Filed 6/24/26 P. v. Corirossi CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085836
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN462148)
ADRIAN CORIROSSI,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Robert J. Kearney, Judge. Affirmed.
Paul R. Kraus, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney
General, Christopher P. Beesley and Namita Patel, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Adrian Corirossi pled guilty to felony possession of methamphetamine
with prior drug convictions (Health & Saf. Code, § 11395, subds. (b)(1), (c))
and was sentenced to two years of formal probation. He challenges
five probation conditions as unconstitutional because the conditions as
written (1) impermissibly delegate judicial authority to the probation officer
and are also (2) overbroad and (3) vague. We disagree.
First, on the particular circumstances of this case the “if directed”
language of each condition did not improperly delegate the court’s authority
to impose the conditions of probation. Second, the conditions are narrowly
tailored to a rehabilitative purpose and do not unduly restrict Corirossi’s
liberty interests. Finally, the conditions are sufficiently precise to provide
Corirossi adequate notice of what is required of him. We thus conclude the
conditions are constitutionally valid and affirm.
I.
After a police search of Corirossi and his belongings revealed
methamphetamine, hypodermic needles, and a stun gun, he was charged
with, among other misdemeanor counts, felony possession of
methamphetamine with prior drug convictions. Corirossi entered into a plea
agreement and pled guilty to the felony count.
At sentencing, the court granted two years of formal probation and
imposed terms and conditions, which Corirossi accepted. The court’s final
probation order included the following probation conditions at issue in this
appeal:
7. TREATMENT, THERAPY, COUNSELING: [¶] . . .[¶]
d. Attend and successfully complete Individual-IF, Group-
IF, and cognitive behavior-IF counseling program[s]
approved by the [probation officer] if directed by the
[probation officer].
8. ALCOHOL CONDITIONS: [¶] . . . [¶]
c. Attend ‘Self-Help’ meetings if directed by the [probation
officer]. [¶] . . . [¶]
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9. DRUG CONDITIONS:
a. Complete a program of residential treatment and
aftercare if directed by the probation officer. [¶] . . . [¶]
14. FURTHER CONDITIONS: [¶] . . . [¶]
b. Participate in a substance use level of care assessment
within 7 business days if directed by [the probation officer].
c. Enroll in & adhere to substance use treatment &
recovery services, as clinically indicated if directed by [the
probation officer].
II.
On appeal, Corirossi challenges these five probation conditions as
unconstitutional because, as written, they (1) impermissibly delegate judicial
authority to the probation officer and are (2) overbroad and (3) vague. We are
not persuaded.
Under Penal Code section 1203.1, subdivision (j), a trial court is
granted broad discretion to impose reasonable conditions of probation “as it
may determine are fitting and proper” including “specifically for the
reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer.” If a probation condition
protects public safety and serves to rehabilitate, it “may impinge upon a
constitutional right otherwise enjoyed by the probationer, who is ‘not entitled
to the same degree of constitutional protection as other citizens.’” (People v.
Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615, 624.) And because “[t]he trial court is
poorly equipped to micromanage selection of a [particular] program” (People
v. Penoli (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298, 308), it may properly exercise its
discretion to determine a general type of programming while leaving it to the
probation officer to specify the details after further examination and
assessment. (See People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1358-1359
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[“court may leave to the discretion of the probation officer the specification of
the many details that invariably are necessary to implement the terms of
probation” as long as the order is not “entirely open-ended”].)
Generally, challenges to probation conditions must be raised in the trial
court, or they are forfeited. (People v. Brand (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 861, 867.)
Objections based on the suitability of particular treatment modes for the facts
of the particular case allow the court to provide any necessary fine tuning.
Constitutional claims raising pure questions of law, however, are not
forfeited by counsel’s failure to object. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875,
887-889 [preservation by objection not necessary when appellant raises facial
challenge to constitutionality of probation conditions].) Because Corirossi
makes facial challenges to the conditions’ constitutionality, he did not forfeit
these limited issues on appeal. (See Brand, at pp. 867-868.)
We review conditions challenged on constitutional grounds de novo.
(Brand, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 867.)
A.
Corirossi argues the probation conditions are unconstitutional because
they improperly delegate the court’s discretionary power to decide the
conditions. Treating the conditions as a group, he asserts none of the
conditions imposes a condition because the “if directed” language of each one
“comprehensively delegate[s]” the decision whether to impose the condition to
the probation officer. He relies specifically on People v. Smith (2022)
79 Cal.App.5th 897 and United States v. Esparza (9th Cir. 2009) 552 F.3d
1088 (per curiam).
In Smith, the trial court imposed a condition that the defendant
“‘participate in any treatment/therapy/counseling program, including
residential, as directed by the probation officer.’” (Smith, 79 Cal.App.5th at
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p. 901.) The appellate court agreed with the defendant that the condition
violated separation of powers because it “delegate[d] to the probation officer
the discretion to decide whether [the defendant] must attend a residential
program, as opposed to an outpatient program.” (Id. at p. 903.) In support,
Smith recognized that “the parties negotiated a disposition that would allow
[the defendant] to remain out of custody in part because she had a young
daughter for whom she cared at home.” (Ibid.) Though the trial court had
acknowledged the defendant needed some form of treatment for substance
abuse, Smith noted the trial court did not require the defendant attend a
residential treatment program. (Ibid.) “Nor did the probation report specify
residential treatment.” (Ibid.) Smith reasoned, “[g]iven the significant
liberty interests at stake, a court—not a probation officer—must make the
decision to require a defendant to attend residential treatment.” (Ibid.)
Esparza considered the following probation condition: “The defendant
shall participate in a psychological/ psychiatric counseling and/or a sex
offender treatment program, which may include inpatient treatment, as
approved and directed by the Probation Officer.” (Esparza, 552 F.3d at
p. 1089, italics added.) Like Smith, Esparza recognized a court must decide
whether a defendant must abide by a condition and how the defendant will be
subjected to it; whereas the probation officer may determine the details of
where and when the condition will be satisfied. (Esparza, at p. 1091.)
Because the condition used the term “may,” Esparza found the decision
whether the defendant would receive inpatient treatment had been
improperly delegated. (Ibid.)
Both Smith and Esparza address facial challenges to a very specific
probation condition that delegates to the probation officer the decision
whether the defendant will be required to complete a residential treatment
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program, and neither provides compelling authority for invalidating the
residential treatment condition or the other four conditions that were
ultimately included in this case. Here, it would appear that the probation
department initially recommended residential treatment as a condition of
probation. It was only in response to a request by defense counsel at the
hearing that the judge agreed to modify the condition so that a residential
treatment program would only be required if directed by the probation officer.
Corirossi cannot fairly complain about the delegation of discretion to the
probation officer that he specifically requested. Smith further appears to
have engaged in a fact-specific inquiry, suggesting that the court may have
treated the claim as an as-applied challenge. Yet Corirossi does not make
such a challenge. We thus find Smith and Esparza do not assist Corirossi.
B.
Corirossi claims the conditions are constitutionally overbroad because
they allow the probation officer to order “any type of assessment, treatment,
therapy, or counseling” beyond that necessary to effectuate the conditions’
purposes, in violation of his protected liberty interests. We disagree with
Corirossi’s characterization of the scope of the conditions.
In support of his position, Corirossi relies on O’Neil. There, the
appellate court determined a probation condition prohibiting the defendant
from associating socially or being present “‘with any person, as designed by
your probation officer,’” was facially overbroad and permitted an
unconstitutional infringement on the defendant’s right of association.
(O’Neil, 165 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1354, 1357-1359.) Two aspects of the
condition rendered it unsound: (1) it did not require the defendant to know
the person had been designated off-limits by probation, and (2) there were no
limits on the persons with whom probation could prohibit the defendant from
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associating. (Id. at p. 1357.) As a result, the condition would allow the
probation officer “to banish [the] defendant by forbidding contact with his
family and close friends, even though such a prohibition may have no
relationship to the state’s interest in reforming and rehabilitating [the]
defendant.” (Id. at p. 1358.) O’Neil further reasoned, “the [trial] court’s order
cannot be entirely open-ended. It is for the court to determine the . . . class of
people with whom the defendant is directed to have no association.” (Id. at
p. 1359.)
O’Neil is easily distinguishable, as none of the five conditions before us
can be described as “entirely open-ended” and unconnected to a rehabilitative
purpose. (O’Neil, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1358.) Far from ordering “any type”
of assessment, treatment, therapy, or counseling, as Corirossi asserts, the
conditions specify the kinds of treatment ordered as individual, group, or
cognitive behavioral therapy; self-help meetings for alcohol issues; temporary
residential drug treatment; substance use assessments; and substance use
treatment and recovery services that are clinically indicated. Because each
condition is on its face related to remediating drug or alcohol problems, it also
cannot be said the conditions “have no relationship to the state’s interest in
reforming and rehabilitating.” (See id. at p. 1358.)
Given the conditions are specific and facially related to a rehabilitative
purpose, Corirossi has failed to demonstrate they unduly infringe on his
liberty interests. (See In re Sheena K., 40 Cal.4th at p. 890 [limitations on
constitutional rights must be closely tailored to purpose of condition to avoid
being unconstitutionally overbroad].) The conditions are not
unconstitutionally overbroad.
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C.
Corirossi’s final argument is a challenge to the conditions on vagueness
grounds. He contends the conditions confer on the probation department
“wide, general, and inadequately limited discretionary authority” to require
him to engage in “unspecified assessment and treatment.” He further argues
that, as written, the conditions do not provide him “adequate notice” of the
“type of assessment and treatment programs” he will be required to
participate in and complete. We discern no vagueness issues.
The touchstone of a void-for-vagueness challenge is the due process
concept of fair warning. (People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494, 500.) The
doctrine prohibits the government from enforcing a provision that “‘forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague’ that people of ‘common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.’” (Ibid.)
Corirossi’s claim is predicated on the assertion that the conditions
inadequately inform him of prohibited or mandated conduct because the
probation department has wide authority to impose some type of unspecified
treatment. But we have already rejected the contention that the conditions,
as written, grant the probation officer authority to decide the conditions of
probation. Instead, the court implicitly concluded the conditions were
appropriate for Corirossi’s rehabilitation. We have also explained the
conditions do not allow “any” type of treatment, therapy, or assessment;
rather, they specify particular programs which the trial court found could
benefit Corirossi and further his rehabilitation. Thus, the conditions, as
written, do not leave Corirossi to speculate as to what types of therapies he
may have to complete. (In re Sheena K., 40 Cal.4th at p. 890 [probation
condition “‘must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is
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required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has
been violated’”].) Corirossi’s constitutional vagueness argument accordingly
does not persuade us.
III.
We affirm.
CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, Acting P. J.
RUBIN, J.
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