Filed 7/8/26 P. v. Contreras CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D086165
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. Nos. RIF2200365,
RIF2100573, RIF2205377,
v. RIM2200393, RIM2202026
EDWARD CONTRERAS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Jennifer Gerard, Judge. Affirmed.
Sheila O’Connor, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha
Cortina and Genevieve Herbert, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Edward Contreras pled guilty to kidnapping, second-degree burglary,
identity theft, and two counts of petty theft. He also admitted certain
enhancements. The trial judge sentenced Contreras to 12 years in prison.
On appeal, Contreras argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying
his motion for a continuance on the day of sentencing so he could explore
withdrawing his guilty pleas. Finding no error, we affirm.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Between 2020 and 2022, the People charged Contreras with six felonies
and four misdemeanors in five separate cases. Because Contreras had prior
strike offenses, he faced a potential sentence for all cases combined of roughly
34 years to life. Contreras initially pled not guilty in each case.
An extended pre-trial period ensued, during which Contreras made
three Marsden1 motions to relieve his court-appointed counsel and obtained
at least five continuances. At various points during this time, Contreras also
retained three different attorneys to represent him.
On September 10, 2024, Contreras, represented by retained counsel,
entered guilty pleas in all five cases. In case No. RIF2200365, Contreras pled
guilty to kidnapping (Pen. Code § 207, subd. (a))2 and admitted to a strike
prior (§§ 667, subds. (c) & (e); 1170.12, subd. (c)), and an out-on-bail
enhancement (§ 12022.1). In case No. RIF2100573, Contreras pled guilty to
second-degree burglary (§ 459). And, in case Nos. RIF2205377, RIM2200393,
and RIM2202026, Contreras pled guilty, respectively, to identity theft
(§ 530.5, subd. (a)) and two petty theft counts (§ 488).
The court scheduled sentencing for September 25, 2024. On that date,
at the request of the defense, the court continued sentencing to
1 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.
2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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December 6, 2024. When the December hearing arrived, the court continued
sentencing to February 28, 2025, again at the defense’s request. Contreras,
who was present at both hearings, personally confirmed that the new
sentencing dates were either “timely” or “fine.”
At the February hearing, Contreras, through yet a different counsel,
sought removal of his attorney. Contreras personally confirmed that desire,
and the trial court appointed counsel who had asked for removal on
Contreras’s behalf. The court then inquired whether defense counsel wanted
to put anything on the record before sentencing. Counsel responded, “I would
like to put on the record that Mr. Contreras’[s] request from the Court is to
withdraw his plea. With that, the conflict panel would need time to prepare
that motion” and “there are various issues that he believes would be founded
a motion to withdraw [sic].”
The trial court denied Contreras’s request. It found “good cause” did
not exist “to prevent the sentencing from occurring at this time,” noting
Contreras’s case had been “set over several times.”
The trial court sentenced Contreras to 12 years in prison for
kidnapping, to run concurrently with a three-year term for second-degree
burglary, nine days for identity theft, and time served for the petty thefts.
III. DISCUSSION
Contreras argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying his
request to continue sentencing so he could prepare a motion to withdraw his
guilty pleas, thereby depriving him of due process and effective assistance of
counsel. In response, the People contend Contreras failed to show good cause
for a continuance. We agree with the People.
In a criminal case, a continuance may only be granted upon a showing
of “good cause.” (§ 1050, subd. (e).) A trial court has wide discretion in
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determining whether good cause exists. (People v. Beames (2007)
40 Cal.4th 907, 920 (Beames).) In making that determination, trial courts
consider “ ‘ “ ‘not only the benefit which the moving party anticipates but also
the likelihood that such benefit will result, the burden on other witnesses,
jurors and the court and, above all, whether substantial justice will be
accomplished or defeated by a granting of the motion.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Doolin
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 450 (Doolin).) A showing of good cause also requires
that both counsel and the defendant have acted with due diligence (People v.
Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1037 (Jenkins)), but the trial court may not
exercise its discretion “ ‘so as to deprive the defendant or his attorney of a
reasonable opportunity to prepare.’ ” (Doolin, at p. 450.)
We review a court’s decision on a motion for a continuance for an abuse
of discretion. “ ‘There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a
continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer must be
found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons
presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied.’ ” (People v.
Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, 1118 (Mungia).) A trial court’s “discretion is
abused only when the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all circumstances
being considered.” (Beames, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 920.) “In the absence of a
showing of an abuse of discretion and prejudice to the defendant, a denial of
his or her motion for a continuance does not require reversal.” (People v.
Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 840; accord Beames, at p. 920 [“[A]n order
denying a continuance is seldom successfully attacked.”].)
Here, Contreras did not explain to the trial court, and fails to explain to
us, why he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty pleas. “ ‘[M]istake,
ignorance, fraud, duress or any other factor that overcomes the exercise of
free judgment’ ” constitute good cause to withdraw a guilty plea. (People v.
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Dillard (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 657, 665.) But “[a] plea may not be withdrawn
simply because a defendant has changed his or her mind.” (Ibid.) Although
counsel stated Contreras had “various issues” on which a motion to withdraw
would be “founded,” counsel did not expound upon these ”issues,” let alone
explain what evidence he anticipated would support the motion. Such a
general assertion based on vague promises of evidence to support a plea
withdrawal falls short of demonstrating that a continuance would affect the
outcome of the proceedings to Contreras’s benefit. (See Jenkins, supra,
22 Cal.4th at p. 1038 [no abuse of discretion in denying continuance when
defendant had not demonstrated continuance would be useful in producing
specific relevant mitigating evidence]; Mungia, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1118
[“In reviewing the decision to deny a continuance, ‘[o]ne factor to consider is
whether a continuance would be useful.’ ”].)
Moreover, without such explanation, there is no basis to conclude that
Contreras and his counsel were reasonably diligent with respect to the
proposed motion. Once Contreras pled guilty, the court continued his
sentencing hearing twice at the request of the defense, delaying the hearing
from September 2024 to February 2025. In the five months between his pleas
and the final sentencing hearing neither Contreras, who was present at the
first two sentencing hearings, nor his counsel, advised the court of his wish to
withdraw his pleas. Instead, Contreras merely affirmed at each hearing,
when the trial court inquired whether the new sentencing dates were “fine”
or “timely,” that continuing sentencing to the later dates was acceptable.
In seeking a continuance to set aside Contreras’s pleas, counsel provided no
justification for the five-month delay in requesting yet another continuance to
file a motion seeking to set aside the plea. (See People v. Jeffers (1987)
188 Cal.App.3d 840, 850 [“[L]ateness of the request [for continuance] may be
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a significant factor justifying denial absent compelling circumstances to the
contrary”].)
In sum, under our deferential standard of review and considering all
the circumstances and reasons provided to the trial court, its decision to deny
the continuance was within the bounds of reason. Contreras did not show he
acted with diligence, did not provide compelling justification for the apparent
delay in bringing up his desire to withdraw his plea, and did not show any
expected benefit if the court were to grant the continuance. (See Doolin,
supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 450.) On these facts, the trial court’s finding that good
cause was lacking, given sentencing had been “set over several times” was
neither arbitrary nor irrational. We see no abuse of discretion.3
Contreras argues because counsel was appointed on the day of
sentencing, counsel had “very little time to meet with, consult and be advised
by Contreras.”
While it is true “the trial court may not exercise its discretion ‘so as to
deprive the defendant or his attorney of a reasonable opportunity to
prepare’ ” (Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 450), the court’s denial of the
continuance here does not support such a claim of error. First, we observe
that at the sentencing hearing, defense counsel neither asserted, nor refused
to proceed on the basis that he was unprepared to represent Contreras.
3 We note that the trial court stated in its denial of the continuance,
“I know that I’ve now relieved Ms. Bond as counsel of record, but you
certainly can file your motion while you’re in state prison. There’s law
libraries up there, and there’s assistance you can seek at that time . . . .” It is
unclear to us what this remark means since from prison the only avenues to
challenge the guilty pleas would be an appeal, like the instant one, or a writ
petition, but not a motion. Nonetheless, as we explained, the court’s finding
that no good cause existed to continue the sentencing hearing was well
supported by the record before it.
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Second, counsel sought to withdraw Contreras’s plea stating it was
Contreras’s request to do so. This demonstrates to us that counsel had
sufficient time before the sentencing hearing to discuss issues with
Contreras, and counsel was prepared to represent Contreras. No reasonable
inference can be drawn from this record that counsel was unprepared.
Accordingly, we cannot conclude Contreras suffered a denial of due process or
was deprived of adequate counsel by reason of the court’s refusal to grant a
continuance.4
Contreras also discusses numerous cases in which reviewing courts
found a trial court abused its discretion by denying a continuance when
counsel was unprepared or unavailable. But none of those cases are like the
facts before us which include: a dilatory request for a continuance, without a
justifiable excuse for the five-month delay in bringing the underlying motion,
with no indication counsel was unprepared, and no showing of a beneficial
outcome. (See People v. Seigler (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 596, 610–618 [trial
court erred by denying motion for continuance made on first day of trial, for
time to file a mental health diversion request, when counsel was not prepared
for trial, record supported the defendant suffered from mental health issues,
and anticipated benefits of obtaining mental health diversion were
“potentially enormous”]; People v. Fontana (1982) 139 Cal.App.3d 326,
4 Contreras, for the first time on appeal, claims counsel was “cut[] off”
from gathering evidence of mitigating circumstances for a possible reduction
in sentence. This claim is forfeited. (See People v. Stowell (2003)
31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114 [“ ‘[Generally,] an appellate court will not consider
claims of error that could have been—but were not—raised in the trial
court’ ”].) In any case, Contreras provides no reason why such evidence could
not have been collected in the five months after entering his pleas.
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332–334 [trial court erred by denying continuance made at probation
revocation hearing for additional time to prepare, when counsel admitted he
was not ready to proceed, provided reasons why, and listed tasks necessary to
be prepare]; Oliveros v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1389,
1400 [in a civil case, trial court erred by denying continuance where
unavailability of trial counsel was not self-inflicted].) Therefore, the cases
cited by Contreras are unpersuasive given the situation before the trial court
here.
But even were we to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion
by denying the continuance, Contreras has not demonstrated prejudice under
either the Watson or Chapman standard. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d
818; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.) The record before us
indicates that Contreras’s pleas were voluntarily made. At the plea hearing,
Contreras confirmed defense counsel went through each of the plea forms
with him, he understood the contents, and he had no questions. The court’s
minute order similarly reflects Contreras knew and understood his
constitutional rights, the nature of the charges, and the consequences of the
plea. Contreras also executed plea forms and imprinted his initials next to
the terms stating, “No one has made any threats to me or anyone close to me,
or placed any pressure of any kind on me in order to make me plead guilty”
and “I have had adequate time to discuss with my attorney (1) my
constitutional rights, (2) the consequences of any guilty plea . . . and (3) any
defenses I may have to charges against me.” Thus, there is no indication
Contreras would have prevailed on a motion to withdraw his pleas. For these
reasons, even if the court erred by denying the motion for continuance,
Contreras has not demonstrated he suffered any prejudice.
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IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
RUBIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
DATO, J.
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