Filed 7/1/26 P. v. Cooper CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B346552
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA094945)
v.
MARK COOPER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Laura Laesecke, Judge. Affirmed.
Edward H. Schulman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Blythe J. Leszkay, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
Defendant Mark Cooper appeals from an order denying his
petition for resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.6.
Defendant contends the trial court’s oral ruling indicated the
court applied the wrong standard of proof to his petition.
Although we agree the trial court at times misstated the
standard of proof, the court’s analysis demonstrated it applied
the correct standard in concluding defendant was guilty of
murder beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant further appeals from the trial court’s refusal to
issue an order directing the California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to grant him a youth offender parole
hearing under section 3051. Defendant asserts he is eligible for
such a hearing under People v. Briscoe (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th
479 (Briscoe), which held section 3051’s exclusion of certain
offenders sentenced to life without parole (LWOP) for special
circumstance felony murder violates equal protection.
Defendant’s Briscoe challenge is premature. Assuming
arguendo Briscoe applies, defendant has not reached his
eligibility date for a youth offender parole hearing, and thus
CDCR has yet to determine whether defendant is entitled to that
hearing. The trial court correctly denied his premature request.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s orders.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In January 2013, “[defendant] and three unidentified
confederates[ ] entered a home in a mobile home park ostensibly
to purchase a large quantity of marijuana from the head of the
household, Mr. Padilla, living there with his family. Defendant
1 Unspecified statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
2
and two of his confederates were armed with firearms. Padilla’s
son-in-law, Mr. Vidal, and friend, Ms. Loza, were present, and
Padilla’s neighbor, Mr. Gonzalez, entered towards the end of the
events. The outcome of the transaction and the ensuing violence
left Vidal dead at the hand of one of the confederates to whom
defendant gave his gun upon another confederate’s command to
‘shoot.’ Gonzalez also was shot, but he survived, as did Padilla,
another target of the shooting. After the shootings, defendant
and his confederates fled with the marijuana.” (People v. Cooper
(Nov. 28, 2018, B283492) [nonpub. opn.].)
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Conviction and sentence
In March 2017, a jury convicted defendant of first degree
murder with the special circumstance that defendant was
engaged in the commission or attempted commission of robbery
or burglary, two counts of attempted murder, one count of assault
with a firearm, four counts of robbery, and one count of burglary.
The jury found true firearms enhancements on all counts.
The trial court sentenced defendant to life in prison
without the possibility of parole plus 10 years, with an additional
indeterminate term of 14 years to life plus 20 years. The trial
court also sentenced defendant to a determinate term of
26 years 8 months in prison.
On appeal we reversed two of the robbery convictions and
one of the firearm enhancements, but otherwise affirmed the
convictions. We remanded for resentencing. The trial court
again imposed life without the possibility of parole plus 10 years
and 14 years to life plus 20 years, but reduced the determinate
term to 16 years.
3
2. Petition for resentencing
On September 8, 2023, defendant filed a petition for
resentencing under former section 1170.95. The trial court
concluded defendant’s petition stated a prima facie basis for relief
and issued an order to show cause.
Prior to the evidentiary hearing, defendant filed a “Petition
for Youthful Offender Parole Hearing Pursuant to People v.
Franklin, People v. Briscoe, and Pen. Code § 3501.” He attached
a proposed order directing CDCR “to schedule and provide
[defendant] with a Youthful Offender Parole Hearing . . . .”
Defendant testified at the evidentiary hearing, as did a
clinical psychologist opining on how defendant’s youth at the time
he committed his crimes may have affected his behavior. The
trial court admitted into evidence transcripts and defense
exhibits from defendant’s trial, the psychologist’s evaluation of
defendant, and a DNA analysis of the crime scene from June
2014.
The trial court denied the resentencing petition and the
petition for a youthful offender parole hearing. We elaborate on
the court’s reasoning in our Discussion, post.
Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Senate Bill No. 1437 and Section 1172.6
“Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
No. 1437) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) amended sections 188 and 189 of
the Penal Code to ‘eliminate[ ] natural and probable
consequences liability for murder as it applies to aiding and
abetting, and [to] limit[ ] the scope of the felony-murder rule.’
[Citation.]” (People v. Lee (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1173
4
(Lee).) “[U]nder the felony-murder rule as it existed prior to
Senate Bill No. 1437, a defendant who committed a statutorily
enumerated felony such as robbery could be convicted of murder
for a killing during the felony without further examination of
their mental state.” (People v. Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956,
964–965.) After Senate Bill No. 1437, however, “[a] participant
in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of [an enumerated
felony, including robbery] in which a death occurs is liable for
murder only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person
was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual
killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual
killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] [or]
(3) The person was a major participant in the underlying felony
and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described
in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.” (§ 189, subd. (e); see Garcia,
at p. 965.)
Assembly Bill No. 1437 also added former section 1170.95,
now numbered section 1172.6, “which creates a procedure for
convicted murderers who could not be convicted under the law as
amended to retroactively seek relief.” (People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 957.) “If a petitioner makes a prima facie
showing of relief under section 1172.6 — that is, a showing that
the petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter under a theory no longer valid under the amended
Penal Code — the resentencing court must issue an order to show
cause for an evidentiary hearing.” (Lee, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1174.)
At the evidentiary hearing, “the burden of proof shall be on
the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
5
petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under
California law as amended by” Senate Bill No. 1437. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (d)(3).) In determining whether the prosecution has met its
burden, “[t]he trial court acts as an independent fact finder.”
(People v. Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451, 457
(Rodriguez).)
B. The Trial Court Applied the Correct Standard of
Proof When Ruling on Defendant’s Resentencing
Petition
Defendant argues the trial court applied the wrong
standard of proof when evaluating his resentencing petition, as
indicated by the court’s comments when explaining its ruling.
Defendant contends the court’s comments demonstrate the court
did not independently determine defendant was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt under current law, but instead determined
there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude
defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. As we explain,
although some of the trial court’s comments were inartful, the
court’s analysis demonstrated it was acting as an independent
fact finder determining defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.
1. The trial court’s decision
Explaining its decision to deny defendant’s resentencing
petition, the trial court began by stating, “[T]he People have
proven that the defendant can be convicted of both the murder
and the attempted murders beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .” The
court referred to evidence at trial that one of perpetrators yelled
“Shoot,” after which defendant threw his gun to a confederate
who then fired at the victims. The court continued, “[T]hat’s why
6
I feel that the evidence is sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt under an aiding and abetting theory that [defendant] could
be convicted of . . . murder[ ] on that theory alone . . . [,] because
when someone says ‘Shoot’ that is an expressed intent to kill, and
[defendant] tosses the gun to facilitate that act. [¶] So if this
were to go to trial now, I would instruct the jury on first- and
second-degree murder under an aiding and abetting theory, and
that also applies to the attempted murder . . . .”
The court also addressed felony murder, an alternative
theory offered by the prosecution. The court stated, “I don’t find
[defendant’s] testimony here in court to be credible,” explaining
defendant’s testimony conflicted with witness testimony at trial.
The court instead credited the trial testimony of victim Loza,
which the court found “more credible.”
The court then addressed the factors for determining
whether a defendant was a major participant in the underlying
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life (§ 189,
subd. (e)(3)), as set forth in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788
and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522. Discussing the role
defendant “play[ed] in the planning of the criminal enterprise,”
the court summarized evidence from trial, then stated, “[I]n
terms of the planning and the criminal enterprise, I think
[defendant] was part of a plan. He knew how to do [the robbery]
when they went in there, and he is the one who is taking the
phones, putting [the victims] down, starting to put the zip ties on
them.”
Regarding defendant’s supplying or using lethal weapons,
the court noted defendant “brought his own [weapon],” which
“weighs against him in this analysis.” As to awareness of the
dangers posed by the crime, the court stated, “I think anybody
7
that goes inside of a house, a small residence, this is a trailer
park, with guns doing drug deals is aware of the dangerousness.”
The court stated defendant was “present at the scene of the
killing and in a position to facilitate or prevent the actual
murder,” because he “could have not thrown the gun [to the
shooter].” The court continued, “[S]o yes, he was in a position to
prevent this from happening.”
Addressing whether defendant’s actions played a role in the
killing, the court noted defendant provided the shooter with a
gun. The court also summarized the evidence of defendant’s
action after the shooting, noting no one helped the victims.
The court addressed whether the circumstances posed a
grave risk of death, and whether defendant had information
beyond the mere fact his confederates were armed. The court
answered both questions, “Yes.” Discussing defendant’s
proximity to the crime and whether he could have prevented it or
aided the victim, the court stated, “Again, he is right there in the
room,” and noted defendant could have, but did not, leave, call
the police, or hold onto his gun rather than provide it to his
confederate. As to the duration of the offense, the court stated it
was not clear from the trial transcripts, although “it sounded like
things went fairly quickly. But, again, I don’t think that
mitigates the defendant’s participation based on the facts that we
have already gone over.” Regarding whether defendant was
aware a confederate would likely kill, the court stated, “I need to
say no more that when someone yells ‘Shoot’ and you give
somebody a loaded gun, you’re aware.” The court further stated,
“I can’t think of any factors that minimizes [the] violence.”
The court addressed defendant’s “youthfulness” at the time
of the crime, acknowledging he was “under the age of 26.” The
8
court stated, “[I]n terms of listening to his testimony, he had a
level of sophistication at that time” based on previous “very large
transactions for marijuana” in which defendant was armed. “So
this was not a rash or impulsive action by the defendant.”
Rather, “[t]his sounds like somebody who . . . has established a
relationship . . . to do these types of crimes.” “This was a very
concerted effort or decision to buy the marijuana in a large
quantity from these individuals and [it] sounded like to me, in
terms of the transcript testimony, to rob them . . . . It seemed
like to me they had a plan to go in and do that, in terms of taking
the marijuana if they could do so. [¶] And I don’t see that there
is anything youthful about [defendant’s] conduct that would tell
me that he did not understand the consequences of his actions.”
The court noted after the crime defendant “wasn’t panicking. He
wasn’t upset. It sounds like he just drove away.”
The court stated, “So with all of those things in mind, I find
that [defendant] is a major participant in the underlying felony.
That he acted with reckless disregard, and that the
youthfulness . . . is not a significant factor that mitigates him
being culpable under the felony murder standard even as it is
today.”
The court concluded, “So under both direct aiding and
abetting and felony murder standard, I believe that [defendant]
could be convicted by a jury of his peers beyond a reasonable
doubt based on the evidence and testimony in this case.”
2. Analysis
Defendant identifies the following statements by the trial
court as evidence the court applied the wrong standard (with
emphasis added):
9
“[T]he court finds that the People have proven that the
defendant can be convicted of both the murder and the attempted
murders beyond a reasonable doubt.”
“[T]hat’s why I feel that the evidence is sufficient to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt under an aiding and abetting theory
that [defendant] could be convicted . . . on that theory alone.”
“So under both direct aiding and abetting and felony
murder standard, I believe that [defendant] could be convicted by
a jury of his peers beyond a reasonable doubt based on the
evidence and testimony in this case.”
Defendant is correct that these statements are not a proper
articulation of the standard of proof under section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3). That subdivision requires the trial court to
determine not whether a defendant could be found guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt — that is, whether the evidence is sufficient
to support a conviction — but whether the defendant “is guilty”
beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the trial court’s independent
assessment of the evidence. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3), italics added;
see Rodriguez, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 457.)
The trial court’s actual analysis, however, is consistent
with the proper standard of proof. The court expressly made
credibility findings, specifically that defendant’s hearing
testimony was not credible, whereas victim Loza’s trial testimony
was. Credibility is the exclusive province of the finder of fact,
and not an appropriate consideration when reviewing merely for
sufficiency of the evidence. (See People v. Penunuri (2018)
5 Cal.5th 126, 142.) In making a credibility determination,
therefore, the trial court necessarily was acting as the finder of
fact.
10
When discussing the Banks and Clark factors, the trial
court at no point referred to the sufficiency of the evidence, or
what conclusions the evidence could support, but rather weighed
the evidence and made its own findings. This is demonstrated by
the following examples:
“I think [defendant] was part of a plan.”
“Defendant “brought his own [weapon],” which “weighs
against him in this analysis.”
Defendant was “present at the scene of the killing and in a
position to facilitate or prevent the actual murder,” because he
“could have not thrown the gun [to the shooter].” “[S]o yes, he
was in a position to prevent this from happening.”
Addressing whether the circumstances posed a grave risk
of death, and whether defendant had information beyond the
mere fact his confederates were armed, the court answered,
“Yes.”
“[Defendant was] right there in the room.”
Although “[the crime transpired] fairly quickly,” “I don’t
think that mitigates the defendant’s participation . . . .”
Regarding whether defendant was aware a confederate
would likely kill, “I need to say no more that when someone yells
‘Shoot’ and you give somebody a loaded gun, you’re aware.”
“I can’t think of any factors that minimizes [the] violence.”
“[T]his was not a rash or impulsive action by the
defendant.”
“I don’t see that there is anything youthful about
[defendant’s] conduct that would tell me that he did not
understand the consequences of his actions.”
In addition to these examples, the trial court concluded its
discussion of the Banks and Clark factors with express findings:
11
“I find that [defendant] is a major participant in the underlying
felony. That he acted with reckless disregard, and that the
youthfulness . . . is not a significant factor that mitigates him
being culpable under the felony murder standard even as it is
today.”
As with the trial court’s credibility findings, these
statements are consistent with independent fact-finding, not
review for sufficiency of the evidence. Again, the court was not
stating what the evidence could demonstrate, but what it did
demonstrate. The court did not find a jury could conclude
defendant was a major participant acting with reckless disregard;
instead, the court stated, “I find” defendant was a major
participant acting with reckless disregard. (Italics added.)
We recognize that immediately after stating these findings,
the trial court stated, “I believe that [defendant] could be
convicted by a jury of his peers beyond a reasonable doubt based
on the evidence and testimony in this case.” This incorrect
articulation of the standard of proof does not undermine the trial
court’s detailed analysis demonstrating application of the proper
standard of proof. Put another way, any error in stating the
standard of proof was harmless because the court’s analysis
applied the correct standard.
That said, we urge trial courts to take care in articulating
the standard of proof under section 1172.6 to avoid challenges
like this in the future.
C. The Trial Court Properly Denied Defendant’s
Request for a Youth Offender Parole Hearing
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his
requested order that CDCR grant him a youth offender parole
12
hearing. Defendant’s request was premature, and the court
properly denied it.
1. Youth offender parole hearings and Briscoe
As a general matter, prisoners who committed their
controlling offenses at the age of 25 years or younger are entitled,
after a designated period of incarceration, to a “youth offender
parole hearing.” (§ 3051, subd. (a)(1).) That hearing is held after
15, 20, or 25 years of incarceration, depending on the length of
the prisoner’s sentence. (Id., subd. (b)(1)–(4).)
The rule is different for prisoners sentenced to life without
the possibility of parole. Those prisoners are eligible for a youth
offender parole hearing only if they committed their controlling
offenses before they turned 18. (§ 3051, subds. (a)(1), (b)(4).)
Those hearings take place after 25 years of incarceration. (Id.,
subd. (b)(4).) LWOP prisoners who committed their controlling
offense after they turned 18 are statutorily ineligible for a youth
offender parole hearing. (Id., subd. (h).)
In People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, our Supreme
Court observed that youth offender parole hearings happen long
after commission of the controlling offense, at which point
“memories have faded, records may have been lost or destroyed,
or family or community members may have relocated or passed
away.” (Id. at pp. 283–284.) To preserve evidence “regarding the
juvenile offender’s characteristics and circumstances at the time
of the offense” (id. at p. 283), our high court held that a defendant
may request a hearing in the trial court at which the defendant
“may place on the record any documents, evaluations, or
testimony (subject to cross-examination) that may be relevant at
his eventual youth offender parole hearing” (id. at p. 284).
13
In Briscoe, a prisoner serving an LWOP sentence for
murder filed a motion for a Franklin evidence preservation
proceeding and a youth offender parole hearing. (Briscoe, supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at p. 486.) The prisoner acknowledged he had
committed his controlling offense at age 21, and thus was
ineligible under section 3051, but argued that statute’s exclusion
of LWOP prisoners violated the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection. (Briscoe, at p. 486.) The trial court denied the
motion. (Ibid.)
The Court of Appeal reversed, holding section 3051 violates
equal protection as applied to a defendant sentenced to LWOP
under section 190.2, subdivision (d), as was the prisoner in that
case. (Briscoe, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 485.) Section 190.2,
subdivision (d) permits a court to impose an LWOP sentence
when a defendant, although “not the actual killer,” “with reckless
indifference to human life and as a major participant, aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists in the
commission of [an enumerated felony] which results in the death
of some person or persons.” (§ 190.2, subd. (d).)
The Briscoe court determined that, following Senate Bill
No. 1437, the elements of section 190.2, subdivision (d) were
identical to the elements of felony murder under section 189,
subdivision (e)(3). (Briscoe, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 491.)
The court concluded section 3051 therefore “violates equal
protection by excluding youth offenders sentenced for special
circumstance murder under section 190.2, subdivision (d) . . .
while including those convicted of nonspecial circumstance first
degree felony murder for the same specified felony offenses per
the exact same standard under section 189, subdivision (e)(3).”
(Briscoe, at p. 485.) The court therefore “reform[ed]” section 3051
14
“to include youth offenders like Briscoe who were sentenced to
life without parole under section 190.2, subdivision (d) for murder
during a robbery or burglary.” (Briscoe, at p. 496.)
In its disposition, the appellate court remanded with
directions “to schedule and conduct” a Franklin proceeding and
youth offender parole hearing “and any related proceedings for
which a need arises.” (Briscoe, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 495–496.)
2. Additional background
As noted in our Procedural Background, defendant filed a
“Petition for Youthful Offender Parole Hearing Pursuant to
People v. Franklin, People v. Briscoe, and Pen. Code § 3501,” and
attached a proposed order directing CDCR to schedule and
provide that hearing. In his petition, defendant argued Briscoe
extended section 3051 to “non-killer youthful offenders who were
convicted of murder on a robbery/burglary felony-murder theory,”
a circumstance defendant contended applied to him. Defendant’s
petition did not request a Franklin hearing, citing Franklin only
for the proposition that section 3051 grants youthful offenders
the right to a youth offender parole hearing.
The trial court addressed defendant’s petition at the end of
the section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing. The court stated it had
never had to sign an order directing CDCR to provide a section
3051 hearing, and believed “[t]hat is a decision for the parole
board.” The court noted defendant had yet to serve 15 years,
apparently referring to the minimum incarceration period before
CDCR must provide a section 3051 hearing. The court stated the
15
proposed order made it seem as if the court were ordering the
hearing now, and the court would not make such an order.2
Defendant’s counsel argued under Briscoe, “[T]he court has
to sign the order.” The trial court paused the proceedings to read
Briscoe. Going back on the record, the court stated defendant
was entitled to a Frankin evidence preservation proceeding,
“[b]ut I’m not comfortable signing an order that he is eligible for a
youthful offender parole hearing at this point.” The court
continued, “I’m not disagreeing that [section] 3051 applies, but I
don’t think it’s appropriate for me to sign an order for a youthful
offender parole hearing.”
The trial court reiterated it would grant a Franklin
evidence preservation hearing, and assumed defendant was
requesting one. Defendant’s counsel responded, “No. What I’m
asking for is the court to order CDCR to schedule a youthful
offender parole hearing pursuant to [section] 3051.” The court
offered again to provide a Franklin hearing, an offer to which
counsel did not respond except to repeat its request for a ruling
on the petition for a youth offender parole hearing. The court
then ruled, “I’m denying it if you’re asking me to just rule under
Briscoe.”
3. Analysis
Defendant argues under Briscoe his LWOP sentence for the
robbery/burglary special circumstance does not bar him from a
youth offender parole hearing, and the trial court should have
2 The court referred to the hearing requested by defendant
as a “Franklin hearing.” In context it is clear the court meant a
youth offender parole hearing, not an evidence preservation
proceeding.
16
ordered that hearing as did the Court of Appeal in Briscoe. The
Attorney General argues Briscoe was wrongly decided, and even
if it were not, defendant’s circumstances are distinguishable.
These issues are not yet ripe for decision.3 (Alliance
San Diego v. California Taxpayers Action Network (2025)
114 Cal.App.5th 1121, 1135 [the ripeness doctrine “prevent[s]
courts from issuing purely advisory opinions or resolving abstract
differences of opinion”].) We agree with the trial court that,
assuming arguendo Briscoe applies to defendant, he nonetheless
has not reached his eligibility date for a section 3051 hearing,
and therefore his request for that hearing is premature.4 We
do not know at this point if CDCR would grant or deny that
hearing in light of Briscoe or other authority. Put another way,
defendant has yet to suffer an injury for which the court may
provide a remedy. There was nothing the trial court could do for
him, and therefore no action by the trial court for us to review.
We recognize that in Briscoe the Court of Appeal remanded
with directions to schedule and conduct a Franklin
proceeding and section 3051 parole hearing. (Briscoe, supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at pp. 495–496.) In that case, however, the trial
court denied the defendant a Franklin hearing because of his
statutory ineligibility under section 3051. (Briscoe, at p. 486.)
That denial put the constitutionality of section 3051 front and
center, and served as an adverse ruling the Court of Appeal could
review.
3 We invited supplemental briefing on the ripeness
question.
4 Having committed his crimes in January 2013, defendant
has at most been incarcerated 13 years as of the date of this
opinion.
17
Here, in contrast, the trial court did not deny a requested
Franklin hearing, but offered to order such a hearing, an offer
defendant’s counsel declined. Further, unlike the trial court in
Briscoe, the trial court in the instant case stated it was “not
disagreeing that [section] 3051 applies” to defendant. Thus, the
adverse trial court ruling present in Briscoe is absent here.
In the absence of a denial of a Franklin hearing or other
adverse ruling based on a finding the defendant is ineligible
under section 3051, a preemptive order directing the parole board
to hold a hearing is akin to an advisory opinion. Further,
motions for those preemptive orders burden the courts with
determinations that may prove unnecessary — much may
transpire between now and the time when defendant arguably
becomes eligible for a parole hearing that could affect his
entitlement to that hearing.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J. M. KIM, J.
18