10,000, to calculate restitution. We disagree.
The trial court had reasonable grounds for using repair cost to calculate restitution.
Penal Code section 1202.4 requires courts to award crime victims “full restitution” for
economic loss. (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f).) (Subsequent undesignated statutory
references are to the Penal Code.) The restitution that Corona-Aguirre proposed using
replacement cost did not provide full restitution because it failed to account for the
customized features that the victim had added to his car or for expenses associated with
purchasing a replacement car. As a consequence, the trial court reasonably decided to
calculate restitution in this case using repair rather than replacement cost.
Accordingly, the restitution order is affirmed.
I. BACKGROUND
We previously granted judicial notice of the record in Corona-Aguirre’s earlier
appeal No. H053716. Because Corona-Aguirre pleaded guilty, the facts below are taken
in part from the probation report in that record.
R.C. is a construction worker. In 2016, he purchased his first car: a 2008 Infiniti
G35. The car had “a lot of sentimental value” for R.C., and he added customized features
such as rims, carbon-fiber parts, and red interior seats. In April 2025 R.C.’s car was
stolen, and police found Corona-Aguirre and four others stripping the car and a second
vehicle. As pictures showed, the doors, the bumper, and most of the interior of R.C.’s car
were removed.
Corona-Aguirre and his companions were arrested and shortly thereafter charged
with operating a chop shop (Veh. Code, § 10801; count 1), conspiracy to commit a crime
(§ 182, subd. (a)(1); count 2), unlawful taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851,
subd. (a); count 3), and two counts of receiving stolen property (§ 496d, subd. 9a; counts
4-5). Corona-Aguirre pleaded no contest to the chop shop charge, and in September
2025, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence on that charge, placed
Corona-Aguirre on probation for two years, and dismissed the remaining charges.
R.C. requested restitution in the amount of $49,902.41, consisting of $45,421.38 to
repair his car, $643.58 for parts already purchased for the car, $1,837.45 in towing-related
expenses, and $2,000 in emotional damages. In support of this request, R.C. submitted a
letter and a victim impact statement with documentation for expenses incurred. In the
letter, R.C. explained that an Infiniti was his dream car growing up, and he worked
extremely hard to pay off the one he purchased. Over time, R.C. “added [his] own
personal touch to the car and made it very unique.” In support of the amount of
restitution sought, R.C. submitted a preliminary estimate from a collision center for
repairing the car: $45,421.38. R.C. also submitted invoices for a battery, a fender, tire
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covers, floor mats, molding, and other equipment that he had purchased shortly after his
car was chopped up (totaling $643.58) as well as towing-related invoices (totaling
$1,837.45). The parties stipulated that R.C. had bought rims, carbon fiber parts, and red
interior seats for his car.
While Corona-Aguirre did not contest the equipment and towing expenses asserted
by R.C., he disputed the emotional damages and the rest of the restitution calculation.
Corona-Aguirre argued that the restitution award should be calculated primarily using the
cost to replace R.C.’s car and capped at $10,371, the high end of the Kelly Blue Book
value for a used 2008 Infiniti GTI. Specifically, Corona-Aguirre proposed awarding
$12,852.03: the $10,371 replacement cost plus the $2,481.03 in uncontested equipment
and towing expenses. Corona-Aguirre did not include in his restitution calculation
anything for the customized features that R.C. had added or expenses such as license fees
and taxes related to purchasing a replacement car.
Although the trial court denied R.C.’s emotional damages, it otherwise awarded
the restitution that R.C. requested ($47,902.41). The court acknowledged that to it
initially the amount sought seemed excessive. However, it observed that in People v.
Stanley (2012) 54 Cal.4th 734 (Stanley), the Supreme Court approved a restitution award
that was three times the value of the car at issue. The court observed as well that, when
some people put a lot of time and energy into a car, it becomes more than a car. The
court also found, based on R.C.’s representations, that “he wants his car fixed.” As a
consequence, the court decided to calculate restitution based on the cost of repair and
made a restitution award of $47,902.41, which was memorialized in a minute order.
Corona-Aguirre filed a timely notice of appeal from the order.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Corona-Aguirre does not dispute that the statutory requirements for
awarding restitution based on the cost of repair were satisfied or that the amount
awarded—$47,902.41—was supported by substantial evidence. Instead, Corona-Aguirre
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contends that the trial court abused its discretion by calculating the amount of restitution
using cost to repair R.C.’s car rather than replacement cost, which would have yielded a
much smaller award of $12,852.03. As explained below, because this amount would not
have provided full restitution, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in using cost of repair to calculate the amount of restitution.
In 1982, California voters passed Proposition 8, which is also known as the
“Victims’ Bill of Rights.” (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 652 (Giordano).)
Proposition 8 amended the California Constitution to give “all persons who suffer losses
as a result of criminal activity” the right to “restitution from the persons convicted of the
crimes.” (Cal Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(A).) Section 1202.4 implements this
right. (See Giordano, at pp. 652-653 [detailing history of implementing legislation].) As
a general rule, where a crime victim has suffered economic loss, section 1202.4 requires
trial courts to order “full restitution.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f).) Indeed, the section states
that, “[t]o the extent possible” restitution shall be in “a dollar amount that is sufficient to
fully reimburse the victim” for economic loss and specifies 12 categories of such loss.
(Id., subd. (f)(3).)
Section 1202.4’s first category of economic loss is “the value of stolen or damaged
property.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(A).) Section 1202.4 specifies two measures for
calculating the value of such property: “[1] the replacement cost of like property, or
[2] the actual cost of repairing the property when repair is possible.” (Ibid.) In Stanley,
supra, 54 Cal.4th 734, the Supreme Court observed that “[t]he statute does not say that
the restitution awarded must be the lesser of the two.” (Id. at p. 737.) Stanley therefore
ruled that “the choice whether to award the property’s replacement cost or cost of repair
‘when repair is possible’ is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” (Ibid.; see also
Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 663-664 [“a trial court … must employ a method that
is rationally designed to determine the surviving victim’s economic loss”].)
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The trial court had good reason for using cost of repair rather than replacement
cost to calculate the value of R.C.’s car. As noted above, section 1202.4 requires courts
to order “full restitution” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)) and, “[t]o the extent possible,” to award an
amount sufficient to “fully reimburse” victims for their loss (id., subd. (f)(3)). The cost-
of-repair measure used by the trial court ensured full restitution by restoring R.C.’s car to
the condition that it was in before Corona-Aguirre and his companions stripped it apart.
By focusing on the price of a car of the same make and year as R.C.’s, Corona-Aguirre
sought to provide R.C. with a car “similar to the one lost.” However, if R.C. were to
receive only the funds needed to purchase a replacement car, he would be forced to find
such a replacement at his own time and expense (In re Dina V. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th
486, 489) and to “pay taxes and license fees” out of his own pocket (In re Alexander A.
(2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 847, 858 (Alexander A.)). Moreover, R.C. had “added [his] own
personal touch to the car and made it very unique” by adding customized rims, carbon
fiber parts, and red interior seats. The restitution award proposed by Corona-Aguirre did
not account for either these customized features or the expenses associated with obtaining
a replacement car. Consequently, in this case it was reasonable to conclude that
“[l]imiting the amount of restitution to the replacement cost would not make the victim
whole” and that using cost of repair to calculate restitution would better ensure full
restitution. (Dina V., at p. 489, fn. omitted; see also Stanley, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 738
[agreeing with Dina V.’s conclusion].)
Corona-Aguirre asserts that the parties stipulated that the price that R.C. paid for
his car in 2016, approximately $13,000, included the rims, carbon-fiber parts, and red
interior seats. We disagree. The parties stipulated that “the victim purchased the car in
2016 for approximately $13,000” and “he bought some rims and some carbon fiber parts
and the red interior seats.” We understand this stipulation to mean that R.C. purchased
his car for $13,000 and then, separately, bought the rims, carbon-fiber parts, and red
interior seats. Corona-Aguirre further asserts that if the features that R.C. added bear on
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value, “the proper response was an adjusted fair market value.” That may be true.
However, once the prosecutor made a prima facie showing of the victim’s loss, the
burden shifted to the defendant (People v. Grandpierre (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 111, 115;
People v. Chappelone (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1172 (Chappelone)), and
Corona-Aguirre presented no evidence concerning the value of the customized features
that R.C. added to his car and, thus, failed to show that the award he proposed provided
full restitution.
Corona-Aguirre contends that the trial court nonetheless abused its discretion by
using cost of repair to calculate restitution because doing so gave R.C. a “windfall.” As
several decisions recognize, avoiding windfalls is a significant concern. (See, e.g.,
People v. Sharpe (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 741, 747; Chappelone, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1172.) Victims should not be awarded restitution using cost of repair and allowed to
use some of the resulting award to purchase a replacement and pocket the rest. However,
that is unlikely to happen here. R.C. told the trial court that his car had “a lot of
sentimental value” to him and, indeed, began purchasing equipment for restoring his car
months before Corona-Aguirre pleaded no contest to the chop shop charge and there was
any assurance that restitution would be awarded. Accordingly, the trial court had ample
grounds for finding that R.C. “wants his car fixed” and thus would have used an award
based on the cost of repair to repair his car.
Corona-Aguirre also contends that the use of repair cost created a windfall because
the contemplated repairs to R.C.’s car would give R.C. “the equivalent of a brand-new
luxury vehicle” or at least something “far better” than the 20-year-old car that he had.
However, Corona-Aguirre did not argue in the trial court that the contemplated repairs
would make R.C.’s car the equivalent of brand new. He argued only that R.C. would
obtain a windfall because the proposed repairs include new parts, fixtures, and fittings,
which “was not the apparent condition of his car at the time of the theft.” Moreover,
Corona-Aguirre cited no evidence in support of this argument, and in light of the
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extensive damage to R.C.’s car when it was stripped, the trial court reasonably could have
found that on balance, even repaired with new parts, the car would be in no better shape
than before it was stolen.
Noting the trial court’s recognition that some car owners have an emotional
attachment to their cars, Corona-Aguirre asserts as well that the trial court based its
restitution calculation on an impermissible factor. We are not persuaded. The trial court
expressly declined to award R.C. emotional damages, and R.C.’s emotional attachment to
his car was properly considered in determining whether he would use an award based on
the cost of repair to repair his car.
Corona-Aguirre also argues that the trial court impermissibly used repair cost to
calculate the restitution award because the resulting amount exceeded the value of R.C.’s
car by “nearly fivefold.” However, in Stanley the Supreme Court expressly rejected the
notion that restitution for property damage must be calculated using the measure yielding
the smallest amount. (See Stanley, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 737 [“The statute does not say
that the restitution awarded must be the lesser of the two.”].) Moreover, Corona-Aguirre
fails to cite a single case holding that repair cost may not be used to calculate restitution
because the resulting amount is too much greater than the amount calculated using
replacement cost. To the contrary, one case cited by Corona-Aguirre affirmed a
restitution award for a damaged car calculated using repair cost even though the resulting
amount was as much as 4.5 times higher than replacement cost of the car. (Alexander A.,
supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 851 [restitution of $8,219.18 awarded based on cost to repair
car even though a replacement car might have cost as little as $1,795]; id. at p. 860
[affirming restitution order].) And in Stanley the Supreme Court upheld a restitution
award of $2,812.94 for damages to a pickup truck calculated using repair cost even
though the truck had been purchased the year before for $950—that is, nearly three times
higher than the amount calculated using replacement cost. (Stanley, at pp. 738-739.)
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Corona-Aguirre asserts that the ratio here between the amount of restitution
calculated using repair cost and the amount using replacement cost “dwarfs” the ratio in
Stanley. In fact, the restitution award here was approximately “four and a half times” the
replacement cost, which is not much greater than the nearly three times replacement cost
approved in Stanley (and, arguably, the same as the ratio in Alexander A.).
Corona-Aguirre also tries to distinguish Stanley on the ground that the case involved a
“vintage vehicle,” while there is nothing “rare or “unique” about R.C.’s car. In fact,
Stanley noted that the victim owned a “1975 Dodge Adventurer pickup” truck. (Stanley,
supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 736, 738-739.) Other than observing that the pickup truck was in
“ ‘excellent’ condition” when purchased (id. at p. 739), there is no suggestion in Stanley
that the vehicle in Stanley was “vintage,” “rare,” or “unique.” Indeed, those words are
not even used in the opinion.
Finally, Corona-Aguirre objects that the cost of repairing R.C.’s car exceeded its
value by $38,000, apparently on the ground that this difference is simply too great.
However, here again, Corona-Aguirre fails to cite any decision holding a restitution
award calculated using one measure improper because it is too much larger than the
amount that might have been awarded using a different measure. Corona-Aguirre also
does not argue that an award of this size violates the excessive fines clauses in either the
California or the United States Constitution. And he fails to reconcile his objection with
the text of section 1202.4, which expressly instructs trial courts to “order full restitution”
and, “[t]o the extent possible,” to award an amount “sufficient to fully reimburse the
victim.” (§ 1202.4, subds. (f), (f)(3).)
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by using
repair cost to calculate restitution.
III. DISPOSITION
The order of September 24, 2025 requiring restitution in the amount of $47,902.41
is affirmed.
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______________________________________
BROMBERG, J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________________
LIE, ACTING P. J.
____________________________________
WILSON, J.
The People v. Corona-Aguirre
H053859