Filed 9/23/26 P. v. Copeland CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085239
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(San Diego Super. Ct.
v. No. SCS329485)
ANTHONY DWAYNE COPELAND,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Anthony J. Campagna, Judge. Affirmed.
Belinda Escobosa, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Anthony Dwayne Copeland of multiple offenses arising
from two separate incidents of domestic violence against his then-girlfriend.
The trial court sentenced him to seven years in prison. His appellate counsel
filed a brief stating no arguable issues can be found. (See generally People v.
Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende); Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S.
738 (Anders).) We have independently reviewed the record and agree there
are no reasonably arguable issues. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
One evening in November 2023, Copeland visited his then-girlfriend,
Shawndra W., at her residence. After hours of drinking with her roommates
and friends, Copeland and Shawndra got into a heated argument that turned
physical. Copeland strangled Shawndra and punched her in her face and
body. He threw a “haymaker” punch that struck her in the face. She fell into
a wall with such force that she left a large hole. Two male friends
intervened, and one of them called 911. A responding police officer observed
redness on both sides of Shawndra’s neck and bruising on her wrist. She
reported neck pain, a headache, and dizziness. Copeland left before the
police arrived, but he was eventually found and arrested two months later
Criminal proceedings were initiated against him and the trial court issued a
criminal protective order requiring him to stay away from Shawndra and to
not contact her. He was personally served with a copy of the order in court.
A month later, in February 2024, Copeland and Shawndra were
found riding in her car together. The police had pulled them over because
the light bulb above her license plate was out. Copeland told the officer he
had not received any tickets lately, had not been arrested, and was not on
probation, parole, or under any other supervision.
2
A few months after that, in May 2024, Shawndra was sleeping and
woke up to Copeland yelling at her in her bedroom. She did not know how he
had gotten into the house; he might have entered through an already broken
window. He picked her up by her throat and shoved her into the wall—
creating another hole—and held her there for a few minutes. He then
punched her twice in the face. She fell to the floor and curled up to protect
herself. When he left minutes later, she called the police. The responding
officers saw that Shawndra had significant bleeding coming from her mouth
and nose. She had a laceration inside her lip that required four stitches, a
large hematoma on her hand, and bruising across her body. Copeland was
arrested nearby that same night.
The prosecution filed a consolidated information charging Copeland
with two counts of corporal injury to a dating partner (Pen. Code,1 § 273.5,
subd. (a); counts 1 & 6), two counts of assault by means likely to produce
great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 2 & 7), two counts of
misdemeanor vandalism (§ 594, subd. (b)(2)(A); counts 3 & 8), two counts
of misdemeanor violation of a protective order (§ 166, subd. (c)(1); counts 4
& 9), and one count of first degree residential burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a);
count 5) with an allegation that a nonaccomplice was present during the
offense (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21)). As to counts 5, 6, and 7 (arising from the May
2024 incident), it was alleged that Copeland personally inflicted great bodily
injury under circumstances involving domestic violence (§ 12022.7, subd. (e))
and that he was out on bail at the time of the offenses (§ 12022.1, subd. (b)).
Four aggravating sentencing factors were asserted as well. (Cal. Rules of
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3
Court, rule 4.421(a)(1) & (3), (b)(1) & (2); further undesignated rule
references are to the California Rules of Court.)
Shawndra initially did not want to press charges and was reluctant
to testify at trial. She still had feelings for Copeland. She maintained he
was a wonderful man and blamed herself to an extent for the fighting.
The prosecution offered the testimony of Chula Vista Police Detective
Frederico Dominguez as an expert on domestic violence. Dominguez
explained three concepts relevant to domestic violence generally: (1) the cycle
of abuse, (2) power and control tactics, and (3) victim recantation. The cycle
of abuse involves an incident of harm (threatened, attempted, or actual), a
honeymoon phase, a calm period, and then tension building until another
incident occurs. Power and control tactics include economic abuse, emotional
abuse, isolation, and coercion, among others. And, according to Dominguez,
up to 80 percent of victims recant at some point during their relationship in
order to avoid problems in the relationship and/or because they maintain “a
true, legitimate, emotional attachment to the perpetrator.”
A jury convicted Copeland on all counts except for the residential
burglary (count 5) and found true the great bodily injury allegation.
Copeland waived his right to a jury trial on the aggravating factors and the
on-bail enhancement. In a bifurcated proceeding, he admitted the on-bail
enhancement, that “the offense involved great violence, great bodily harm,
threat of great bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty,
viciousness, or callousness” (rule 4.421(a)(1)), and that he had prior
convictions of increasing seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)). The trial court
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found true that Shawndra was particularly vulnerable (rule 4.421(a)(3)) but
not true that Copeland had engaged in violent conduct (rule 4.421(b)(1)).2
At sentencing, defense counsel advocated for Copeland to be placed
on probation with a referral to Drug Court and execution of sentence
suspended, emphasizing that the root of his violent conduct was alcohol
abuse. The court believed that Copeland was sincerely ready to address his
substance abuse. But he was presumptively ineligible for probation (§ 1203,
subd. (e)(3)) and the court did not consider this to be an unusual case
overcoming that presumption given the facts of this case, his prior
misdemeanor convictions for domestic violence offenses, his polysubstance
abuse, and his housing instability.
At the same time, the court did not consider the maximum
punishment (requested by the prosecution) to be appropriate here. It
ultimately imposed a total determinate term of seven years in prison—three
years (the midterm) for the May 2024 corporal injury offense (count 6), three
years (the low term) for the great bodily injury enhancement on that count,
and one year (one-third the midterm) for the November 2023 corporal injury
offense (count 1). It stayed punishment for the assault offenses, struck
punishment for the on-bail enhancement, and ordered credit for time served
on the misdemeanor offenses.
DISCUSSION
Appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436
and Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738 indicating that she identified no reasonably
arguable issues for reversal on appeal. She asked this court to review the
2 The prosecution had specifically alleged that Copeland engaged in
violent conduct by “inflicting great bodily injury after entering an inhabited
portion of a building with the intent to commit a felony inside ... .”
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record as mandated by Wende, paying particular attention to whether the
court erred in: (1) admitting the deputies’ body worn camera video footage; (2)
allowing the prosecution’s domestic violence expert to testify; (3) instructing
the jury with CALCRIM No. 850; or (4) sentencing Copeland. We offered
Copeland the opportunity to file a supplemental brief on his own behalf and
gave him additional time to do so, but he ultimately did not submit a brief.
Our review of the record as mandated by Wende and Anders has
disclosed no reasonably arguable appellate issues. The court admitted just
one body worn camera video over Copeland’s objection.3 It is from the traffic
stop in February 2024 where Copeland and Shawndra were riding in the car
together. Copeland argued the prosecutor could prove the protective order
violation through the officer’s testimony and perhaps a photo; the video was
more prejudicial than probative insofar as it included his statements to the
officer. The court reasonably admitted the video, finding his evasive
responses as to his arrest history probative of his knowing violation of the
protective order. (See People v. Wall (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1048, 1069 [“A trial
court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for abuse of
discretion, and it will not be disturbed unless there is a showing that the
trial court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or absurd manner resulting in
a miscarriage of justice”].)
3 Copeland initially objected to another body worn camera video that was
taken after the May 2024 assault. It captured Shawndra showing the officer
a video on her cell phone in which Copeland is yelling at her. Copeland
questioned when the cell phone video was taken and objected to its relevance
“particularly if it was not taken on that same day.” At trial, however,
Shawndra confirmed she took the video after Copeland woke her up in
her bedroom and Copeland accordingly withdrew his objection.
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Copeland also moved in limine to exclude the testimony of the
prosecution’s domestic violence expert, Detective Dominguez, asserting that
(1) the prosecutor failed to timely disclose his identity and the nature of his
proposed testimony pursuant to section 1054.1 and (2) Dominguez was not
qualified to testify as a domestic violence expert. As to the first ground, the
prosecutor explained he had disclosed Dominguez’s information a month
earlier, with the caveat that he was looking for a backup expert in case the
detective had a scheduling conflict, which turned out not to be the case. No
prejudice from this timely albeit equivocal disclosure appears in the record.
(See People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 467 [“To prevail on a
claim alleging a violation of discovery statutes, an appellant must show there
is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of
the proceedings would have been different”].)
As to the second ground, Dominguez explained at trial that he worked
in the Family Protection Unit, which investigates cases involving domestic
violence, sexual assault, child abuse, and elder abuse. He had taken more
than 400 hours of training on these subjects—including training on the
dynamics of domestic violence relationships—and had investigated more than
2,500 domestic violence cases in his career. He leads Chula Vista’s domestic
violence response program as well as a multidisciplinary team of
nongovernmental agencies, social service providers, and law enforcement
agencies that collaborate on certain cases. On about 10 prior occasions, he
had testified as an expert on power and control dynamics, the cycle of abuse,
and the recanting phenomenon. This testimony amply supported his
qualifications to testify as an expert. (See People v. Farnam (2002) 28
Cal.4th 107, 162 [“Error regarding a witness’s qualifications as an expert
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will be found only if the evidence shows that the witness ‘ “ ‘clearly lacks
qualification as an expert’ ” ’ ”].)
In light of Detective Dominguez’s testimony, the trial court decided to
instruct the jurors with CALCRIM No. 850. Copeland objected, arguing that
Dominguez had not investigated this particular case and his testimony on
domestic violence in general “require[d] the jury to extrapolate and make a
leap that” was not “necessarily appropriate in this case.” The court properly
overruled the objection as the instruction correctly informed the jurors that
Dominguez’s testimony was not evidence that Copeland committed the
offenses charged. The jury could consider the testimony “only in deciding
whether or not Shawndra [W.]’s conduct was not inconsistent with the
conduct of someone who’s been abused, and in evaluating the believability of
her testimony.” (See People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1088, fn. 5
[“If the prosecution offers [intimate partner battering] evidence, an additional
limiting instruction might also be appropriate on request, given the statutory
prohibition against use of this evidence ‘to prove the occurrence of the act or
acts of abuse which form the basis of the criminal charge’ ”].) As the court
noted, defense counsel was free to argue in closing that Dominguez’s general
description of a relationship involving domestic violence did not apply here.
Finally, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Copeland
probation given his multiple violent attacks on Shawndra and his history of
domestic violence. (See People v. Superior Court (Du) (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th
822, 831 [we review “a trial court’s finding that a case may or may not be
unusual [for] abuse of discretion”].) We otherwise see no legal error in the
sentence, fines, and fees imposed nor in the custody credits awarded.
Competent counsel represented Copeland in this appeal.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
DATO, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
BUCHANAN, J.
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